The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict.
Crisis Group is currently seeking an Analyst on Somalia. Based in the region, the Analyst will research and produce policy reports on conflict-related issues, including security and governance, in Somalia and the region. Experience in political analysis and conflict prevention and three years professional experience in government, academia, international organisations, NGOs or journalism are required. A strong knowledge of Somali/and or Arabic is an advantage.
For more information on the vacancy Analyst, Somalia, kindly follow the link.
Based in one of Crisis Group’s offices, the Analyst will research and contribute to the production of policy reports on International Crisis Group’s coverage of Iran, with a focus on the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 and Iran’s regional policies. S/he will also practically support meetings and events organised by Crisis Group.
An excellent verbal and written command of Persian and English is required.
For more details on this vacancy, kindly follow the link.
As a member of the EU Advocacy & Research team, the Analyst will support EU research and advocacy activities with a particular focus on an assigned geographical region.
- Maintain contact with Crisis Group advocacy/field staff to disseminate information and ensure consistent advocacy messaging;
- Help coordinate the advocacy itineraries for Crisis Group program and project directors and analysts during their visits to Brussels;
- Provide EU policy advice and thematic research support to field and advocacy staff on issues relevant to Crisis Group’s program activities in conflict prevention and resolution;
- Draft written material on conflict issues and European policies as directed;
- Hold advocacy meetings with relevant officials in the EU institutions and member states when required; and,
- Carry out administrative duties relevant to the work of the EU Advocacy & Research unit.
Candidates who are interested in this role are invited to submit their application via this website before 15 October 2016.
- A degree in European studies, conflict studies, political science, international relations or similar;
- Minimum two years of professional experience in European advocacy or policy environment;
- Proven familiarity with international think tanks, NGOs, and multilateral organisations;
- Demonstrated knowledge and understanding of EU foreign policy and related institutions;
- Excellent administrative and organizational skills and an ability to pay close attention to detail;
- Fluency in English and French required;
- Excellent oral and written communication skills; and,
- Authorisation to work in the EU.
To access the full description of the Analyst, EU Advocacy & Research job opening, kindly follow the link.
The International Crisis group is looking for a Senior Analyst based in Mexico. The Senior Analyst will research and produce reports and derivative products on security, political, legal, governance, human rights and social issues related to Mexico. He / she will conduct extensive field research into prevailing issues in Mexico, provide written analyses on the key issues, prepare detailed reports and briefing papers, propose policy initiatives for governmental, intergovernmental, political, and non-governmental stakeholders to address the underlying issues and provide general support to the Program Director with respect to current and future Crisis Groups activities and projects in the region.
For this position, fluency in English and Spanish is essential as well as the ability to formulate well-targeted policy recommendations.
To access the full description of the Senior Analyst job opening, kindly follow the link.
Based in the New York International Crisis Group Office and reporting to the Director Multilateral Affairs/Head of New York Office, the Analyst will research and produce reports on the evolution of the membership, tactics, strategies and ideologies of various non-state armed groups.
For access to the full job description for Analyst, Non-State Armed Groups, kindly follow the link.
Reporting to the Project Director South Asia & Senior Adviser Asia, the Senior Analyst will research and produce reports on security, political, legal, governance, human rights and social issues related to Afghanistan.
For the full job description, kindly follow the link.
Reporting to the Project Director South Asia & Senior Adviser Asia, the Senior Analyst will research and produce reports on security, political, legal, governance, human rights and social issues related to Afghanistan.
For more details, kindly follow the link.
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Based in the region, the Senior Analyst will research and produce reports on security, political, legal, governance, human rights, and social issues related to Afghanistan.
- Conducts extenisve field research into prevailing issues of Afghanistan;
- Provides written analyses on the key issues;
- Prepares detailed reports, briefing papers and derivative products (op eds, blogs, short notes) seeting out relevant research findings and policy recommendations in concise and clear fashion;
- Proposes policy initiatives for governmental, intergovernemtnal, political, and non-governmental stakeholders to address the underlying ussues;
- Advocates,both locally, nationally and internationally, when appropriate, and represents Crisis Group at events, meetings and in media interviews;
- Provide general support to the Project and/or Program Director with respect to current and future Crisis Group activities and projects in the region and;
- Supervises a small research team and field office.
Applications will be accepted until the appropriate candidate is selected.
Since March 2015, a civil war has been raging in Yemen involving several outside military powers. April Longley Alley, International Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula, explains how Yemen reached this destructive impasse.
For full access to the video about War in Yemen, kindly follow the link.
In this video, Crisis Group's Project Director for Turkey Nigar Göksel explains the main findings of the report Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence and advocates a long-term strategy to integrate Syrian refugees into Turkish society.
For details and full access to the video Integrating Syrian Refugees in Turkey, kindly follow the link.
Policy and Research Papers
Après l’élection d’Alpha Condé à la présidence en novembre 2010, des élections législatives doivent clôturer une nouvelle étape de la transition politique guinéenne. La récente expérience de politisation violente des ethnicités et le manque de confiance des acteurs politiques dans le dispositif électoral sont des motifs d’inquiétude. Le président Condé a engagé unilatéralement une refonte du système électoral, mais il suscite d’autant plus de méfiance que les perspectives du parti présidentiel pour les législatives sont incertaines. Il n’a prêté que peu d’attention, et bien tard, à la réconciliation et au dialogue avec son opposition, très mobilisée. La Guinée ne peut se permettre ni un bricolage du système électoral ni une nouvelle campagne fondée sur des arguments ethniques. Un accroissement des tensions à l’approche du scrutin pourrait susciter des violences intercommunautaires. Il pourrait aussi offrir une opportunité d’agir à ceux qui, dans l’armée, se satisfont mal d’avoir regagné les casernes. L’attaque lancée le 19 juillet 2011 par des militaires contre la résidence du président confirme la réalité de ce risque. Il y a donc aussi une necessité pour la réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS), pour laquelle la communauté internationale avait marqué sa disponibilité dès la prise de pouvoir du général Konaté. Sur ce point très sensible, les progrès ont été lents.
Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeated pledges over the last nine years, the majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions. Lack of justice has destabilised the country and judicial institutions have withered to near non-existence. Many courts are inoperable and those that
do function are understaffed. Insecurity, lack of proper training and low salaries have driven many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those who remain are highly
susceptible to corruption. Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about the legal system, and there is little evidence that the Afghan government has the resources or
political will to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently, has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid an atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority of Afghans have been forced to accept the rough justice of Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of the country that lie beyond government control.
To reverse these trends, the Afghan government and international community must prioritise the rule of law as the primary pillar of a vigorous counter-insurgency strategy
that privileges the protection of rights equally alongside the protection of life. Restoration of judicial institutions must be at the front and centre of the strategy aimed at stabilising the country. The Afghan government must do more to ensure that judges, prosecutors and defence attorneys understand enough about the law to ensure its
fair application. Reinvigoration of the legal review process and the adoption of a more dynamic, coordinated approach to justice sector reform are critical to changing
the system. Justice is at the core of peace in Afghanistan and international engagement must hew to the fundamental goal of restoring the balance of powers in government and confronting governmental abuses, past and present. Urgent action is also needed to realign international assistance to strengthen support for legal education, case management, data collection and legal aid.
This paper cautions that unless there is an opening of political space and a participatory transition, the soon to be independent government risks recreating the kind of centralised, authoritarian and ultimately unstable state it finally managed to escape. The ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cobbled together an important, though tentative, Southern consensus ahead of the January 2011 referendum. But its choke-hold on power and a “winner-takes-all” approach to the transition have since jeopardised those gains. Meanwhile, armed insurgencies, militia activity and army defections highlight internal fault lines and latent grievances within the security sector.
This report focuses on a deteriorating criminal justice sector that fails to prevent or prosecute crime and protects the powerful while victimising the underprivileged. Heavily overpopulated, understaffed and poorly managed, prisons have become a fertile breeding ground for criminality and militancy, with prisoners more likely to return to crime than to abandon it.
With outdated laws and procedures, bad practices and poor oversight, the criminal justice system is characterised by long detentions without trial and few distinctions made between minor and major criminals. Prisons have nearly 33,000 more prisoners than authorised, the large majority remand prisoners awaiting or on trial. Given weak accountability mechanisms for warders and prison superintendents, torture and other abuses are rampant and rarely checked. A permissive environment, along with abysmal living conditions, has made prisons a hotbed of drug abuse, violence, and criminality. Illegal detentions by the military, by exacerbating local grievances, also create a fertile ground for militant recruitment, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
What risk does prison overcrowding, understaffing and insecurity pose for wider security and justice sector reform efforts in Haiti? This policy briefing from the International Crisis Group examines the problems facing the Haitian prison system. It argues that extreme prison overcrowding threatens Haiti’s security and stability. The most urgent need is to relieve existing prisons by using other space temporarily, while supporting the detention commission in accelerating treatment of pre-trial cases. These measures must be accompanied by construction to meet prison requirements for a generation.
Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan - Asia Report N°255 | 23 January 2014
Since the end of Burundi’s decade-old civil war in 2000, the country has faced a problematic land legacy, with the need to resettle hundreds of thousands of unfairly deprived refugees and displaced persons. Restitution is essential to consolidate peace, but amid acute land tensions due to demographic growth and the scarcity of available arable lands, the current policy is weakening peacebuilding efforts and reviving ethnic resentment. It gives advantage to repatriated citizens to the detriment of current land owners, who were not all complicit in land thefts during the civil war. In order to avoid restitution being perceived as revanchist, a new land reconciliation policy is required, more aligned with the spirit of the 2000 Arusha peace agreement.
This report, the second in a two-part series on failures and deficiencies of land reform in Burundi, analyses the dilemma between reconciliation and restitution. If these two national objectives are not properly balanced, restitutions can lead to a revival of past ethnic tensions and, by repairing one injustice through another, create frustration and resentment.
Burundi, whose population lives mainly in rural areas, is facing two land problems. The first is structural and due to poor land management, particularly in a context of high population growth, which generates violence and crime. The second is a legacy of the civil war that deprived hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people of their properties. Only renewed focus and fresh thinking can help prevent rural criminal violence. However, instead of meaningful reform, only a review of the land code has been implemented. The impact of the absence of a comprehensive change in land governance, especially on conflict resolution, will continue to fuel public resentment, especially for those who have been dispossessed of their properties or have limited access to land ownership. The sense of injustice and the pressing need for land will likely contribute to future conflicts unless the government adopts a new approach.
This report, the first in a two-part series, examines why reform has failed to improve land governance since the 2000 Arusha agreement. It suggests a way forward to relaunch land reform initiatives in a comprehensive and coherent manner. A second report will analyse the complex land restitution policy for refugees and displaced persons.
Little more than five years ago, Liberia was emerging from fourteen years of brutal war and pillage that had left it in ruins. today, it has a democratically elected president, and the security sector is experiencing reforms that are unprecedented not only in the country, but in the world. Under cover of a 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force, it drew both its army and defence ministry to zero, in order to recruit, vet and train the personnel for these institutions from the ground up. Such "root and branch" security sector reform (SSR) was bold. But, given the many abuses perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) both before and during the civil war, the vast majority of Liberians supported it.
Since the December 2010-January 2011 uprising, Tunisia has successfully overcome successive political crises, yet seems less able to absorb the impact of major jihadi attacks. As a result of the successful national dialogue, 2014 began on a note of optimism that led to a significant reduction in political tensions, but concerns are growing again. At the heart of this anxiety are an increase in violence along the Algerian border; the chaotic situation in Libya; and the advance of radical Islamism in the Middle East – all made all the more acute by an alarmist anti-terrorist discourse. An echo chamber for the conflicts agitating the region, Tunisia needs to tackle terrorism in a calm and depoliticised manner. The fights against terrorism and organised crime are inextricably linked. In addition to security measures, the government should take new economic and social initiatives that would ensure border communities trust and support the state.
