Burundi SSR Background Note

05/07/2016

Key Statistics

Population: 11,17 million (World Bank, 2016)

Capital: Bujumbura

Official Languages: Kinyarwanda, French, English (Kiswahili used in commercial hubs)

Major Ethnic Groups: Hutu (Bantu) 85 percent, Tutsi (Hamitic) 14 percent, Twa (Pygmy) 1 percent. 

GDP per Capita (current US dollars): 206 (Trading Economics, 2017)

GDP per Capita PPP (international US dollars): 682 (Trading Economics, 2017)

Security Sector Stats

Active Armed Forces: 41,000 including paramilitary forces (Trading Economics 2017)

Small Arms: A conservative estimate shows that at least 100,000 households in Burundi possess small arms or light weapons (Pézard & Florquin, 2007)

Military Expenditure: 2.3 percent of GDP (SIPRI 2017).

Table of Contents

1. General Overview

2. Political Context

3. Overview of SSR in the Republic of Burundi

4. Sector Specific Overview

    i. Security Management and Oversight Bodies

    ii. Police Reform

    iii. Defence Reform

    iv. Justice Reform

    v. Prison Reform

    vi. Transitional Justice

5. Donor Support and Coordination

6. Future Considerations

1. General Overview

Squeezed in between its neighbours Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania, Burundi is a small landlocked country in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. With a population estimated at around 10.16 million, the country is comparable to its northern neighbour Rwanda (12 million), but significantly smaller than its larger neighbours to the East (Tanzania, 45 million) and West (DRC, 75 million). [1]

With a GDP per capita of 267 USD in 2014, the country is one of the world’s poorest nations. [2]  Only one in two children go to school and an estimate of only 2% of the population has electricity in their homes.  Due to the underdeveloped manufacturing sector, the economy is predominantly agricultural, accounting for more than 30% of GDP and employing more than 90% of the population. Although the country has had a steady economic growth of around 4% annually since 2006, it remains highly dependent on foreign aid, which accounts for 42% of the country’s national income. [3]

2. Political Context

Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has experienced numerous cycles of violence. The immediate years after independence were characterised by a violent struggle for power between political factions of the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority, culminating in the presidency of Michel Micombero which consolidated a Tutsi dominated government lasting until the country’s first popular elections in 1993. In the 1993 elections, the Burundians chose their first Hutu head of state, Melchior Ndadaye, and a parliament dominated by the Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu) party. However, only months after the elections Ndadaye was assassinated by elements in the Tutsi-led military, spurring a new cycle of violence and revenge that transformed into a 12 year long civil war between the Tutsi controlled army and Hutu rebels.

In 1998, a peace process began in Arusha, Tanzania, and an agreement for peace and reconciliation was ultimately signed in August 2000. Representing the heart of power in Burundian politics, part of the rebel’s demands—aside from returning to the pre-assassination constitutional order—was to reform the country’s Tutsi dominated security institutions. Hence, the Arusha Agreement stipulates various provisions on the reform of the security sector, including a balanced representation of Hutu and Tutsi, professionalisation of security and justice institutions, the creation of a new national police service and demobilization of tens of thousands of combatants. However, despite the advances made by the Arusha Agreement, the civil war continued—mainly due to the absence of the Hutu rebel group CNDD–FDD in the negotiations—and few of the agreement’s proposed reforms were implemented. [4]

Eventually, in November 2003, the interim government and the CNDD–FDD signed a ceasefire agreement and the first measures to implement the Arusha Agreement were taken. This included the formation of a new military and police force—the Burundian National Defence Force (FDN) and the Burundian National Police (PNB) —in 2004, incorporating ex-rebels. While the elections of 2005 brought the CNDD-FDD to power, hostilities between the Burundian government and the Hutu rebel group PALIPEHUTU–FNL continued. [5]  As a result of these continued aggressions, reform efforts were delayed and political tensions between the government and the political opposition increased. These tensions culminated in 2006 with the arrest of prominent members of the opposition, a general paralysis of the National Assembly, as well as power struggles within the CNDD–FDD.

