Burundi SSR Background Note


Key Statistics

Population: 10,88 million (Military Balance)

Capital: Bujumbura

Official Languages: Kinyarwanda, French, English (Kiswahili used in commercial hubs)

Major Ethnic Groups: Hutu (Bantu) 85 percent, Tutsi (Hamitic) 14 percent, Twa (Pygmy) 1 percent. 

GDP per Capita (current US dollars): 351 (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2015)

GDP per Capita PPP (international US dollars): 951 (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2015)

Security Sector Stats

Active Armed Forces: 20,000 (Military Balance, 2014). There are 39 women in the armed forces (0.14 percent) (Iteka & Fride, 2011)

Small Arms: A conservative estimate shows that at least 100,000 households in Burundi possess small arms or light weapons (Pézard & Florquin, 2007)

Military Expenditure: 2.2 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2013).

Table of Contents

1. General Overview

2. Political Context

3. Overview of SSR in the Republic of Burundi

4. Sector Specific Overview

    i. Security Management and Oversight Bodies

    ii. Police Reform

    iii. Defence Reform

    iv. Justice Reform

    v. Prison Reform

    vi. Transitional Justice

5. Donor Support and Coordination

6. Future Considerations

1. General Overview

Squeezed in between its neighbours Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania, Burundi is a small landlocked country in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. With a population estimated at around 10.16 million, the country is comparable to its northern neighbour Rwanda (12 million), but significantly smaller than its larger neighbours to the East (Tanzania, 45 million) and West (DRC, 75 million).[1]

With a GDP per capita of 267 USD in 2014, the country is one of the world’s poorest nations [2] . Only one in two children go to school and an estimate of only 2% of the population has electricity in their homes.  Due to the underdeveloped manufacturing sector, the economy is predominantly agricultural, accounting for more than 30% of GDP and employing more than 90% of the population. Although the country has had a steady economic growth of around 4% annually since 2006, it remains highly dependent on foreign aid, which accounts for 42% of the country’s national income. [3]

2. Political Context

Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has experienced numerous cycles of violence. The immediate years after independence were characterised by a violent struggle for power between political factions of the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority, culminating in the presidency of Michel Micombero which consolidated a Tutsi dominated government lasting until the country’s first popular elections in 1993. In the 1993 elections, the Burundians chose their first Hutu head of state, Melchior Ndadaye, and a parliament dominated by the Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu) party. However, only months after the elections Ndadaye was assassinated by elements in the Tutsi-led military, spurring a new cycle of violence and revenge that transformed into a 12 year long civil war between the Tutsi controlled army and Hutu rebels.

In 1998, a peace process began in Arusha, Tanzania, and an agreement for peace and reconciliation was ultimately signed in August 2000. Representing the heart of power in Burundian politics, part of the rebel’s demands—aside from returning to the pre-assassination constitutional order—was to reform the country’s Tutsi dominated security institutions. Hence, the Arusha Agreement stipulates various provisions on the reform of the security sector, including a balanced representation of Hutu and Tutsi, professionalisation of security and justice institutions, the creation of a new national police service and demobilization of tens of thousands of combatants. However, despite the advances made by the Arusha Agreement, the civil war continued—mainly due to the absence of the Hutu rebel group CNDD–FDD in the negotiations—and few of the agreement’s proposed reforms were implemented.[4]

Eventually, in November 2003, the interim government and the CNDD–FDD signed a ceasefire agreement and the first measures to implement the Arusha Agreement were taken. This included the formation of a new military and police force—the Burundian National Defence Force (FDN) and the Burundian National Police (PNB) —in 2004, incorporating ex-rebels. While the elections of 2005 brought the CNDD-FDD to power, hostilities between the Burundian government and the Hutu rebel group PALIPEHUTU–FNL continued. [5]  As a result of these continued aggressions, reform efforts were delayed and political tensions between the government and the political opposition increased. These tensions culminated in 2006 with the arrest of prominent members of the opposition, a general paralysis of the National Assembly, as well as power struggles within the CNDD–FDD.

