The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), a member of the PASOS network of think tanks, is an independent research centre dedicated to advancing security of citizens and society they live in on the basis of democratic principles and respect for human rights. In the midst of Centre's interest are all policies aimed at improvement of human, national, regional, European and global security.
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, Commander, NATO Training Mission and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, speaking at the Royal United Services Institute.
Civilian crisis management has long been considered the EU’s forte. Recent research however has questioned the EU’s claim to this specialization. I will interrogate how the EU has fared in building civilian capabilities for CSDP through a case study of the impact of the Europeanization of CCM norms in one of the newer EU member states - Poland. I investigate the domestic reverberations of an EU-level CCM governance – conceptualized as a vertical diffusion of norms - and a horizontal diffusion in the realms of policy setting, institutional adaptation, as well as in recruitment and training. I hypothesize that the European cognitive constructions and policy designs are the more likely to impact upon Polish security policy the more they resonate with the ideas embedded in the national security identity.
Another intervening variable affecting the ‘translation’ of EU policy into the domestic context is state capacity. Due to weaknesses
in the supply side of CCM and the refracting impact of national security identity and state capacity, I find that Europeanization has had a limited impact on the civilian response capability-building in Poland. Europeanization has been shallow, featuring adjustments
on the margins rather than the core of the security policy.
Serious political crises in Niger, Honduras, Turkey, Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, and Mauritania in recent years illustrate the continuing influence of security forces on the political trajectories of countries around the world. Examples of such instability are particularly recurrent in Africa. When Africa’s political crises turn into coups, armed insurrections, or tragic confrontations, the defense and security forces (DSF) are invariably key players. For many years, such military actions were justified as an established right of state sovereignty over domestic issues. Often, they were even recognized as such on the international level.
The report outlines the armed forces’ evolution under independent Guinea’s three previous heads of state and the legacies for current reform efforts. Secondly, it looks at the current state of the military and (to a lesser extent) other security forces, considering recruitment issues, indiscipline, impunity, factionalisation, civil-military relations and life
in the armed forces. Thirdly, it considers the efforts at army reform and lays out a way to make them succeed.
This paper builds on questions raised by earlier Saferworld research into IJMs, conducted between November 2009 and April 2010. This research revealed a complex and seemingly disjointed patchwork of donor-supported IJM projects, most of which were operating at a fairly small scale and without clear links either to formal or to other informal justice mechanisms. The research raised a number of challenging questions, including how and why donors first began supporting new IJMs, whether and how these new systems contribute to the strengthening of a broader system of justice in Nepal and to what extent their creation has supported ongoing peacebuilding efforts across the country.
This report studies the transition from civilian to military-dominated police-building in Afghanistan. From 2002, Germany was the lead nation responsible for coordinating international assistance for police-building. The German police programme in Afghanistan was designed as a sustainable project with a civilian approach. However, Germany only invested relatively little funds in the building and reform of the ANP. This reflected the initially rather limited involvement of the international community as a whole in Afghanistan. The United States’ Afghanistan policy relied on cooperation with the warlords as well as on the military regime in Pakistan. This policy served to strengthen the armed opposition forces. Once it became clear that the building of the ANP was not progressing quickly enough, the USA de facto assumed the lead role in police-building in Afghanistan. This meant a change of paradigm from a civilian-based
police reform to a military-based police reform. Militarization was accelerated by the US dominated change of strategy in favour of counterinsurgency in 2009.
The report refers to the problems of the dominance of military elements in building the ANP. It is not clear whether the militarization of the ANP has significantly improved the chances of survival for members of the Afghan police. What is certain is that militarization cannot solve the problem of the weak legitimacy of the Afghan state. There is still a lack of trust between the public and the police, especially as the ANP is inadequately equipped to prevent or solve crimes. Moreover, the possible long-term consequences of militarization are problematic: It is easier to militarize the police now than it will be to drive out the spirit of militarization at a later date. The militarization of the ANP is therefore at the best ineffective and at the worst counterproductive. Only a police force which the people trust can be effective.