Despite the following development of a peace process between the government and the FNL, the country continued its political turmoil. Tensions between political parties in the National Assembly, internal divisions of the CNDD–FDD and continued violence all added to the political instability, characterised and spurred by the government’s efforts to consolidate its power through authoritarian means. The elections of 2010 were a further indication of the country’s move away from a process of democratisation to one of authoritarianism and one-party rule. After the opposition’s critique of the local elections, describing it in terms of “massive electoral fraud”, a joint coalition was formed (l’Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi, ADC-Ikibiri) which withdrew all of its candidates from the presidential election, leaving the ruling party a landslide victory with over 90 % of the votes. Declared “illegal” by the government, the boycott of the presidential elections was accompanied by government restrictions on the activities of the opposition and the arrest of many of its prominent leaders. As a result, members of opposition groups either left the country or, as in the case of the former rebel group FNL’s leader Agathon Rwasa, went underground.  [6]

Political violence resurged in the wake of the 2010 elections. In an independent report from Human Rights Watch, the estimated number of politically motivated killings ranged between 40 and 300 during 2011 alone, most of them conducted with impunity. [7] The country has since drifted away from a process of democratisation and towards authoritarian rule, with former rebels returning to the use of violence. Most opposition party leaders who had fled the country after boycotting the 2010 elections returned to Burundi, as was the case with Alexis Sinduhije, president of the MSD, and Agathon Rwasa, former rebel leader and the FNL. [8]  Upon their return, members of the opposition parties, including the FNL and MSD, were harassed and intimidated, despite government promises that political parties could operate freely. Government officials and police disrupted or obstructed party meetings and arrested a number of FNL and MSD members. [9]  

Members of the imbonerakure —the youth league of the ruling CNDD-FDD—committed acts of violence, including killings, beatings, rape, threats, and extortion against their perceived opponents and other Burundians. Despite a public outcry and promises by the government and party officials to punish such actions, abuses continued throughout 2013. Some opposition party members threatened to retaliate in kind through their own youth groups. A clash between imbonerakure and MSD youth in Gihanga, Bubanza province, on 6 October 2013 caused injuries on both sides.

After 2010, the absence of parliamentary opposition was partially balanced by civil society organisations and media, but several civil society leaders and journalists were subsequently intimidated and blocked from administrative processes, pushed into exile which in turn led to a disappearance of independent media from Burundi. [10]

On 21 March 2014, a tentative revision of the Constitution was rejected by one vote. The project was seen to be in conflict with the Arusha Accords, especially with respect to its proposition to modify Article 302 of the Constitution, which impeded president Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office. In spite of this outcome, the CNDD-FDD –the president’s party– nominated Nkurunziza as their presidential candidate for the coming elections during their party convention on 25 April 2015. On 28 April, fourteen parliamentarians submitted a question to the Constitutional Court, inquiring whether the Constitutional limit of three years included only elections under universal suffrage – and hence would not count Nkurunziza’s first mandate, which was conferred to him by the National Assembly in 2005. The Court decided in favour of the president on 5 May, validating his decision to run for a third term.

This decision and the question of interpretation marked the beginning of a large-scale crisis in the country. Civil society organisations formed a protest movement, “Halte au troisième mandate” (“stop the third term”), and a series of demonstrations in the capital took place over several days. In several cases, excessive violence was used against the protesters, and they in turn committed violent acts against police and individuals suspected to belong to the imbonerakure. [11]  The government refuted all accusation of having applied arbitrary violence, but reports by the UN Security Council and the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights give account of over ten deaths by firearms in April and May 2015. [12]

On 13 May 2015, army general Godefroid Niyombare, together with other officers and high ranking military, staged a coup d’état against Nkurunziza. The coup, condemned by the international community, failed after two days of fighting between its supporters and government loyal troops. It also marked a turning point in the crisis, which was compounded by hand grenade attacks in the capital, political assassinations, and mass arrests. Around 470 people were detained in response to the demonstrations and unrests. [13]

