National Defence / Armed Forces

 The UK  Ministry of Defence's Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 provides joint, operational level doctrine for the military contribution to stabilisation. 
This will usually take place during or immediately following conflict and in the context of weak or failed states that face a range of challenges to governmental authority that range from criminality to insurgency. 
JDP 3-40 identifies the general priorities for stabilising failed or failing states, and determines the nature, level, principles and priorities that govern the UK military contribution and the guidelines governing transition to civilian and host nation control. 
DCDC provides two versions of JDP 3-40 (the original and an A4 version) along with a guide and four supporting documents to the JDP.

Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution

This document provides Department of State, DoD, and USAID practitioners with guidelines for coordinating, planning, and implementing SSR programs with foreign partner nations. The objective of this paper is to provide guidance on how best to design, develop, and deliver foreign assistance such that it promotes effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security sector development in partner states.

An ISS analysis on the difficulties and challenges in implementing DDR and SSR processes in the DRC.

This paper is the result of a collaborative effort of researchers and former practitioners with experience in the DRC currently working for Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute for International Relations based in The Hague, the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College London in the United Kingdom, the Institut français des relations internationales based in Paris, France, and the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa. Hans Hoebeke, Senior Researcher at Egmont, The Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium was extensively consulted during the preparation of this paper.

The authors of this paper have drawn upon their professional experience in the DRC and/or ongoing analysis of developments there. This has included interviews, conducted both in country and at donor headquarter level, of political representatives and working-level practitioners of donor country and multilateral institutions, independent experts, Congolese civil servants across the justice, police and defence sectors as well as non-governmental organisation and civil society representatives.

The report outlines the armed forces’ evolution under independent Guinea’s three previous heads of state and the legacies for current reform efforts. Secondly, it looks at the current state of the military and (to a lesser extent) other security forces, considering recruitment issues, indiscipline, impunity, factionalisation, civil-military relations and life
in the armed forces. Thirdly, it considers the efforts at army reform and lays out a way to make them succeed.

Serious political crises in Niger, Honduras, Turkey, Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, and Mauritania in recent years illustrate the continuing influence of security forces on the political trajectories of countries around the world. Examples of such instability are particularly recurrent in Africa. When Africa’s political crises turn into coups, armed insurrections, or tragic confrontations, the defense and security forces (DSF) are invariably key players. For many years, such military actions were justified as an established right of state sovereignty over domestic issues. Often, they were even recognized as such on the international level.

After many years of political instability and three failed attempts of DDR, there is a renewed effort in Guinea-Bissau to get DDR and SSR right. With a national strategy and action plan on SSR in place, Guinea-Bissau has attracted a lot of attention from the international community. Many donors, the European Union (EU) among others, are sending experts to assist in the SSR process in Guinea-Bissau. While there are favourable circumstances for SSR in Guinea-Bissau such as a willingness and
commitment displayed by the national authorities, a number of difficulties and challenges were highlighted during the briefing. The Army, which is by far the most powerful actor in Guinea-Bissau, has to be brought into the reform process. In addition, the large numbers of donors and experts have to be absorbed, organized and most off all coordinated.

This monograph examines the relationship between organized crime, internal violence, and institutional failure in Guatemala. It aims to increase awareness of this growing threat to regional security and to provide a granular, textured case study of a phenomenon that, while most striking in Guatemala, is present throughout Latin America as a whole. Organizationally, the monograph comprises three substantive sections. The first, offers an overview of the emerging security environment in Latin America, examining
organized crime as a form of irregular warfare. The second, zooms in on Guatemala, exploring the origins, nature, and effects of the current crisis in that country. The third, considers the implications for Guatemalan and U.S. policy.

As a collection of separate papers, this volume is not aimed at being a coherent, polished version of the security transformation of Sierra Leone, but at providing an insight into the thoughts of those involved. In particular we have sought to showcase papers providing a ‘warts-and-all’ picture of the reform process that not everyone would agree with, but all have to acknowledge as being relevant. The original idea of these papers was to provide inputs into a broader piece of research reconstructing the narrative of the UK intervention, so many of them were not written with publication in mind. Rather, the authors sought to provide their own views of the process from their particular vantage point and to highlight different perceptions of the same processes.

In the year 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which stresses the relevant need to integrate women into the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, and which has led the United Nations to issue frequent reports and initiatives in that regard. The goal of this book is to contribute its development, especially on the eve of its tenth anniversary.
In Latin America, the practical development of Resolution 1325 faces diverse challenges as the region has given relevance to its participation in peace operations and is currently looking forward fostering institutional capabilities which could allow it to address present needs and integrate new trends. The book shows these facts through researching women integration in the defence and security sphere and their contribution to peace operations in the region. The first part deals with the gender perspective in the current conflicts and developments of international security. The second part includes a comparative analysis on the female integration of the armed forces, the police and national contributions to United Nations peace operations.