The UK Ministry of Defence's Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 provides joint, operational level doctrine for the military contribution to stabilisation.
This will usually take place during or immediately following conflict and in the context of weak or failed states that face a range of challenges to governmental authority that range from criminality to insurgency.
JDP 3-40 identifies the general priorities for stabilising failed or failing states, and determines the nature, level, principles and priorities that govern the UK military contribution and the guidelines governing transition to civilian and host nation control.
DCDC provides two versions of JDP 3-40 (the original and an A4 version) along with a guide and four supporting documents to the JDP.
Post-conflict peacebuilding demands concerted efforts from all stakeholders to ensure its success; particularly, civil society must complement the capacity of the conflict-weary state. A successful peacebuilding, however, requires a harmonious relationship between the state and civil society. This paper analyses state-civil society relations at different phases of Liberia’s protracted post-conflict peacebuilding process. The paper argues that civil society groups have played and continue to play important role in the peacebuilding process in Liberia and therefore need the support of the Liberian state and the international community to continue their watchdog role. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the Liberian experience for other post-conflict states.
The aim of this paper is to account for the evolution of the draft Code, and to examine its relationship (if any) to similar initiatives within and beyond Africa. Following this brief introduction therefore, the paper attempts to place the draft Code within the context of general trends in civil-military relations in Africa. It then traces the evolutionary process of the African Code, within the context of similar and related initiatives and processes in Africa. The paper also identifies the main provisions of the Code. It compares the OSCE Code to the draft African Code, pointing out similarities and differences and the extent to which the former was a model for the latter. The paper then identifies matters arising in the drive to achieve the adoption and implementation of the present draft African Code. The paper is concluded with recommendations which could enrich the CoC and create the basis for more viable articulation of the agenda of democratic control of armedand security forces in Africa.
This volume analyses the role of civil society in the reform and oversight of the security sector in post- communist countries as a key aspect of the transition towards democracy. It is widely accepted that civil society actors have an important contribution to make in the governance of the security sector. However, that specific role has not been subject to much close or comparative examination. This book constitutes an attempt to examine and compare experiences of civil society participation in security oversight across Central and Eastern Europe. The first part of the volume presents the reader with the theoretical and conceptual background against which the potential role of civil society in security sector governance can be understood and assessed. The remainder of the book is comprised of nine country studies of civil society engagement with the security sector. Reviewing developments over the past 15 years of regime transformation in the region, the book draws upon a rich variety of cases that cast light on the different experiences, challenges, and successes of civil society actors and the media in democratization, security sector reform, and the exercise of democratic oversight of the security sector. Marina Caparini is senior fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Philipp H. Fluri is deputy director of DCAF and executive director of DCAF Brussels (Belgium). Ferenc Molnar is a military sociologist and deputy director of the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University, Budapest (Hungary).
Democracy is unlikely to develop or to endure unless military and other security forces are controlled by democratic institutions and necessary safeguards, checks and balances are in place. The result of a 2-year research project managed under the auspices of the European Group on Armed Forces and Society (ERGOMAS) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), this comparative study examines how contemporary European states, both mature Western democracies and emerging democracies of post-communist Europe, manage the issue of how best to control the very institution that has been established for their protection and wields the monopoly of legitimate force. This volume contains 28 case studies from 14 countries: the Czech Republic, Germany, Georgia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland, and the Ukraine. The studies cover a variety of situation from corruption to military incompetence, disobediencetowards civilian superiors, lack of expertise among civilians, to unauthorized strikes and accidents. They focus on the relationship between political, civilian and military actors while identifying problems and dangers that can emerge in those relations to the detriment of effective and legitimate democratic control. This book will be of much interest to students of Civil-Military Relations, military sociology, IR and strategic studies.