Click here to access the report.
Les partenaires internationaux de la Guinée-Bissau se réuniront à Bruxelles le 25 mars pour étudier le dossier crucial de la RSS. Cette analyse effectuée par l'International Crisis Group argumente que la configuration actuelle n'a jamais été aussi favorable à des avancées dans ce secteur: l'armée a été décrédibilisée par son dernier coup d'Etat en 2012; les élections de 2014 ont porté au pouvoir des responsables politiques moins dépendants des militaires car légitimés par les électeurs et appuyés par les partenaires internationaux; enfin, ces derniers sont moins divisés qu'en 2012. Cette occasion ne doit pas être manquée. Ce rapport contient donc un certain nombre de recommendations, à la fois concernant le rôle des partenaires internationaux de la Guinée-Bissau, et sur l'amélioration des institutions nationales de défense et de sécurité. Dans l'ensemble, tous les acteurs doivent garder à l'esprit que la réforme se fait dans la longue durée et qu'elle nécessite un arbitrage fin entre des groupes et réseaux aux intérêts divergents.
Ce rapport existe aussi en anglais.
A moins de quatre mois de l’échéance, la transition au Burkina Faso doit concentrer tous ses efforts sur les élections d’octobre. Dans un contexte marqué par des tensions politiques et une forte agitation sociale, l’exclusion des représentants de l’ancien pouvoir des prochains scrutins, inscrite dans le nouveau code électoral, ouvre la porte à d’interminables arguties juridiques et menace le respect du calendrier électoral. Elle rend possible la mise à l’écart d’un pan entier du monde politique. Faute de pouvoir s’exprimer dans les urnes, celui-ci pourrait être tenté de le faire par d’autres moyens ou d’essayer de saboter le processus électoral. Il n’est toutefois pas trop tard pour atténuer les risques. Le gouvernement peut encore préciser le code électoral par décret. Par ailleurs, le dialogue entre les acteurs politiques et sociaux de tous bords doit être maintenu, idéalement par la mise en place d’un cadre de concertation. Le Conseil constitutionnel, qui statuera en dernier recours sur l’éligibilité des candidats, doit rester fidèle à la lettre et à l’esprit inclusifs de la charte de la transition et de la Constitution.
Cette analyse publiée par l'International Crisis Group revient sur la période de transition vécue par le Burkina Faso et propose une série de mesures dans le domaine de la justice et de la sécurité, encourageant le dialogue politique entre représentants de tous pans de la société et le renforcement de la transparence dans la planification de réformes de la sécurité et de la justice.
The huge, sparsely populated, impoverished Sahel is affected by growing numbers of jihadi extremists and illicit activities, including arms, drugs and human trafficking, estimated to generate $3.8 billion annually. Borders are porous, government reach limited. Populations and unemployment are soaring. Within this perfect storm of actual and potential instability, criminal networks increasingly overrun Central Sahel – the Fezzan in Libya’s south, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin. State authority is weak in relatively stable Niger. To the south, the radical Islamist, primarily Nigerian, Boko Haram insurgency is responsible for thousands of civilian deaths and more than a million displaced. Western and regional counter-terrorism efforts are insufficient, but neither have more integrated approaches proposed by the EU and UN borne fruit. Without holistic, sustained action against entrenched criminal networks, misrule and underdevelopment, instability is likely to spread and exacerbate radicalisation and migration.
This report, published by the International Crisis Group, argues that, to reverse the Sahel’s deepening instability – in particular deterioration in already precarious Niger – national governments and external actors need not only to manage the short term, but also to take a long view. This would involve committing to sustained efforts to shore-up fragile states by consistently and transparently promoting good governance and durable development, as well as to resolve existing conflicts and address their humanitarian consequences.
You can read the executive summary and download the full report here.
Lebanon is surviving internal and regional strains remarkably well, but this resilience has become an excuse for tolerating political dysfunction. If the Lebanese political class does not take immediate steps like holding long-overdue elections, fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law, its complacency will only make an eventual fall harder and costlier.
Read the executive summary and download the full report here.
Based on a report in French published by the International Crisis Group, this executive summary provides a comprehensive analysis of security reforms underway in Tunisia in response to recent terrorist attacks. It argues namely that to tackle jihadi violence, as well as better manage political and social conflict, a thorough reform of the internal security forces will be necessary. The report further formulates a number of key recommendations to the president and the government, to the main political parties, the Assembly of the People's Representatives and international institutions and partner states in the security domain.
In the year since the 2014 Gaza war, little has been done to alter the conditions that precipitated it. The so-called Palestinian government of national consensus, formed in June 2o14 and seated in the West Bank, has been reconstituted without Hamas’s consent. Viewing Gaza as a trap, it refuses responsibility for governing it. Though it lacks the ability and desire to exercise authority there, it continues to collect tax revenues on all Gaza imports as the internationally recognised power. The Hamas government relied on taxes from goods smuggled through Gaza-Egypt tunnels, but those, together with the sole border crossing with Egypt, were shut after President Abdelfattah el-Sisi took power in Cairo in July 2013. To forestall another conflict, Israel has loosened the closure regime somewhat. But this does not address Gaza’s needs: the acting government lacks funds; its economy is a shambles; and most Gazans have no access to the outside world. More must be done on these, or the next war is probably just a matter of time.
Ce Rapport Afrique n°229 publié par l'International Crisis Group (IGC) s'intéresse de façon détaillée à la menace du radicalisme religieux au Cameroun. Le développement de l’intolérance religieuse y est un risque réel, mais malheureusement sous-estimé par les autorités. Afin d’éviter la propagation de l’extrémisme violent sur son territoire, le Cameroun doit rassembler toutes les confessions religieuses autour d’un nouveau pacte social et l’entériner par une charte de la tolérance religieuse.