This book aims to show busy senior officials and senior officers in Defence Ministries and Armed Forces how progress can be made in defence without tackling the
problem right across government. It presents ten particular measures that are based on recent experiences of countries.

This book is about understanding, managing and, as necessary, reforming the defence sector. It does not, however, treat the defence sector in isolation, but as part of government and the security sector, as a grouping of assets that can be employed in support of overall national policy. Nor does it equate the defence sector with the military alone.

This paper was drafted further to the Dutch policy framework for security sector reform (SSR). It examines the following three questions: 1) Why is it important to apply a gender perspective in SSR? 2) What commitments has the Netherlands made? 3) What opportunities for reform are presented by our partnerships with the various actors that make up the security sector?. It briefly examines the current situation with regard to gender and security sector reform and underscores the importance of devoting attention to equal rights and opportunities for both men and women within the security sector. The second chapter offers examples and some practical recommendations.

This papers presents the widespread reform of state institutions Indonesia has been going through since 1998. It also addresses what drove the process, some challenges and lessons learnt.

The handbook has been produced by a collaborative effort among researchers and practitioners across Africa. It provides guidance on undertaking a process of security-sector transformation consistent with democratic governance principles and a human security agenda. It is primarily intended for security-sector practitioners both in the security organisations and among the civil authorities charged with managing and monitoring the activities of the security organisations. It is secondarily intended to assist policy makers, civil society, and those agencies that provide financial and technical support to efforts to strengthen security-sector governance in understanding the issues involved in a transformation process.

This publication is the result of the first of two joint workshops between the two tracks with the participation of the PfP-C Security Sector Reform Working Group and the Regional Stability South Caucasus Study Group. The meeting took place in November 2003 in Reichenau, Austria, hosted by the Austrian Ministry of Defense (represented by the National Defense Academy and the Bureau for Security Policy). It reflects the excellent possibilities and opportunities the Consortium provides for interdisciplinary, comparative and crosscountry studies. It shows how unconventional ideas and new initiatives can be tested without immediately having major political impacts. This is what makes the PfP Consortium so unique and deserves our support and attention.

This paper reports on a consultative dialogue between the World Bank and Australia’s whole-of-government spectrum of institutions, with a focus on development actors ‘hearing’ the security perspective. In this, we join a growing process of dialogue between ‘accidental partners’ – development and security actors, unfamiliar with each other but faced with the same challenge of being engaged in fragile and conflict-affected environments. It presents the results of this consultative dialogue: (1) describing models of engagement from Australia’s operational experience integrating security and development, extracted from the experience in Solomon Islands and Bougainville (2) raising issues about knowing each other and working together, and (3) identifying emerging themes at the junction of security and development, and offering practical ideas to take further.

The loss by many states of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force has contributed significantly to the proliferation of failed and failing states worldwide. In such states, a multitude of threats, including insurgencies, terrorist networks, transnational organized crime, and illicit shadow economies, flourish. These states often become trapped in cycles of violent conflict that threaten stability and security at home, in their neighborhoods, and throughout the world. States emerging from conflict are highly prone to return to conflict within the first few years of postconflict status. The widespread availability of lethal weapons exacerbates the tensions that already permeate conflict and postconflict environments.

The mechanism of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of successful peacekeeping, peace-building, postconflict management, and state-building. Security sector reform (SSR) has emerged as a promising though poorly understood tool for consolidating stability and establishing sovereignty after conflict. While DDR enables a state to recover the monopoly (or at least the preponderance) of force, SSR provides the opportunity for the state to establish the legitimacy of that monopoly.

The essays in this book reflect the diversity of experience in DDR and SSR in various contexts. Despite the considerable experience acquired by the international community, the critical interrelationship between DDR and SSR and the ability to use these mechanisms with consistent success remain less than optimally developed. DDR and SSR are essential tools of modern statecraft, but their successful use is contingent upon our understanding of both the affinities and the tensions between them. These essays aim to excite further thought on how these two processes—DDR and SSR—can be implemented effectively and complimentarily to better accomplish the shared goals of viable states and enduring peace.

Edited by Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic, with contributions from:

The Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Security Sector Reform Working Group held a workshop entitled “Gender & Security Sector Reform” from 17 to 19 February 2010. The workshop, hosted by DCAF, was an opportunity for thirty-six practitioners, researchers and policy advisors from sixteen NATO and PfP countries to discuss and exchange on ongoing efforts and challenges to integrating a gender perspective into SSR. The workshop focused on best practices and examples from the ground in both national and international security sector institutions, including NATO peace support operations, ministries of defence, and armed forces.

