Academia / Research
Video: Bringing Women into the Security Sector Reform Process in Somalia, Hanan Ibrahim, African Initiative for Women
This study on Nepal was commissioned by CARE Austria (CÖ) as a contribution to CARE’s International Report on Women, Peace and Security: Review of 1325 +10 years in Nepal, Uganda and Afghanistan, defining ‘meaningful participation by women’. The Country Study was carried out between 13th July and 30th September 2010 by Consultant Lesley Abdela, Senior Partner in UK-based Consultancy Eyecatcher/Shevolution. As well as small-group gatherings in Kathmandu and desk review of relevant documentation, meetings were held with CARE staff and partner organisations and other stakeholders, including war survivors, Donors, INGOs, NGOs, women’s network alliances/coalitions, Nepal Government Departments, LPCs, community groups, Media and UN agencies.
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Publication: Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Publication: Reforming Afghanistan's Police, International Crisis Group
The EU engages in aspects of Security Sector Reform (SSR) through EUPOL Afghanistan, the police mission launched in 2007, and through the European Commission’s contributions to justice reform in the country. Based on an analysis of past efforts at police reform by the EU and other European and international actors, this Occasional Paper identifies a set of internal and external coordination challenges that hamper mission success.
Internally, institutional constraints have meant that the coordination of EU instruments has been difficult to achieve. Member States, meanwhile, have until recently focused primarily on bilateral contributions to police and justice reform in the case of Germany and Italy, respectively, or on their military contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Externally, the resource gap and differing philosophies underlying police reform on the part of the US (the biggest contributor to police reform) and the EU have meant that coordination has been lacking, and existing coordination bodies unable to fulfil their tasks.
Limited resources deployed in pursuit of police reform exacerbate these difficulties as inadequate commitments of political, material and personnel resources all too often translate into a loss of political influence at the strategic level.
When a coup d'état or unconstitutional change of government happens, how does the UN respond? This is the question addressed in IPI's latest policy paper: UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises by Charles T. Call.Examining the UN's experience in dealing with such political crises in Kenya, Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Kyrgyzstan between 2008 and 2011, this report identifies trends across the cases and draws lessons regarding the role of international mediation and the transitional political arrangements that emerged.
- Publication:Translating Mediation Guidance into Practice: Commentary on the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation by the Mediation Support Network, Mediation Support Network
- Publication: Power sharing, transitional governments and the role of mediation, Center for Humanitarian Dialog
Strengthening the UN's Mediation Support Unit, whose standby team of thematic experts have been successfully deployed in several cases;In order to ensure a principled, coherent, and effective response that prevents the escalation of violence and facilitates a country's return to constitutional order, Call recommends:
- expanding and adequately resourcing UN regional offices, which have made singular contributions to mediation efforts;
- appointing mediators with prior professional experience in other multilateral organizations, who can contribute to effective collaboration among international and regional organizations;
- preparing the UN more systematically for addressing electoral disputes;
- enhancing communication between the UN Department of Political Affairs and resident coordinators on the ground;
- creating effective UN mechanisms to monitor transitional arrangements, including power sharing arrangements and other efforts for reconciliation, justice, and conflict-sensitive development.
- Interestingly, Call argues that the UN should be cautious about adopting a blanket policy of denouncing all departures from constitutional order.
The Homicide Monitor is the most comprehensive publicly available dataset on murder in the world. It is a data-driven data visualization tool designed to show the distribution, dimensions and dynamics of homicidal violence in an interactive and accessible manner. Since homicidal violence is concentrated in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Monitor includes additional information at the national, state and city scale.
The Homicide Monitor was designed with a wide variety of users in mind. The goal is to show policy makers, journalists, scholars, and activists how lethal violence is distributed, whether spatially, temporally or demographically. Some countries and population groups are much more at risk of dying violently than others. A better diagnosis of how homicide is spread can help in the design of effective violence prevention and reduction measures.
Access and find out more about the Homicide Monitor online.
This collection contains 10 commonly used tools for Security and Justice Sector Reform Programming as well as additional online resources. Download the PDF document below to read more on each tool.
- Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal, Environmental and Security (PESTLES) Analysis
- Results -Based Management (RBM)
- Stakeholder Analysis
- Power/Interest Matrix
- Conflict Mapping
- Capacity, Integrity and Sustainability Framework
- Effects Estimate
- Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis
- Organisation Mapping
- Gap Analysis
The 15th Fragility States Index (FSI) annually highlights the current trends in social, economic and political pressures that affect all states, but can strain some beyond their capacity to cope. Linking robust social science with modern technology, the FSI is unique in its integration of quantitative data with data produced using content-analysis software, processing information from millions of publicly available documents.
The result is an empirically-based, comprehensive ranking of the pressures experienced by 178 nations. The Index is used by policy makers, civil society, academics, journalists, investors, and businesses around the world.
Fund for Peace launched the Fragile States Index 2019 in Geneva on Wednesday, 10 April and discussed the findings of the 15th Fragile States Index, published in conjunction with The New Humanitarian, and its relevance to the humanitarian sector at the Graduate Institute’s Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding. This joint event featured a briefing on the FSI and its findings for 2019 and a panel discussion on the changing humanitarian focus on fragile states and the role of the media in chronicling the immediate and long-term impact of social, political, and economic pressures on lives and livelihoods around the world.
Dr Carolina Hernanedez of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies in the Philippines talks about how she sees the security sector of Southeast Asia and its development.
The audio version of this video is available here.
Comments from Mark Downes, Head of ISSAT, to open the Panel Discussion on SSR in West Africa and to introduce the panel members.
ISSAT Senior SSR Advisor sheds light in this video on the main characteristics and competencies that SSR Advisors need to have inorder to carry out their activities efficiently. Besides the technical skills that are needed in any SSR Advisor, Bgen(ret) Belondrade, shares his real-life experience on what competencies he had to develop to undertake advisory activities to high level authorities on SSR.
"The best predictor of a state's stability and security is the level of violence against women in society," said Texas A&M University's Valerie Hudson in this interview with ECSP. That link is "based on rigorous empirical analysis," she said. "There's something to it. It's not just political correctness Hudson is the co-author of "Sex and World Peace", which she launched with Chad Emmett (also interviewed) at the Wilson Center last month. The book is the product of 10 years of research by Hudson, Emmett, and co-authors Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, and Mary Caprioli. In the world of gender studies, "one of the things that we quickly discovered was that anecdotes abound, but anecdotes do not add up to data," Hudson said. Read the full post on New Security Beat: www.newsecuritybeat.org
The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), a member of the PASOS network of think tanks, is an independent research centre dedicated to advancing security of citizens and society they live in on the basis of democratic principles and respect for human rights. In the midst of Centre's interest are all policies aimed at improvement of human, national, regional, European and global security.
Representatives of PASOS and the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) held a four-day training seminar in Egypt May 10-13 for Egyptian NGOs. The sessions were part of a program to link reformers in Central and Eastern Europe with Middle East organizations working on democratic reform. The training focused on security-sector reform and capacity-building for think tanks. The training was led by Sonja Stojanović, Filip Ejdus, and Marija Marović of BCSP. They drew on Serbia's transformation experience, encouraged the 15 participants to debate the issues facing post-revolutionary Egypt, and led interactive workshops. The seminar was part of the PASOS project "Linking change-makers in the Middle East & North Africa with democratic reformers of post-communist (Central and Eastern) Europe."
Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts have been unsuccessful because policymakers fail to acknowledge that elite corruption and the exclusionary character of the state are the underlying causes of the violence that has left more than 2,800 dead since 2009, Professor Hussein Solomon, Senior Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of the Free State, South Africa, said during a presentation at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) on March 28, 2013.
The annual Christmas lecture to the Royal United Services Institute by General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK Ministry of Defence.
This 2012 lecture elaborates on how the new Joint Forces Command and the changes in the armed forces as a result of the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) will need to adapt to contingency operations and to more steady-state defence engagement as a means of conflict prevention, especially after the withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014. This will include military contributions to Security Sector Reform as part of the joint Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)/Ministry of Defence (MOD) Defence Engagement Strategy.
En République Démocratique du Congo, une poignée d’hommes lutte pour sauver le plus vieux parc naturel d’Afrique. Depuis 20 ans, groupes rebelles, forces armées et réfugiés menacent ce sanctuaire de biodiversité situé en pleine zone de guerre. Les « Rangers des Virunga » défendent au péril de leur vie cette réserve qui abrite les derniers gorilles des montagnes, mais aussi d’immenses gisements de minerais, de bois et de pétrole. Ils sont le dernier rempart entre la nature et la folie prédatrice des hommes.
Ce documentaire met en évidence les liens entre l'environnement et le secteur de la sécurité et accentue en particulier les pressions subites par les parcs naturels lorsque le climat sécuritaire se dégrade.
Le Sahel est une région diverse qui devient de plus en plus importante pour la sécurité régionale et mondiale. Par ailleurs, des dynamiques telles que la mauvaise gouvernance, un secteur agricole fragile, l'absence d'une transition démographique, et le manque d'emplois, en ont fait "une nouvelle frontière" pour les groupe djihadistes. En effet, ceux-ci essaient d'y manipuler et exploiter les tensions sous-jacentes de la région.
Serge Michaïlof résume les défis sécuritaires auxquels le Sahel fait face en particulier démographiques, d'extrémisme, de gouvernance et autres et explique ce qui devrait être fait pour y répondre de manière efficace.
This new SIPRI film evaluates how far we have to go to achieve peace, justice and strong institutions in the world by 2030—one of the goals set by the United Nations in its sustainable development agenda set out in 2015.
There is a clear concern raised throughout the film that current global trends are working against peacebuilders, particularly with regard to reducing violence everywhere.
The challenges explored include, but are not limited to: a lack of inclusion of populations in decision making, particularly youth globally; a lack of understanding of what causes structural violence; and the difficulty in convincing power holders to open up the political space.
Les villageois burkinabé en avaient assez des coupeurs de route et des voleurs de bétail. Alors ils ont décidé de créer leurs propres milices, qu'ils ont appelé les Koglweogos. Mais ces groupes d'auto défense sont maintenant tellement puissant qu'ils inquiètent les autorités.
Alors peut on contrôler encore les Koglweogos ?
En 2016, la Tchad est en émoi : des milliers de citoyens descendent dans les rues de N’Djaména pour dénoncer le viol de Zouhoura, une lycéenne de 16 ans, par un groupe d’adolescents (dont des fils de dignitaires tchadiens). Pour faire taire la population, le président Idriss Déby, au pouvoir depuis 1990, coupe l’accès à internet. Bis repetita deux mois après, lorsqu’il est réélu à la présidence. Une méthode qu’il adapte en 2018 en bloquant les réseaux sociaux, quand il modifie la Constitution pour rester au pouvoir.
Considering a year of state-led military operations, multi-party civil wars, humanitarian emergencies and state instability due to economic and constitutional collapse, what common trends and themes connect some of the challenges to international security?
What are the overarching regional and geopolitical rivalries driving conflict? And what implications for international security will the Trump administration’s America First policy have for a rules-based international order, especially considering Russia and China’s increasingly assertive foreign policies?
For full access to Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2019, kindly follow the link.
"La sécurité du Sahel est aussi la sécurité de l'Europe" selon l'ambassadeur Angel Losada Fernandez, Représentant spécial de l'UE pour le Sahel. Dans un entretien avec le Centre d’études stratégiques de l'Afrique, l'ambassadeur Losada évoque la stratégie de l'UE au Sahel, selon le nexus sécurité-développement. Les quatre piliers de cette stratégie incluent la jeunesse, la lutte contre la radicalisation, les migrations et la lutte contre les trafics illicites. L'ambassadeur Losada est à ce poste depuis 2015. Par le passé, il a occupé plusieurs fonctions en tant que diplomate, notamment Représentant permanent de l'Espagne auprès de la Commission de la CEDEAO de 2006 à 2011.
Depuis 2012, des extrémistes islamistes liés à Al-Qaïda ont pris le contrôle du Nord du Mali, en exploitant un soulèvement séparatiste Touareg. Cette mainmise, associée à la faiblesse du pouvoir de Bamako et à la fragilité de la région sahélienne, suscitent l’inquiétude.
Malgré l’intervention française et le déploiement de forces conjointes de cinq pays du Sahel,les groupes terroristes contrôlent toujours une grande partie de cette région et sont de plus en plus influents au Burkina Faso ainsi qu’au Niger.
Comment les Etats africains combattent-ils le terrorisme sur un si vaste territoire ? Comment se concrétisent les actions sur le terrain ? La tâche est immense et incertaine dans cette zone sous haute tension.
Odoxa a réalisé un sondage exclusif pour l'IRIS et Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui en Franceà l'occasion des 11e Entretiens européens d'Enghien.
Gaël Sliman, co-fondateur et président d’Odoxa, présente les enseignements de cette enquête portant sur ce que pensent les Français d'une armée européenne commune et de la politique de sécurité et de défense européenne.
Le Dr. Boubacar N'Diaye fournit une vue d'ensemble des performances de certains parlements d'Afrique dans le domaine du contrôle du secteur de la sécurité, tout en identifiant les bonnes pratiques en matière de contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité. Le Dr. N'Diaye propose aux parlementaires, décideurs et autres praticiens un certain nombre de solutions pour améliorer la qualité du contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique.
Dr. Raymond Gilpin examines the underlying trends affecting security in Africa, including demography, climate, migration, urbanization, and how they affect issues ranging from resource competition to transnational crime to state-citizen relations. He suggests areas of opportunity for legislators, and offers a roadmap for effecting change.
In 2013, DCAF - ISSAT had interviewed Lamine Cissé, Strategic SSR Advisor to ISSAT, where he outlined critical aspects of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and justice reform in Guinea. A short video has been prepared with excerpts from this interview, as a tribute to Mr. Cissé, who passed away in April 2019.
General Lamine Cissé, from Senegal, has held a number of strategic positions at the national and international level. He culminated his military career in the position of Chief of Defence Staff. This was followed by his appointment as Minister of Interior and a series of International appointments which included the post of Head of Mission for the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Office for Western Africa. More recently, he led an SSR assessment mission for ECOWAS in Guinea.
Du Mali au Burkina Faso, les djihadistes occupent des aires d'influence territoriales relativement limitées mais n'excluent pas la coopération dans certaines zones au cours de leurs opérations. Concernant l'enlèvement des deux touristes français au nord du Bénin, l'identité des preneurs d'otage est encore inconnue mais la ministre de la Défence Florence Parly a indiqué que deux mouvements terroristes principaux ont été repérés et "qui sont affiliés pour l'un à Al Qaïda, pour l'autre à l'EIGS (Etat islamique au Grand Sahara)".
Michel Goya, officier des troupes de marine, docteur en histoire contemporaine, répond à nos questions à l’occasion de sa participation aux Internationales de Dijon :
- Comment les guerres et la conflictualité ont-elles évolué ?
- Comment définiriez-vous l’ensemble des menaces aujourd’hui ?
- La France a-t-elle un rôle particulier à jouer dans la pacification du monde ?
Au Soudan, cela fait bientôt un mois que des manifestants tiennent un sit-in devant le QG de l'armée à Khartoum, la capitale. Dans la foulée de la chute du président Omar el-Béchir le 11 avril 2019, ils exigent la fin du régime militaire au pouvoir depuis des décennies et la mise en place d'une démocratie. Nos reporters Bastien Renouil, Élodie Cousin et Julia Steers ont suivi trois acteurs de cette révolte, des Soudanais ordinaires qui se battent pour un avenir meilleur.
