The European Commission requested ISSAT’s support in the design and delivery of a two-day workshop on Security Sector Reform, in view of building EU capacity to support the design and delivery of SSR programmes.
The objectives of the two-day workshop were as follows:
The workshop targeted middle and senior-management level representatives from the European Commission (DG DEV, RELEX, AIDCO, ECHO, etc) the EU Council Secretariat (DG8, DG9, CPCC, etc), Parliament.
The thematic unit for governance, security, human rights and gender (E4) at AIDCO planned to conduct a review on EC support within the justice sector. This review was based on the study "Support for Judicial Reform in ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) Countries" which was finalized this year. The reference group commented on the current review focusing on ACP countries and gave advice on the writing and method of the new review. Target audience was the EC E4 thematic unit and other people or organisations taking part in the reference group. ISSAT’s role was to participate in a reference group for a review on the EC support within the justice sector. The reference group met twice, at the beginning of the process to discuss the inception report and at the end in a restitution workshop. The first meeting was planned for the 2nd of February 2011 and the second meeting in August.
The EC commissioned an evaluation by external consultants of its support to justice and security system reform over the period 2001-2009, covering aid programming and implementation. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess to what extent Commission assistance had been relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable in providing the expected impacts in Justice and Security System Reform. The results of the evaluation were to be used by DGs DEV, Relex, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and the EU Delegations to support policy decision-making and project management purposes.
The EC Evaluation Unit, which commissioned the evaluation, requested periodic advisory support from ISSAT. The Evaluation Unit forms part of the Evaluation Reference Group, which comprises representatives from the main relevant services from the Commission (including AIDCO, RELEX, and JLS). It is responsible for reviewing and approving the approach, detailed methodology and the inception, desk and final reports from the external consultants undertaking the evaluation.
The European Commisison provided an increasing level of support to Justice and Security Sector Reform through EU Delegations worldwide. In order to increase the capacity of its staff, the Commission, through DG EuropeAid (unit E4), requested the support of ISSAT in facilitating and contributing to a workshop for EU staff working on Justice and Security Sector Reform.
The target audience was mainly composed of EU Delegations staff managing JSSR programmes in country.
ISSAT’s role was to :
The paper sets out principles and norms for the European Community’s engagement in SSR, based on current support in different countries and regional settings, the relevant policy frameworks under which the EC supports SSR, and the rationale for
SSR as an important part of Community support. In this way the policy framework will help to ensure more coordinated and strategic approaches to Community activities falling under the different policy instruments, recognising that SSR needs to be treated as a cross-cutting issue, spanning the various strands of EC external assistance. In addition, the concept seeks to define the Community’s role in the wider framework of EU external action in the area of SSR in order to ensure complementarity between EC activities and those undertaken by the EU as part of CFSP/ESDP and by Member States bilaterally. The aim is that this concept and the EU Concept for ESDP support for Security Sector Reform (SSR), which was agreed under the UK Presidency, will complement each other and be joined within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR.
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The European security strategy was drawn up under the authority of the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council of 12 and 13 December 2003. It identifies the global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union and clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with them, such as building security in the EU's neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. It also assesses the policy implications that these objectives have for Europe.
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The fight against illegal arms transfers requires regulation and an effective monitoring of arms brokers. Their business primarily consists of facilitating and arranging transactions in exchange for compensation or material recompense. Indeed some of them manage to circumvent existing controls by exploiting different national regulations or conducting their activities from countries where controls are weak or non-existent.
In 2003 the EU member states took an important initiative by setting a harmonized system of control of arms brokers. With the adoption of a European Common Position they introduced controls on brokering activities taking place on their territories. Yet, six years later, all EU member states still have no legislation on arms brokering, while others need to adapt their national legislation to EU standards. Furthermore this European instrument reflects minimum standards which currently appear insufficient to effectively fight against ill disposed brokers.
This report reviews the extent to which EU member states implement the Common Position on arms brokering and suggests some improvements for a better control on brokering activities and an effective fight against illegal arms transfers. One section of the report also considers a major gap in the national regulations: extraterritorial controls on brokering activities. Finally, the report presents the case study of the Belgian legislation on arms brokering.