Looks at the Caolition Provisional Authority's efforts to rebuild Iraq's security sector and provides lessons learned.
Global Development and Human Security explores the possibility of connecting all countries to the global economy while defusing the social tensions and managing the security risks that can result from exposure to a turbulent international system. The complex intersection between security and development policies has not been adequately mapped or explored. Frail and failing states that lack sound market and security institutions are the weak links in an interconnected global system. Yet aid allocation principles discourage engagement with these "difficult partners," and the insular culture of development assistance hinders interaction with the security community. In a world beset by "problems without passport" (infectious diseases, environmental pollution, international crime, conflict spillovers, terrorism, etc.), a new paradigm should supplant the now obsolete development consensus. The authors took stock of current development practices through the prism of Sweden's Shared Responsibility bill, which addresses peace, security, opportunity, environmental conservation, human rights, and democracy. The resulting volume draws the implications of emerging threats to global peace and prosperity for development policy and practice. It seeks to build bridges of understanding between the development community and the security establishment by bringing together lessons of experience currently scattered in the literature. Each chapter is self-contained and includes policy findings and recommendations. The book is principally aimed at practitioners who need up-to-date knowledge about security and development issues. Publication of this paperback edition makes the book available for use as an introductory text for security specialists with little knowledge of development or for development specialists with limited knowledge of security, or for college or university students in these areas.
Le bilan de plus de cinquante ans d'indépendance (1958-2010), en matière de relations entre l'armée et le pouvoir et entre l'armée, les forces de sécurité et les citoyens guinéens est très préoccupant. La réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS) est indispensable pour redéfinir les fonctions des forces de défense et de sécurité, éduquer et professionnaliser les forces, restaurer la justice, recréer des relations de confiance civilo-militaires, penser à la réconciliation nationale.
Although each state is inarguably unique it is possible to identify certain common problems and issues with respect to defense governance and management. This text introduces the reader to the basic principles of governance and management through the identification of these key commonalities. It also shows that if individuals are keen to reform practices within their defense establishment they also need to be aware of the various constraints and obstacles that may challenge them. Each written by an acknowledged expert in their field, the contributions identify examples of good practice from across the world and analyze the steps taken to implement that practice. Designed to support teaching, each chapter includes prompts for reflective activity.
This handbook is a broad introduction to enhancing parliamentary oversight of the security sector. The handbook has been written on the assumption that there is no single model of parliamentary oversight which works for all countries. The rules and practices that are accepted and effective in one place may be unthinkable or irrelevant in another. Moreover, all parliaments do not have the same powers.
For most countries, security today is primarily measured in non-military terms and threats to security are non-military in nature. These threats include incompetent government, corruption, organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling (weapons, drugs, contraband, people), illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources (e.g., water) and, of course, terrorism. As security is no longer just a military concern, it is no longer just the preserve of MODs and MFAs which have, to date, been the main ministries involved in security cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security. Security henceforth requires the coordination of the 'external' ministries (i.e., MOD and MFA) and their agencies (armed forces, intelligence services) with those of the 'interior' ministries: internal affairs, education, finance, overseas development, transport, environment; health, etc., with their agencies (policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, etc.). Security today takes in social development and demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way which security in the Cold War days did not. Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of national structures, patterns of investment, and systems of government. Likewise it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale.
This book, authored by a multi-national team, draws a complicated, yet logically evolving picture of the problems in the security sector reform field of South-East Europe, examining the post-totalitarian and post-conflict challenges to be faced.
On 11 November 2011, a group of country experts, practitioners, policy makers, analysts and security experts assembled at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, to exchange insights and build practical knowledge on the following topic: (How) Can non-state actors and civil society in Tunisia and Egypt address security (reform) in these transition contexts? This summary report is an attempt to share with the general public some salient points that came out of the day’s discussion. The content of this paper is based exclusively on the exchange of opinions and ideas of the individuals present that day.