Au Soudan, un coup d'État militaire aura finalement mis fin aux 29 années de dictature d’Omar el-Béchir. À la suite d'un soulèvement populaire inédit, en décembre 2018, l'armée s'est mise à protéger les manifestants des services de sécurité loyaux à l'ancien chef d’État, avant de déclarer sa destitution le 11 avril dernier.
On May 10, 2012, the USIP Center of Innovation for Security Sector Governance held its third annual conference. For the second year running, the conference focused on the pressing question of security sector reform in North Africa and the Middle East.
9:00 a.m. - 9:15 a.m. Welcome and Opening Remarks
- Ambassador Richard Solomon, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Robert Perito, Director, Security Sector Governance Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
9:15 a.m. - 10:45 a.m. Panel of Representatives from the Region
- Magda Boutros, Director, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Egypt
- Najla Elmangoush, former member of the National Transitional Council's Public Engagement Unit, Libya
- Rana Jarhum, Human Rights Activist, Yemen
- Dr. Murhaf Jouejati, Chairman of the National Consensus Movement and Member of the Syrian National Council, Syria
- Dr. Radwan Masmoudi, President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, Tunisia
- Hesham Sallam, Researcher, Egypt
On May 10, 2012, the USIP Center of Innovation for Security Sector Governance held its third annual conference. For the second year running, the conference focused on the pressing question of security sector reform in North Africa and the Middle East.
10:45 a.m. - 11:50 a.m. Panel of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Region
- Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen (1997-2001)
- Ambassador Rust Deming, Former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia (2000-2003)
- Ambassador Deborah Jones, Former U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait (2008-2011)
- Ambassador Thomas Riley, Former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco (2003-2009)
11:50 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Closing Remarks
Dr Carolina Hernanedez of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies in the Philippines talks about how she sees the security sector of Southeast Asia and its development.
The video version of this podcast is available here.
International peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries, including the DRC, typically prioritize top-down approaches. According to Séverine Autesserre—an expert on peacebuilding, humanitarian aid, and African politics—international peace organizations rarely tap into local knowledge and expertise or consider the voices of local communities.
For episode 2 of the African Peacebuilding Network, Kujenga Amani podcast, Séverine Autesserre, a professor of Political Science at Barnard College, discussed the overall impact of international peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, the difficulty of building peace from the top down and without input from the intended beneficiaries, and the potential for local peacebuilding efforts to transform conflict situations in the DRC and beyond.
To listen to the podcast, Kujenga Amani: Peacebuilding in Africa, please follow the link.
This conference brought together experts of West Africa and the Sahel specifically to shed light on the implications of elections, radicalization, and rising threats from jihadi militants and other armed conflict actors.This tripartite political phenomenon has significant consequences for governance and security in the region and beyond.
The conference addressed the practice and significance of multiparty elections in contexts of competitive authoritarian regimes, post-intervention transitions, and governance reforms – particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. It also assessed logics of radicalization, consequences for security strategies, and logics of military engagement both for state actors and international forces. Finally, it assessed the distinct threats arising from Jihadi groups in the region, state militarization, and migrant trajectories.
To listen to the podcast, Governance and Security in the Sahel, please follow the link.
Parmi les questions après l'enlèvement et la libération des deux touristes français : l'ampleur de la présence jihadiste dans la région. Depuis des mois le Burkina Faso est sous forte pression, le Bénin a connu sa première attaque armée. Selon certains, quatre Etats du Golfe de Guinée sont menacés.
Malgré la guerre antiterroriste menée par les forces de Barkhane au Mali, les groupes djihadistes ne cessent de se déplacer et de gagner du terrain en Afrique de l'Ouest. Liés à Al-Qaida ou à l'Etat Islamique, ils alimentent l'insécurité avec des groupes criminels dans une bande spécifique du Sahel, à savoir la Mauritanie, le Mali, le Niger, le Tchad, le Burkina Faso et le Bénin.
Pour écouter le podcast, Afrique de l'Ouest : les djihadistes tentent-ils une "course à la mer"?, veuillez suivre le lien.
Si le proto-État érigé par Daech en Irak et en Syrie s’est écroulé, l'Etat islamique n'est cependant pas vaincu. La mouvance djihadiste reste très active et menace toujours ses anciens territoires et au-delà, partout dans le monde, par l'arme du terrorisme. De quelle manière Daech s'est transformé?
Afin d'écouter le podcast, Daech aujourd'hui, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.
Policy and Research Papers
The Deaf, the Blind and the Politician: The Troubles of Justice and Security Interventions in Fragile States
By Erwin van Veen & Maria Derks
This article argues for an integrated, political and pragmatic approach to justice and security development as one of the key objectives of effective international support to peace building and state building in conflict-affected and fragile states. Developments since the 1990s suggest that different actors and communities have started to work on the same issues from different angles and with – perceived– different mandates. As a result, important parts of the debate on how to deal with security system reform (SSR), justice reform and the rule of law seem somewhat stuck in conceptual arguments. This article suggests moving away from such debates and instead to focus on what such justice and security engagements are meant to achieve, for whom, and which general approaches are likely to provide most added value.
This is a pre-publication draft of an ongoing project.
Begun in 2005-2006, the SSRI Project by ISDS seeks to develop an assessment tool regarding the performance of the Philippine security sector which can serve as (1) a diagnostic instrument to determine what needs to be done to improve security sector governance (SSG) in the country; (2) a guide to the formulation of a reform program to achieve good/democratic security sector governance; and (3) a monitoring mechanism on the progress (or lack of it) of SSR for good/democratic SSG.
En juillet 2011, le programme de bonne gouvernance ‘Gutwara Neza’, sous le patronage du Ministère de la Justice, a réalisé une réflexion nationale sur la justice de proximité au Burundi. Consistant en une série de quatre ateliers de consultation régionaux suivis d’une journée de débat national, cette activité a permis de dégager des pistes de réforme prioritaires pour pérenniser le système de justice locale très riche dont dispose le pays.
A report commissioned by the EU on community justice in Burundi, including an analysis of traditional justice mechanisms.
The improper management of conventional ammunition and explosives poses significant safety and security risks. Frequent ammunition depot explosions and diversions from ammunition stocks of state actors testify to the relevance of the issue to Africa. Overcoming challenges to effective national ammunition management can be a formidable task in itself. This paper considers the challenges to and scope for action on ammunition management in Africa. It is argued that concerted efforts by African states and their international partners will be essential to effectively limiting risks of undesirable explosive events and ammunition diversions on the continent.
The fight against illegal arms transfers requires regulation and an effective monitoring of arms brokers. Their business primarily consists of facilitating and arranging transactions in exchange for compensation or material recompense. Indeed some of them manage to circumvent existing controls by exploiting different national regulations or conducting their activities from countries where controls are weak or non-existent.
In 2003 the EU member states took an important initiative by setting a harmonized system of control of arms brokers. With the adoption of a European Common Position they introduced controls on brokering activities taking place on their territories. Yet, six years later, all EU member states still have no legislation on arms brokering, while others need to adapt their national legislation to EU standards. Furthermore this European instrument reflects minimum standards which currently appear insufficient to effectively fight against ill disposed brokers.
This report reviews the extent to which EU member states implement the Common Position on arms brokering and suggests some improvements for a better control on brokering activities and an effective fight against illegal arms transfers. One section of the report also considers a major gap in the national regulations: extraterritorial controls on brokering activities. Finally, the report presents the case study of the Belgian legislation on arms brokering.
The problem of lacking or inconsistent regulations on arms brokering is painstakingly clear. Arms brokers are central in many illicit arms transfers, including transfers to conflict regions, embargoed actors, and serious human rights abusers. In the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW (UN PoA) of 2001, States specifically committed to develop adequate national legislation and common understandings on arms brokering. This report reviews progress made around the control of brokering.
It shows that a growing number of states have established legislation on arms brokering, or will do so. Comparing domestic norms and multilateral standards reveals that there is a large degree of convergence on key regulatory principles and measures, a good foundation for developing global minimal standards on brokering controls. The UNGA in October/November 2005 provides an opportunity for strengthening the international commitment to enhancing cooperation in combating illicit SALW brokering. Further efforts in this regard remain crucial, in particular in order to eliminate the loopholes and inconsistencies which allow brokering activities to take place with relative ease and impunity.
It is therefore urgent that the UN establish, at a minimum, a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Brokering, mandated to consider the feasibility of an international instrument and to identify the elements required for effective national brokering controls. The mandate should also consider controls on transportation and financial services related to arms brokering. Complementary standards on SALW control should also be developed in conformity with commitments undertaken with the UN PoA, including the development of minimal standards on end-user certificates and of adequate licensing to decide on arms exports and brokering activities.
This paper will proceed in four parts. The first part will examine the basic theoretical relationship between legal systems and market-oriented poverty reduction. The second part will examine various elements of legal and judicial reform and current activities. The third part will describe a strategy framework and methodology for designing and preparing legal and judicial activities. Lastly, the fourth part will examine the role of the World Bank and the organizational mechanisms available to the Bank to ensure that its
theoretical and policy approaches are constantly refined for new circumstances and in light of new interdisciplinary research.
For over a decade, the international community has been helping developing nations reform their judiciaries. The World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have extended over $800 million in loans for judicial reform. At the same time, the United Nations Development Program, the European Union and its member states, and the American, Australian, Canadian, and Japanese governments have provided significant grant aid to help developing nations improve the operation of the judicial branch of government. Why are international donors supporting reform? What kinds of projects are included within a reform program? How can a successful reform be achieved?
This annex can only provide a brief overview of transitional justice measures (§ I), and summarize an argument that clarifies the aims that these measures arguably are designed to seek (§ II). This is important, in turn, in order to clarify the contributions that transitional justice can make to security and development, particularly in the context of fragility. Contrary to misconceptions, particularly on the part of non-experts, transitional justice is neither past-oriented, nor of concern to victims alone; rather, to the extent that it achieves any of its goals, it does so in virtue of its potential to affirm general but basic norms—therein its potential contributions to both security and development. The argument thus is also meant to counter the perception that transitional justice measures hamper development and reconstruction, or that transitional justice is not urgent in the aftermath of the cessation of conflict (§ III). The next section clarifies the ‘mechanisms’ through which transitional justice can be thought to make their contributions to development, emphasizing their norm affirming function, and their (related) potential to disarticulate and articulate networks (§IV). Finally, I close by showing the relevance of the foregoing analysis to the WDR and offer four cautionary notes about the approach it adopts (§V).
Those who work in the legal reform business generally expected greater impact from this investment in new laws. Analysts, drafters, and project implementers often assumed that market forces would propel a greater level of implementation once the right laws were in place. Instead, a number of common problems repeatedly appear as counterparts in beneficiary countries have moved from legislation to implementation.
These problems have been independently identified by numerous legal reform professionals. They
can be summarized as follows:
• Lack of ownership: Laws are often translated or adopted wholesale from another system as “hasty transplants,” without the necessary careful, patient adaptation to the local legal and commercial culture and without substantial involvement by the stakeholders most directly affected, including the private sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), not simply government counterparts.
• Insufficient resources: Law reform projects are too short term and too lightly funded to create the needed mechanisms and processes that would permit sufficient absorption through broadbased discussion and sustained participation in the process of reform.
• Excessive segmentation: Overly narrow diagnoses and responses to legal shortcomings produce projects that ignore systemic problems and fail to add up to an integrated, effective whole.
When the law works for everyone, it defines and enforces the rights and obligations of all. This allows people to interact with one another in an atmosphere that is certain and predictable. Thus, the rule of law is not a mere adornment to development; it is a vital source of progress. It creates an environment in which the full spectrum of human creativity can flourish, and prosperity can be built. The Commission understands legal empowerment to be a process of systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance their rights and interests as citizens and economic actors.
The eighth edition in DCAF’s Yearly Book series examines theconceptual and operational dimensions of Security Sector Transformation inAfrica. African knowledge and experience has contributed much to theevolution of the security sector reform (SSR) concept while Africa continuesto be the main arena for SSR programmes. Consequently, over the years,DCAF has actively sought to expand its knowledge base, policy researchfocus and operational activities on African security sector reform andgovernance issues. For these reasons it is therefore particularly appropriatethat DCAF focuses on this subject in 2010 – the 10th anniversary of thecreation of the DCAF foundation.
This is the second of two volumes of the report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and consists mainly of the outcomes of fi ve working groups established to inform the Commission’s deliberations through substantive work in the thematic areas of Access to Justice and Rule of Law, Property Rights, Labour Rights,
Business Rights and with respect to overall implementation strategies. The working groups consisted of a core of between fi ve and seven experts and stakeholders in their
individual capacities from around the world, with leading edge expertise and experience in the theme to be studied.
For nearly two decades, international organisations and bilateral donors agencies have been involved in the promotion and implementation of legal and judicial reform projects in developing and transition countries. This paper refers to this process as the rule of law enterprise (RLE). It identifies the ambiguities and misconceptions of the RLE and asks why there has been so little interaction between those involved in the implementation of legal and judicial reform and academics with knowledge and experience on this topic. After identifying the theoretical and practical obstacles to a fruitful dialogue the paper concludes that such a dialogue could take place, provided that academics – political scientists and lawyers – and practitioners adjust their respective approaches.
The Rule of Law in Peace and Capacity Building Operations: Moving beyond a Conventional State-Centred Imagination
Although the ‘rule of law’ is now widely recognised as indispensable to eff ective peace operations, its delineation remains elusive. Researchers contest its substance while those most responsible for its implementation ( e.g. the United Nations) promulgate only abstract notions needed to inform detailed decisions. At its worst, this means that competing reform activities undermine each other, making long term success less likely. The questions we address are about the deficiencies in how rule of law is conceived. Particular attention is paid to the little recognised assumption that the Weberian state ideal corresponds to the societies on the receiving end of international
interventions. After a review of extant academic and practitioner viewpoints, we set out a post-Weberian framework which expands the dominant imagination to include non-state rule of law ‘providers’. We argue that the optimum sources for immediate yet sustainable rule of law solutions may often be those which bear little resemblance to the conventional state-based providers that populate mainstream conceptions.
In this paper, I will analyze the connections between the multilateral debates and external agendas, on the one hand, and the implementation of rule of law strategies in the field, on the other. The first part of the paper will start with a brief historical overview of the emergence of international support for rule of law institutions and its progressive inclusion into conflict management strategies. I will then proceed with an analysis of the state of the multilateral debate and of the concept of ‘local ownership’, with a view to identify why rule of law programs still suffer from a lack of legitimacy at the multilateral and operational levels.
Postconflict societies are characterized by lack of the rule of law, past and present gross human rights violations, impunity, and economic devastation and decay. In response to past human rights violations, a variety of measures have been developed, including prosecutions at both international and domestic levels, truth commissions, and reparations for victims. All these options need strong institutions. In postconflict and post-authoritarian societies, this often requires reforming or rebuilding the judicial system and its supporting services. This paper draws connections between judicial reform, transitional justice, and development in transitional contexts.
The linkages between good governance, rule of law and economic growth, once more fully understood, have the potential to unshackle economies and decrease poverty throughout the developing world. Currently, however, most initiatives are heavy in rhetoric and light on directly addressing the legal structures and policies that affect the poor. Until developing countries can enable their vast populations of poor citizens to actively participate in their economies, their growth and the creation of egalitarian societies will be severely hampered. Analyzing and building on the final report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and other previous work, this article outlines a functional approach to addressing the most critical needs of the poor, including but not limited to issues that directly affect livelihoods and economic opportunity. It accordingly aims to help the poor gain a foothold in effecting their own development and making legal empowerment a reality. By introducing important lessons in ommunity-based justice from an access to justice program in Bolivia, the article provides tangible examples that might help shape legal empowerment initiatives to best address the needs of the poor.