Le résumé du rapport, ainsi qu'une version à télécharger, sont disponibles en ligne.
L’Algérie est en passe de devenir un intermédiaire indispensable de la stabilité en Afrique du Nord et au Sahel. Toutefois, le pays a besoin de meilleures stratégies à long terme pour faire face aux pressions financières, à un voisinage dans la tourmente, à des menaces jihadistes transfrontalières, aux tensions continues avec la France et le Maroc, et enfin avec une transition politique générationnelle non résolue qui paralyse les institutions.
Lien vers le document: L'Algérie et ses voisins
Devolved government in Kenya’s newly formed north-eastern counties, designed to address decades of political marginalisation and underdevelopment, has been undermined by dominant clans monopolising power and growing corruption. Violent clan competition and antipathy between elected county elites and the remaining national administrative structures have allowed the violently extremist Al-Shabaab movement to expand and operate with relative impunity across large areas of the North East. Its attacks exposed security-service disarray and caused a sharp reversal of already stretched state services in this vast and poor region that shares a porous 680km border with Somalia.
Read full report: Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security
Après un été 2015 marqué par de nouveaux affrontements au Nord Mali, une détente surprenante est survenue en octobre à l’issue de pourparlers entre des responsables de la Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), principale coalition rebelle, et ceux de la Plateforme d’Alger, regroupement de mouvements proches de l’Etat malien.
Le processus de paix reste cependant fragile. L’attaque de l’hôtel Radisson le 20 novembre rappelle que les groupes radicaux tenus à l’écart du processus de paix demeurent une force de nuisance. Par ailleurs, il ne faut pas confondre un moment d’accalmie avec le retour d’une paix durable.
Rapport complet: Mali: la paix venue d’en bas?
On 6 September 2015, a reform council appointed by Thailand’s military-run administration, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), rejected a constitution prepared by a drafting committee it had itself appointed. With the draft scuppered, the military regime extended its tenure by at least seven months, backtracking on the roadmap to “fully-functioning democracy” it announced after the May 2014 coup and delaying a general election until mid-2017.
Read full report: Thailand’s Lengthening Roadmap to Elections
The 8 November elections were a major waypoint in Myanmar’s transition from authoritarian rule. Holding a peaceful, orderly vote in a context of little experience of electoral democracy, deep political fissures and ongoing armed conflict in several areas was a major achievement for all political actors, the election commission and the country as a whole. The victorious National League for Democracy (NLD) needs to use the four-month transitional period before it takes power at the end of March 2016 wisely, identifying key appointees early so that they have as much time as possible to prepare for the substantial challenges ahead.
Full report available: The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications
A major breach of the agreement signed in Addis Ababa and Juba in August to end South Sudan’s now two-year old civil war is increasingly likely. While low-level conflict is continuing in Unity state, conflict is now escalating in the Equatorias and Western Bahr el Ghazal. Many of the disparate members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) reject the agreement, while the government shies from implementing a deal it believes is to its detriment. The heads of state of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, the regional body that mediated the agreement), former Botswanan President Festus Moghae, head of the agreement’s Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), and key states that partnered with IGAD, including China, Norway, the U.S. and the UK, must take urgent, united action to put the peace process back on track or South Sudan will enter the new year at war again.
Link to the paper: South Sudan: On the Brink of Renewed War
With the nuclear accord between Tehran and world powers in force, a chief question is what it means for Iran. The clash between competing visions of the country’s future has heightened since the deal. Many, there and abroad, believe it could rebalance domestic politics. It not only has boosted the profile of those who promoted it, but, more fundamentally, it has opened space for new debates in a domestic sphere that was dominated by the nuclear issue for more than a decade. Yet, the political system, with its multiple power centres and tutelary bodies, inherently favours continuity. As its guardians try to quell the deal’s reverberations and preserve the balance of power, any attempt by Western countries to play politics within the Iranian system – for instance by trying to push it in a “moderate” direction – could well backfire. If world powers hope to progress on areas of concern and common interest, they must engage Iran as it is, not the Iran they wish to see. To start, all sides should fulfil their commitments under the nuclear deal.
Full paper: Iran After the Nuclear Deal
Locked in their deadliest violence in two decades, the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) should urgently resume peace talks. The return to a military-based approach to the conflict and domestic political polarisation, fuelled by a spillover of the Syrian conflict, have dismantled the achievements of peace talks undertaken during the 2.5-year ceasefire which collapsed in July 2015. Bloody urban battles in the south east have since then given the conflict a new, unpredictable momentum. The failure to secure peace has cost more than 550 lives – up to 150 of them civilian, including that of the well-known human rights lawyer and Diyarbakır bar association head Tahir Elçi on 28 November. Turkey faces a critical choice: to advance its military strategy against the PKK in a fight that is bound to be protracted and inconclusive, or to resume peace talks. Whichever course it chooses, however, a comprehensive solution to the Kurdish issue will necessitate addressing longstanding Kurdish rights demands.
Full paper available here: A Sisyphean Task? Resuming Turkey-PKK Peace Talks
Venezuela’s opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) coalition obtained a crushing victory in the 6 December parliamentary elections, putting an end to fifteen years of domination of the legislature by parties associated with former President Hugo Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro and opening up the possibility of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis afflicting the country. The MUD overcame extremely adverse campaign conditions and surpassed its own most optimistic forecasts, winning 112 of the 167 seats in the National Assembly (AN). This gives it a two-thirds majority in parliament, and with it the opportunity to exercise control not only over the legislative agenda but also, to some degree, over the government. Despite this development, the two sides will need all their creativity and imagination, as well as the political will, to agree solutions to the country’s urgent problems. The international community should support these efforts.
Full paper available here: The End of Hegemony: What Next for Venezuela?