After having been postponed twice, the presidential elections eventually took place on 20 July 2015, with 69% of votes in favour of Nkurunziza. The situation continued to deteriorate, especially through a wave of assassinations by the different parties to the conflict, and gunshots and hand grenade attacks on an almost daily basis. Given the violence and its ethnic dimension, fears of another civil war in the country was pronounced by international observers. [14]

Ultimately, the instability brought about by aggravated violence with a potentially ethnic dimension lead to a large-scale migration crisis. As of 1 April 2016, the number of refugees having left Burundi was as high as 269,000, with 100,000 internally displaced people. [15]

3. Overview of SSR in the Republic of Burundi

Given the political violence that has characterised the country in recent years, and the major opposition’s withdrawal from the political arena and back to a method of violence, the country faces severe security challenges. 

The Arusha Agreement from 2000 represented the beginning of the end of the long civil-war and ethnic tensions that had plagued the country for decades. As a solution to one of the fundamental sources of the conflict, the agreement provided a framework for the reformation of the Burundian security sector that had been dominated by factions of the Tutsi minority. The agreement highlighted the need for the security sector to be politically neutral, united and representative of the entire population, and to be an instrument for the security of the people as a whole, and not for the security of the regime [16].

Preceding peace and ceasefire agreements between the government and CNDD-FDD (2003), and later with FNL (2008; 2009) were formulated in reference and aimed to encompass the reforms stipulated in the Arusha Agreement. These included explicit goals of the reintegration and demobilisation of former combatants, as well as the need to balance the representation of different factions within the security sector. As an example, the Pretoria Protocols regulating the ceasefire agreement between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD explicitly stated that the FDN “shall be composed of 60% officers selected from the governmental army and 40% officers from the CNDD-FDD” [17] .

In a report published in March 2004, the UN Secretary-General set out various SSR issues that needed to be addressed by a new peacekeeping operation following the peace agreement between the Burundian government and CNDD-FDD. Aside from the short-term goals of demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, the report emphasised the need to support a broader security reform in order to ensure sustainable peace - including the strengthening of rule of law and ensuring political participation [18].

The subsequent UN Security Council resolution (1545), establishing the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), highlighted recommendations from the report, authorising ONUB to “(....) carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement” [19].  

The BINUB replaced the ONUB in 2006. [20] The present mission in Burundi, the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), was established with the withdrawal of BINUB in 2010. [21] As in the case of resolution 1545, the underlying Security Council resolution (1959) emphasised the need to strengthen institutional capacity in order to ensure political stability, rule of law and equal political participation. The ONUB finally completed its mandate the 31 December 2014 and handed over all responsibilities to the UN country team in Burundi, which consist of agency, funds and programmes working under the umbrella of a UN development framework for Burundi. [22]

More generally, political gridlock between the different parties is the greatest challenge to security and stability in the country. The escalation of low intensity conflict is closing the remaining political space, despite international consensus on the necessity to take up dialogue again. [23]

4. Sector Specific Overview                                 

i. Security Management and Oversight Bodies

Burundi’s constitution stipulates the distribution of authority among its security organisations, identifying the purview of the National Defence Force (FDN), the National Police (PNB), and the National Intelligence Service (SNR). According to this, the FDN is tasked with the defence of the country’s independence and sovereignty, the PNB with its internal security and the SNR with collecting intelligence to ensure the security of the state. [24]

The separation of powers between the executive and parliament regarding security matters provides the presidency with extensive influence over the security sector. As the commander-in-chief, the president can authorise the use of the armed forces to defend the state, and to re-establish order and public security [25] .

The constitution further stipulates the existence of a National Security Council to function as an advisory body to the executive. After considerable delay, the council was finally created in 2008, comprised of members appointed by the president [26] . The council can play a role of coordinating reform in the security sector. 