This study provides groundbreaking analysis of the challenges faced in security and justice service delivery. More importantly, it proposes an innovative solution for development agencies engaging in supporting security and justice development. A multi-layered approach to security and justice programmes is a methodology that is highly context specific, targeting donor assistance to those providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points where actual day-to-day service delivery occurs. A multi-layered strategy recognises that unorthodox solutions and partnerships may be necessary to respond to the severe challenges of fragile states. The primary objective is to develop and strengthen the relationship between service providers (state and non-state) and the users of those services in the marketplaces where they work, in the neighbourhoods where they live and on the roads they travel, while fostering greater performance accountability.
The Judicial Reform Program in Mongolia: Accomplishments, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations for the Future
Part I summarizes in broad strokes the scope of JRP’s work with Mongolia’s justice sector institutions. Part II summarizes “Lessons Learned” from the perspective of donors,
implementers, and recipients of USAID assistance. The final chapter, Part III, contains recommendations for the justice sector of Mongolia and for future donors. It is based on the experience of the Judicial Reform Program over the past eight years and draws on the recommendations coming out of JRP’s March 2009 closing conference “Next Steps in Justice Reform,” which brought together all of the key justice sector leaders and administrators. As its final contribution to its Mongolian partners, this Report seeks to synthesize the consensus outcomes of the conference which in turn were intended to serve as a road map for future reforms and improvements in the administration of justice.
This speech, delivered by Amartya Sen at the first World Bank conference on Comprehensive Legal and Judicial Development, discusses the importance of legal reform within a comprehensive development framework. Legal reform advances freedom-a crucial and constitutive quality of comprehensive development. Legal reform is thus important on its own; its cause need not be indirectly established through its contribution to economic development. Legal reform is, however, also causally interconnected with other constitutive elements of comprehensive development. By acting as a platform where the poor have equal voice and by creating the backbone of the capitalist system, a sound legal system is necessary to advance political and economic development.
Pakistan is one of the world best-kept tourist secrets, being endowed with a deep history, a rich and embracing culture and the majestic splendour of most the world’s highest mountains – features which are generally not well known abroad. Those of us that have had the privilege to live and work in Pakistan have had much to appreciate. What is generally better known is that Pakistan is a large poor country which ranks between Papua New Guinea and Nepal on the United Nation’s human development index, and faces a range of profound governance and economic challenges to its development.
This aim of this paper is to illuminate and reflects on one focused and substantial effort to improve this situation. It complements an earlier article outlining the purpose, goals and objectives of the project published at its outset.2 It will review the ongoing experience being gained in Pakistan’s Access to Justice reform program with a view to distil lessons learned for the emerging discourse on law and justice development programs. The paper approaches the subject in four parts: history, objectives, progress to date, and lessons learned.
Like other donors, SDC has dealt with rule of law issues for years. In several countries, SDC supports judicial reform and the improvement of the legal framework for economic and social development. This concept paper aims to provide information and guidance to SDC’s staff and partners at headquarters and in partner countries. The concept paper begins by identifying the essential elements of the rule of law. Although there is no internationally accepted definition of the rule of law, key elements generally include: non-discrimination and equality before the law, the hierarchy of norms, and the substantive coherence of the legal framework, the government is bound by law, the separation of powers, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and respect for human rights.
The rule of law is interlinked with other concepts used in international cooperation: the rule of law is a means to realize human rights and gender equality, a key element for good governance, decentralization, poverty reduction, economic development, and peace building. Depending on these different perspectives, the concept is multicoloured, and it results in different and sometimes even conflicting approaches to and priorities for legal and judicial reforms. SDC will use the rule of law concept as a means to realize human rights, and implement its principles with flexibility, taking into account the relevant context, and potential entry points for cooperation.
Part two of this concept paper looks at the growing trend to include the rule of law dimension in legal and judicial reform projects. The performance of judicial institutions depends not just on operational efficiency, but also on their accessibility to vulnerable groups and effectiveness in realizing human rights. Justice sector reforms are increasingly seen from a systemic perspective, as a series of interconnected institutions and procedures to be analysed and improved. Moreover, legal and judicial systems are not restricted to formal, “modern” laws and institutions: they include informal and traditional law and procedures.
Part three provides illustrative examples of SDC’s engagement and experience involving the rule of law dimension both in legal and judicial reform and in other areas of development cooperation. The examples show that the legal dimension of development can be addressed in a variety of contexts and manners with different partners and entry points.
This paper cautions that unless there is an opening of political space and a participatory transition, the soon to be independent government risks recreating the kind of centralised, authoritarian and ultimately unstable state it finally managed to escape. The ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cobbled together an important, though tentative, Southern consensus ahead of the January 2011 referendum. But its choke-hold on power and a “winner-takes-all” approach to the transition have since jeopardised those gains. Meanwhile, armed insurgencies, militia activity and army defections highlight internal fault lines and latent grievances within the security sector.
More than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by violent conflict.
The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development examines the changing nature of violence in the 21st century, and underlines the negative impact of repeated cycles of violence on a country or region’s development prospects. Preventing violence and building peaceful states that respond to the aspirations of their citizens requires strong leadership and concerted national and international efforts. The Report is based on new research, case studies and extensive consultations with leaders and development practitioners throughout the world.
World Bank copyright Holder: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank: World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (2011)
It is now widely recognized that the advancement of the rule of law is essential to the maintenance of peace and security, the realization of sustainable development, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Rule of law assistance is a growing area of demand and significant experience has been accumulated in this field over the past 20 years. Yet, despite the centrality of the rule of law to our challenging global agenda, rule of law assistance is still too often executed in an ad hoc manner, designed without proper consultations with national stakeholders, and absent exacting standards of evaluation. A new perspective on rule of law assistance delivery is clearly needed.
The United Nations hosted a consultative process in New York resulting in this report, entitled New Voices: National Perspectives on Rule of Law Assistance. Sixteen national rule of law experts engaged in rule of law reform in 13 countries and regions, joined representatives from the United Nations system and partner countries to offer their respective views on how rule of law assistance can be better channeled to deliver results. The overall aim is to enhance dialogue between rule of law assistance providers and rule of law reformers in countries with a view to placing national perspectives at the centre of rule of law assistance.
This report outlines the following set of recommendations, corresponding to four major common conclusions which emerged from the consultative process. The national experts widely agreed that rule of law assistance is enhanced where: 1) national actors experience greater ownership over rule of law programmes; 2) local stakeholders are empowered; 3) assistance is coordinated and coherent; and 4) meaningful evaluations and assessment of impact are conducted. These common conclusions are based on the personal views and experiences of the national experts with rule of law assistance as articulated in the Voices section of this report.
It is hoped that the common conclusions and recommendations formulated by this informal forum of experts will serve as an important turning point towards a more effective approach to rule of law assistance. A clear call emerged for national rule of law policy-makers and experts and donor partners to come together to develop an internationally-recognized framework guiding rule of law assistance.
Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified by the UK's Stabilisation Unit
The lessons identified here are based on ideas that have been developing across Government and on our deepening understanding of what works and what doesn’t
work on the ground. They will hopefully be of use to policymakers, practitioners and programme managers working in and on conflict-affected environments.
The complexity of the challenges in stabilisation environments require integrated solutions at multiple levels. Rather than re-inventing our responses to each new
crisis, we need to identify relevant lessons from past experience, learn from these, and adapt them to the specific requirements of each new environment.
The identification of lessons remains just the first step. We need to ensure that the lessons are actually ‘learned’. This requires a genuine commitment at all levels to learning from the past, the dedication of resources (human and financial) to support the learning process, and the development of systems to feed lessons back into policy, planning and practice. The lessons learning process should be a continuous cycle.
This Issues Note gives readers a basic understanding of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), so that they are in a position to consider whether DDR is an appropriate stabilisation intervention. It clarifies questions, issues and articulates the decisions that the practitioner may face with when considering a DDR programme. This note should be read in conjunction with Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A UK View, and with other Stabilisation Issues Notes, particularly those on Security and rule of Law and Economic Recovery.
Human rights are key to stabilisation - both as a means and as an end in themselves. Although we need to promote universal adherence to human rights, we need to recognise that there can be different cultural and political approaches to dealing with human rights violations, especially during a fragile peace process. Human rights need to be embedded in planning and assessment for stabilisation; the selection of specific tools will depend on needs, opportunities and constraints in any particular context.
This report is based on a February 25, 2010 panel presentation and the views expressed on fighting corruption in SSR during a meeting of the Security Sector
Reform Working Group. The panel consisted of Raymond Gilpin, vice president of the Center for Sustainable Economies at USIP, Rachel Nield, legal adviser at the Open Society Justice Initiative, former Chief of Police Michael Berkow (retired), president of Altegrity Security Consulting, and Alex Berg, a USIP peace scholar.
DDR 2008. Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in the World during 2007
This study is a comparative analysis of active, 2007 DDR programmes, whether they were in the early planning phase or implementing final social reintegration activities. The main goal of this year’s report is to provide an overall vision for the active DDR programmes and, as such, widen the general and current understanding of the process. Specifically, this report aims to address academics and practitioners.
Justice Beyond The Hague provides important insights into the strengths and limitations of current international justice mechanisms. It makes a clear case for increasing support to national legal systems and outlines a variety of ways that the U.S. government can improve and coordinate its aid with others. While there will always be a place for international courts in countries that cannot or will not prosecute perpetrators themselves, this Council Special Report successfully argues
that domestic systems can and should play a more meaningful role.
Justice Beyond The Hague: Supporting the Prosecution of International Crimes in National Courts by David A. Kaye, Copyright © 2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations Press. Posted with permission.
"A Common Approach for Building International Capacity to Support SJSR" is the title of ISSAT's second High Level Panel (HLP), organised on May 19th, 2011. ISSAT hosted its HLP discussion in Brussels, Belgium with the focus on the increasing need for establishing the right balance of technical, methodological and contextual expertise within SSR interventions.
The basis for the HLP topic was the recognition that the number of SSR mandates within Peace Support Operations (PSO) and crisis management operations has increased over the past years. In parallel, the demand for SSR and rule of law advisors who combine specialist knowledge with a solid understanding of the politics involved in reform processes has increased.
At present, many bilateral and multilateral donors face serious capacity gaps when it comes to having readily-available and deployable personnel with SSR experience and expertise. Security and justice reform requires a multi-disciplinary response: it requires personnel with an understanding of the political nature of SSR and the importance of accountability to a legitimate authority, coupled with those who have a technical understanding of how, for example, a police service, the military, the courts system and the various ministries function.
The panel who addressed these issues were:
- Mr. Richard Wright, Director Conflict Prevention & Security Policy, European External Action Service (EEAS)
- Mr. Cedric de Coning, Advisor to ACCORD and NUPI and Author of the Study on Civilian Capacities within the Non-governmental Civilian Roster Community
- Mr Mika-Markus Leinonen, Director, Civcom Chair, European External Action Service (EEAS)
- General Juan Estaban (by video), Former Head of the EU SSR Mission in Guinea Bissau
This study analyses the issue of early recovery. In doing so it critically discusses, in a first step, the policy strategies and operational frameworks of selected bilateral donors, regional organizations as well as multilateral institutions to disentangle the main background concepts underlying the policy concepts and to inform the reader of the major challenges involved.The research investigate the following issues: the relations and trade-offs between the strategic objectives of peace-building as well as security and development; the analytical integration of socio-economic development and conflict; the methodological conceptualization of the 'transition' phase; the trade-offs between short and long-term development objectives; and the challenge of sequence and prioritization.
The study highlights policy recommendations and implications in fourteen priority areas: the reintegration of ex-combatants and special groups (IDPs, refugees), infrastructure, employment, agriculture, education, health, fiscal policy and public finance, monetary policy and exchange rate management, the financial sector, external finances (capital flight, debt relief, remittances, ODA), trade, private sector development and entrepreneurship, economic governance (land property rights and access to land, corruption, the management of natural resources, illegal economic activities, regional conflict factors) and horizontal inequality.
As part of a new series in a joint ISIS DCAF project, "Communicate, Coordinate and Cooperate: the A-Z of Cohering EU Crisis Management in the post-Lisbon Era", this first paper highlights some major operational challenges that hinder Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission planners and field personnel from effectively implementing security sector reform (SSR) missions. Member States have launched thirteen SSR missions without mustering the political will to supply sufficient adequately-trained personnel, money and equipment.
Member States must decide on whether or not they want the EU to become a viable international actor in the field of SSR. If so, they must clearly prioritise future CSDP missions in order not to waste scarce resources through mere flag raising exercises. Therefore, and in addition to addressing the operational needs mentioned above, the EU needs to agree on an SSR strategy in the EAS which would clarify the concrete criteria for intervention as well as objectives to be achieved in the framework of SSR-related CSDP missions.
The loss by many states of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force has contributed significantly to the proliferation of failed and failing states worldwide. In such states, a multitude of threats, including insurgencies, terrorist networks, transnational organized crime, and illicit shadow economies, flourish. These states often become trapped in cycles of violent conflict that threaten stability and security at home, in their neighborhoods, and throughout the world. States emerging from conflict are highly prone to return to conflict within the first few years of postconflict status. The widespread availability of lethal weapons exacerbates the tensions that already permeate conflict and postconflict environments.
The mechanism of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of successful peacekeeping, peace-building, postconflict management, and state-building. Security sector reform (SSR) has emerged as a promising though poorly understood tool for consolidating stability and establishing sovereignty after conflict. While DDR enables a state to recover the monopoly (or at least the preponderance) of force, SSR provides the opportunity for the state to establish the legitimacy of that monopoly.
The essays in this book reflect the diversity of experience in DDR and SSR in various contexts. Despite the considerable experience acquired by the international community, the critical interrelationship between DDR and SSR and the ability to use these mechanisms with consistent success remain less than optimally developed. DDR and SSR are essential tools of modern statecraft, but their successful use is contingent upon our understanding of both the affinities and the tensions between them. These essays aim to excite further thought on how these two processes—DDR and SSR—can be implemented effectively and complimentarily to better accomplish the shared goals of viable states and enduring peace.
Edited by Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic, with contributions from:
Gender analysis of actual SSR processes is sorely lacking in the SSR literature. In ‘Poster Boys No More: Gender and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste’ Henri Myrttinen breaks new ground in examining the gender dimensions of the DDR and SSR processes in Timor-Leste, with a focus on the establishment of the police and armed forces. The paper explores issues such as: how men’s roles relate to gang violence and relationships of patronage that undermine the security services, how women have been incorporated into the new security services and how the security services are addressing gender-based violence. It shows how a gender perspective can add to our understanding of many of the social processes at work in Timor-Leste and help to find solutions to some of the main security issues in the country, making recommendations for Timor-Leste’s ongoing SSR processes.
Table of Contents
2. Background to the DDR/SSR Process
3. Gender Roles in Timor-Leste
3.1 Women and girls
3.2 Men and boys
4. Violence, Insecurity and Gender
4.1 Masculinities and the legitimacy of violence
4.2 Patrons and clients
4.3 Gender-based violence
5. FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL)
5.2 Recruitment and training
5.3 Internal tensions and external problems
6. Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL)
6.2 Recruitment and training
6.3 GBV and the Vulnerable Persons Units
6.4 Internal and external problems of the PNTL
7. The 2006 Crisis
7.1 Overview of events
7.2 Aftermath of the crisis
8. Overview of Post-2006 SSR Developments
8.1 The F-FDTL
8.2 The PNTL
8.3 The SSR process
9. Analysis and Policy Recommendations
Appendix 1. Timeline of key events from 1974-2009
Appendix 2. Overview of UN Missions in Timor-Leste 1999-2009
The research project The North Caucasus: views from within focuses on issues of social difference, such as ethnicity, religion, generational difference and migration, and the challenges arising from these. It considers local perspectives on these challenges; how people seek to address them; and what they consider needs to be done to resolve them. It involved the collaboration of international and Russian experts, including researchers from the North Caucasus, and institutional partnership between the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Saferworld. The work focused on five republics in the North Caucasus: Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Our research shows that social and political conditions for people on the ground – particularly for youth, who feel excluded from both economic and political life – do little to defend society against the influence of ideological extremism. More engagement with the problems affecting young people, and improved governance, including in the security and justice sectors, can help build resilience to violence.