The past year has seen a ratcheting up and convergence of security concerns in the Sahel and Maghreb with the growing potency of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the influx of mercenaries and weaponry from Libya, the expanding influence of narcotics traffickers, and Boko Haram's widening lethality. Nonetheless, regional cooperation to address these transnational threats remains fragmented.  In Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence , the latest Africa Security Brief from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Laurence Aïda Ammour examines the central role that Algeria plays in defining this cooperation and the complex domestic, regional, and international considerations that shape its decision-making... 

◆ Efforts to counter al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) growing influence in both the Maghreb and the Sahel are fragmented because of the inability of neighbors to forge collaborative partnerships.

◆ Algeria faces inverse incentives to combat AQIM outside of Algiers as it gains much of its geostrategic leverage by maintaining overstated perceptions of a serious terrorism threat.

◆ The Algerian government’s limited legitimacy, primarily derived from its ability to deliver stability, constrains a more comprehensive regional strategy.

The full paper can be downloaded from

http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ASB18.pdf

Intervening states apply different approaches to the use force in war-torn countries. Calibrating the use of force according to the situation on the ground requires a convergence of military and police roles: soldiers have to be able to scale down, and police officers to scale up their use of force. In practice, intervening states display widely differing abilities to demonstrate such versatility. This paper argues that these differences are shaped by how the domestic institutions of sending states mediate between demands for versatile force and their own intervention practices. It considers the use of force by Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States in three contexts of international intervention: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The paper highlights quite different responses to security problems as varied as insurgency, terrorism, organised crime and riots. This analysis offers important lessons. Those planning and implementing international interventions should take into account differences in the use of force. At the same time, moving towards versatile force profoundly changes the characteristics of security forces and may increase their short-term risks. This difficulty points to a key message emerging from this paper: effective, sustainable support to states emerging from conflict will only be feasible if intervening states reform their own security policies and practices.

This book is a tool intended for all those who are interested in acquiring knowledge in an area still unexplored within the region, and for the promotion of a joint collaboration among civilian, military and police forces, in order to boost gender equality within democratic institutions.

Following the signing of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending the Liberian civil war, there have been revitalized efforts for security sector reform, led principally by the United States and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of (i) the extent and effect of international support for parliamentary oversight of the security sector relative to other reform priorities, and (ii) to assess the potential impact of the reform process on preventing conflict recurrence in Liberia.

The European Union’s mission to contribute to the training of the Somali Security Forces is the first military training mission launched by the EU. Deployed in April 2010, EUTM is nearing the end of its mandate: the training of the recruits will be completed by mid-July 2011. The mission was carried out in close coordination with the US, the African Union and the Ugandan army, and contributed to the EU’s visibility in East Africa. However, given the overall feebleness of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its inability to implement reform, the political effectiveness of the mission is doubtful. In the current context, EUTM should not be extended beyond its original mandate. The EU and other donors should instead support more functional local administrations and make future assistance to the TFG contingent upon tangible progress towards completing transitional tasks, a normalization of political life, and restoring the provision of public services.

In 2011 NATO initiated the Inteqal process, i.e. the “transition” of security responsibilities from ISAF to the Afghan state and its security forces. The main pillars of this process are the build up of the Afghan Army and Police and the improvement of Afghanistan’s governance system at both national and local level. Progress has been made in this respect, although challenges remain. NATO aims to complete the transition by 2014, while reducing its military presence in the country, but a substantial Allied footprint is likely to remain in Afghanistan beyond that date. The death of Bin Laden has brought about little changes to the situation on the ground, while it may have a significant impact on the US’s attitude towards peace talks with the Taliban and thus influence the transition timeline and nature.

• The Arab Awakening opened the door to democratic political change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral component of the nascent democratic process in the region. While SSR is a long-term process, it should be a key part of institution building in the new democracies. Democracy requires security institutions that  are open, professional, and responsive to public needs.
• The transitions to democracy are varied in nature and scope. SSR will differ by country and must be tailored to the political realities and specific circumstances of each state. The international community can foster successful SSR processes by calibrating its assistance according to the reform efforts in each country. A general or “one-size-fits-all” approach to SSR will not be successful.
• A sense of political powerlessness, an unresponsive bureaucracy, a general lack of opportunity, economic stagnation (including high unemployment), and repressive security forces all contributed to the Arab Awakening. As a result of the upheaval, democratic forces in several of the MENA countries are pushing for transparency and accountability in the security services.
• SSR must be undertaken in a holistic manner, couched within the framework of overall democratic reform and linked to other broad policies such as justice sector reform, evolution of the political process, and economic development. SSR will only be achieved if it is integrated and pursued in unison with these larger processes of democratic change. 
• The international community, especially the United States and the European Union, need to foster democratic developments and, in particular, to support and coordinate SSR.