The watchdog function of media and civil society has been diminished, especially through a restrictive media law, decreed in 2013, although the main provisions were amended in 2015. [27]   More recently, the context of 2015 crisis has significantly reduced space for independent media and civil society, negatively affecting freedom of expression, the right to assemble and freedom of press. For instance, several media outlets were prevented from broadcasting after they attempted to cover the protests, and journalists were repeatedly detained and intimidated by police and the imbonerakure. [28]

The Independent National Human Rights Commission (Commission Nationale Indépendante des Droits de l'Homme (CNIDH)) is an independent institution created in January 2011. It is composed of seven representatives elected by the National Assembly and nominated by presidential decree for a mandate of four years. [29] Within its general mandate to defend human rights in Burundi, especially with regards to the security forces, the Commission seems independent, efficient and enjoys a generally high level of trust in its work. [30]

An Ombudsoffice, specified in the Arusha Accords as well as in the 2005 Constitution, was installed in January 2010. The Ombudsoffice is nominated by the National Assembly (with a majority of three quarters, with approval of the senate with a qualified majority) for a period of six years non-renewable. The Ombudsoffice is an independent authority that enjoys immunity from jurisdiction in the exercise of his function. The office examines complaints and investigates management failures and human rights violations of public agents, the judiciary and local collectives, including public service institutions. It does not, however, possess jurisdiction over the armed forces, which as of now impedes the office from investigating their conduct and cooperating with them. [31]

ii. Police Reform

As in the case of FDN, the Burundian National Police (PNB) was established in 2004 as a result of the Arusha Agreement. The new force was a result of the merger of the pre-existing Airport and Border Police, the Public Security Police and the Criminal Investigations Department. [32]

The new force was set up with personnel from these previously separate police services, as well as from the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB), the gendarmerie and former rebel combatants. The size of the police thus expanded almost overnight from approximately 2,000 officers to over 18,000. The ceasefire agreement between the government and CNDD-FDD, the so-called Pretoria Protocols, specified the relative composition of the force. It stated that as a guiding principle, the general staff of the new force should be comprised of 65% from the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and 35% from CNDD-FDD [33] .

The diverse backgrounds of the PNB personnel continues to pose legitimacy, management, and discipline challenges, particularly as no vetting took place when it was created. Since 2005, training initiatives have been developed through bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Different levels of training among the members of the force are an additional problem, indicating a need to harmonise the force’s operational capacity through structured and coordinated training programmes.

Apart from these organisational issues, the PNB has worked to establish community policing throughout the country, supported by Belgium and Germany. Its establishment started in certain pilot communities. Although it demands considerable physical capacity and staff, such a policy is a preventive and modern policing effort to the benefit of the population. In order to ensure the strategy’s success, equally strong efforts are needed for the development of social cohesion. [34]

Recent reports give account of excessive use of force during the demonstrations since April 2015, including the use of firearms. [35] The police are accused of disrespecting the human rights of detainees, as well as committing other human rights violations. The current political situation also has a negative impact on international support targeting the police. For example, the UN’s suggestion to send 228 police to Burundi in reaction to the crisis has been rejected by the country’s government. [36]

iii. Defence Reform

As an imperative part of the Arusha Agreement, Burundi took the first step of reforming the military in 2004 by establishing the new National Defence Force (FDN). In accordance with the agreement, the new force sought to ensure an ethnically balanced force with no more than 50% of its members from one particular ethnic group. [37]  As in the case of the PNB, the Pretoria Protocols additionally stipulated the representation of former CNDD-FDD combatants. According to this agreement, 40% of the new force’s officers were to be recruited from the FDD. [38]

International support has focused on ensuring a minimum level of necessary infrastructure, such as housing and training facilities, as well as support for training activities. These have predominantly been aimed at ethics and conduct, but include also management, oversight and military justice.