The English version of the report is titled, The North Caucasus: views from within People’s Perspectives on Peace and Security . In addition to the main report, five case studies from the individual republics will shortly be uploaded to the Saferworld website.
The Russian version is titled The North Caucasus: views from within - Challenges and problems for social and political development . The five republic case studies are included within the report.
The research forms part of the EU-funded ‘People’s Peacemaking Perspectives’ project, a joint initiative implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld and financed under the European Commission's Instrument for Stability. The project provides European Union institutions with analysis and recommendations based on the opinions and experiences of local people in a range of countries and regions affected by fragility and violent conflict.
Read the report
The importance of security sector reform (SSR) has increasingly been emphasizedin international engagement with post-conflict countries. Many governments and UN and donor agencies have emphasized women’s participation and efforts to achieve gender equality as crucial elements of post-conflict reconstruction. In 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, peace and security4, highlighting the interdependence of postconflict gender equality, peacebuilding and security. Women are acknowledged as playing important roles in peacebuilding and in sustaining security on a communal level. Gender inequality is understood to inhibit development and violence against women to be a pervasive form of insecurity with widespread ill-effects across society. There is also growing awareness of the need to address the particular experiences of men and boys, both as victims and as sources of insecurity.
Table of Contents
2. Gender and security sector reform
2.1 Gender and security
2.2 Gender and (in)security in post-conflict settings
2.3 Principles for integrating gender in security sector reform
3. Gender mainstreaming and promoting women’s participation in post-conflict security sector reform
3.1 Gender mainstreaming in security sector reform
3.2 The challenge of women’s participation in security sectorreform
3.3 Women’s civil society groups in security sector reform
3.4 Women parliamentarians in security sector reform
4. Securing women’s full and equal participation in post-conflictsecurity situations
4.1 The challenge of women’s participation in security services
4.2 Women’s participation within post-confl ict security services
5. Gender and specifi c post-conflict security sector reform issues
5.1 Integrating gender in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
5.2 Integrating gender in transitional justice and justice reform
Women, Peace and Security: from Resolution to Action - Ten Years of Security Council Resolution 1325
This publication summarizes the proceedings of the seminar entitled “Women, Peace, and Security:From Resolution to Action. Ten years of Security Council Resolution 1325”, held in Geneva on 15 September 2010. Convened jointly by the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the seminar is part of an ongoing series of joint events hosted by DCAF and UNOG since 2003, addressing various aspects of security governance.
For the purpose of this paper the term "child soldier" will be used for a personunder the age of 18 who is associated with armed groups or government forces, in any capacity other than a family member. The term "child combatant" will be used for a person under the age of 18 who is or has been actively participating in hostilities in such a manner that he or she adheres to the criteria set in international humanitarian law.
Currently scores of children are recruited and used for military purposes, and perpetrators are not held accountable. There is clearly a need to move from lawmaking, program development, and training, to law enforcement, implementation, monitoring and reporting. In the words of the UN Secretary-General: to move to an "era of application".
Table of Contents
1. Child Soldiers, an Introduction
2. Child Soldiers and Recruitment
3. International Legal Instruments Relevant to Child Soldiers
4. Root Causes of Child Soldiering
7. Negotiating the Release of Child Soldiers
8. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
9. Children with Special Needs
11. Criminal Justice and Child Soldiers
12. International Initiatives to Stop the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflicts
13.1. Recommendations for Action
Annex 1: World Map of the Use of Child Soldiers
Annex 2: Human Security Network Members
DCAF conducted a mapping study on Gender and Security Sector Reform Actors and Activities in Liberia from November 2010 to March 2011. The mapping study was undertaken by an independent consultant, Mr Cecil Griffiths from the Liberian National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA). This research was made possible thanks to the cooperation of most gender and SSR actors in Liberia including the Ministry of Gender and Development (MoGD), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Civil Society Organization Working Group on Security Sector Reform.
This project aimed to complement existing information on gender and SSR issues in Liberia and to reinforce information-sharing and coordination between actors.
On 31 March 2011, LINLEA and DCAF organised a workshop in Monrovia to complete and validate the findings of the study. In addition to validating the findings of the study, the participants made key recommendations related to gender and training, policy development, programmes and activities. The report was launched in Monrovia on 23 September 2011.
This working paper suggests the best practices in reintegration program design include: planning of pilot activities for reintegration support at the start of the DDR process; investing in regular communication and outreach with ex-combatants, communities and other stakeholders; ensuring specialised services and program adaptations for vulnerable groups of ex-combatants including children, women and the disabled; and building broad-based partnerships that facilitate the evolution of reintegration activities into wider development programming.
As evidenced by the successes and challenges of reintegration programs around the world, the institutional structures and arrangements governing DDR and reintegration programs can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of these operations. Minimum institutional features of particular relevance include: strong national ownership; the separation of political oversight and technical implementation bodies; decentralized program structures; timely and regular monitoring and evaluation; rigorous financial systems and controls; and a clear exit strategy
To access the full paper, click here.
This discussion note draws on a variety of studies, in particular the work produced for the seminar series on reintegration sustainability in the context of shadow economies that TDRP organised.
To access full text, click here.
This paper, commissioned by Sida to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, aims both to improve knowledge regarding reintegration and to identify the role of development co-operation in this process. By looking at certain factors in a society; physical security, economic security, political influence and social reintegration of ex-combatants, this study sets out to understand circumstances that are essential to reintegration, and what culprits to avoid. In particular, it recommends certain precautions, steps and strategies that donors and their partners need to take into consideration when promoting reintegration through development cooperation.
Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation
Rule of law–based criminal justice responses to terrorism are most effectively ensured when they are practiced within a criminal justice system capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the rights of the accused and when all are equally accountable under the law. Building the capacity of weak criminal justice systems to safeguard mutual rights and responsibilities of governments and their citizens is essential for the alleviation of a number of conditions conducive to violent extremism and the spread of terrorism. A new wave of multilateral counterterrorism initiatives has the opportunity to recalibrate how criminal justice and rule of law–oriented counterterrorism capacity-building assistance is delivered to developing states with weak institutions.
This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the Paris Principles and the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity-building assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically.
This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of constitutional choices made after conflict, drawing upon comparative studies of six constitutions and peace agreements. The paper attempts to synthesize the practical lessons drawn from the cases, with a focus on (i) the constitution-making process; (ii) the extent of reliance on executive and geographical power-sharing; (iii) the viability of checks and balances; (iv) the electoral model; (v) the role of political parties in the transition; and (vi) issues of implementation.
To view this publication, please follow this link.
This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.
This MENA report joins the overall Index report, available at www.defenceindex.org, as an analytical summary of the detailed
This is a brand new tool and is the result of a major two-year study. This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.
As a part of this Index, 82 countries across the globe were subject to expert, independent assessment. These countries accounted for 94 per cent of global military expenditure in 2011 (USD 1.6 trillion).
They were selected according to the size of their arms trade, the absolute and per capita size of their militaries, and a proxy of the size of their security sector. Each country was assessed using a comprehensive questionnaire of 77 questions, clustered into five risk areas: political risk, finance risk, personnel risk, operations risk, and procurement risk. Each of these five areas in turn has specific risk areas, as shown in the diagram below.
The analysis was subjected to multiple levels of peer review to minimise the risk of bias and inaccuracies in the responses. Governments were given opportunities to comment on the draft and to provide additional commentary if they desired. Each government has received a comprehensive report outlining our findings for each question, with references to all the sources we used. These assessments are made public on our website.
A second index has also been developed that addresses defence companies, analysing the anti-corruption systems of 129 major global companies. This index, the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (www.companies.defenceindex.org), was published by Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme, on 4th October, 2012.
The report, co-drafted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (formerly known as the Centre for Civil-Military Relations) and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence with the support of DCAF, presents the findings of the needs assessment on gender and SSR in Serbia.
• Generates a detailed baseline for the current state of gender mainstreaming in security sector institutions at the central, provincial and municipal level;
• Identifies local needs, gaps and shortcomings of current SSR processes, and prioritizes needs which should be addressed by national authorities and civil society, with the support of the international donor community, including DCAF’s gender and SSR project.
The needs assessment is built on desk research, interviews, and a series of local stakeholder consultations conducted in Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Novi Pazar, Bujanovac and Belgrade in the course of March and April 2010. It forms the building block of DCAFs dedicated and long term gender and SSR project in Serbia.
These Principles were developed in order to provide guidance to those engaged in drafting, revising, or implementing laws or provisions relating to the state’s authority to withhold information on national security grounds or to punish the disclosure of such information.
They are based on international (including regional) and national law, standards, good practices, and the writings of experts.
They address national security—rather than all grounds for withholding information. All other public grounds for restricting access should at least meet these standards.
These Principles were drafted by 22 organizations and academic centres (listed in the Annex) in consultation with more than 500 experts from more than 70 countries at 14 meetings held around the world, facilitated by the Open Society Justice Initiative, and in consultation with the four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and/or media freedom and the special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights:
the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights,
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media.
Security sector reform (SSR) is a relatively new concept that now shapes
international programmes for development assistance.1
Originating within the
development community, the concept is based on the assumption that democracy and sustainable socio-economic development—including the objectives
of poverty reduction and social justice—cannot be achieved without meeting
the basic security needs of individuals and communities. Recognizing that it is
often state security institutions themselves that threaten the security of individuals and society, whether through inefficiency, unprofessionalism, inadequate state regulation, corruption or human rights violations, SSR focuses on
the sound management and accountability of the security sector consistent
with the principles and practices of good governance. The objective of SSR is
to achieve efficient and effective security institutions that serve the security
interests of citizens, society and the state, while respecting human rights and
operating within the rule of law and under effective democratic control.
Access full paper at: http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2003/files/SIPRIYB0307.pdf
Why did Western European states agree to the enlargement of the EU and NATO? Frank Schimmelfennig analyzes the history of the enlargement process and develops a theoretical approach of 'rhetorical action' to explain why it occurred. While rationalist theory explains the willingness of East European states to join the NATO and EU, it does not explain why member states decided to admit them. Using original data, Schimmelfennig shows that expansion to the East can be understood in terms of liberal democratic community building. Drawing on the works of Jon Elster and Erving Goffman, he demonstrates that the decision to expand was the result of rhetorical action. Candidates and their supporters used arguments based on collective identity, norms and values of the Western community to shame opponents into acquiescing to enlargement. This landmark book makes an enormous contribution to theory in international relations and to the study of European politics.
Access full paper at http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item1170965/?site_locale=en_GB
The subject of learning lessons is fraught with difficulties, not least because lessons,like beauty, are often in the eye of the beholder. It has been the author’s experience that many lessons that are formally identified as such are not learned. The reasons for this are varied: those identifying the lessons may be biased; the resources to enable learning may be lacking; and the lessons simply may not “stick.” Nonetheless, those lessons that do become embedded in the human and organizational psyche are those that have created new doctrines, reshaped institutions, become an integral part of new training standards, and demonstrably shown an improvement in the conduct of business. NATO’s involvement in the Western Balkans over the past fifteen years has provided a rich vein of experience and has fomented considerable change. This article examines that experience and analyzes some of the major lessons that have been identified. Some will have been learned, while others have not; in some instances, the lessons that were identified will subsequently prove to be flawed. Throughout this analysis the paper will attempt to chart the metamorphosis of NATO from a passive Cold War military alliance to an active political and security actor on the world stage.
Access or download the full paper at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=eb06339b-2726-928e-0216-1b3f15392dd8&lng=en&id=122284
Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century
A U.S. report by Colin Gray from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) based at the U.S. Army War College discussing the future of hard and soft power in military operations.
In most security sector institutions, women constitute a small minority of the personnel. Unwelcoming working environments discourage recruitment and retention of women, and thus create a vicious circle that perpetuates their minority status. At the same time, female security sector staff associations have multiplied, promoting networking and offering mutual support among members. Many of these associations have expanded their mandate to activities reaching beyond their members’ welfare.
This occasional paper examines the structures, mandates and activities of a sampling of female staff associations and networks in the security sector, analyses whether and how they meet members’ needs, and gauges the effect or influence they have had on changing policies and practices in their institutions and in the communities they serve. Research for this paper focused on 67 international, national, regional, and local female security sector associations and networks in the military, police, corrections, justice system, fire and emergency services, immigration services, and in national security bodies and private security companies from around the world. An annex to the paper provides more information on the associations studied.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the incorporation of information and communications technologies (ICTs) into the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems of peacebuilding programmes. It introduces the reader to the breadth and depth of new technologies that are currently available or could potentially be available to monitor and evaluate (including measure and disseminate) results of peacebuilding programmes. More specifically, the paper focuses on exploring the application of the following ICTs: mobile technology, social media, big data, the digitzation of surveys, and tools to better visualize data.
Key questions this document addresses:
- How can ICTs help overcome key structural and programmatic monitoring and evaluation challenges as they relate to peacebuilding programmes?
- How have ICTs been integrated or used to monitor and evaluate peacebuilding programmes?
- What are the key considerations that must be taken into account when incorporating new technologies into monitoring and evaluation systems for programmes implemented in conflict and fragile environments?
- What are some of the resources, in terms of hardware, or software, available to practitioners?
Access the paper here.
Local ownership is widely considered to be one of the core principles of successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes. Nonetheless, there remains a gap between policy and practice. This article examines reasons for this gap, including concerns regarding limited capacity and lack of expertise, time and cost constraints, the allure of quantifiable results and quick wins, and the need to ensure that other principles inherent to SSR are not disregarded. In analysing what is meant by local ownership, this article will also argue that, in practice, the concept is narrowly interpreted both in terms of how SSR programmes are controlled and the extent to which those at the level of the community are actively engaged. This is despite policy guidance underscoring the importance of SSR programmes being inclusive and local ownership being meaningful. It will be argued that without ensuring meaningful and inclusive local ownership of SSR programmes, state security and justice sector institutions will not be accountable or responsive to the needs of the people and will, therefore, lack public trust and confidence. The relationship between the state and its people will be weak and people will feel divorced from the decisions that affect their security and their futures. All this will leave the state prone to further outbreaks of conflict. This article will suggest that the requisite public confidence and trust in state security and justice sector institutions, and ultimately, the state itself, could be promoted by SSR programmes incorporating community safety structures.
Recent events in Mali, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate that building professional indigenous forces is imperative to regional stability, yet few success stories exist. Liberia is a qualified “success,” and this study explores how it was achieved by the program’s chief architect. Liberia suffered a 14-year civil war replete with human rights atrocities that killed 250,000 people and displaced a third of its population. Following President Charles Taylor’s exile in 2003, the U.S. contracted DynCorp International to demobilize and rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia and Ministry of Defense; the first time in 150 years that one sovereign nation hired a private company to raise another sovereign nation’s military. This monograph explores the theory and practice behind the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the legacy military and security sector reform (SSR) that built the new one. It also considers some of the benefits and difficulties of contracting out the making of militaries. This is significant since the private sector will probably participate increasingly in security sector reform. The monograph concludes with 28 concrete recommendations for practitioners and 6 recommendations for the U.S. Army on how to expand this capability. Finally, this monograph is written by a practitioner for practitioners.