Despite the following development of a peace process between the government and the FNL, the country continued its political turmoil. Tensions between political parties in the National Assembly, internal divisions of the CNDD–FDD and continued violence all added to the political instability, characterised and spurred by the government’s efforts to consolidate its power through authoritarian means. The elections of 2010 were a further indication of the country’s move away from a process of democratisation to one of authoritarianism and one-party rule. After the opposition’s critique of the local elections, describing it in terms of “massive electoral fraud”, a joint coalition was formed (l’Alliance des Démocrates pour le Changement au Burundi, ADC-Ikibiri) which withdrew all of its candidates from the presidential election, leaving the ruling party a landslide victory with over 90 % of the votes. Declared “illegal” by the government, the boycott of the presidential elections was accompanied by government restrictions on the activities of the opposition and the arrest of many of its prominent leaders. As a result, members of opposition groups either left the country or, as in the case of the former rebel group FNL’s leader Agathon Rwasa, went underground.  [6]

Political violence resurged in the wake of the 2010 elections. In an independent report from Human Rights Watch, the estimated number of politically motivated killings ranged between 40 and 300 during 2011 alone, most of them conducted with impunity. [7] The country has since drifted away from a process of democratisation and towards authoritarian rule, with former rebels returning to the use of violence. Most opposition party leaders who had fled the country after boycotting the 2010 elections returned to Burundi, as was the case with Alexis Sinduhije, president of the MSD, and Agathon Rwasa, former rebel leader and the FNL.[8] Upon their return, members of the opposition parties, including the FNL and MSD, were harassed and intimidated, despite government promises that political parties could operate freely. Government officials and police disrupted or obstructed party meetings and arrested a number of FNL and MSD members.[9] 

Members of the imbonerakure —the youth league of the ruling CNDD-FDD—committed acts of violence, including killings, beatings, rape, threats, and extortion against their perceived opponents and other Burundians. Despite a public outcry and promises by the government and party officials to punish such actions, abuses continued throughout 2013. Some opposition party members threatened to retaliate in kind through their own youth groups. A clash between imbonerakure and MSD youth in Gihanga, Bubanza province, on 6 October 2013 caused injuries on both sides.

After 2010, the absence of parliamentary opposition was partially balanced by civil society organisations and media, but several civil society leaders and journalists were subsequently intimidated and blocked from administrative processes, pushed into exile which in turn led to a disappearance of independent media from Burundi. [10]

On 21 March 2014, a tentative revision of the Constitution was rejected by one vote. The project was seen to be in conflict with the Arusha Accords, especially with respect to its proposition to modify Article 302 of the Constitution, which impeded president Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office. In spite of this outcome, the CNDD-FDD –the president’s party– nominated Nkurunziza as their presidential candidate for the coming elections during their party convention on 25 April 2015. On 28 April, fourteen parliamentarians submitted a question to the Constitutional Court, inquiring whether the Constitutional limit of three years included only elections under universal suffrage – and hence would not count Nkurunziza’s first mandate, which was conferred to him by the National Assembly in 2005. The Court decided in favour of the president on 5 May, validating his decision to run for a third term.

This decision and the question of interpretation marked the beginning of a large-scale crisis in the country. Civil society organisations formed a protest movement, “Halte au troisième mandate” (“stop the third term”), and a series of demonstrations in the capital took place over several days. In several cases, excessive violence was used against the protesters, and they in turn committed violent acts against police and individuals suspected to belong to the imbonerakure. [11]  The government refuted all accusation of having applied arbitrary violence, but reports by the UN Security Council and the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights give account of over ten deaths by firearms in April and May 2015. [12]

On 13 May 2015, army general Godefroid Niyombare, together with other officers and high ranking military, staged a coup d’état against Nkurunziza. The coup, condemned by the international community, failed after two days of fighting between its supporters and government loyal troops. It also marked a turning point in the crisis, which was compounded by hand grenade attacks in the capital, political assassinations, and mass arrests. Around 470 people were detained in response to the demonstrations and unrests. [13]

After having been postponed twice, the presidential elections eventually took place on 20 July 2015, with 69% of votes in favour of Nkurunziza. The situation continued to deteriorate, especially through a wave of assassinations by the different parties to the conflict, and gunshots and hand grenade attacks on an almost daily basis. Given the violence and its ethnic dimension, fears of another civil war in the country was pronounced by international observers. [14]

Ultimately, the instability brought about by aggravated violence with a potentially ethnic dimension lead to a large-scale migration crisis. As of 1 April 2016, the number of refugees having left Burundi was as high as 269,000, with 100,000 internally displaced people. [15]

3. Overview of SSR in the Republic of Burundi

Given the political violence that has characterised the country in recent years, and the major opposition’s withdrawal from the political arena and back to a method of violence, the country faces severe security challenges. 