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The focus of this paper is to offer recommendations for ways in which the EU may incorporate justice-sensitive reform initiatives within SSR programmes to address the legacy of impunity for human rights violations and the ongoing human rights violations committed by elements within the security forces. The primary focus is therefore on those sectors of the security system that are currently both abusive and engaged in reform processes – the FARDC and police (Police Nationale Congolaise, or PNC). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the justice and penal systems, although the importance of these in addressing impunity, as well as in a holistic approach to SSR, is clear. The author interviewed stakeholders and observers from civil society, national authorities, and the international community in Kinshasa, Bunia, Goma and Brussels between November 2007 and June 2008. Follow this link to view the publication.

This report is an assessment of peace, conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan, conducted between June 2011 and March 2012. It analyses how local, national and international dynamics around independence in July 2011 and the end of the six-and-a-half-year formal Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) process with Sudan have impacted on peace and conflict in 2011–2012 and how they are likely to influence peace and development over the next decade. Utilising International Alert’s Peacebuilding Framework, it assesses the dynamics, structures and opportunities for building a positive peace under five Peace Factors: Power, Economy, Safety, Justice and Well-being. It also analyses some of the challenges and impact of peacebuilding actors, institutions and strategies over the CPA period and provides a series of recommendations on improving peacebuilding programming beyond 2012 in terms of prioritising approaches, target locations and actors/partners. It concludes that, while the enjoyment of peace is highly variable across South Sudan, the nation as a whole and few if any of its constituent peoples or counties have yet experienced a positive, sustainable peace. Conflictual and rapidly worsening relations with Sudan as well as uncertainty about the length of suspension of oil exports (and thus revenues) appear likely to aggravate longstanding deficits in governance, security, economic opportunity, justice and reconciliation. This in turn increases the risk that South Sudan will become more violent in 2012 and beyond. Follow this link to view the publication.

The aim of this paper is to account for the evolution of the draft Code, and to examine its relationship (if any) to similar initiatives within and beyond Africa. Following this brief introduction therefore, the paper attempts to place the draft Code within the context of general trends in civil-military relations in Africa. It then traces the evolutionary process of the African Code, within the context of similar and related initiatives and processes in Africa. The paper also identifies the main provisions of the Code. It compares the OSCE Code to the draft African Code, pointing out similarities and differences and the extent to which the former was a model for the latter. The paper then identifies matters arising in the drive to achieve the adoption and implementation of the present draft African Code. The paper is concluded with recommendations which could enrich the CoC and create the basis for more viable articulation of the agenda of democratic control of armedand security forces in Africa.

The objective of the Guidelines is to provide practitioners on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants with strategic guidance and operational direction in preparing, implementing and supporting sustainable employment-focused reintegration programmes for social reintegration and reconciliation.These guidelines are based on ILO's experience in this field in various countries. In addition, they complement and operationalise in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standard (IDDRS), the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) and the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income-generation and Reintegration.

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Security is not only a central issue for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, it has critical implications for the country’s management of its public finances. This paper by Peter Middlebrook, Nicole Ball, William Byrd and Christopher Ward, reviews Afghanistan’s security sector from the perspective of public finance management (PFM) and development. The Afghan security sector must be integrated into all aspects of the country’s PFM system and subject to all budgetary and fiduciary processes.

Security impacts the gamut of development issues faced by Afghanistan, ranging from state building and capacity development to revenue collection, security delivery and encouraging private sector-led growth. Both the Afghanistan government and external partners highlight security as a key enabling factor for the country’s growth and development. There is a critical need for reliable security to allow the Afghan people to conduct their daily lives in relative safety.

The Afghan security sector accounted for 40% of the country’s national budget as well as external assistance during the years under review, and raises major public finance management issues. In view of these issues, the Government of Afghanistan requested that the World Bank (WB) include the security sector in its PFM Review. This paper is one of five volumes comprising the WB Review titled “Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development”.

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This discussion note draws on a variety of studies, in particular the work produced for the seminar series on reintegration sustainability in the context of shadow economies that TDRP organised.

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Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral part of the international community’s efforts to build peace and enhance security in weak post-war states. It has, however, proven difficult to undertake SSR in such contexts. A number of factors constitute a challenge to create security forces that are able to provide security to the population.