SSR activities are key for stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states through their emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance. The EU has engaged in aspects of SSR for the past decade through its CFSP/CSDP as well as development and enlargement policies. The recently launched CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa take place in a new institutional context, and address European security concerns in a fragile but geopolitically important region. The EU’s engagement with SSR in general and the Horn of Africa in particular shows the difficulties in simultaneously pursuing dual objectives of stability and institution-building and in adopting and coordinating long-and short-term approaches to the problems facing the region. To do justice to the holistic conception of SSR and its emphasis on accountability and democratic oversight, the training of security forces and capacity building needs to be framed in a long-term approach that aims for sustainable structural change. The creation of the EEAS has given the EU the right tools – but a continued emphasis on policy coordination is necessary to address old and new, institutional and operational, challenges so as to attain a comprehensive approach to SSR. The input and continued commitment of member states to CSDP also remains vital
One of the key weaknesses in controls on the international arms trade is the absence or penury of national regulations on arms brokering activities. At present, only about sixteen countries in the world are known to control the activities of those negotiating, arranging or otherwise facilitating arms transfers between buyers and sellers. Moreover, unscrupulous brokers have demonstrated their ability to circumvent existing controls by exploiting differences in national approaches, or by simply conducting their activities from another country with lax or no controls at all. This weak link in arms control allows unscrupulous brokers to engage with impunity in undesirable or illicit activities such as arranging arms transfers to embargoed governments or non-state actors.
An important regional initiative to counter this phenomenon is the EU Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering. Under this instrument, EU member states have committed themselves to establishing a clear legal framework for brokering activities taking place within their territory. By creating common standards, the EU Common Position thus represents a significant step forward. However, there remain concerns that these standards still fall short of what is required to effectively combat undesirable or illicit brokering activities.
The first part of this report identifies key issues in this respect and suggests concrete measures governments should consider when deciding on what controls they deem appropriate. The second part of this report presents an overview of already existing or planned brokering controls in certain EU member states. The report concludes that despite the progress presented by the EU Common Position, there are still shortcomings regarding the controls that would seem necessary for effectively combating unscrupulous brokers and their activities. Where appropriate, governments of EU member states should therefore individually be encouraged to ensure that their national approach fully addresses arms brokering. This would also facilitate possible future efforts on the level of the EU to further strengthen common commitments. In turn, such further efforts to counter undesirable brokering will be required to strengthen member states’ abilities to combat and prevent illicit arms transfers.
The 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2005 European Consensus on Development acknowledge that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. These Council Conclusions re-affirm the nexus between development and assert that security should
inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action, whilst recognising that the responsibilities and roles of development and security actors are complementary but remain specific.
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These council conclusions reviews the policy framework put in place to implement a coordinated and comprehensive EU-wide policy framework, acknowledges the work done during the Finnish presidency with the Commission to develop this framework and exhorts future presidencies and the Commission to continue developing and operationalizing the framework.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform in partner countries. The EU has a broad range of civilian and military instruments which are able to support SSR activities. A case-by-case analysis will always need to be undertaken to assess whether any proposed activities are most appropriately carried out through CFSP/ESDP or Community action or indeed a combination of both. This concept is deliberately broad in order not to constrain future CFSP/ESDP or Community activities but in any situation, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission will need to work in close co-operation both to ensure a clear, functional division of responsibilities and to ensure maximum coherence and effectiveness of overall EU effort.
Over the past decade or so, the EU has gradually adopted the concept of ‘human security’ in its support for security andjustice programming. A commitment to human security implies that security and justice strategies and programmesshould proactively seek to take into account and address citizens’ needs and concerns, as primary recipients ofsecurity and justice provision. One way to ensure these requirements are met is to promote public participation in thedesign, implementation and monitoring of security and justice mechanisms.The EU has a number of policies, tools and frameworks which commit its institutions to taking a ‘participatoryapproach’ to programming, including in the areas of security and justice. These commitments are gradually, ifunevenly, being translated into practice. However, research by the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) Security Clusterhas identified a number of institutional, cultural and operational challenges which hinder the understanding anduse of participatory approaches by EU institutions. This paper gives an overview of the challenges faced by EUactors in understanding and using participatory approaches and suggests steps that EU institutions can take to overcome them.
This paper examines the efforts of the European Union to advance Security Sector Reform and to bridge the gap with the Judiciary Sector Reform and the rule of law in the Occupies Palestinian Territories. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the EU engaged actively in the state-building project in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by taking a number of initiatives in situ . Security has been a key issue in all Israeli-Palestinian agreements concluded during the post-1993 Oslo interim period up to 1999 and then, with the resumption of the Palestinian intifada in 2000, security became primordial to all internationally-sponsored diplomatic initiatives and peace plans. The article analyses the EU initiatives undertaken to help the Palestinian Authority reform its security and judiciary sectors, and argues that while the European Union has, in theory, supported the rule of law perspective in Palestinian Security Sector Reform, in reality it has not paid much attention to improving democratic civilian oversight and accountability.
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The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on our core values.
This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It examines how the European Union has fared in practice, and what is to be done to improve implementation.
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This study focuses on EU support to SSR in the form of CSDP missions, analysing recent developments in the EU's internal set-up, capacities and training arrangements for mission personnel. It is based on interviews with mission personnel, Brussels-based officials and secondary sources.