- Security sector reform (SSR) policies and operational guidance have proved to be ineffective in prioritizing, sequencing, managing, and implementing donor-supported initiatives.
- SSR policies and operational guidance do not reflect economic and political realities in donor countries. This disjunction requires greater selectivity in the choice of partner countries and the kind of pragmatic support provided.
- A significant imbalance exists between supply and demand for justice and security development, as core segments of partner governments typically resists and will continue to resists key provisions of SSR.
- Political will in partner countries is, like its companion concept, local ownership, highly fragmented, reflecting a natural competition between and among rationally self interested stakeholders.
- Effective programming requires donors to direct their influence and support toward those constituencies (and their leadership) in whose self-interest is to implement SSR programs, despite the resistance to justice and security development by other stakeholders and competing political actors.
- Donor-supported justice and security programs should be disaggragated and should concentrate on narrowly defines problems and issues, rather than seek to be holistic and comprehensive.
To access the article, follow this link.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent declaration of the "Global War on Terror" (GOWT), US international security assistance has increased substantially, with billions of dollars going to support security forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other "frontline" states. The United States has also adopted a new approach to security assistance, called security sector reform (SSR). In principle, SSR moves security assistance well beyond the traditional "train and equip" approach and takes the physical security of the state's population and protection of human rights from the sidelines to mid-field.
In practice, US-supported SSR efforts often continue to focus primarily on training and equipping military and police forces, especially in connection with counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, reliance on the US military and private contractors to plan and implement US SSR efforts has strongly reinforced the focus on operational capacity over accountability to civilian authority and respect for human rights. Private contractors engaged in SSR have been involved in well-publicized abusive practices, including the killing of unarmed civilians.
To access the article, follow this link.
International actors in Security Sector Reform (SSR) are increasingly taking on roles as “advisors” to Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice. Rather than directly implement changes necessary for SSR, these advisors must persuasively articulate suggestions to their local counterparts. Advisors’ success depends on their ability to convey recommendations in a manner that makes change acceptable to their advisees. Ministerial and governmental advising is not the exclusive purview of any one entity. Rather, advising is undertaken by a diverse range of individuals from U.S. and foreign governments, militaries, NGOs, private contractors, and U.N. agencies. These actors have correspondingly diverse objectives and approaches to SSR; without coordination or consensus on SSR programming, advisors may find themselves working at cross-purposes. Furthermore, the multiplicity of advisors and institutions makes sharing best practices and improving over time and across conflicts extremely difficult.
What common challenges do foreign advisors face, and how might they pool intellectual resources and “lessons learned” to address these challenges?
To access the article, follow this link.
Monrovia, Liberia is on the front lines for security sector reform (SSR) in nations devastated by extended, violent conflict and civil war. SSR initiatives in Liberia are among the most comprehensive in the world in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. As such, these efforts represent a critical opportunity to assess SSR as an element of U.S. and international approaches to post-conflict peace-building. The program in Liberia has broken new ground for SSR in several different areas. This first of two reports on SSR in Liberia focuses on the Liberian defense sector. Part II of this series will address SSR in the law enforcement and justice sectors.
To access the article, follow this link.
Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train without Brushes
This article describes the activities related to civil society's engagement with the question of security sector reform (SSR) in Liberia since the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in August 2003, identifies the challenges it faces and draws lessons learned from this engagement; particularly the need to develop local capacity, networks of support and national ownership. Consideration is given to the specifics of the rapidly evolving post-conflict context in which such reforms are taking place and their connection to the field of transitional justice as a means of addressing a history of human rights abuses. The discussion also covers the scope of potential engagement for civil society in the new political landscape in Liberia that has been created by the deployment of one of the world's largest peacekeeping forces and the arrest of former president Charles Taylor.
To access the article, follow this link.
Little more than five years ago, Liberia was emerging from fourteen years of brutal war and pillage that had left it in ruins. today, it has a democratically elected president, and the security sector is experiencing reforms that are unprecedented not only in the country, but in the world. Under cover of a 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force, it drew both its army and defence ministry to zero, in order to recruit, vet and train the personnel for these institutions from the ground up. Such "root and branch" security sector reform (SSR) was bold. But, given the many abuses perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) both before and during the civil war, the vast majority of Liberians supported it.
How did a U.S. counterinsurgency effort that was intended to foster the Afghan government’s local legitimacy end up undermining it? The answer requires us to quickly dip our toes into the murky waters of Afghanistan’s subnational structures.
To access the article, follow this link.
- In 2006, a day of deadly riot in Kabul dramatized the need for an Afghan constabulary force capable of controlling outbreaks of urban violence. In response, the U.S. military and Afghan authorities created a elite gendarmerie, the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
- Although ANCOP was conceived of as a riot control force, it was assigned to the Focused District Development Program to replace district-level Afghan Uniformed Police who were away for training. The high demand and constant transfers required by this duty resulted in rates of attrition among ANCOP unit of 75 to 80 percent.
- In 2010, ANCOP's superior training, firepower, and mobility were recognized in its assignments, along with a "surge" of U.S. military forces, to reverse the Taliban's hold on key areas in Southern Afghanistan.
- In heavy fighting in Marja, Helmand province, ANCOP was demonstrably unprepared to serve as a counterinsurgency force, particularly in areas that had not been cleared by coalition and Afghan military forces.
- Subsequent improvements in training and partnering with U.S. forces improved ANCOPS's performance in kandahar, where ANCOP was used to hold areas that had been cleared by the military.
- By 2011, ANCOP had firmly established its place as an elite rapid reaction and counter-insurgency force with a positive reputation among coalition troops and afghan citizens.
This paper describes how security sector reform (SSR) has become a pivotal part of international peacebuilding efforts. The author details how donor agencies and Western governments devote substantial resources to strengthen the legitimacy and efficiency of security systems in war-torn societies. The paper discusses the SSR process in Liberia in view of the shift from a transitional to a democratically elected government. It identifies dilemmas between the SSR agenda and the objective of ownership, and argues that a more inclusive and less state-centered approach is needed.
To access the article, follow this link.
A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTI’s Kenya Transition Initiative
Between 2011 and 2014 the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)’s Kenya Transition Initiative implemented what was essentially a pilot program of the new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept. Aiming to counter the drivers of ‘violent extremism’ (VE), this operated through a system of small grants funding activities such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates on sensitive topics, counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder, and so on. This paper delivers lessons from the program, generated via an independent evaluation, offering insights of relevance to the broader CVE community of practitioners. A first overarching conclusion is that programming decisions would have benefitted from a more comprehensive understanding of VE in the local context. For instance, subsets of the population more narrowly ‘at-risk’ of being attracted to VE should have been identified and targeted (e.g. potentially teenagers, ex-convicts, members of specific clans, and so on), and a greater focus should have been placed upon comprehending the relevance of material incentives, fear, status-seeking, adventure-seeking, and other such individual-level drivers. A second conclusion is that the KTI team would have profited from additional top-level guidance from their donors, for instance, providing direction on the extent to which efforts should have been targeted at those supportive of violence versus those directly involved in its creation, the risks associated with donor branding, and contexts in which the pejorative term ‘extremism’ should have been pragmatically replaced by neutral terminology. As a priority donors and the wider community should also provide suitable definitions of the CVE concept, rather than leaving practitioners to construe (undoubtedly inconsistently) it’s meaning from the available definitions of VE.
The recent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is a significant accomplishment for the European Union. Still, the agreement marks the beginning, rather than the end, of a long-term process of normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The maintenance of the EU’s “constructive ambiguity” approach to the question of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state is important for continued normalizing relations between the countries. The EU’s continuous and active involvement and interest in the region is of paramount importance for the full implementation of the agreement.
Devant les événements politiques qui secouent actuellement le monde arave, les Pays-Bas s'interrogent sur la façon de soutenir les forces démocratiques dans la région. Par le biais de la motion de MM. Pechtold et Timmermans déposée le 23 mars 2011, la Chambre des représentants a prié le gouvernement de solliciter un avis de l'AIV sur la capacité, notamment financière, des politiques néerlandaise et européenne à appuyer la démocratie de l'état de droit dans les pays arabes et perses. La demande en ce sens adressée à l'AIV le 18 avril 2011 se décline en deux questions.
- Les instruments dont dispose actuellement l'Union européenne (dialogue dans le cadre des accords d'association, aide, préférences commerciales, prêts de la BEI, PESC, etc.) lui permettent-ils d'appuyer adéquatement la transition du monde arabe vers la démocratie et l'état de droit?
- Comment les Pays-Bas peuvent-ils utiliser efficacement leurs dispositifs bilatéraux actuels pour soutenir ce processus?
The success of Libya's 2011 revolution has given way to political disarray, an institutional vacuum, and an extraordinary proliferation of non-state and quasi-state armed groups operating across the country. However, rather than pursuing political or ideological objectives, these groups increasingly focus on resource predation.
Through an empirical study of various axes of violence in contemporary Libya, this report highlights the critical role played by criminal accumulation, land grabs, and protection rackets in the actions of tribal militias and jihadist groups, and in the fighting that has blighted one major urban hub. Whereas conventional representations of Libya's post-revolutionary period dwell on the political battle between Islamists and secular forces, the reports suggests that the cause of the country's increasing levels of armed violence can be found in the absence of a functional state and the fragmentation of a local, tribal, ethnic and ideological forces, which together make the violent acquisition of material resources essential to group survival.
The paper can be found here.
As the Arab Spring has renewed Western interest in the political, as well as military, role of Arab armed forces, reform—rather than mere assistance—is crucial. In this monograph, the author focuses on the structural aspects of reform from which the Arab Spring forces would benefit. Seven features are identified which need to be addressed when attempting Arab military reform in the countries affected by large-scale unrest in 2011: an unclear mandate, over-politicization, a challenging ongoing security situation, limited resources, lack of civilian oversight, pockets of paramilitary activity, and, in parts, as well as the lack of an institutional perception of reform need. Their origins are elaborated as much as recommendations for what outside assistance can achieve.
The article is available here.
Until a few years ago, the relationship between Washington and Ankara was perennially troubled and occasionally terrible. Turkey opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and complained that the Pentagon was allowing Iraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorating security along the Iraq-Turkish border. Disagreements over how to respond to Iran’s nuclear program; U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey’s outreach efforts to Iran and Syria; and differences over Armenia, Palestinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties. However, Turkey is now seen as responding to its local challenges by moving closer to the West. The United States has called the U.S.-Turkish relationship a “model partnership” and Turkey “a critical ally.” For a partnership between Turkey and the United States to endure, Turkey must adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspective, crack down harder on terrorist activities, and resolve a domestic democratic deficit. At the same time, Europeans should show more flexibility meeting Turkey’s security concerns regarding the European Union, while the United States should adopt a more proactive policy toward resolving potential sources of tensions between Ankara and Washington that could worsen significantly at any time.
The paper is available here.
A free and impartial media should be one of the pillars of a stable society. Media organisations have direct communication with a considerable portion of the population and are in a powerful position to support peace and security-related efforts. In a country like Kosovo, with a violent past, the media needs to pay special attention when covering emotionally charged issues, as failure to do so threatens to heighten tensions.
This study, ‘Media reporting on peace, conflict and security issues: How objective and conflict-sensitive is media coverage and reporting on these issues?’, examines the existing legal framework governing media and the perceptions of citizens on whether media outlets are sensitive or partisan in their reporting. Amongst other things, these perceptions are key in shaping people’s opinions and perceptions of Kosovar institutions. Currently, there are two regulatory bodies for press and broadcast media, but nothing for online media.
In recent months the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue has been prioritised in the media, and though the reporting is generally perceived to be impartial, there is a potential for inciting conflict if there is ambiguity and a perceived lack of objective reporting, particularly the use of conflict-insensitive language. This report concludes with suggestions for how media outlets could work towards more conflict sensitive news coverage.
This report was the result of joint work and collaboration between 11 organisations, including members of the Forum for Security in Pristina and Conflict Prevention Forum in the north, and through community dialogue meetings and desk research facilitated by FIQ and AKTIV.
This paper is available in English, Albanian and Serbian on the Saferworld website.
Non-conventional armed violence and non-state actors: challenges for mediation and humanitarian action
Some of the most lethal episodes of armed violence in recent years have taken place in countries that do not suffer from conflict according to its conventional definitions. At the same time new armed conflicts in Mali and Syria appear to be shaped not just by political differences, but also criminal motives, jihadist ideology and an extraordinary level of violent factionalism.
The hybrid character of both armed violence and conflict stands at the heart of current global security concerns. But the specific challenges posed by armed violence in non-conflict settings have yet to receive a coherent response from peace and development professionals. The coercive power exerted by non-state armed groups over communities and territories, and their connection with transnational networks make it hard to negotiate anything more than short-term deals aimed at reducing violence or providing humanitarian relief. Legal provisions to protect civilian lives are particularly difficult to enforce.
Hostility towards these groups from states and the international community is deep and widespread, particularly when they are associated with terrorist acts or organised crime. However, this report outlines four areas of future research in policy and programming that would be highly relevant to the work of organisations devoted to peace and humanitarian affairs: the nature of an outreach strategy to armed groups, the legal instruments that are available, the sort of community engagement that should be sought, and the approach towards formal economic and political structures. Establishing a broad network of practitioners, scholars and policymakers is suggested as a means to make progress on all these fronts.
Publication is available here.
Since the December 2010-January 2011 uprising, Tunisia has successfully overcome successive political crises, yet seems less able to absorb the impact of major jihadi attacks. As a result of the successful national dialogue, 2014 began on a note of optimism that led to a significant reduction in political tensions, but concerns are growing again. At the heart of this anxiety are an increase in violence along the Algerian border; the chaotic situation in Libya; and the advance of radical Islamism in the Middle East – all made all the more acute by an alarmist anti-terrorist discourse. An echo chamber for the conflicts agitating the region, Tunisia needs to tackle terrorism in a calm and depoliticised manner. The fights against terrorism and organised crime are inextricably linked. In addition to security measures, the government should take new economic and social initiatives that would ensure border communities trust and support the state.
Click here to access the report.
The CSG has just published its inaugural SSR 2.0 Brief on “Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic: Chronicle of a Death Foretold,” written by Teodora Fuior and CSG Senior Fellow David Law.
This brief looks into the implementation of SSR in CAR, the deficiencies of its design, and the missteps made in its implementation. Its central finding is that the failure of the peacebuilding process in CAR was predestined, stemming from the earliest stages of SSR implementation in the country.
With the burgeoning use of cyberspace and digital applications, individuals, private companies and governments have all become increasingly concerned about the dangers of attacks that target the cyber domain. Cyber security measures designed to mitigate or respond to such technology-driven threats have traditionally been a focus for more developed countries, which enjoy greater connectivity, advanced information and communications technology and a greater sense of vulnerability. Yet the cyber domain is also a growing concern for developing countries as well. Developing countries have also offered fertile ground for cyber criminals capable of threning developing and developed countries alike. This only increases the urgency of exploring cyber security’s place in security sector reform (SSR).
Les préoccupations sécuritaires et l’urgence d’engager une véritable dynamique de développement ont conduit une poignée d’États européens à accroître leur présence et à inciter l’UE à agir en mobilisant unlarge éventails d’outils. Mais quel est le model à suivre?
L'article ce trouve sur le site du Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP). Pour y accéder, cliquez ici.
Le MAEP est un instrument, au rayonnement continental, établi par et pour les États africains. Il est destiné à évaluer les pratiques des États en matière de gouvernance, dans quatre domaines : la démocratie et la gouvernance politique, la gouvernance et la gestion économiques, la gouvernance d’entreprise et le développement socio-économique.
Cet article ce trouve sur le site du Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité. Pour y accéder, cliquez ici.