The Arusha Agreement from 2000 represented the beginning of the end of the long civil-war and ethnic tensions that had plagued the country for decades. As a solution to one of the fundamental sources of the conflict, the agreement provided a framework for the reformation of the Burundian security sector that had been dominated by factions of the Tutsi minority. The agreement highlighted the need for the security sector to be politically neutral, united and representative of the entire population, and to be an instrument for the security of the people as a whole, and not for the security of the regime [6].

Preceding peace and ceasefire agreements between the government and CNDD-FDD (2003), and later with FNL (2008; 2009) were formulated in reference and aimed to encompass the reforms stipulated in the Arusha Agreement. These included explicit goals of the reintegration and demobilisation of former combatants, as well as the need to balance the representation of different factions within the security sector. As an example, the Pretoria Protocols regulating the ceasefire agreement between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD explicitly stated that the FDN “shall be composed of 60% officers selected from the governmental army and 40% officers from the CNDD-FDD” [7] .

In a report published in March 2004, the UN Secretary-General set out various SSR issues that needed to be addressed by a new peacekeeping operation following the peace agreement between the Burundian government and CNDD-FDD. Aside from the short-term goals of demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, the report emphasised the need to support a broader security reform in order to ensure sustainable peace - including the strengthening of rule of law and ensuring political participation [8].

The subsequent UN Security Council resolution (1545) [9] , establishing the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), highlighted recommendations from the report, authorising ONUB to “(....) carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement”. The BINUB repaced the ONUB in 2006.

The present mission in Burundi, the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), was established with the withdrawal of BINUB in 2010. As in the case of resolution 1545, the underlying Security Council resolution (1959) emphasised the need to strengthen institutional capacity in order to ensure political stability, rule of law and equal political participation.

The most pressing threat to stabilising security is the issue of impunity, often related to political violence. The issue extends over the whole of the security sector, from corruption and politicisation of the judiciary to the harassment and extrajudicial killings by agents of security organisations. The consequences are severe by substantially limiting the political sphere and spurring a cycle of political violence [10] .

In a recent document from the country’s National Security Council, seven areas are highlighted as prioritised in the country’s national security strategy, and point to a broader understanding of security beyond the capacities of the state.  As an example the document highlights energy supply, food security and political dialogue as imperative parts of the security strategy. Although far from implemented, it indicates an understanding of the intrinsic links between development and security, as well as the need to ensure the security of the individual in order to facilitate domestic stability.

4. Sector Specific Overview                                 

i. Security Management and Oversight Bodies

Burundi’s constitution stipulates the distribution of authority among its security organisations, identifying the purview of the National Defence Force (FDN), the National Police (PNB), and the National Intelligence Service (SNR). According to this, the FDN is tasked with the defence of the country’s independence and sovereignty, the PNB with its internal security and the SNR with collecting intelligence to ensure the security of the state.

The separation of powers between the executive and parliament regarding security matters provides the presidency with extensive influence over the security sector. As the commander-in-chief, the president can authorise the use of the armed forces to defend the state, and to re-establish order and public security [11] .

The constitution further stipulates the existence of a National Security Council to function as an advisory body to the executive. After considerable delay, the council was finally created in 2008, comprised of members appointed by the president. Through its extensive mandate, including the monitoring of the security forces, the council has considerable potential to function as an effective coordinator of ongoing reforms. The national security strategy was published by the Council  in June 2013 [12] .

Both the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of National Defence have extensive influence over the day-to-day operations of its respective security organisations, the PNB and the FDN. From an operational perspective this is problematic, foremost because of the risk of politicisation of the security institutions’ operations, but also due to the increased tensions between the ministry and the uniformed officials [13] .

Civil society oversight is severely hampered by recent legislation limiting press freedom. The broad and imprecise formulation of the legislation, in combination with harsh fines and the threat of imprisonment, limits the journalistic freedom through self-censorship. Furthermore, arbitrary arrests, harassments and threats are common, severely restricting the independent media’s ability to exercise oversight [14] . The latest in these developments is the adoption of a new media law in June 2013, which has been heavily criticised for limiting the freedom of the press by forbidding reporting on matters that could "undermine national security, public order or the economy" [15] .

ii. Police Reform

As in the case of FDN, the Burundian National Police (PNB) was established in 2004 as a result of the Arusha Agreement. The new force was a result of the merger of the pre-existing Airport and Border Police, the Public Security Police and the Criminal Investigations Department.