La victoire de Roch Marc Christian Kaboré à l’élection présidentielle du 29 novembre montre que les Burkinabè aspirent autant au changement qu’à la continuité. Des défis considérables attendent le nouveau gouvernement : fortes demandes socioéconomiques, exigence de justice, lutte contre la corruption et l’impunité, réforme de l’armée et insécurité régionale.
Document disponible ici: Burkina Faso : transition acte II
Guatemala is enjoying a rare moment of opportunity. A new president, Jimmy Morales, bolstered by a landslide victory, has taken office promising to end corruption. The old political elite is in disarray. Emboldened citizens are pressing for reforms to make justice more effective and government more transparent. Behind these changes is a unique multilateral experiment, the UN-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), whose investigators work with national prosecutors to dismantle criminal networks within the state. CICIG is not a permanent fix, however. Guatemala will lose its opportunity unless national leaders assume the fight against impunity as their own, approve stalled justice and security sector reforms and muster the financial resources to strengthen domestic institutions.
Please kindly follow the link to access the document: Crutch to Catalyst? The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
According to the International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe is floundering, with little sign of meaningful reform and sustainable, broad-based recovery. Governance deficits, political violence, corruption, electoral reform, human rights and rule-of-law violations are deep challenges that must be faced. Therefore, international actors should seek common ground and action that addresses these sensitive political challenges and also promote an inclusive, sustainable economic recovery. Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries – South Africa, in particular – have specific interest in ensuring Zimbabwe recovers its position as a lynchpin of stability and an engine for regional development. To do so, they, the U.S., UK, China, the European Union (EU), African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) should develop an engagement framework that has clear governance, rule-of-law, financial, and economic objectives and enables monitoring and assessment.
Access the full report on Zimbabwe: Stranded in Stasis by following the link.
One year after President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term sparked the crisis in Burundi, the International Crisis Group (ICG) publishes a report on the dynamics leading to the current situation and on the tensions running through the country. ICG then presents recommendations to all implicated actors, national or international, state or non-state, in order to reduce tensions and restart the dialogue, prevent a descent into ethnic conflict and be ready to intervene in case of mass violence, and mitigate the impact of the economic and social crisis on the population.
To access an executive summary and the recommendations of the ICG report on Burundi - A Dangerous Third Term, kindly follow the link. The full report in French can also be downloaded.
Malgré la signature de l’accord de paix de Bamako en juin 2015 et la présence de forces internationales dans le pays depuis plus de trois ans, la crise au Mali est loin d’être résorbée. Les violences armées sont en augmentation dans certaines zones. Depuis le début de l’année 2015, des groupes armés mal identifiés, dont certains se revendiquent comme jihadistes, ont lancé des attaques contre plusieurs villes du centre du pays. Elles ont d’autant plus surpris que l’essentiel des incidents armés étaient jusqu’alors concentré au Nord. A la suite de ces attaques, de nombreux fonctionnaires ont fui plusieurs préfectures du centre. Les populations ont le sentiment que l’administration malienne les abandonne à leur sort. Des groupes radicaux en profitent pour s’implanter et diffuser des messages hostiles à l’Etat et à ses partenaires étrangers. Alors que les efforts se focalisent toujours sur le Nord, le centre du pays reste largement négligé par l’accord de Bamako issu des pourparlers de paix intermaliens.
Ce rapport publié par l’International Crisis Group analyse les dynamiques qui expliquent l’extension des zones d’insécurité au centre du Mali et décrit les groupes qui en sont responsables. Cet espace central est organisé autour du delta intérieur du fleuve Niger, territoire inondable particulièrement fertile et donc objet de convoitise ; les zones exondées alentours sont partagées entre agriculteurs et éleveurs. Ce rapport se concentre sur les territoires les plus touchés par les violences armées, c’est-à-dire la région administrative de Mopti, principalement les cercles de Ténenkou, Youwarou et Douentza ainsi que le Nord de la région de Ségou, près de la frontière mauritanienne. Il prévient des risques qui menacent cette partie du Mali et formule des propositions concrètes pour endiguer le développement des violences armées. Il est le fruit de plusieurs séries d’entretiens avec les principaux acteurs politiques et militaires, des diplomates, des membres de la société civile et des responsables religieux à Bamako et dans la région de Mopti en février et octobre 2015 puis en janvier et mars 2016.
Pour accéder au rapport Mali central : la fabrique d’une insurrection ?, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.
After almost 70 years of armed conflict that has targeted and devastated the lives of minority communities, the new government of Myanmar, which took power on 30 March 2016, inherited a peace process.
Seeking for a political settlement, the efforts are currently oriented towards the negotiations to convince the armed groups to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in order to have a broader political dialogue. To ensure such goal, the government is recommended to demonstrate a less unilateral approach to the process in general and to guaranty that the civil society women and youth are fully and equally involved.
However, several challenges are facing this process including the weak capacity of the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC), the forceful posture of the military on the ground, the difficulty to include all the parties of the political society and the fragility of the political and security environment.
This paper presents in its first part an overview on the roots of the peace process and its framework as well as the role played by the NCA. The second part will be devoted to the features of the new approach which has been set up and followed by the current government in order to tackle in priority the peace process. This intention had been clear through the “Union Peace Conference” during which nearly all armed groups were presented.
Finally, the paper attempts to highlight the fundamental doubts concerning the peace process such as the possibility of implementing a negotiated federal solution, the concerns of sub-minorities and the question of the legitimacy of the negotiated solutions.
To access the Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue kindly follow the link.
This briefing paper analyses the current situation in Kyrgyzstan and highlights some factors which create a favourable environment for radical groups and the need for weaknesses such as high unemployment, inadequate education and absence of rule-of-law to be addressed for the state to be stable. The author argues that the most effective response is to look for political solutions with the goal of winning over communities and thus reducing extremists' space. He explains why, framing the response as "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE) is a term that may alienate the communities needing help as well as give an excuse for more represseive policies if reconciliation fails.