Mali sits in a precarious position following the 2012-2013 crisis that resulted in France's military intervention. Much of the political and structural problems that led to the country's near collapse remain largely unchanged. This piece provides a useful overview of the challenges facing Mali's government.
To read the full CSG Insight paper, click here.
Published by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), this report analyses regional peace operations launched by the African Union and sub-regional organisations, identifying advantages, challenges and trends. It argues that there is currently an international division of peacekeeping, whereby African operations have come to act as a first responder, providing initial stabilisation missions in operational environments where the UN cannot yet go, or to allow the UN time to mobilise a broader operation. The authors also address the lack of predictable and sustainable funding, and further issues of division of roles and responsibilities between actors. Finally, the report highlights some considerations for partners.
Les partenaires internationaux de la Guinée-Bissau se réuniront à Bruxelles le 25 mars pour étudier le dossier crucial de la RSS. Cette analyse effectuée par l'International Crisis Group argumente que la configuration actuelle n'a jamais été aussi favorable à des avancées dans ce secteur: l'armée a été décrédibilisée par son dernier coup d'Etat en 2012; les élections de 2014 ont porté au pouvoir des responsables politiques moins dépendants des militaires car légitimés par les électeurs et appuyés par les partenaires internationaux; enfin, ces derniers sont moins divisés qu'en 2012. Cette occasion ne doit pas être manquée. Ce rapport contient donc un certain nombre de recommendations, à la fois concernant le rôle des partenaires internationaux de la Guinée-Bissau, et sur l'amélioration des institutions nationales de défense et de sécurité. Dans l'ensemble, tous les acteurs doivent garder à l'esprit que la réforme se fait dans la longue durée et qu'elle nécessite un arbitrage fin entre des groupes et réseaux aux intérêts divergents.
Ce rapport existe aussi en anglais.
Published by the Carnegie Middle East Center, this paper engages with Egypt and Tunisia's "missed opportunity": four years after popular uprisings forced the countries' longtime leaders from power, police forces and security agencies genuinely accountable to democratically elected civilian authorities have not emerged. The author argues that, until governments reform their security sectors, rather than appease them, the culture of police impunity will deepen and democratic transition will remain impossible in Egypt and at risk in Tunisia.
La mission EUPOL RD Congo est arrivée à son terme en décembre 2014. Un mois plus tard, des manifestations à Kinshasa ont été violemment réprimées par les forces de l’ordre et ont mis en exergue les lacunes et les dysfonctionnements persistants de celles-ci. La présente note publiée par le GRIP a pour double objectif de dresser un bilan de la mission EUPOL, en discutant notamment son caractère stratégique à la fois pour l’Union européenne et pour la RDC, et de dégager les perspectives sécuritaires dans un contexte pré-électoral tendu.
Pour plus d'informations et pour télécharger l'article, cliquez ici.
Published by Penal Reform International, this report is designed to describe key global trends in the use and practice of imprisonment and to identify some of the pressing challenges facing states that wish to organise their penitentiary system in accordance with international norms and standards. Topics include:
- Prison populations and rates of imprisonment
- Prison management
- Prison regimes
- New technologies
- Criminal justice, social policy and sustainable development
The report also includes a Special Focus pull-out section on the impact of the ‘war on drugs’ and its implications for prison management. Significant international developments, recent research projects and precedent-setting court decisions are highlighted throughout.
Global Prison Trends is intended to be an annual publication. Tracking trends and challenges in criminal justice systems will be vital to designing and assessing measures intended to strengthen the rule of law as a means to advancing sustainable development.
For more information and to download the report, follow this link.
The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the Year of Its Review: Integrating Resolution 1325 Into the Military and Police
Published by the Latin America Security and Defence Network (RESDAL), this report examines the integration of Resolution 1325 by assessing three UN missions: MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and UNIFIL (Lebanon). Namely, the following questions are addressed:
- Fifteen years after Resolution 1325 was adopted, to what extent has it been integrated into peacekeeping operations?
- What approach has been developed for the military component?
- What achievements and pending challenges have been found in the implementation of this Resolution in the area of military and police tasks?
- What role does the approach on women, peace and security have in the peacekeeping review process?
CGS Insights: Learning from Failure? British and European Approaches to Security and Justice Programming
Originally published on the SSR Resource Centre in March 2015, this article discusses recent evaluation reports of UK and EU security and justice programming and analyses alternative and innovative SSR strategies. The author argues that learning lessons from failure and understanding what is not working are essential tools of such approaches. The blog post provides a useful overview of new approaches to security and justice reform and has therefore been republished here as a CSG Insight.
Originally published by the China Daily: On Tuesday, Beijing issued its first white paper on military strategy, ushering in greater military transparency by giving details of the direction of its military buildup to other nations.
The document of about 9,000 Chinese characters revealed a list of new expressions that have never before appeared in Chinese white papers.
In the preface it reaffirmed China's adherence to peaceful development and its "active defense" military strategy.
The paper highlighted future cooperation with Russian armed forces, saying the PLA will foster a comprehensive, diverse and sustainable framework to promote military relations.
EU State Building Contracts: early lessons from the EU's new budget support instrument for fragile states
The European Union (EU) began using State Building Contracts (SBCs) to provide budget support to fragile and conflict affected states in early 2013. Over the next five years, the EU plans to use more than two thirds of funding under the 11th European Development Fund and over half from the Development Cooperation Instrument for 2014–2020 to assist people in fragile situations. The State Building Contract is a key instrument in the EU’s fragile states toolkit, and thus likely to increase in visibility and importance. At the same time, while most European Member States’ development agencies are gradually shifting away from the use of budget support, they continue to provide fiscal support in fragile states through the EU’s SBCs and through budget support-like instruments.
Le putsch avorté du 13 mai dernier est intervenu après plus de deux semaines de manifestations dans les rues de Bujumbura et de violences policières qui ont fait plusieurs dizaines de victimes depuis l’annonce de la candidature de Pierre Nkurunziza à un troisième mandat. L’absence du président, qui se trouvait en Tanzanie pour assister à un sommet régional des chefs d’État sur la situation de son pays, était propice à un coup de force.
Burundi is back at the brink. Less than a decade after the end of its civil war, a political conflict over the president’s attempt to stay in office for a disputed third term risks escalating into wider violence, policy specialists say. The international community has begun to respond, but should do more, and quickly. In this article, recent USIP research on how to prevent election violence identifies four strategies as being most effective. Peacebuilders can press the security sector to remain politically neutral, can continue monitoring and mapping by those organizations that remain on the ground, and can help the national election commission operate effectively. Additionally, diplomatic efforts to raise awareness about the impending crisis could bring more resources to the peace effort.
Peace talks between Colombia’s government and the country’s largest rebel group FARC began in November 2012 with the aim of ending a conflict that has left some 220,000 dead. Thus far, agreements have been reached on land reform, guerilla’s political participation, and the illegal drugs trade. Until now, the conflict had seen significant de-escalation since the FARC’s unilateral cease-fire declaration in December 2014 and the unprecedented joint humanitarian demining agreement of March 2015. Developments since the Cauca attack last April suggest Colombia’s peace process is facing a potentially devastating setback: the army’s offensive on 21 May killed 26 rebels, prompting the FARC’s decision to suspend its ceasefire on 23 May and President Santos’s call for accelerated talks point to a peace process on the brink of collapse.
This backgrounder explores the larger military dimension of the peace process and how it remains a major sticking point towards reaching a final and sustainable peace agreement. The first section examines the challenges of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of such decentralised guerilla organization. The second section explores the military fundamental distrust of the peace process and possible explanations for their ongoing resistance to a final agreement.
Security and insecurity in a police state: Security Sector Reform in the occupied Palestinian territories and the law of unintended consequences
As a wave of protests swept through the Arab world in 2010–11, toppling regimes that had long seemed invulnerable to such popular mobilization, the relative stability of the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) largely escaped international attention. In a marked break with the unrest and massive sustained popular mobilizations of the past, no significant opposition emerged to challenge the status quo in the oPt, even though dissatisfaction with the status quo runs high in the territories. The author of this article argues that the reason for this historic quiescence is the conflicted version of the security-led mode of governance in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) that the Oslo process has established in the oPt, backed by US and EU financial and technical assistance.
This article is the second contribution in the Center for Security Governance's new blog series that features recent research findings on security sector reform published in international relations academic journals.
This contribution summarizes research originally published here:
Mustafa, Tahani, (2015). “Damming the Palestinian Spring: Security Sector Reform and Entrenched Repression”. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1020738
Following the publication in May 2015 of the "Top 10 Programming Tools for Security Sector Reform" by ISSAT, the author of this article, Dr Tony Welch (a former British Army One Star General and United Nations official) examines the proliferation and increasing complexity of programming and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methodologies in the field of SSR. He suggests that these tools undermine the principle of local ownership in SSR, by keeping the decision-making process in external hands.
In an effort to curtail the insurgency in Afghanistan, the US military and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) blended military and humanitarian operations, much to the dismay of many within the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community. One of the major debates surrounding this effort concerns the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative, which several NGOs have faulted for causing “blurred lines” between military and aid activity. PRTs were small units that combined diplomatic, military, and development components in an effort to improve stability in Afghanistan through the enhancement of economic viability, rule of law, and public services. Because of this mixed approach, NGOs such as CARE International, MSF, Save the Children, Oxfam, and others accused the US military and ISAF of increasing risks to aid workers in the field.
Read the article here. It is based on research originally published here:
Mitchell, D.F., (2015). Blurred Lines? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan, 2010–2011. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development . 4(1), p.Art. 9. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ev
Once again, Haiti finds itself at a crossroads. Having partly recovered from a devastating earthquake in 2010, Haiti is planning to hold multi-tiered elections this year. If a legitimate government and parliament emerge from that process, they could address some of the country’s deeper governance, economic, social and environmental challenges. The progress of police reforms is a crucial piece of the equation, given the significant reduction of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) already underway.
Centre for Security Governance (CSG) Senior Fellow Stephen Baranyi has co-authored a new report, with Yves Sainsiné, on the development of the National Police, public security and the rule of law in Haiti. The full report is available in French here. The English Executive Summary is available on the SSR Resource Centre Blog.
The alarming state of the overtaxed United Nations peacekeeping system endangers human rights, genocide prevention, development and the prospects for sustainable peace, USIP board Vice Chairman George Moose told an audience June 5 at the annual membership meeting of the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area. Read a transcript of his intervention here.
A new set of development goals that will be adopted by the world’s heads of state at the United Nations in September highlights the crucial problem of “fragile states” and the need to strengthen their governance, according to experts including current and former top diplomats and USIP President Nancy Lindborg.
The UN General Assembly plans to approve the new Sustainable Development Goals at its September session. The draft includes a call to build resilient states with “peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and effective and capable institutions.” The Millennium Development Goals focused almost entirely on issues such as poverty, education and health. The change represents a profound shift among the world's biggest development agencies, said Lindborg. She described fragile states as countries where governance is generally “weak and ineffective, and also illegitimate in the eyes of its citizens.”
Find more about the question here.
In this article, Adam Blackwell, current Secretary for Multidimensional Security at the Organisation of American States (OAS), discusses the problems associated with private security firms throughout Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), especially in Honduras. In his paper, Blackwell posits several recommendations, including the establishment of legal frameworks outlining the responsibilities of both governments and the industry specifically related to the licensing of private security companies, expansion of social protection for workers in the sector, and the introduction of entry requirements and training guidelines. Furthermore, Blackwell argues that citizens and businesses must be informed about the capabilities and limitations of security services, while the oversight capacity of the police and courts must improve to combat the impunity currently enjoyed by the industry itself.
The article can be downloaded here.
Le GRIP défend depuis plus de 35 ans la vision d’une paix mondiale assurée par le désarmement, la prévention des conflits et, lorsqu’ils surviennent, leur résolution pacifique privilégiant les instruments politiques et diplomatiques. Contribuer à faire de cette vision idéaliste une réalité nécessite de mieux comprendre et analyser les nombreux éléments de conflictualité récurrents dans le monde.
Le partage des ressources, les disputes territoriales et maritimes, les questions foncières, les changements climatiques, les déplacements de populations et l’immigration massive sont autant d’enjeux qui conduisent souvent à prendre les armes. Ces conflits sont ensuite alimentés par l’insuffisance des contrôles sur la production et le commerce des armements, leur prolifération, ainsi que par des niveaux de dépenses militaires qui détournent les ressources économiques nécessaires au développement et à la construction de la paix.
Ces questions sont au cœur des recherches et des actions du GRIP. Par ses nombreuses études et conférences, enrichies par des missions d’enquête fréquentes – principalement en Afrique et en Asie du Sud-Est – le GRIP participe à la construction de la paix en apportant un éclairage différent aux citoyens et aux décideurs.
Vous trouverez ici le rapport annuel 2014 de l'organisation.
En passe de connaître une dissolution administrative, le Katanga, province la plus méridionale de la Réplique Démocratique du Congo, présente de nombreuses caractéristiques qui contribuent à expliquer l’apparition de certains groupes armés. Ce rapport du GRIP, publié en juin 2015, retrace les causes et conséquences des différents conflits entre groupes armés de la région, tels que la mouvance des Kata Katanga ou les Maï-Maï de Yakutumba. Cette étude a été réalisée avec le concours de collaborateurs locaux de la société civile congolaise.
Pour plus d'informations et pour télécharger le rapport, rendez vous ici.
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, professeur associé à l'Institut d'Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement (IHEID) et directeur adjoint du Centre politique de sécurité de Genève (GCSP), livre son analyse de l'année qui s'est écoulée depuis que le porte-parole de l'Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant annonçait que son organisation devenait "l'Etat islamique" en juin 2014. En outre, l'auteur tire trois enseignements des développements depuis les évènements de l'été dernier: la constante progression de l’Etat islamique, l’absence criante pour l’heure d’une stratégie régionale ou internationale conséquente pour faire face au groupe et la nature révolutionnaire des changements en cours au Levant.
Vous pouvez consulter l'article ici.
Dans sa série: "Après les élections: les défis de sécurité fondamentaux que le Nigéria doit relever", le Centre d'Études Stratégiques de l'Afrique (CESA) vient de publier une nouvelle section sur les défis en matière de gouvernance que rencontre le pays.
Si elle ne constitue pas un sujet classique en matière de sécurité, la gouvernance est toutefois un aspect central des menaces souvent intérieures ou fondées sur des questions sociétales auxquelles le Nigéria est confronté. Des clivages ethnoreligieux à la montée de l’extrémisme au sein des communautés marginalisées, en passant par un manque de professionnalisme des forces armées, la mauvaise gouvernance est un thème courant dans pratiquement toutes les difficultés de sécurité du Nigéria. Dans de nombreux cas, ces difficultés sont en fait symptomatiques de processus gouvernementaux faibles, d’exclusion ou d’exploitation et, de ce fait, sont appelées à perdurer tant que les problèmes de gouvernance sous-jacents n’auront pas été résolus.
Vous pouvezu consulter l'intégralité de l'analyse ici.
Vous trouverez aussi sept autres défis décrits par le CESA, intitulés:
Les « diamants du sang » et les mines de coltan qui financent les groupes armés en République Démocratique du Congo sont des exemples tristement célèbres de l’hégémonie et de l’impunité des multinationales extractives, s’enrichissant au prix de graves violations des droits de l’homme. Les populations locales ou autochtones restent trop souvent impuissantes face au pouvoir politique et financier de ces acteurs transnationaux qui profitent de systèmes juridiques faibles ou irresponsables. Toutefois, le nombre croissant de poursuites judiciaires menées par des communautés Mayas au Guatemala contre des entreprises canadiennes tend à démontrer l’existence des voies légales pour empêcher les violations de leurs droits fondamentaux et faire entendre leurs revendications.