Based on previous research, this report highlights some of the challenges to SSR in weak post-war states. Through an analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic, this study shows that informal power structures, a volatile security situation and failure to understand how SSR is influenced by other political processes, negatively impact on the prospect for successful  implementation of reforms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that weak capacity and lack of political will on behalf of the national government, is a challenge to local ownership and sustainable reforms. Despite a holistic approach to reforms aiming to improve both the capacity of the security forces and to increase democratic control of the security institutions, insufficient international engagement, scarce resources, lack of strategic direction and inadequate donor coordination have limited the prospect for implementation of reforms.

In the year since the revolution, Tunisia has achieved what no other Arab Spring country has managed: peaceful transition to democratic rule through national elections widely viewed to be free and fair. The legacy of the previous regime, however, remains. Dr. Querine Hanlon assesses the prospects for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Tunisia and concludes that Tunisia’s new government faces major challenges dismantling and reorienting the mandate and institutional culture of Tunisia’s labyrinth of security institutions. Serious SSR will be critical for building trust in the new governments and its security institutions and essential if Tunisia’s transition to democratic rule is to succeed in the long term.

President Michel Martelly of Haiti was widely expected to announce the creation of a new Haitian army on November 18, 2011. Instead, the newly-elected president called for the creation of a civilian-led commission that will have forty days to finalize a plan for the army, which was disbanded in 1995. A draft of the “Martelly plan,” dated August 2011, called for building an army of 3,500 troops that would be operational within three years and progressively take over as the UN peacekeeping force MINUSTAH withdraws.
This issue brief by Arthur Boutellis, IPI Senior Policy Analyst, provides a background to the security sector in Haiti and explores the shape that a new Haitian army might take. It addresses the political context in which the army will be reinstated, financial considerations for the government of Haiti, and the role that the international community could play to support Haitian efforts to build an accountable security sector.

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The overall purpose of the High Level Panel (October 2nd-3rd 2012) was to take stock of the challenges when implementing security and justice reforms at a national level; to identify lessons that could be applied to other SSR processes in the Eastern African region; and to look at what role regional and international actors could optimally have in SSR initiatives. The High Level Panel brought together over 200 SSR policy makers and practitioners to unpack the key issues faced by both those implementing and leading SSR. Those attending the event were experts responsible for leading and implementing processes in Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan, as well as key donors, regional and multilateral organisations and representatives from the African Security Sector Network and other civil society organisations. 

This report reflects the informal conclusions drawn from the selected country-case studies as well as thematic debates at the High-Level Panel. 

DCAF's newest addition to its SSR series has just been published, co-authored by Albrecht Schnabel and Marc Krupanski and titled "Mapping Evolving Internal Roles of the Armed Forces." It is widely assumed, at least from a Western perspective, that the armed forces provide national defence against external threats. In reality, within many consolidated Western democracies the armed forces are assuming an increasingly wide range of internal roles and tasks. These can include domestic security roles and the provision of humanitarian assistance in situations of natural or humanitarian catastrophe, often under the command and control of different civilian agencies. This SSR Paper seeks to make sense of this complex reality. Different internal roles of armed forces are analysed, drawing on the cases of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Through carefully examining evolving internal roles and identifying patterns and lessons from these experiences, this SSR Paper provides an important contribution to understanding the evolving nature of contemporary armed forces.

This report reflects on what broadening the base of UN troop- and police-contributing countries will entail in practice, and it provides a framework for thinking about why UN member states do, or do not, provide peacekeepers to UN-led missions. The report identifies recent trends in troop contributions to UN and non-UN missions, summarizes states’ rationales for providing peacekeepers to UN operations, examines the factors that inhibit such contributions, identifies potential major contributors of uniformed personnel for the future, and notes some of the most significant challenges facing the UN. These challenges include the global financial crisis, political controversy over the future direction and nature of peacekeeping mandates, issues of discipline and ill health, and the unique problems associated with finding police personnel for UN missions.

The paper concludes by suggesting ways in which the UN might begin to improve its ability to expand the pool of peacekeeping capabilities. It recommends providing incentives to encourage larger and better contributions of uniformed personnel, enhancing public diplomacy related to peacekeeping, improving the way in which the UN Secretariat makes its requests to member states for peacekeepers and relevant specialist capabilities, and strengthening analysis of contributing countries as a precursor to developing a strategic plan on force generation.