To access the briefing paper Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation kindly follow the link.
This briefing paper from the International Crisis Group is based on fieldwork in Bukavu, Goma, Lubumbashi and Kinshasa and is part of a series of publications on the DRC’s broader electoral process. Demonstrations in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), turned violent on 19 September 2016, when the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) should have launched the constitutionally-required presidential election process. The author argues that to prevent more violence, Congo’s partners need to use diplomatic and financial tools to focus the actors, particularly the majority, on the need to move rapidly to credible elections. They also need to use their leverage and public positions to minimise violence while the political blockage continues.
To access the briefing paper Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The “Street” and Politics in DR Congo kindly follow the link.
This report is a detailed assessment on the failure of the UN-brokered peace process in Libya and on the unresolved pressing issues like worsening living conditions, control of oil facilities, people-smuggling, and the struggle against jihadist groups. The report concludes that regional and global actors involved in the diplomatic process over Libya should converge on common goals, push for a renegotiation of the accord, use their influence to restrain the belligerents and nudge them toward a political solution and participation in a security track.
For full access to The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset, kindly follow the link.
Dans cet article, les réfugiés burundais évoquent les raisons et les conditions de leur fuite, ainsi que la façon dont ils envisagent l’avenir. Cette enquête est le fruit de plus de 50 entretiens menés entre février et août 2016 en Tanzanie, en Ouganda, en Belgique, au Kenya et au Rwanda. Les témoignages sélectionnés illustrent la diversité des parcours des exilés burundais ; ils dévoilent des expériences douloureuses et révèlent leur désir de tirer la sonnette d’alarme face à la violence du conflit qui frappe leur pays.
Pour accéder à Réfugiés burundais : la vie en exil , veuillez cliquer sur le lien.
The death toll in Turkey's Southeast rose nearly 10 per cent over the past three months as domestic political and regional dynamics propel the 32-year-old conflict deeper into a more violent trend. This brief comprises of a multi-layered collection of open-source data collected over the past five years by Crisis Group to aid policymakers and public opinion better understand what exactly is happening and what options are available to de-escalate the conflict.
For full access to Turkey’s PKK Conflict Veers onto a More Violent Path, kindly follow the link.
Unresolved conflicts and breakaway territories divide five out of six of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership countries, most of them directly backed by the Russian Federation. But a policy of isolating the people living in these conflict regions narrows the road to peace. Based on the daily experiences of people in regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Donetsk, Lugansk and Transnistria this paper sheds light on the daily life in conflicts that are unlikely to be resolved soon.
For full access to Isolation of Post-Soviet Conflict Regions Narrows the Road to Peace, kindly follow the link.
Cameroon’s military campaign against the Boko Haram insurgency started late but has met with partial success. To consolidate gains and bring lasting peace to the Far North, the government must now shift to long-term socioeconomic development, countering religious radicalism and reinforcing public services.
For full access to the report Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram (available only in French), kindly follow the link.
This report examines the emergence of a new form of organised violent resistance in the Muslim-majority northern parts of Myanmar’s Rakhine State. It is important to know and acknowledge the perspectives of Rakhine Buddhists and their strongly-felt grievances. The current violence, however, is qualitatively different from anything in recent decades and has fundamental implications for the situation in the troubled state and potentially for Myanmar’s transition as a whole. The report looks at the establishment of a new armed group, its objectives and international links; the response of the government and security forces; and the implications for the people of Rakhine State and the country.
For full access to the report Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, kindly follow the link.
Fighting in Juba in July ended efforts that had brought President Salva Kiir and former First Vice President Riek Machar together in a transitional government. Since then, Kiir has played a weak hand well, reconfiguring domestic and regional politics in his favour. Machar’s exile makes the president more amenable to certain compromises. The result has been calm in the capital, while national peace remains distant with much of the country under fragile local truces or in conflict. The government’s ability to balance its military and diplomatic advantages with peacemaking will determine whether conflict diminishes. Regional consensus to support it and isolate armed opposition groups presents a brief window when a strengthened Juba’s political calculations favour ending conflicts. Regional and wider international powers should seize the opportunity to push strongly for inclusive national dialogue and negotiations with rebel groups focused on politics (eg, governance arrangements), local security dynamics, the economy and communal relations rather than military-based solutions.
For full access to the report South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard, kindly follow the link.
Central American gangs are responsible for brutal acts of violence, abuse of women and forced displacement of thousands. Based on interviews with officials and experts in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, this report discusses new forms of regional collaboration in law enforcement among the countries of the Northern Triangle.
For full access to the paper, Mafia of the Poor: Gang Violence and Extortion in Central America, kindly follow the link.
Le plan de résolution du conflit au Kivu consistant à privilégier la solution militaire s’avère être un échec. Deux années après le début du rapprochement entre le président Congolais Joseph Kabila et son homologue rwandais Paul Kagame, les soldats gouvernementaux sont encore aux prises avec des miliciens pour le contrôle des terres et des zones minières. Bien qu’aucune des deux parties n’ait réellement les capacités de prendre un ascendant définitif, elles ont toutes deux les ressources suffisantes pour prolonger la lutte. Dans le même temps, les civils subissent des violences extrêmes et la situation humanitaire se détériore. Les tensions ethniques se sont aggravées à l’annonce des plans de rapatriement de dizaines de milliers de réfugiés congolais qui ont fui au Rwanda durant les années 1990. Le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies a observé la situation se dégrader à l’est du Congo sans s’opposer aux décisions de Kagame et Kabila.
The report outlines the armed forces’ evolution under independent Guinea’s three previous heads of state and the legacies for current reform efforts. Secondly, it looks at the current state of the military and (to a lesser extent) other security forces, considering recruitment issues, indiscipline, impunity, factionalisation, civil-military relations and life
in the armed forces. Thirdly, it considers the efforts at army reform and lays out a way to make them succeed.
