La communauté des praticiens

Public outreach and dialogue on a grassroots level have been high priorities throughout the development of the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR). The campaign included widely publicized press conferences and debates, and the dissemination of publications to raise awareness of security issues as well as of the actual ISSR process and the role the population could play. Public input was then collected through public opinion surveys, comment boxes and questionnaires.
A key component here was the innovative approach of a “Have Your Say” bus, which travelled throughout Kosovo in urban and rural zones gathering information on threats. This carefully planned and targeted approach resulted in confidence building among the general population and facilitated the sharing of fears and expectations with the project team. Contrary to what was expected, the main threats identified by the population related to employment and the economy, rather than ethnic tensions or external dangers. This finding was integrated into the Review, which today is still considered one of the key reference documents for security issues in Kosovo.

In Sierra Leone, a decision was made to link efforts to develop national security policy to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The national security sector review, which was designed to serve as the basis for national security policy, was therefore merged with a central strategic pillar of the PRSP on “promotion of good governance, security and peacebuilding”. The rationale for formally linking the two processes was based on national recognition that security is essential for economic development, and on the need to support connections between broader social and economic policies. It was also intended to align government priorities in a way that would streamline resources. This innovative approach faced several challenges; for example, concerns were voiced by some members of government about a “securitization” of the development agenda, particularly with regard to the high costs envisioned for the security package within the PRSP. Despite the challenges, Sierra Leone’s PRSP became the first national document to explicitly acknowledge linkages between security and economic development. In practice, it is also said to
have enhanced the coherence and coordination of SSR support on the part of international donors, by providing a clear framework with which they were able to align themselves.

Source: (Garrasi, Kuttner and Wam, 2009).

In Timor-Leste, the government’s intention was first to develop a national security policy, which would subsequently guide the development of national security legislation. However, following the 2006 security crisis, swift development of the legislation became a priority, so that the roles and responsibilities of the police and defence forces could be more clearly delineated. Legislation and policy thus advanced in parallel: the national security law would be led by the Office of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defence, while national security policy would continue to be developed under the auspices of the Office
of the President and the Secretary of State for Security. In order to ensure links between the two processes, each of the institutions would comment in parallel on the draft law and draft policy. In practice this approach proved challenging; there were limited national resources to lead both processes, and equally limited international resources to support the national effort.  Finally, further delays in the policy-making process resulted in the national security law being adopted prior to the national security policy. As a result there was difficulty aligning policy with law, despite the fact that the law did not undergo the same broad consultative process as national security policy. After considerable national effort, law and policy were finally aligned, with a focus on supporting an integrated security sector.

In Liberia, it was decided that the Governance Commission (GC) would lead in the development of national security strategy. The GC, which had been created by the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement to promote good governance in the Liberian public sector, resolved to ensure a consultative approach to the development of the strategy. However, this approach was resisted by numerous representatives of government ministries, who feared that including civilians in discussions on national security would
amount to compromising that security.

The leadership provided by the GC was vital in overcoming this challenge. In particular, an effective approach was the South-South dialogue the GC supported, which brought together experts from other countries in the region to share their experiences with similar processes.

This approach proved extremely useful in alleviating fears of undertaking broad national public consultations. The consultation
process then took place across the country and involved traditional chiefs, women, civil society, local authorities, youth and local officials from the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The consultation identified local perceptions of national security threats, which included poverty, unemployment, crime, ethnic tensions and regional insecurity. These concerns were in turn reflected in the national security strategy and resulted in recognition of the need for a wider range of government ministries to support national security provision.

In the Central African Republic, the committee in charge of organizing the “National SSR Seminar” – the Comité Préparatoire – was supported by UNDP. The Comité was in charge of research and document preparation, including gathering lessons from the threat assessment and supporting the information and awareness-raising campaign via consultation meetings in Bangui and five provinces. The Comité was also responsible for practical and logistical arrangements for the seminar. As the Comité undertook this intensive work, two main challenges emerged. First, staff members were only partially detached from their ministries or civil society organizations. This resulted in a prioritization of their other duties rather than the short-term mission they had been asked to complete within the Comité .
Second, a number of the members were very senior – often former ministers – and were therefore reluctant to undertake the large number of (even basic) tasks required by the Comité ’s mandate. UNDP and other international experts assisted the Government in overcoming these challenges: in highlighting the importance of the work of the Comité to high-level political actors, they garnered support for secondments of staff to the Comité .

UNDP also provided training and seconded secretarial staff to the Comité to increase the body’s administrative capacity. The provision of advice and sensitization on the need to carefully consider the membership of such committees paid off when the Secrétariat Technique Permanent (that replaced the Comité Préparatoire following the National SSR Seminar) was assigned full-time staff for its mandate, thus enabling it to fully support implementation of the security sector reform activities agreed at the Seminar.