There have been considerable developments in security-policy thinking since the end of the Cold War, and a complex set of transnational threatsand challenges necessitates new security policies and strategies. Not only the attacks of 11 September 2001, but also the dark side of globalisation such as climate change, the global spread of dangerous technologies and international organised crime have changed the security perspective and policy procedures in recent years. Consequently, new
national-security strategies, white papers and security-policy documents have been drafted in order to take into account the changing security landscape.
On 6 April 2009, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) welcomed a group of leading security experts for a seminar entitled “Security Strategies Today : Trends and Perspectives”. The goal of the seminar was to provide a forum for experts from different European states, major international powers and regional and international organisations to take stock of current security polices in the European region and beyond. The participants had an opportunity to assess the direction of security-policy thinking by analysing a number of key security-policy documents such as national-security strategies, defence concepts and white papers, among others. Assumptions regarding future threats were considered, as were a variety of drafting processes and methodologies.
More than 30 participants attended the seminar, including representatives of the Defence Ministries of Finland, Germany and Sweden, as well as representatives of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to faculty members from the GCSP, regional and international experts from a range of academic and policy institutions participated, including speakers from PricewaterhouseCoopers, the International Affairs Institute (Rome), the Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing), the Royal Institute of International Relations (Brussels) and the Foundation for Strategic Studies (Paris).
This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights.To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.
This policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia andin what context these possible activities should be viewed. The main focus will be on direct engagement on security topics such as the EU Border Management project BOMCA.
However, indirect activities such as education programmes that might be beneficial to security and stability in Central Asia will not be ignored. After an exposé on EU security interests in Central Asia, in the second paragraph attention is devoted to national and regional threats to the security of Central Asian republics and engagement of the EU. The paper concludes with a few recommendations for EU institutions and member
states that could help to strengthen EU–Central Asia security cooperation including aspects of Security Sector Reform.
This evaluation was commissioned by the Joint Evaluation Unit in DG DEVCO on behalf of the European Commission. It provides an independent assessment of the Commission’s past support to Justice and Security System Reform (JSSR), and makes recommendations with a view to improving current and future Commission strategies and programmes. The evaluation covers the period 2001-2009 and all regions where the Commission provides JSSR assistance, with the exception of those countries that
fall under the mandate of DG Enlargement. Only those aspects of justice reform which mostly directly fall under Security System Reform, such as strengthening of criminal justice systems and the legal institutions involved in the oversight of security institutions, are considered. The evaluation covers all funds provided by the Commission geographical programmes (EDF, ENPI, DCI) and the thematic budget lines (such as the IfS, EIDHR, NSA), with the exception of humanitarian funds managed by ECHO. This represents a total of €1bn of funds contracted over the evaluation period. An inventory and typology of these funds is presented in Annex 9 of this report.
This collection of essays is divided in two parts. In the first part, security is considered from a theoretical angle, as a phenomenon that has become an integral part of modern society and inevitably interacts with law in many ways. The aim of the authors’ analyses is to emphasise the ambiguity of the notion of security and its tendency to expand and affect simultaneously different fields of law.
Depending on the adopted approach, security can be understood in many different terms and through various concepts: inter alia through exceptionality, from a constructivist viewpoint, or as human security. Whereas for example, an ‘existential’ approach takes risk and danger as a fact of life and is based on the assumption of the fragility of the human condition, leading to traditional and military understandings of security, a constructivist approach regards security as a discursive speech act enabling criticism of security claims. Analysing security in connection with law highlights both tensions and contradictions. From classical analyses on states of emergency to new conceptualizations of security as a specific dimension within the process of European integration (‘the European Security Constitution’), legal approaches to security and law today are facing many paradoxes and challenges.
The second part of the book considers some of these security dilemmas in two specific areas of law: human rights and criminal law. Here, the authors address the militarisation of the fight against terrorism, the distinction between administrative and penal sanctions, the limits of intelligence activities and the scope of criminalisation.
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Security Sector Reform (SSR) is increasingly becoming a cornerstone in international security and development cooperation. Indeed, the concept has often been seen as a panacea for many of the biggest threats to the world such as failed states, terrorism and poverty. In particular, this book focuses on the complexities of implementation of SSR across the globe and the actual and potential role for the European Union (EU) to play in SSR. As suggested in the title of the book, this involves not only opportunities, but challenges to be overcome as well. There are three core themes to this book: Policy, Policies and Practice. By presenting the themes in this particular order a greater appreciation of the influences on the process of SSR, from conception to implementation is relayed to the reader. This volume appeals to audiences interested in the EU as a global actor and the interrelationships between foreign, security, defence and development policies.