This background report explains the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. It is the first in a series of reports which will focus on the national and international policies
needed to take the country out of its incessant cycle of political crises and become a point of stability in the region.
The dysfunctional state of Haiti’s justice system has impeded implementation of democratic reforms since the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. In spite of robust international efforts for six years following Aristide’s 1994 restoration, little lasting progress has been made, and there has even been regression in some areas. The lack of political will of successive Haitian governments has been the major factor but donor approaches have also suffered from flawed methodology.
The earthquake that hit Haiti was the deadliest natural disaster ever in the Western Hemisphere. It caused enormous human suffering and physical destruction, the extent and impact of which were multiplied by the country’s longstanding structural problems, such as pervasive poverty, urban overcrowding, unplanned urbanisation and environmental degradation. A long history of corrupt and inefficient governments, centralised political power, extremely inequitable income distribution and by no means always benign foreign interventions has been immensely compounded by the natural disaster. The consequences threaten to undermine the slight progress toward stability and development that had been made since President René Préval took office in 2006.
This report surveys the Kosovo domestic legal system. More than two years after declaring independence, Kosovo struggles with uneven rule of law and a weak justice system that is failing its citizens. The police, public prosecutors and courts are erratic performers, prone to political interference and abuse of office. Organised crime and corruption are widespread and growing. Realising that prosperity, relations with the European Union (EU) and affirmation as an independent state depend on the rule of law, the government has taken important steps, replacing key officials and passing long-delayed reforms. But critical weaknesses remain, notably in the courts, and the government, supported by the international community, must act swiftly to curtail them.
L'ICG publie une étude sur les relations entre l'Etat malien et les autorités religieuses locales. De nombreux Maliens réclament davantage de régulation de la sphère religieuse, mais un Etat faible et discrédité n’a ni les moyens, ni la légitimité pour intervenir de manière intrusive. La solution réside selon les auteurs dans une régulation à minima et un partenariat entre autorités politiques et religieuses. L'étude développe ainsi des pistes intéressantes pour l'adoption d'une approche RSS, notamment au travers d'une appropriation locale par les acteurs.
Pour accéder à l'étude Islam et politique au Mali : entre réalité et fiction, veuillez suivre le lien.
Two years on, the Burundi crisis shows little sign of resolution. Political and ethnic polarisation are now tearing apart the integrity of the army, long seen as the primary achievement of the Arusha peace agreement in 2000 which brought an end to protracted civil conflict.
For full access to Burundi: The Army in Crisis, kindly follow the link.
Cette étude de l'International Crisis Group évoque les difficultés rencontrées par la RDC dans son entreprise de reconstruction de l'Etat ainsi que les menaces à la sécurité humaine auxquelles font face les populations de l’ex-province du Katanga. Depuis 2015, des tensions parcourent la région. Le mécontentement envers Kinshasa gagne du terrain face aux manœuvres politiques et à une situation économique dégradée, tandis que la région est un enjeu majeur pour le président Kabila, déterminé à se maintenir au pouvoir.
Pour accéder à l'étude RD Congo : dangereuse guerre d’influence dans l’ex-Katanga, veuillez suivre le lien.
Ce rapport d'ICG se penche sur la situation en Tunisie et identifie les principaux chantiers pour la réforme de l'Etat. Malgré la formation d’un gouvernement d’union nationale qui regroupe les principaux partis politiques, un sentiment d’exclusion socio-régional et de délitement de l’Etat s’accroit dans le pays. Plusieurs pistes sont ici étudiées en vue de garantir le respect des principes de l'Etat de droit, qui passent notamment par une réforme du système de la justice et un approfondissement des instances de lutte contre la corruption.
Pour accéder au rapport La transition bloquée : corruption et régionalisme en Tunisie, veuillez suivre le lien.
Cette étude revient sur la situation au Burundi en matière de Réforme des secteurs de la sécurité. La formation dispensée par les partenaires internationaux a pris fin, et sa lucrative participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix à l’étranger est contestée. Une armée divisée et découragée est un risque majeur pour la stabilité du pays. Seul un dialogue entre le gouvernement et l’opposition pourrait donner des assurances aux officiers qui résistent à la politisation de l’institution. Il est plus urgent que jamais.
Pour accéder à l'étude Burundi : l’armée dans la crise, veuillez suivre le lien.
Depuis deux ans, le Niger est en guerre contre Boko Haram. Ce conflit armé pèse sur les équilibres fondamentaux, notamment financiers, de ce pays pauvre et déstabilise le Sud-Est, théâtre principal des affrontements. La lutte contre Boko Haram dans le Sud-Est du Niger suscite des tensions locales et exacerbe les violences intercommunautaires autour de l’accès aux ressources. Face aux limites de l’intervention militaire, les autorités doivent mettre l’accent sur la démobilisation des militants du mouvement, le règlement politique des conflits locaux, ainsi que la relance de l’économie et des services publics.
Pour accéder à l'étude Le Niger face à Boko Haram : au-delà de la contre-insurrection, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.
La campagne militaire camerounaise contre l'insurrection de Boko Haram, bien que lancée tardivement, a rencontré plusieurs succès. Afin de consolider les avancées obtenues et instaurer une paix durable dans le nord du pays, le gouvernement doit désormais se focaliser sur le développement socio-économique sur le long terme, contrer l'islamisme radical et renforcer les services publics.
Pour un accès à l'analyse complète, Cameroun : faire face à Boko Haram veuillez suivre le lien.
This report by the International Crisis Group identifies and analyses the Nigerian military’s ailments, which are spread across the entire system of defence management. It is based on interviews with serving officers in Abuja, retired officers at various locations in the country, personnel involved in operations in the north east and the Niger Delta, defence scholars in research institutions and diplomats in Abuja.
To access the full Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform report, kindly follow the link.
The International Crisis Group analyses the tensions surrounding Tunisia's fight against corruption and "revolutionary justice" measures. Can a renewed commitment by the political class on transitional justice prevent the further spread of corruption and defuse the risks of polarisation in the country?