The Burundian government has furthermore conducted a strategic study of its defence sector from 2011 to 2014 with the help of the Dutch government. This defence review, conducted in a universal, transparent and inclusive manner, has primed the creation of a new National Defence Policy that defines the roles and key missions of the FDN. It also resulted in a defence white paper that describes the strategic orientation of the FDN for the next ten to fifteen years, a conceptualisation of its structures, and priorities for reform. [39] At the same time, the Burundian government formulated a National Security Strategy in June 2013, which serves as a basis to improve coherence and planning of strategic security questions. [40]

Apart from the challenge posed by opposition to reform, which is linked to personal strife or divisions within the FDN, the current political crisis also affects the dynamics within the army. [41] These tensions, especially after the failed coup of 2015, are best illustrated by the series of assassinations targeting high ranking officers, both among the opposition and supporters of the current government. Members of the lower ranks are under surveillance by the national intelligence service and the military police. [42]

iv. Justice Reform

The justice sector faces a number of challenges that limit its efficiency. A lack of independence, of oversight mechanisms and of an overall framework to guide legal aid have been highlighted as areas of most pressing concern. At the operational level, the justice sector is in need of resources (both human and financial) in order to increase its efficiency. As these challenges are interlinked, an overall strategic framework is needed to ensure a comprehensive reform.

There are a number of factors that limit equal access to formal justice services. High costs, remoteness of the courts, the absence of appropriate information about the system, and the fact that the dominant legal language is French (spoken only by a minority of the population) are all barriers that limit the access for a significant portion of the population.

In terms of capacity development, actors in the justice system have benefited from several national and international, government and NGO-led training programs since 1993. On a larger scale, a process of transitional justice as foreseen in the Arusha Accords after years of violence and civil war has still not taken place. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established despite a lack of consensus but has not been operational. [43]

v. Prison Reform

The penitentiary system is in pressing need of reform. Prisons are overcrowded, unhygienic and violent, with a large number of prisoners in pre-trial detention or on remand. In an attempt to address the issue, President Nkurunziza pardoned several thousands of prisoners on the country’s 50th anniversary in June 2012. Further improvements were made through programs addressing security sector reform in cooperation with the Netherlands.

The 2015 crisis had an impact on the state of detention facilities. Reports give account of abuse of detainees, as well as of the existence of unofficial detention centres and mass arrests. [44]

5. Donor Support and Coordination

In 2007, the Burundian Government established the Partners Coordination Group (PCG) in collaboration with international partners as the highest national aid coordination body. The PCG is subdivided into three thematic levels, and also serves as a framework for dialogue between development partners and the government in order to ensure coordination and harmonisation of aid and to measure progress.

The international community has been supporting the national authorities on matters that range from the field of economic development to that of security matters.  Upon the signature of the Arusha Accords, UN agencies were rapidly deployed, and the European Union and partner states were committed in supporting the country’s reconstruction.  Countries such as Belgium, Germany, Japan and France got involved in the justice and security reforms in Burundi. In addition, the support provided by the Netherlands has acquired a central role in the security system reconstruction of Burundi through the security sector development program (SSD). Based on a bilateral agreement with the Government of Burundi signed in 2009 (expected to end in 2017) this program focuses primarily on the defence forces (FDN) and on the police (PNB), including the main bodies of supervision and control of the latter, namely the National Security Council, the Parliament, the media, the Ombudsman and various NGOs. [45]

The SSD program relies on a Memorandum of Understanding, encompassing a strong political commitment, which is materialised through SSR discussion groups. This discussion group consists of representatives from 11 institutions and ministries involved in security governance, and ensures the participation of various state actors – legislative, executive and judiciary powers – as well as civil society in reform efforts. [46]

The SSD Programme is divided into four phases, each with a duration of two years, at the end of which progress is evaluated. Structured in three levels; political, strategic and technical, the programme is staffed mainly with local Burundian personnel, with a programme manager connecting the three levels.