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A new IPI report identifies the security sector in Côte d’Ivoire as a root of a decade of crises there and discusses how comprehensive security-sector reform is a key to preventing a return to armed conflict in the future. 
The report provides a historical perspective as to how the Defense and Security Forces in Côte d’Ivoire were at the root of the 2002 crisis, why successive peace accords failed to produce security sector reform, and how the failure to reunify the Ivoirian security forces prior to holding the 2010 presidential election was a key factor behind the recent crisis and contributed to its escalation into a military confrontation. 
The report also includes recommendations on how to focus reform on changing the relationship among politicians, security institutions, and the larger population, as part of a broader reconciliation process among Ivoirians themselves.

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L’insécurité maritime se confirme comme l’une des menaces persistantes à la stabilité des États riverains du golfe de Guinée. En dépit d’une prise de conscience croissante et de la volonté politique d’y faire face, l’augmentation rapide des actes de piraterie a pris de court plusieurs pays de la région. L’absence d’un dispositif commun, relativement complet, de surveillance et de lutte contre la piraterie, limite encore la portée des initiatives prises par certains États, et qui ne couvrent pas l’ensemble de la région du golfe de Guinée. Une stratégie à long terme passe par la mutualisation des moyens, et par la coopération entre les trois organisations régionales, la CEEAC, la CEDEAO et la Commission du golfe de Guinée, ainsi que par l’implication d’autres acteurs du secteur maritime concernés par la lutte contre la piraterie dans la région.

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This article discusses a growing tendency among news reporters allowing senior military officers and personnel to dictate defence coverage. 

Honduras’ security and justice sector suffers from severe deficiencies. It remains largely inefficient and unable to safeguard security and the rule of law for its citizens. Criminal investigative units are plagued with serious problems of incompetence, corruption and progressive penetration by organised crime. The judiciary lacks independence and is subject to systematic political interference. Inter-institutional coordination is poor and flawed by a climate of mutual mistrust and rivalry over competencies.

This report describes and analyses the EU’s contribution to strengthening security and the rule of law in Honduras through a major security sector reform (SSR) programme earmarked with a budget of €44 million. The report underlines the crucial need for increased local ownership as a sine qua non condition if the EU’s endeavours are to trigger sustainable institutional change and thus further human security in Honduras. The report also examines prospects for the creation of an international commission against impunity, following the example of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).

This chapter examines the security sector reform in Iraq after the end of major combat operations in April 2003. The author discusses the Polish contribution to stabilization and reconstruction as member of the US-led 'coalition of the willing.' He draws the conclusion that an augmentation of NATO capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly security sector reform, would enable it to better face the challenges of the strategic environment in Iraq.

This paper outlines the process of producing Sierra Leone’s 2002 defence white paper. Unique to this process was the document’s explicit aim of explaining to the general public both the progress and the shortcomings of security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone’s defence system. The white paper was produced on the assumption that without making this information publicly available, opportunities to engage ordinary people in future reform initiatives would be limited. 

The paper also describes some of the challenges faced in the white paper’s production, including those from military counterparts in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and from international military and civilian advisers.

After a complex process of consultation and debate, the defence white paper is a strong statement of where Sierra Leone’s defence sector stands today and the direction it should take in the future. It is obvious that all this chapter’s recommendations will not necessarily be implemented in practice. It is also clear that while Sierra Leone has come a long way in building up a strong and democratically accountable defence system, there are still many challenges ahead.

On 1 October 2012 the roundtable on Security Sector Expenditure Reviews, hosted by the World Bank Global Centre on Conflict, Security and Development in Nairobi, Kenya and organised in partnership with DCAF’s International Security Sector Advisory Team, brought together economists and Security Sector Reform (SSR) practitioners and experts to discuss the challenges and opportunities for supporting the conduct of expenditure reviews and enhancing financial management in the security sector. 

The roundtable considered past and ongoing security sector expenditure reviews, in particular in Afghanistan and Liberia.  It sought to examine the challenges, trends and prospects of including similar reviews in other post-conflict countries.  It also provided a platform for economists and SSR practitioners to discuss how they can better collaborate to promote and enhance security sector expenditure review processes.  In addition, the roundtable included discussions on how such expenditure reviews can enhance ongoing SSR efforts and how to ensure that financial management becomes more integrated in SSR processes.

This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.

This MENA report joins the overall Index report, available at www.defenceindex.org, as an analytical summary of the detailed
results.

This is a brand new tool and is the result of a major two-year study. This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.

As a part of this Index, 82 countries across the globe were subject to expert, independent assessment. These countries accounted for 94 per cent of global military expenditure in 2011 (USD 1.6 trillion). 

They were selected according to the size of their arms trade, the absolute and per capita size of their militaries, and a proxy of the size of their security sector. Each country was assessed using a comprehensive questionnaire of 77 questions, clustered into five risk areas: political risk, finance risk, personnel risk, operations risk, and procurement risk. Each of these five areas in turn has specific risk areas, as shown in the diagram below.