Publiée par le Centre International pour la Paux et les Droits de l'Homme (CIPAH), cette analyse est disponible ici.
Dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du Nord, la Syrie et la Libye sont en proie à l'instabilité politique et se distinguent en tant que pays générateurs d'importants flux migratoires. Dans cette analyse, le visage syrien et libyen de la migration africaine est présenté avec un regard particulier sur le contexte régional dans lequel il se situe. En particulier, il s’agit de faire état de l’intensification de la pression migratoire de la Syrie et de la Libye sur leurs pays voisins.
La crise humanitaire et sécuritaire qui fait rage en Syrie et en Lybie est un lourd fardeau que partage la région du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord dans son ensemble. Bien que les naufrages en Méditerranée fassent l’objet d’une attention médiatique accrue, ils ne sont pas la seule conséquence de l’instabilité dans la région. Des conséquences aussi tragiques peuvent être repérées au Liban, en Jordanie, en Turquie, en Tunisie et en Egypte.
Vous pouvez lire l'article ici.
A moins de quatre mois de l’échéance, la transition au Burkina Faso doit concentrer tous ses efforts sur les élections d’octobre. Dans un contexte marqué par des tensions politiques et une forte agitation sociale, l’exclusion des représentants de l’ancien pouvoir des prochains scrutins, inscrite dans le nouveau code électoral, ouvre la porte à d’interminables arguties juridiques et menace le respect du calendrier électoral. Elle rend possible la mise à l’écart d’un pan entier du monde politique. Faute de pouvoir s’exprimer dans les urnes, celui-ci pourrait être tenté de le faire par d’autres moyens ou d’essayer de saboter le processus électoral. Il n’est toutefois pas trop tard pour atténuer les risques. Le gouvernement peut encore préciser le code électoral par décret. Par ailleurs, le dialogue entre les acteurs politiques et sociaux de tous bords doit être maintenu, idéalement par la mise en place d’un cadre de concertation. Le Conseil constitutionnel, qui statuera en dernier recours sur l’éligibilité des candidats, doit rester fidèle à la lettre et à l’esprit inclusifs de la charte de la transition et de la Constitution.
Cette analyse publiée par l'International Crisis Group revient sur la période de transition vécue par le Burkina Faso et propose une série de mesures dans le domaine de la justice et de la sécurité, encourageant le dialogue politique entre représentants de tous pans de la société et le renforcement de la transparence dans la planification de réformes de la sécurité et de la justice.
Un avion patrouilleur de l'armée de l'air japonaise a survolé, mardi 23 juin, selon Reuters, jusqu'aux limites de Reed Bank, un plateau marin riche en ressources énergétiques, dont la Chine et les Philippines se disputent la possession, dans un secteur contesté de mer de Chine méridionale, foyer de tension entre la Chine et ses voisins d'Asie du Sud-Est.
Ce survol d'un avion de surveillance P3-C Orion s'inscrit dans le cadre d'exercices militaires conjoints menés par les Philippines et le Japon au grand dam du pouvoir chinois, qui avait condamné une "ingérence" du Japon dans le secteur. On le sait, la Chine revendique l'essentiel (environ 90 %) de la Mer de Chine méridionale et elle ne s'en cache pas. Elle effectue actuellement des travaux de remblais sur différents atolls des îles Spratleys afin d'y implanter des bases navales et aériennes.
Comment interpréter ces évolutions et que nous disent-elles de la relation Japon-Philippines d'une part et de la posture de défense japonaise d'autre part ?
Publié par l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), cet article s'intéresse à la coopération croissante en matière de sécurité entre Manille et Tokyo.
In the absence of a strong state, insurgents, traffickers or tribal warlords may provide political and socioeconomic goods through arrangements we characterize as "complementary governance". When formulating an effective response to this security challenge, policymakers and researchers must account for the complex connections and interactions between multiple non-state governing entities.
You can read the full article here.
Over the last 25 years Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR) has been utilized as a post-conflict tool in over 60 peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts globally. Supporting efforts ranging from post Cold War statebuilding in southern Africa and Central America, to nation building across Asia, Europe and Africa, DDR remains integral in linking security and development issues in countries recovering from armed conflict. Today DDR is undergoing a significant shift. Initiatives across the Middle East, Asia and the Sahel are calling for DDR during protracted conflict. The advent of interim stabilization measures (ISMs), the inclusion of mercenary groups, and those associated with terrorism and the introduction of countering violent extremism (CVE) permeate this new DDR landscape.
Dean Piedmont, the Director for the Peacebuilding, Reintegration and Stabilization Group, has chosen a reading list that provides a sound foundation cross-referencing the fundamentals of DDR and the emerging CVE environment. As this is a ‘new frontier’ in the DDR landscape, these provide an instructive policy orientation for these interested in the dynamics of contemporary DDR.
Escalation since April in the conflict in South Sudan left little hope a settlement could be reached any time soon. Both government and opposition forces appeared dedicated to a military solution. In the past weeks however renewed hope has come from a series of engagements by 1) the South African government, 2) progress in reconciliation between the G10 group of leaders, and 3) renewed offers of conciliation by President Kiir himself. Those close to the situation however continue to see a major impasse from the various commanders of the opposition forces, who continue to reject deals on offer. This research article by Matthew Leriche examines the causes and implications of these obstacles, as well as the "new security market" in South Sudan derived from the SSR agenda.
Read the piece here.
This article published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) discusses the failure to arrest Omar al-Bashir at last week’s AU summit. The decision by the South African government to allow him to attend was in defiance of South Africa's obligations under the Rome Statute and a court order preventing his departure from the country on 15 June. According to the author, this shows that the International Criminal Court is struggling to maintain its legitimacy in Africa.
Read the article here.
The author of this article examines developments towards the inclusion of police reforms in peace support operations. She argues that getting policing right is at the heart of peace support operations, and therefore the African Union should sufficiently staff the policing department. In this light, the Police Strategic Support Group is a key actor, due to its role in promoting police, civilian and military cooperation.
Read this analysis here.
Abstract: The possibility of ending the armed conflict in Colombia will depend, to a large extent, on the state’s ability to prevent multiple criminal economies, and inhibit the actors who participate in them from damaging the implementation of the final peace agreements. This article analyzes criminal economies’ ability to destabilize and thereby damage the post-conflict phase, and identifies dilemmas the state must confront in responding to this situation. The article’s objective is to provide an analytical model to understand the complex relationship between actors involved in the peace process and criminal economies, and to thereby identify risks and possible models for intervention. The theoretical referent of this work is the discussion about peacebuilding in fragile states and literature that identifies organized crime as a spoiler. This is the first attempt to apply this perspective to Colombia, and to take the particular characteristics of the country into account while making comparisons with other countries that exhibit similar features in their own post-conflict and transitional phases. The article comes to the conclusion that in Colombia it is necessary to consider Interim Stabilization Measures, which allow the state to provide an effective response that takes advantage of available resources without losing sight of the need to strengthen local institutions in the mid-term.
This article can be found here: Garzón-Vergara, J.C., (2015). "Avoiding the Perfect Storm: Criminal Economies, Spoilers, and the Post-Conflict Phase in Colombia." Stability: International Journal of Security and Development . 4(1), p.Art. 36. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fx
Following the publication of his own reading list on DDR, De-radicalisation and Countering Violent Extremism, Dean Piedmont authored the third Centre for Security Governance SSR 2.0 Brief on "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Countering Violent Extremism". He argues that there is no policy guidance to address the DDR-CVE nexus. As this brief shows, there is a need for a new, innovative policy framework for DDR that better equips the concept to address the DDR-CVE challenge. A paradigm shift in policy is needed to reframe DDR as a conflict-prevention measure, rather than merely a post-conflict peacebuilding tool.
You can access the brief and its abstract here.
International and Intergovernmental Organizations have a shared desire to ensure peace and stability in post-conflict states. However officials in international institutions have their own agendas as to the conduct and outcomes of security sector reform (SSR). It can be argued that these rivalries and contradictory agendas can significantly impede the pursuit of effective SSR programmes. As SSR is a crucial but challenging component of peacebuilding it is essential to identify the sources of this competition, explain its impact, and suggest ways by which impediments to SSR outcomes may be mitigated.
Read the article here.
A Tunisian gunman recently massacred 38 people at the major resort of Sousse. It was the second mass attack this year, after the March 18 assault on the well-known Bardo Museum in the capital Tunis that killed 22 people, most of them tourists. U.S. Institute of Peace Special Advisor Daniel Brumberg explores the ramifications for Tunisia and the region, as the country shows determination to pursue a democratic transition.
Read the Q&A here.
Based on two years of research, interviews, and expert workshops, this publication outlines a new conceptual and operational framework aimed at improving outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected states transitioning out of conflict or repression by zeroing in on inclusiveness as a guiding principle.
Transitions are critical junctures in which these states have an important chance to break with cycles of conflict and repression. To help make the most of the opportunity, while managing the tensions and divisions that a transition inevitably brings to the fore, the publication offers practical ideas for leaders at all levels of society to strengthen social cohesion, equality, and a sense of common nationhood.
Recognising the great differences across countries and transitional contexts, the publication is not a “how-to guide” but instead a framework to be drawn upon and applied differently in different times and places. It offers detailed analysis and practical advice on inclusive policy-making in 10 priority areas: Political Dialogue Processes; Nation-Building Programs; Institutional Design; Elections and Political Party Development; Transitional Justice; Rule of Law; Security; Education; Economic Growth; and Taxation and the Administration of Public Resources.
The full publication is available in English, while an overview of its findings is available in English, Spanish, French and Arabic.
The political transition in Nigeria has generated a spirited dialogue on the priorities and course corrections required for Africa’s most populous nation. Key among these is security. While Nigeria’s struggle with the violent extremist organization, Boko Haram, has garnered most attention, the country faces a series of fundamental security challenges that, if left unaddressed, will trigger instability with long-term implications for Nigeria and the region. This Africa Center report reviews the most pressing of these challenges, how they have emerged, and actions needed to address these threats. -
Download the report here.
What went wrong in the Central African Republic? International engagement and the failure to think conflict prevention
This paper presents the results of a project on international engagement in the Central African Republic (CAR) – a joint initiative by the Applied Research Seminar of the Graduate Institute’s Master in Development Studies and the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. In light of the outbreak of violence in CAR at the end of 2012, the paper aims to decipher the shortfall in preventing conflict in CAR despite repeated international interventions over the last two decades.
Other papers published by the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform are available.
This paper focuses on the role of the private sector in the prevention of electoral violence. The positive contribution of the private sector to conflict prevention, mediation and alleviation is increasingly recognised in policy and academic circles, yet little research has been carried out with respect to its role in the prevention of election violence. To this end, the paper considers the example of Kenya in the hope that novel lessons will be revealed for firms seeking to engage in conflict mitigation strategies related to election-related conflict.
Other papers published by the Geneva Peacebuilding platform are available.
Lebanon is surviving internal and regional strains remarkably well, but this resilience has become an excuse for tolerating political dysfunction. If the Lebanese political class does not take immediate steps like holding long-overdue elections, fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law, its complacency will only make an eventual fall harder and costlier.
Read the executive summary and download the full report here.
This report explores the nature of the risks inherent in U.S. security sector assistance to the fragile states of Africa and how the United States might better anticipate and mitigate these risks. It examines these issues through a review of qualitative and quantitative literature from both the academic and policy fields and through interviews conducted throughout the agencies of the U.S. government. The quantitative literature suggests a stark dilemma for those responsible for U.S. security sector assistance to the AFRICOM area of responsibility: The countries that are most in need of assistance are usually the ones least able to make positive use of it. Case studies of security sector assistance in the fragile countries in Africa are used to trace multiple specific pathways by which such assistance can have negative second- and third-order effects. Finally, the report provides numerous recommendations about ways in which the United States can improve the processes by which it monitors and evaluates, plans, and implements security sector assistance in the fragile states of Africa and more generally.
Find out more and download the report here.
In this new addition to the International Peace Institute's "Providing for Peacekeeping" series, the authors look at the experiences of European UN member states in MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. A subset of the paper gives an overview of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), which gathers and analyses information to produce military intelligence. The report raises some issues that deserve further attention if MINUSMA, or future missions, are to optimise capability. A final section offers recommendations aimed at facilitating and improving the contribution and participation of European militaries in MINUSMA and in UN peacekeeping more broadly.
Alors que le processus électoral de 2015 promettait d’être un test pour la consolidation de la démocratie burundaise, la situation de crise actuelle fait craindre une déshérence des principes issus de l’accord d’Arusha. Ce dernier avait posé les jalons d’une sortie de la guerre civile, par la mise en place d’un modèle consociatif de partage du pouvoir. Censé garantir la paix par le dépassement des antagonismes, ce modèle est aujourd’hui menacé par les dégradations intervenues ces dernières années et l’impasse politique actuelle née de la nouvelle candidature de Pierre Nkurunziza à la présidence du pays. Agathe Plauchut explore les limites des acquis d'Arushi dans cette note d'analyse du Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP).
An article originally published in Spanish by Agencia Pública and translated here by InSight Crime, this investigation into Brazil's military police training reveals the extent of physical, psychological and disciplinary abuses to which soldiers are subjected. It sheds light on the the deshumanisation of the military police during training, accusing the current curriculum and rules of being "antiquated" - therefore not training the police force to protect the population, and further fueling a culture of violence.
Read it online.
Originally published as a dissertation, this research by Valarie Findlay explores both the notion of terrorism and counterterrorism policies throughout history, asking whether the events of 9/11 were responsible for the transformation of law enforcement and a watershed of legislation in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The author uses qualitative and quantitative data, as well as the examination of key factors that set the foundational context and measurement criteria, such as relevant aspects in the history of law enforcement, the organisational structure of law enforcement, the incidence of militarisation, the powers of law enforcement and specific legislative responses to terrorist incidents, societal conflict and societal change.
Read the article online.
Only fifteen United Nations’ member states provide more than 60 percent of the 104,000 UN uniformed personnel deployed worldwide. How can a more equitable sharing of the global peacekeeping burden be produced that generates new capabilities for UN operations?
Operational partnerships are one potentially useful mechanism to further this agenda. They are partnerships that occur when military units from two or more countries combine to deploy as part of a peacekeeping operation. This report assesses the major benefits and challenges of these partnerships for UN peace operations at both the political and operational levels.
The report begins by providing an overview of the different varieties of partnerships in contemporary UN peace operations and describes the major patterns apparent in a new database of forty-one operational partnerships from 2004 to 2014. It presents case studies of two UN missions that exhibit the full range of operational partnerships: the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The authors explore why some UN member states engage in operational partnerships or might do so in the future, arguing that the reasons include a wide range of both mission-specific concerns and broader political and security-related reasons.
Since 2000, more than 8 million people were killed around the world due to interpersonal violence. Almost half of these homicides are committed in just 23 countries, representing one tenth of the global population. Which characteristcs make these places stages of such high homicide rates?
Lack of popular legitimacy in state authorities and failing to deliver basic public goods – including security and justice are some of the common aspects between these nations. Based on these and other reviews, this note presents some of the basic reforms to be conducted in order to effectively reduce the homicide rates.
Is it possible to significantly reduce interpersonal violence in a single generation? This research believes that the answer is yes.
Read this "Homicide Dispatch" by Manuel Eisner online.
Reconciliation projects face two critical challenges: the situation on the ground in postconflict settings and the gap between reconciliation theory and practice. If the society is to transition successfully to a new path forward, the critical knowledge gap must first be closed. The first step is assessing work recently completed or now in progress. How do organisations even define reconciliation ? What activities are being undertaken to that end? What theories underpin intervention strategies? How do organisations measure success? Published by the United States Institute of Peace, this report answers these questions and points the way forward.