The new force was set up with personnel from these previously separate police services, as well as from the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB), the gendarmerie and former rebel combatants. The size of the police thus expanded almost overnight from approximately 2,000 officers to over 18,000. The ceasefire agreement between the government and CNDD-FDD, the so-called Pretoria Protocols, specified the relative composition of the force. It stated that as a guiding principle, the general staff of the new force should be comprised of 65% from the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and 35% from CNDD-FDD [16] .

The diversity of backgrounds of the PNB personnel continues to pose legitimacy, management, and discipline challenges, particularly as no vetting took place when it was created. Since 2005, training initiatives have been developed through bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Different levels of training among the members of the force are an additional problem, indicating a need to harmonise the force’s operational capacity through structured and coordinated training programmes.

iii. Defence Reform

As an imperative part of the Arusha Agreement, Burundi took the first step of reforming the military in 2004 by establishing the new National Defence Force (FDN). In accordance with the agreement, the new force sought to ensure an ethnically balanced force with no more than 50% of its members from one particular ethnic group.

As in the case of the PNB, the Pretoria Protocols additionally stipulated the representation of former CNDD-FDD combatants. According to this agreement, 40% of the new force’s officers were to be recruited from the FDD [17] .

International support has focused on ensuring a minimum level of necessary infrastructure, such as housing and training facilities, as well as support for training activities. These have predominantly been aimed at ethics and conduct, but including also management, oversight and military justice.

However, there are still clear challenges to continued reform. Internal resistance to rationalisation of numbers stemming from threatened personal interests, and factions within the FDN wanting to preserve its influence over Burundian politics both constitute great challenges to continued transformation [18] .

iv. Justice Reform

The justice sector faces a number of challenges that limit its efficiency. A lack of independence, of oversight mechanisms and of an overall framework to guide legal aid have been highlighted as areas of most pressing concern. At the operational level, the justice sector is in need of resources (both human and financial) in order to increase its efficiency. As these challenges are interlinked, an overall strategic framework is needed to ensure a comprehensive reform.

There are a number of factors that limit equal access to formal justice services. High costs, remoteness of the courts, the absence of appropriate information about the system, and the fact that the dominant legal language is French (spoken only by a minority of the population) are all barriers that limit the access for a significant portion of the population.

In terms of capacity development, actors in the justice system have benefited from several national and international, government and NGO-led training programs since 1993. However, a clear strategic vision and greater coordination between these initiatives would yield greater results and help avoid overlaps. The Ministry of Justice is therefore developing strategic plan focusing on training for judges and justice sector personnel, in line with its overall policy goals.

v. Prison Reform

The penitentiary system is in pressing need of reform. Prisons are overcrowded, unhygienic and violent, with a large number of prisoners in pre-trial detention or on remand. In an attempt to address the issue, President Nkurunziza pardoned several thousands of prisoners on the country’s 50th anniversary in June 2012. Among those pardoned were pregnant or breastfeeding women, prisoners over and under 18 years of age, prisoners that were terminally ill, and prisoners serving terms of five years or less [19] .

In April 2012, 10,567 prisoners were held in 11 prisons with a combined capacity of only 4,050. This number had decreased to 6,581 by the end of December [20] .

vi. Transitional Justice

Transitional justice has only reached the national agenda in recent years, despite the Arusha Agreement provisions for establishment of an International Judicial Commission of inquiry on genocide and war crimes, as well as a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 

Progress was made during 2012 with a draft law to establish the TRC. However, the proposed law has received criticism from Amnesty International, among others, for excluding civil society and religious groups from the TRC, questioning its independence. Furthermore, the draft law did not include explicit prohibitions for mass amnesties, including war crimes and crimes against humanity [21] .

After a long period of inaction, the law on the establishment of the TRC was eventually signed into force by the President of the Republic on 15 May 2014. Its four-year mandate officially began on 10 December 2014 with the nomination of the 11 Commissioners, as foreseen in the law. Although this is considered as a major step in the transitional justice process provided in the Arusha Agreement, key concerns remain on the credibility of the whole process and on ensuring that victims’ rights are guaranteed [22] .