The total duration of the commitment is of eight years and the high level of funding dedicated to each phase —between 15 and 20 million euros— is likely to produce a real impact in terms of boosting the capacities of the two main institutions receiving support. The program is also characterised by a considerable degree of flexibility, since it is able to adjust to certain unexpected developments or political tensions, or meet urgent needs previously unidentified. The Dutch authorities are paying utmost attention to ensuring coordination with all SSR stakeholders in order to improve results on the ground. The current context of crisis has however led to a suspension of the programme. [47]

The European Union also decided to suspend financial support to the national government of Burundi in March 2016. In the current context, the EU has found the government’s commitment to reform be insufficient and has terminated the consultation procedure with Burundi as per article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. [48]

6. Future Considerations

Though Burundi has enjoyed a short period of peace since 2010, recent events paint a picture of a growing tension in the country after the 2015 elections, which has obstructed peacebuilding processes in the country and undermine the progress that has already been made in the field of SSR.

The recent developments summarised above suggest a power struggle between the CNDD-FDD that is consolidating its influence over the state, and a multifaceted opposition dominated by the FNL. At the centre of the conflict are actual and perceived limitations to political participation, where violence is seen as a legitimate measure on both sides.

Faced with this situation, the international community is identifying mechanisms to de-escalate the crisis. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union considered launching an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), without a clear consent from Burundian authorities. [49]  The deployment of troops was delayed until a possible agreement with Burundi was created or established. The United Nations Security Council has for its part authorised the deployment of 228 policemen in the country. [50]  however, the deployment was refused by the government. Both international organisations continue to call for reopening dialogue between the different camps in Burundi, which could contribute to help alleviate current tensions and get the country out of the crisis, while pursuing efforts towards mediation. [51]

Key Documents for More Information:

References

Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 :Burundi http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/burundi/report-2013

African Development Bank.”Burundi: Country Strategy paper 2012-2016”. October 2011

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement for Burundi (2000)

BBC News Country Profile: Burundi http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13085066 (accessed 10-08-2013)

BBC News Africa “Agathon Rwasa: Burundi ex-rebel leaves hiding” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23590991 (accessed 20-08-2013)

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – November  2009: No.1

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – April 2010: No.2

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – August 2010: No.3

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – October 2010: No.4

Davis, Laura (2009) “Transitional Justice and Security System Reform” International Centre for Transitional Justice

Development Gateway. “AMP Burundi”September 2011

Freedom House (2013) “Freedom in the World: Burundi”, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/burundi

Human Rights Watch Report on Burundi January 2012

Human Rights Watch “Burundi: Violence, Rights Violations Mar Elections” http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/01/burundi-violence-rights-violations-mar-elections (accessed 10-08-2013)

Nibigira, Concilie & Scanlon, Helen (2010) “Gender, Peace and Security: The Challenges Facing Transitional Justice Processes in Burundi” International Center for Transitional Justice

Pretoria Protocol 2003

Report of the Secretary General on Burundi (2004)

Strategie Nationale De Securite, Conseil National de Sécurité, Republique du Burundi. Juin 2013

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1545 (2004)

[1] World Bank 2016, Burundi .

[2] World Bank 2016, GDP per Capita.

[3] The CIA World Fact Book 2017, Burundi.

[4] National Council for the Defence of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie – CNDD-FDD). 

[5] Party for the Liberation of the Hutu - National Forces of Liberation (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération – PALIPEHUTU-FNL).  

[6] Institute for Security Studies, Burundi: Overview of the 2010 elections and observations on the way forward , 14 Octobre 2010.

[7] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Burundi, 2012.

[8] RFI Afrique, Burundi: Two of  President Nkurunziza's Main Opponents Return from Exile , 10 mars 2010. 

[9] RFI Afrique, Wave of Violence in Burundi before the Presidential Election , 27 June 2010. 

[10] Thierry de Vircoulon, Lessons from the Burundi Crisis: the Failures of Democratic Peacebuilding , IFRI Note, June 2016.