The analysis was subjected to multiple levels of peer review to minimise the risk of bias and inaccuracies in the responses. Governments were given opportunities to comment on the draft and to provide additional commentary if they desired. Each government has received a comprehensive report outlining our findings for each question, with references to all the sources we used. These assessments are made public on our website.

A second index has also been developed that addresses defence companies, analysing the anti-corruption systems of 129 major global companies. This index, the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (www.companies.defenceindex.org), was published by Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme, on 4th October, 2012.

On October 20 and 21, 2011, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) - United States, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the African Institute for Security Sector Transformation (AISST)- Partners- Senegal, held a joint conference on the theme “Developing a Guinean National Security Policy.” The conference brought together members of the Guinea’s ACSS community, as well as official representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the National Transition Council, and Guinean civil society organizations. Contributions by speakers and attendees brought to light the necessary preconditions for ensuring that the national security policy (NSP) development process remains credible and effective.

Speaker presentations focusing on the experiences of other countries in the region fueled a discussion about Guinea’s true needs, in light of current and future threats that the country must manage. 

During these discussions, participants underlined the unique characteristics of Guinea’s situation, in particular highlighting the similarities and differences between the political, economic and geographic contexts of Guinea and the other countries in the region.

Particular emphasis was placed on the consultative process implemented for developing Guinea’s national security policy. The experiences of participating members of the National Security Sector Reform Steering Committee also contributed to this reflective exercise.

In the end, it was concluded that discussions must be continued and developed in further depth.

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In preparation for the October 2000 Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) in Manaus Brazil and at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) studied the global trend toward the creation of Defense White Papers. The study aimed to understand the nature of these documents in order to prepare the U.S. delegation to discuss the tendency in Latin America and the Caribbean during the DMA. The INSS study team found no agreement about what constitutes a 'white paper' other than each is a consensus statement on a topic. The team examined 15 defense documents worldwide and interviewed participants in the development process and independent analysts. The results suggest that the formative, often difficult, process through which governments must move to solidify their approach to national security defense policy, and the structure to implement it and build consensus for it is the essential part of a 'white paper,' providing a constructive experience that benefits the country. Governments tended not to want a template for this process, although at the working level there is some interest in the experience of other states. Defense White Papers become highly stylized nationalistic documents that reflect a state's unique domestic circumstances and international geopolitical situation. The attached chart provides an overview comparison of the Defense White Paper processes of Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa. Past efforts by U.S. agencies to design templates have failed.

The ongoing transition process in Afghanistan will deliver three shocks in the coming few years: foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, aid volumes and international spending in the country will decrease and, lastly, the political dispensation will be upended by presidential elections in which President Hamid Karzai is not supposed to run again. These challenges are mounting at a time when, due to inconsistent international approaches and a lack of appreciation for the Afghan context, Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption, and ethnic factionalization within the society and the domestic security forces. Based upon a review of the security sector, governance, social and economic conditions, regional relations and negotiation efforts with the insurgents, this article finds that fundamental questions about the efficacy of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan continue to lack clear answers. Regardless, significant room for improvement – both in policy and execution – appears to exist. It remains to be seen whether, as many Afghans fear, a civil war will engulf Afghanistan once again in the post-transition period or whether the international community will take those steps – re-energizing governance reform efforts, maintaining financial support and continuing to strengthen the Afghan army and police – which could help to bolster stability.

This publication is the result of a Seminar with participants from varied sectors of the Liberian government. Its main findings show that despite good beginnings in the security sector, several challenges in terms of prioritization, resources, training and strategizing remain.  A section on the country's DDR efforts highlight the accomplishments and challenges of the program at the time (2007)Furthermore, this publication formulates a series of open questions with regards to the issues of gender sensitivity in DDR, verification of actual disarmament, reintegration of adult ex-combatants as well as the geographical imbalance of reforms.

Under the aegis of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) DCAF undertook three case studies in Burkina Faso, Burundi and Senegal each of which was prepared by country experts. Each study seeks to identify and facilitate the exchange of good practices and experiences between the states concerned, as well as among similar institutions around the world. Each study examines relevant national institutions, as well as their legal status, shedding light on their strengths and weaknesses and contributing to an evaluation of their capacity building needs. Each study also includes details of their complaints handling procedures and of standards that may be relevant to other similar institutions, contributing as a result to a deepened understanding of their mandates, remit, and functioning. Furthermore, these case studies provide a snapshot of the state of security sector governance in each of the three countries, as well as the progress of ongoing reforms.