This International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the third and final in a series analysing the regional dimension of insecurity in Africa and collective and individual state responses, presents the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)’s current institutional apparatus in the field of peace and security, and analyses its responses and deficiencies through three case studies: Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Burkina Faso. It is part of a broader reflection on the changing nature of conflict and growing transnational threats, problems requiring novel solutions which regional bodies are well placed to find. This report considers what institutional reforms need to be undertaken to improve ECOWAS’s collective action in the face of formidable challenges to peace and security in West Africa.
For full access to the ICG report Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa, kindly follow the link.
This report also exists in French.
Depuis octobre 2016, le Cameroun traverse une crise politique. La minorité anglophone, qui se sent marginalisée politiquement et économiquement, exprime sa frustration sur fond de revendications corporatistes. Bien que le gouvernement ait consenti à quelques mesures d'apaisement, il devrait reconstruire la confiance mutuelle avec la minorité anglophone afin d'éviter l’engrenage à la veille des élections générales prévues en 2018.
Pour accéder à Cameroun : la crise anglophone à la croisée des chemins, veuillez cliquer le lien.
Tamil-speaking women in Sri Lanka’s north and east pushed for accountability and truth during the country’s civil war but have been marginalised during the transitional justice process. The government and international actors must include their voices and address their injustices and difficult economic situation to ensure lasting peace.
For full access to Sri Lanka’s Conflict-Affected Women: Dealing with the Legacy of War, kindly follow the link.
Revised and ratified after its shock rejection in October 2016’s referendum, Colombia’s peace agreement still lacks sustainable political support. Reversing public distrust will need swift and effective implementation of the accord – including full apologies for past crimes and the visible handover of weapons by insurgents.
For full access to In the Shadow of “No”: Peace after Colombia’s Plebiscite, kindly follow the link.
La crise centrafricaine est une crise de longue durée, émaillée de violences sporadiques sur fond de désintégration de l’Etat, d’économie de survie et de profonds clivages entre groupes socio-ethniques. Alors que les groupes armés (dont les anti-balaka et les ex-Seleka) se caractérisent par leur criminalisation et leur fragmentation, les tensions intercommunautaires ont mis à mal l’unité nationale et la fabrique sociale centrafricaine.
En Centrafrique, les défis à relever pour les autorités de la transition et les partenaires internationaux imposent de remplacer le programme de désarmement par une politique de désarmement qui ne concerne pas uniquement les miliciens mais aussi les communautés et qui comporte des opportunités réelles et des sanctions effectives. Cela suppose de conserver une capacité de contrainte sur les groupes armés, c’est-à-dire, entre autres, de revoir le calendrier de départ de la force française Sangaris et de réduire les capacités de financement des groupes armés. Cette politique permettra de réduire l’attractivité de l’économie milicienne pour la jeunesse centrafricaine.
Article complet ici
Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia’s only even nominal parliamentary democracy, faces growing internal and external security challenges. Deep ethnic tensions, increased radicalisation in the region, uncertainty in Afghanistan and the possibility of a chaotic political succession in Uzbekistan are all likely to have serious repercussions for its stability. The risks are exacerbated by leadership failure to address major economic and political problems, including corruption and excessive Kyrgyz nationalism.
Full article available here
Latin America Report N°55, 23 October 2015
Horrific, unpunished human rights violations have blurred the lines between politics, government and crime in Mexico’s south-western Guerrero state. Drug gangs not only control the illegal heroin industry and prey on ordinary citizens through kidnapping and extortion, but have also penetrated, paralysed or intimidated institutions obligated to uphold democracy and rule of law. The disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa teaching college in September 2014 by police allegedly acting in league with gangsters was no anomaly. To break the cycle of violence, ensure justice for the disappeared and bring rule of law to an impoverished, turbulent region, the federal government must give prosecution of unsolved disappearances and other major human rights violations in Guerrero to an independent special prosecutor backed by an international investigative commission empowered to actively participate in the proceedings.
For this report, Crisis Group interviewed dozens of victims, business people, activists, journalists and government officials in the cities of Iguala, Chilpancingo and Chilapa during eight visits to the state from October 2014 through August 2015. It also spoke with activists, analysts and federal officials in Mexico City. The focus of this study is the fight against impunity as a necessary part of security and justice reform, particularly in a state that has suffered some of the country’s most severe human rights violations.
See full report of Disappeared: Justice Denied in Mexico’s Guerrero State
Defeat by a wafer-thin margin in the October 2016 plebiscite on the peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency shocked Colombia’s society and political establishment, as well as the accord’s international backers. A revised accord, with numerous changes demanded by opposition leaders, was unveiled less than two months later, but the illusion of consensus was short-lived. Peace with the guerrillas is again set to polarise parties and candidates in elections in 2018. A swift, effective start to implementation of the accord is needed to reverse public wariness and political resistance.
For full access to In the Shadow of “No”: Peace after Colombia’s Plebiscite, kindly follow the link.
With the proliferation of conflicts, weakening international institutions, and rising nationalism, the world faces daunting times ahead. A new coalition of states must come together to promote our collective interest in peace and security.
To access the entire article War Must Not Become the New Normal, kindly click on the link.
Conflict in the impoverished Kasai region was sparked by local grievances but has spread to reflect wider discontent, including frustration over the country’s ongoing political and economic crisis.
To access the entire article Kamuina Nsapu Insurgency Adds to Dangers in DR Congo, kindly click on the link.
Crisis Group’s Watch List 2017 includes the Lake Chad basin, Libya, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sahel, Somalia, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela and Yemen. This annual early-warning report identifies conflict situations in which prompt action by the European Union and its member states would generate stronger prospects for peace.
For full access to the report, Watch List 2017, kindly follow the link.
For an update on the report, Watch List 2017 – First Update with entries on counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia and the Western Balkans, kindly follow the link.