[11] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Election in Burundi , 7 July 2015.

[12] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi , 7 July2015, S/2015/510; African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Report of the Delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on its fact-finding mission to Burundi , 7 - 13 December 2015.  

[13] African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Report of the Delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on its fact-finding mission to Burundi,  7 - 13 December 2015.

[14] OHCHR, Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on the situation in Burundi , 29 June 2016. 

[15] UNHCR, Refugees from Burundi Related to the Current Situation – Breakdown per Country , 1 April 2015. 

[16] Peace Accords Matrix, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi , 2000.

[17] United Nations, Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi , 2003.

[18] United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on Burundi , March 2004.

[19] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1545 , May 2004.

[20] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1719 , October 2006.

[21] BNUB, United Nations Office in Burundi , 2014.

[22] BNUB, UNDAF 2012-2016’s Signature Ceremony , 17 January 2013.

[23] BNUB, UNDAF 2012-2016’s Signature Ceremony , 17 January 2013.

[24] Constitute, The Constitution of Burundi , art. 245, 2005.

[25] Constitute, The Constitution of Burundi , art. 110, 2005.

[26] Constitute, The Constitution of Burundi , art. 277-78, 2005.

[27] RFI Afrique, Media: Burundian Parliamentarians Return to Liberal Laws , 5 March 2016.

[28] United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders on his Mission to Burundi , 30 December2015.

[29] CNIDH, Independent National Commission of Human Rights , 2017

[30] ISSAT, Evaluation of Security Sector Reform in Burundi, Final Report, February 2014. 

[31] DCAF-OIF, Mapping Study: Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces in Francophone Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa , 2016. 

[32] Libération Africa4, The Burundi National Police: Which force for which order? , 19 juin 2016. 

[33] African Union, Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi , 2003.

[34] ISSAT, Evaluation of Security Sector Reform in Burundi, Final Report, February 2014.

[35] African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Report of the Delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on its fact-finding mission to Burundi, 7 - 13 December 2015 , 7 au 13 December 2015.

[36] RFI, Burundi Opposes Deployment of UN Police , 03 August 2016.

[37] Peace Accords Matrix, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi , 2000.

[38] African Union, Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi , 2003. 

[39] Hendrickson Dylan, Burundi Defence Review : Lessons Identified , June 2014. 

[40] ISSAT, Evaluation of Security Sector Reform in Burundi, Final Report, February 2014.

[41] Centre for International Governance Innovation, Security Sector Reform Monitor: Burundi , 16 August 2010. 

[42] International Crisis Group, Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term, 20 May 2016.

[43] Thierry de Vircoulon, Lessons from the Burundi Crisis: the Failures of Democratic Peacebuilding , IFRI Note, June 2016.

[44] Committee Against Torture, States Parties Replies to List of Issues , 19 novembre 2014.

[45] Partner Coordination Group, Terms of Reference , 2005.

[46] Security Sector Development Programme (DSS) Burundi, Memorandum of Understanding , n.d.

[47] Security Sector Development Programme, About Us , 2014. These institutions and ministries are the two defence and security committees of the National Assembly and the Senate, the Ministry of Justice, the Presidential Ministry responsible for Good Governance and Privatisation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry for National Defence and Former Combatants, the National Education Service, the National Security Council and two civil society organizations specialized in security. 

[48] European Council, Burundi: EU Closes Consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement , 14 March 2016.

[49] African Union, Communiqué of the 565th meeting of the PSC on the situation in Burundi , 17 December 2015. 

[50] Security Council, Resolution 2303 , 29 July 2016. 

[51] RFI Afrique, Burundi: Big Moves Around Resuming Dialogue, 9 February 2017. 

The International Security Sector Advisory Team

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provides practical support to the international community in its efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. It does this by working with a group of member states and institutions to develop and promote good security and justice reform practices and principles, and by helping its members to build their capacity to support national and regional security and justice reform processes.

Organisation