Long term defence planning is a complex, multi-stage, iterative process. The main stages defined  in this report are:

1. Political Guidance Analysis
2. Environmental Assessment
3. Mission Analysis
4. Planning Situations Development
5. Capability Requirements Determination
6. Capability Assessment
7. Options Development
8. Solution Selection

Long term defence planning is never just a technical procedure. That is also a highly political process that needs to be discussed in political terms.

This document reflects the discussions of the “Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Building a Progressive Kenya” conference, which took place in Nairobi on 5 – 6 December, 2011. Held in the aftermath of a process of nationwide dialogue and at the invitation of the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities, various stakeholder groups representing a wide cross-section of views and perspectives of Kenyan society participated at this conference so as to coalesce these views around the implementation of the objectives and goals of the KNDR process

The National Dialogue, co-hosted by the Liberian Transitional Government and UNMIL, brings together all statutory security agencies of Liberia to help address the critical problem of Security Reform, which is attributed to the main causes of the Liberian conflict. This report summarizes the discussions that took place among these stakeholders

Successful democratic transitions hinge on the establishment of effective civilian control of the armed forces and internal security institutions. The transformation of these institutions from instrumentsof brutal repression and regime protection to professional, regulated, national services – security sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is an acutely political process affected by an array of different actors and dynamics. In a contested and unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the reform of Egypt’s security sector requires urgent attention.

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This Working Paper describes the first year of renewed war in South Kordofan (June 2011–July 2012), focusing on the conduct and dynamics of the conflict and the primary armed actors. It also identifies shared weapons and ammunition holdings based on detailed accounts of materiel seized, as well as photographs and first-hand physical inspections.
 
 While the war in South Kordofan is fundamentally a conflict between primarily (Northern) Sudanese actors for control of the state, it also has clear cross-border implications—as SAF’s air strikes in Unity state and the Southern fighters’ temporary seizure of the Hejlij oil fields attest. This paper reviews these border aspects of the conflict and its impacts on relations between Khartoum and Juba.
 

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Between October 2nd and 3rd 2012, DCAF’s ISSAT organised a High Level Panel (HLP) on the Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform1 (SSR) in East Africa, in partnership with the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON), the Governments of Burundi, Kenya, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Somalia and South Sudan, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). It was attended by over two hundred SSR policy makers and practitioners.

This report seeks to take those discussions further, including more of the points raised by participants during the HLP, and adding in lessons from experience gathered from individual missions and related trainings. Three case studies featured in the HLP (Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan) and as such provide many of the examples, although the report also draws from examples beyond East Africa. An introductory section on SSR in each of these countries is provided in section one and full case studies are included in the annex.

It is hoped that this report, which keeps to the same thematic areas as those covered in the HLP, will offer information on contemporary thinking in security and justice reform, as well as provide some recommendations and examples of good practice to those interested in or engaged in SSR.

The countries of the Americas have identified the development and sharing of national Defense White Papers as a useful confidence- and security-building measure for the promotion of security in the Hemisphere. This paper is intended to provide a brief outline of essential characteristics of Defense White Papers and to explain the rationale and the process for their development.  A listing of elements commonly contained in White Papers is also provided. 

It is important to note that there is no agreed standard format for White Papers in the Americas. This is perhaps a logical reflection of the differing historical, geographical, cultural, political and fiscal contexts in which the countries of the Americas define their security threats and defense objectives, capabilities and constraints.  However, there are elements which are common to many White Papers.  This paper focuses on basic principles and raises issues that Governments could usefully consider in the formulation of their own White Papers, based on the experience of OAS Member States which have already undertaken that process.

This report was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development in order to explore the linkages between security-sector reform and transformation, including downsizing of the Palestine National Security Forces, at a time of political instability, on the one hand, and fiscal stabilisation and financial management over the medium term under conditions of significant economic uncertainty, on the other hand.

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These Principles were developed in order to provide guidance to those engaged in drafting, revising, or implementing laws or provisions relating to the state’s authority to withhold information on national security grounds or to punish the disclosure of such information.

They are based on international (including regional) and national law, standards, good practices, and the writings of experts.
They address national security—rather than all grounds for withholding information. All other public grounds for restricting access should at least meet these standards.

These Principles were drafted by 22 organizations and academic centres (listed in the Annex) in consultation with more than 500 experts from more than 70 countries at 14 meetings held around the world, facilitated by the Open Society Justice Initiative, and in consultation with the four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and/or media freedom and the special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights:

 the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
 the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights,
 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
 the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and
 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media.

The Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (CI) was published on 4 October 2012. This analysis, the first of its kind, provided  comparative information on the disclosure and quality of anti-corruption systems in 129 major defence companies.

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