5. Donor Support and Coordination

In 2007, the Burundian Government in collaboration with international partners established the Partners Coordination Group (PCG) as the highest national aid coordination body. Subdivided into 12 thematic groups, the idea is for donors to hold regular meetings with the relevant ministries. The PCG also serves as a framework for dialogue between development partners and the government in order to ensure coordination and harmonisation of aid [23] .

In a document from 2011, the Development Gateway reported more than 300 projects registered in their online application Aid Management Platform (AMP). The platform is designed for the Burundian government and its international partners to keep track of, and coordinate development assistance [24] .

The international community has been supporting the national authorities on matters that range from the field of economic development to that of security matters.  Upon the signature of the Arusha Accords the UN agencies have been rapidly deployed, and the European Union and partner states have committed to support the country’s reconstruction.  Countries such as Belgium, Germany, Japan and France got involved in the justice and security reforms in Burundi. In addition, the support provided by the Netherlands has acquired a central role in the security system reconstruction of Burundi through the security sector development program (SSD). Based on a bilateral agreement with the Government of Burundi signed in 2009 (will finish in 2017) this program focuses primarily on the defence forces (FDN) and on the police (PNB), including as well the main bodies of supervision and control of the latter, namely the National Security Council, the Parliament, the media, the Ombudsman and various NGOs.

The SSD program relies on a particularly clear MoU, encompassing a strong political commitment.  It is divided into four phases, each of about 2 years, at the end of which progress is evaluated. Since the end of the second phase an action plan including indicators of success also helps to determine the targets achieved. The program awards a central role to national commitment in its implementation.  Therefore, its structures are divided among three levels, political, strategic and technical, mainly staffed by Burundian personnel, with a programme manager connecting the three levels mentioned above.

The duration of the commitment is of 8 years and the high level of funding dedicated to each phase - between 15 and 20 million euro - is likely to produce a real impact in terms of boosting the capacities of the two mainly supported institutions. The program is also characterized by a considerable degree of flexibility, since it is able to adjust to certain unexpected developments or political tensions, or meet urgent needs previously unidentified. These characteristics allowed the award of substantial value to the governance pillar in the second phase (2012-2014), which has now become the priority in upcoming years. The Netherlands authorities’ concern that the SSD program is run whilst ensuring coordination with other SSR stakeholders is a major stepping stone to improving results on the ground.

6. Future Considerations

Though Burundi has enjoyed a short period of peace since 2010, recent events paint a picture of a growing tension in the country ahead of its 2015 elections [25] , which could potentially obstruct peacebuilding processes in the country and undermine the progress that has already been made. In a recent interview, the former rebel leader Agaton Rwasa, said: ‘Burundi has resumed a war...people are being shot with live bullets when they are not armed.’ The recent arrest of human rights activist Pierre Claver Mbonimpa—for alleging that Burundians are receiving military training in the Democratic Republic of Congo and are being armed—is a worrying sign that the government is trying to silence critical voices. The UN, international parties and non-governmental institutions in Burundi have added to the report that violence has escalated due to the activities of Imbonerakure.

On 9 June 2014, General Principles for the Conduct of the 2015 Elections were drawn up in Bujumbura in the hope of creating an environment for free, transparent, inclusive and peaceful elections [26] .

In early 2014, the government expressed that it wanted the UN peacebuilding mission, BNUB, to withdraw from the country and hand over its functions to the UN Country Team. While the UN argued for a continuation of the mission—as not all political functions of BNUB could feasibly be led by UN agencies on the ground—the request from the government was based on the argument that BNUB’s departure would enable Burundian actors to take full ownership of its political process. A Transition Steering Group (TSG)—co-chaired by the UN and the government of Burundi – was established in March in preparation for BNUB’s expected departure in December 2014 [27].

The previously reviewed developments suggest that unlike the historical conflict along ethnical lines, the present situation is predominantly characterised by a power struggle between the CNDD-FDD that is consolidating its influence over the state, and a multifaceted opposition dominated by the FNL. At the centre of the conflict are actual and perceived limitations to political participation, where violence is seen as a legitimate measure on both sides. The prevalence of impunity exacerbates the problem, being both a cause and a symptom of the failure to ensure access to the political sphere.