Development of national security strategy in Liberia stemmed from recognition that the security sector needed reform:  challenges in that sector’s governance had to be met, and there were specific issues such as the duplication of mandates between existing security institutions. The actual trigger was the organization by Liberia’s Governance Commission of a policy seminar in 2006 to address the need for more coordinated action in the area of SSR. The participants recognized that a clear strategy would have to rationalize the security sector and clarify the various needs and functions in an overarching framework. The government’s 150-day action plan in 2006 signalled commitment to devising a national security strategy, which was approved in 2008.

In the case of Timor-Leste, there had been references to the need for a national security policy in the national security framework adopted in 2003. However, impetus to move the policy forward developed only after the 2006 national security crisis, which brought to light major weaknesses within the sector. The Secretariat of State for Security was then tasked by the Minister of Defence and Security to develop the policy. However, changes in the government and shifting national priorities affected the political will required to develop the document, which resulted in the process stalling on several occasions. It was only the determination of the Secretariat of State for Security and the Office of the President that allowed the policy development to be revitalized with the creation of an informal national security policy core group. With UN support, this group spearheaded finalization of the draft, which was sent to the Council of Ministers for approval in early 2011.

In partnership with the UN DDR Unit, UNFPA, UNDP and the UN Mission in Sudan (UN 2010) supported DDR interventions to  address HIV, promote human development, and provide psychosocial support and reproductive health services. The Mission’s work involved close collaboration with the North and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions, the Sudan Armed Forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan National AIDS Programme.

Activities included:

• Vulnerability and capacity assessments of women associated with the armed forces.
• Training demobilized ex-combatants, women associated with the armed forces and community members on HIV/sexual and reproductive health/gender-based violence through a trainer-training programme.
• Implementing public information campaigns to raise awareness and sensitize receiving communities about HIV.
• Developing referral networks with existing providers to ensure service coverage in receiving communities.
• Supporting access to reproductive health services and STI testing and treatments.
• Supporting access to voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) for ex-combatants and women associated with the armed forces.
• Training reintegration counsellors on HIV, sexual and reproductive health and gender- based violence.

In addition to historical contradictions and inadequacies, implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has further exposed the need to address critical issues in Liberia’s security sector, in order to consolidate the gains of post-conflict reconstruction and to pave the way towards good governance. In view of the role played by ill-governed security institutions in the Liberian civil war, the success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia will to a large extent depend on the extent to which the security sector is reformed to operate more efficiently and within a framework of effective democratic control. Within this context, a dialogue on SSR would help broaden the constituency of actors working to develop a collective vision of security in Liberia. Moreover, such a dialogue would facilitate the inclusion of debates around the security sector prior to elections, so as to sustain interest on the issue in a post-election reform agenda. Significantly, a dialogue on SSR would serve as a crucial step in bringing voice and accountability into the process of creating an inclusive, locally driven SSR process in Liberia.

Against this background, the Ministry of Justice of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) convened a National Dialogue on Security Sector Reform, which was held in Monrovia 3-4 August 2005. The event was jointly facilitated and funded by the Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG) of King’s College, University of London; the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Lagos, Nigeria; and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland. The dialogue served as an avenue toward a structured but informal conversation on SSR among relevant stakeholders, including
the United Nations, the transitional legislature, the judiciary, civil society, relevant ministries, civil society, and organizations responsible for implementing reform.

The dialogue was guided by, and sought to provide answers to, the following interrelated
questions:

1. What kind of security (and security sector) does Liberia have?
2. What kind of security (and security sector) do Liberians want?
3. What are the necessary key steps for achieving the desired security?
4. Who are the critical actors for attaining such security?
5. How can a locally driven, inclusive and accountable security sector reform process be
achieved?

Source: Excerpts from Summary Report, cited in Adedeji Ebo, The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform
in Liberia, DCAF, Geneva, 2005 (Annex 3, pp. 59–60).

The United Nation’s task mandated by Security Council resolution 1704 of 2006 to assist the Government of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the security sector appeared to have been met by national ambivalence. This is in spite of the fact that the mandate was endorsed by the Prime Minister, who signed the “Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste” project with UNDP in June 2008. Many national interlocutors held the view that the review was a belated and unnecessary exercise, especially given that national review processes such as the Force 2020 defence sector review process were already under way. The word “review” was also seen by some as pejorative. Given the lack of interest and even subtle resistance, it would have been easy at that point to conduct a purely technical review in isolation and move on to the other things in which the government was demonstrably more interested. However, as the review took shape and gained momentum, the United Nations’ integrity of motive became evident. Relevant ministers, secretaries of state and the Council of Ministers did debate and coordinate the review, agreeing and amending as necessary. A further interesting development was the aspect of gender and
the strong backing by the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality. Thus, the review began to create its own champions within the government, and that reinforced the point that SSR is essentially a political and transformative process.

The entire process took almost two years, with the requisite detailed planning and timelines. Subsequently, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) began drafting the review independently. However, it did manage to engage national partners in the drafting process at a later stage. Following review by relevant government and security sector agencies, the review was ultimately approved by the Council of Ministers in May 2012. The comprehensive review of the security sector featured as a foundation document because it had demonstratively gone through the political process of review and endorsement.

Source: Murray McCullough and John Symons, Security Sector Support Unit, UNMIT.