Key Documents for More Information:


Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 :Burundi http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/burundi/report-2013

African Development Bank.”Burundi: Country Strategy paper 2012-2016”. October 2011

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement for Burundi (2000)

BBC News Country Profile: Burundi http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13085066 (accessed 10-08-2013)

BBC News Africa “Agathon Rwasa: Burundi ex-rebel leaves hiding” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23590991 (accessed 20-08-2013)

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – November  2009: No.1

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – April 2010: No.2

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – August 2010: No.3

CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – October 2010: No.4

Davis, Laura (2009) “Transitional Justice and Security System Reform” International Centre for Transitional Justice

Development Gateway. “AMP Burundi”September 2011

Freedom House (2013) “Freedom in the World: Burundi”, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/burundi

Human Rights Watch Report on Burundi January 2012

Human Rights Watch “Burundi: Violence, Rights Violations Mar Elections” http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/01/burundi-violence-rights-violations-mar-elections (accessed 10-08-2013)

Nibigira, Concilie & Scanlon, Helen (2010) “Gender, Peace and Security: The Challenges Facing Transitional Justice Processes in Burundi” International Center for Transitional Justice

Pretoria Protocol 2003

Report of the Secretary General on Burundi (2004)

Strategie Nationale De Securite, Conseil National de Sécurité, Republique du Burundi. Juin 2013

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1545 (2004)

[1] World Bank, last accessed on 25/04/2016.

[2] The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD

[3] CIA World Factbook, Burundi. Last access on 23 June 2017. 

[4] Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie

[5] Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération

[6] http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/01/burundi-violence-rights-violations-mar-elections

[7] Human Rights Watch Report on Burundi (2012)

[8] RFI Afrique, Burundi: deux des principaux opposants au président Nkurunziza de retour d’exil , 10 mars 2010

[9] RFI Afrique, Vawe of Violence in Burundi before the Presidential Election , 27 June 2010. 

[10] Thierry de Vircoulon, Lessons from the Burundi Crisis: the Failures of Democratic Peacebuilding, l’IFRI Note, June 2016.

[11] UN Security Council, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission électorale des nations Unies au Burundi , 7 July 2015. S/2015/510. 

[12] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi , 7 July2015, S/2015/510. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Report of the Delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on its fact-finding mission to Burundi, 7 - 13 December 2015. 

[13]African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Report of the Delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on its fact-finding mission to Burundi,  7 - 13 December 2015. 

[14] OHCHR, Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on the situation in Burundi, 29 June 2016. 

[15] UNHCR, Refugees from Burundi related to the current situation – breakdown per country, Last access on 23 June 2017. 

[6] Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement for Burundi(2000)

[7] Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi (2003)

[8] Report of the Secretary General on Burundi (2004)

[9] UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1545 (2004)

[10] Human Rights Watch Report on Burundi 2012

[11] CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – August 2010:No.3

[12] The document is available on the CNS web site: http://spcns-burundi.net/

[13] CIGI Security Sector Reform : Burundi – August 2010:No.3

[14] Freedom House (2013) “Freedom in the World: Burundi”, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/burundi

[15] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13085066

[16] Pretoria Protocol 2003

[17] Pretoria Protocol 2003

[18] CIGI Security Sector Reform: Burundi – August 2010:No.3

[19] Freedom House (2013) “Freedom in the World: Burundi”, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/burundi

[20] Amnesty International Annual Report 2013: Burundi http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/burundi/report-2013

[21] Amnesty International Annual Report 2013: Burundi http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/burundi/report-2013

[22] Impunity Watch Policy Brief December 2014 : http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/IW_Policy_Brief_Election_of_TRC_Commissioners_(Dec_2014).pdf 

[23] African Development Bank.”Burundi: Country Strategy paper 2012-2016”. October 2011

[24] Development Gateway. “AMP Burundi”Septemer 2011

[25] See: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48150#.U76WzBCSyJk UN News Centre, 27 June 2014

[26] General Principles for the Conduct of the 2015 Elections, see: http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2961&ctl=Details&mid=5312&ItemID=1887751&language=en-US

[27] Gustavo de Carvalho, ISS Pretoria, 10 July 2014, see: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35435:iss-the-uncertain-future-of-peacebuilding-in-burundi&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111

The International Security Sector Advisory Team

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provides practical support to the international community in its efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. It does this by working with a group of member states and institutions to develop and promote good security and justice reform practices and principles, and by helping its members to build their capacity to support national and regional security and justice reform processes.