Contrôle des transferts d'armes en Afrique subsaharienne: leçons pour la mise en oeuvre du Traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA)
Cette Note d'Analyse présente les principales conclusions et recommandations d'une étude menée dans dix pays d'Afrique francophone en vue d'identifier les défis posés par la mise en oeuvre du Traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA). Elle fait le point sur les forces et les faiblesses des systèmes de contrôle des transferts d'armes de ces pays et souligne les éléments de contexte essentiels. Enfin, elle recommande des stratégies pour renforcer ces systèmes grâce à des mécanismes de coopération et d'assistance internationales.
Lire l'article en ligne sur le site du GRIP.
Ce Rapport Afrique n°229 publié par l'International Crisis Group (IGC) s'intéresse de façon détaillée à la menace du radicalisme religieux au Cameroun. Le développement de l’intolérance religieuse y est un risque réel, mais malheureusement sous-estimé par les autorités. Afin d’éviter la propagation de l’extrémisme violent sur son territoire, le Cameroun doit rassembler toutes les confessions religieuses autour d’un nouveau pacte social et l’entériner par une charte de la tolérance religieuse.
Le résumé du rapport, ainsi qu'une version à télécharger, sont disponibles en ligne.
‘This study looks into two examples of countries that have applied the method of ‘Defense Agreement’ in their military budgeting. Denmark and Sweden have set the example (although both in a somewhat different manner) to establish a multi-year consensus on defense. The goal of the ‘Defense Agreements’ is to create stability and clarity for a number of years, on the purpose of the armed forces and on defense planning. This study aims to provide a more in-depth discussion of the two models, and to look at both their benefits and disadvantages’. - Margriet Drent and Minke Meijnders, Clingendael.
From Combatants to Peacebuilders: A Case for Inclusive, Participatory and Holistic Security Transitions
The purpose of this project is to present key policy-relevant findings from a two-year participatory research project on the timing, sequencing and components of post-war security transitions, from the perspective and self-analysis of conflict stakeholders who have made the shift from being state challengers to being peace- and state-building agents in South Africa, Colombia, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Burundi, Southern Sudan, Nepal and Aceh.
- Security sector reform (SSR) is a highly complex and political process involving a range of international and local actors. There is a growing policy consensus that sustainability is a critical component of success for SSR programs, and that early local ownership is a critical component of sustainability.
- Practitioners face several obstacles to achieving local ownership, particularly in conflict affected countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. To overcome these obstacles and effectively promote local ownership, international actors must answer three important questions:
- First, what are we trying to achieve? Despite the apparent consensus on the importance of local ownership, the definition of local ownership is still debated.
- Second, which locals should take ownership of SSR? It is often difficult for international donors to select partners, since local actors often have competing visions and priorities.
- Finally, how do we measure success? In evaluating SSR programs, should international or local values and priorities be used to judge the success of SSR programs?
Access Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform on USIP's site.
Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l’Ouest | Janvier à mars 2015
Publié par le GRIP depuis 2011, ce monitoring trimestriel a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l'Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d'Ivoire, la Guinée, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Il se pense sur les questions de sécurité interne au sens large, les tensions régionales, la criminalité et les trafics transfrontaliers.
Drawing on the Africa Center’s decade of work on maritime security issues in Africa, ACSS, in consortium with interagency partners, has released the comprehensive, Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security and Criminal Justice Primer .
The waters surrounding the continent are vast depositories of natural resources. From fisheries to hydrocarbons, these resources generate valuable revenue to littoral African states. In addition, they are a source of food and employment for millions of Africans. The seas also serve to connect African countries to their neighbors and to the rest of the world. To realize the potential of this “blue economy,” African states must effectively deal with significant maritime security challenges including piracy, illegal fishing, illegal migration, arms trafficking, narco-trafficking, and marine pollution.
This publication on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea therefore examines measures to strengthen sovereign control and collective security.
Maritime security has become a key issue for policy experts, academics, researchers and various stakeholders. The concept of maritime security can best be defined as the security of sea lines of communication (SLOC), good governance at sea and serene activities for seaborne trade. This article from the Security Sector Reform Resource Centre aims at examining crucial aspects of maritime security for Pakistan in the Indian Ocean region by understanding the possible nature of challenges it faces – both internal and external. It argues that it is essential for Pakistan to develop a collective, common, cooperative and comprehensive maritime security strategy in the Indian Ocean region.
The report, produced by Isabel Vogel and commissioned by the DFID evaluation division,considers the current uses and definitions of Theory of Change (ToC). A methodology which maps the assumptions which inform planned interventions within all stages of an initiative, ToC is increasingly regarded as an essential tool in designing and appreciating the complex network of factors which influence project outcomes.The review considers the practical aspects of ToC implementation and to develop a more consistent approach which is gaining in reputation and use within the international development community.
Vogel acknowledges that lack of consensus exists around the specific definition of ToC. The review highlights the necessity for flexibility in developing a successful ToC. Through consideration of different approaches, outlining examples of ToC in practice within the appendix, Vogel identifies and draws together a short list of the core elements, generally agreed upon as essential requirements for any discussion centred on theory of change. The review further examines the most effective means of establishing a logical pathway to desired outcomes using the ToC model. Vogel highlights the need to establish ToC as an ongoing process developed alongside all phases of a programme from inception to impact evaluation and emphasises that assumptions should be made explicit within the organising framework of a project.
ToC, as the review makes clear, has the potential to provide an invaluable framework for discussion and critical thinking surrounding project implementation and evaluation. It allows for subjective analysis to be discussed and represented, through diagrams and visuals, which can in turn support more dynamic exchange between policy actors, grantees and donors.
For full report, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf
The relationship between transitional justice and security system – or sector – reform (SSR) is understudied, yet both contribute to state-building, democratisation and peacebuilding in countries with a legacy of massive human rights abuse. The security system is fundamental in any democracy for protecting the citizens’ rights. Yet in postconflict environments it usually comprises members of the police, military, secret police, intelligence agencies, armed rebel groups and militia – the groups which are often the most responsible for serious and systemic human rights violations during conflict. Reforming the system to ensure security agents become protectors of the population and the rule of law is therefore of the utmost urgency, but the political and security context may pose serious challenges to reform.
This paper draws on research in four very different environments: Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Timor-Leste. Although effective SSR is highly context-specific, this paper argues that the EU could improve the substance of its SSR programming and implementation by drawing on lessons from these four case studies.
Published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), this paper advocates for a strategic review of African peace operations in the face of increasingly complex security environments. It formulates a number of key recommendations for the next ten years, including establishing regular discussions between strategic partners and the African Union, fostering inter-departmental coordination and the adoption of common objectives, improving investment in the planning and management of missions, and reinforcing the role of civilians in mission planning.
This is the form to use when contributing a Lessons Identified Report. Please read the instructions on the first page carefully. Thank you for sharing your insights!
Advancing the rule of law around the world is the central goal of the World Justice Project (WJP).
Establishing the rule of law is fundamental to achieving communities of opportunity and equity—communities that offer sustainable economic development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights. Without the rule of law, medicines do not reach health facilities due to corruption; women in rural areas remain unaware of their rights; people are killed in criminal violence; and firms’ costs increase because of expropriation risk. The rule of law is the cornerstone to improving public health, safeguarding participation, ensuring security, and fighting poverty.
The WJP Rule of Law Index™ is an innovative quantitative assessment tool designed to offer a comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law, not in theory, but in practice.
This report is the second in an annual series. Indices and indicators are very useful tools. The systematic tracking of infant mortality rates, for instance, has greatly contributed to improving health outcomes around the globe. In a similar fashion, the WJP Rule of Law Index™ monitors the health of a country’s institutional environment—such as whether government officials are accountable under the law, and whether legal institutions protect fundamental rights and allow ordinary people access to justice.
This policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia andin what context these possible activities should be viewed. The main focus will be on direct engagement on security topics such as the EU Border Management project BOMCA.
However, indirect activities such as education programmes that might be beneficial to security and stability in Central Asia will not be ignored. After an exposé on EU security interests in Central Asia, in the second paragraph attention is devoted to national and regional threats to the security of Central Asian republics and engagement of the EU. The paper concludes with a few recommendations for EU institutions and member states that could help to strengthen EU–Central Asia security cooperation including aspects of Security Sector Reform.
This volume hopes to initiate a debate within the SSR community of policy and practice on the future of the concept, developing new ideas on the form and content of a second-generation model. If nothing else, it hopes to give shape to a new research agenda that can harness the many lessons learned from a decade of implementation to foster a more informed debate on the future of SSR.
This book is a witness of historical events and facts in the first fiveyears of Nepal’s peace process between 2005 and 2010. Some ofthe documents in this book are legal documents such as theComprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), being an annex to the InterimConstitution of Nepal 2007. Some can be interpreted as politicaldocuments. However, one thing in common for all the documentscollected in this volume is that they are manifestation of Nepalesepeople’s aspirations and struggles towards peace, justice and equality.Each document carries its own ‘spirit’ within it.
Building Peace-Seeking Justice. A Population-based survey on attitudes about accountability and social reconstruction in the CAR - Human Rights Cen...
Decades of political instability, state fragility, mismanagement, and a series of armed conflicts have led the Central African Republic (CAR) to a state of widespread violence and poverty. This study provides a better understanding of the scope and magnitude of violence in CAR and its consequences, as well as a snapshot of what the citizens of CAR believe is the best way to restore peace. It also examines the issue of justice and accountability for the serious crimes that were committed.
This report provides the findings from a survey of 1,879 adults, residents of CAR, randomly selected in the capital city of Bangui, and the prefectures of Lobaye, Ombella M’Poko, Ouham, and Ouham Pende. These prefectures encompass a large geographic area representing 52 percent of the total population of CAR and have experienced varying levels of exposure to the conflicts. Locally trained teams conducted the interviews between November and December 2009.
This report provides a detailed analysis of results on a wide range of topics related to the population’s priorities and needs, exposure to violence, security, community cohesion and engagement, access to information, conflict resolution, reintegration of former combatants, transitional justice, and reparations for victims. Interviewers used an open-ended format and respondents could provide more than one answer to most questions.
The purpose of this paper is to propose an analysis which discloses the various interdependencies that may exist between modes of objectifying the nation and the legitimacy of discursive strategies of nation-building in the context of a grave social conflict. The paper advances two interrelated arguments. Firstly, it argues that the order of conflict in the Congo is contingent on the strictly symbolic efficacy of myths of identity. Secondly it argues that the “charisma” of some of the country’s “Big Men” is a related to what I call the democratization of sovereignty, and neither to their supposedly exceptional individual qualities nor to a specifically African “Big Man”-syndrome. I propose that while one must be critical of the Weberian notion of “charisma” as a sociological theory of prophecy, one can nonetheless use the notion of “charisma” as a tool to analyse symbolic properties that accrue to a specific individual and his followers, to the extent that they embody a subjectivity which is held as absolute by his, or their, proper discourse.
The aim of this issue paper is to provide some ideas regarding how best to create suitable conditions for security sector reform (SSR) in DRC. Throughout the last decade, SSR has become a key component of the international agenda in states affected by conflict. There is a growing consensus amongst donors regarding the necessity of implementing SSR for effective stabilization and reconstruction. Since 2003, this has resulted in DRC in several donor-supported initiatives to strengthen the police, military, and justice sectors. Although some of these efforts may have initially shown must promise, progress on SSR in DRC remains very limited.
The Security Sector Governance (SSG) Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducted baseline studies of the security sector in six Southern African countries, namely Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as the Southern African Development Community’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC Organ). The results of this research are reflected in this monograph.
'Everything is at Zero'. Beyond the Referendum. Drivers and Choices for Development in Southern Sudan
The purpose of this paper is, however, not to add to the extensive literature speculating on various outcomes and their consequences. Serious efforts are currently
being made by the parties themselves, the African Union, other regional partners, the UN and other international stakeholders to address the immediate challenges so as to secure a peaceful transition after the expiry of the interim period. This paper, rather, focuses on the one variable that remains constant in both scenarios, which is long-term and strategic in nature: The ability of the South – where ‘everything’, in the words of its President, ‘is at zero’ – to develop and improve the lives of its ten million people.
This background report explains the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. It is the first in a series of reports which will focus on the national and international policies
needed to take the country out of its incessant cycle of political crises and become a point of stability in the region.
After many years of political instability and three failed attempts of DDR, there is a renewed effort in Guinea-Bissau to get DDR and SSR right. With a national strategy and action plan on SSR in place, Guinea-Bissau has attracted a lot of attention from the international community. Many donors, the European Union (EU) among others, are sending experts to assist in the SSR process in Guinea-Bissau. While there are favourable circumstances for SSR in Guinea-Bissau such as a willingness and
commitment displayed by the national authorities, a number of difficulties and challenges were highlighted during the briefing. The Army, which is by far the most powerful actor in Guinea-Bissau, has to be brought into the reform process. In addition, the large numbers of donors and experts have to be absorbed, organized and most off all coordinated.
This monograph examines the relationship between organized crime, internal violence, and institutional failure in Guatemala. It aims to increase awareness of this growing threat to regional security and to provide a granular, textured case study of a phenomenon that, while most striking in Guatemala, is present throughout Latin America as a whole. Organizationally, the monograph comprises three substantive sections. The first, offers an overview of the emerging security environment in Latin America, examining
organized crime as a form of irregular warfare. The second, zooms in on Guatemala, exploring the origins, nature, and effects of the current crisis in that country. The third, considers the implications for Guatemalan and U.S. policy.
Report on Judicial Systems in the Americas 2006-2007. Background information on the Haiti judicial system
This chapter provides background information on the Haiti judicial system. It is based on the Introduction to the Caribbean Community contained in this report; the Report on Judicial Systems in the Americas 2004-2005; the report “Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti and the International Community” (2006), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005, published by the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; the World Bank report “Doing Business” (2006); and data gathered via Internet.
The dysfunctional state of Haiti’s justice system has impeded implementation of democratic reforms since the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. In spite of robust international efforts for six years following Aristide’s 1994 restoration, little lasting progress has been made, and there has even been regression in some areas. The lack of political will of successive Haitian governments has been the major factor but donor approaches have also suffered from flawed methodology.
Strengthening the rule of law in Haiti poses a major challenge to both the Haitian Government and several donors. For the Government the challenge is to ensure that the opportunity presented by the return to constitutional order in 1994 is used to construct new and reformed rule-of-law institutions against a background of decades of repression and systematic human rights violations. For donors, the challenge since 1994 has been how to advance a reform process in a political environment not conducive to change and characterized by protracted political crisis and paralysis.
This issue of the CIGI Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti analyses the programming shift undertaken by MINUSTAH and some donors from a traditional DDR to
a violence reduction approach, underlining the problems of coordination and knowledge sharing that emerged.
This edition of the Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti, written before the January 12, 2010 earthquake, examines issues surrounding the renewal of the UN mission, the
recommendations on the security apparatus put forth by the two presidential commissions and existing security threats. While some priorities of the SSR process will
change dramatically in the wake of the earthquake—with a significant portion of the security infrastructure devastated and the police thrust into the role of relief facilitators—
many of the existing challenges will remain the same, only amplified.
This paper sets out five recommendations for change of United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti’s (MINUSTAH) mandate on 15 August 2006. In addition it sets out
recommendations for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), and police, judicial and correctional reform that can be realised under the current mandate. These recommendations reflect the current situation in Haiti and are based on an analysis of what is feasible and can be realistically implemented given the existing circumstances. The paper highlights changes that are necessary in the immediate future to enhance DDR, police, judicial and correctional reform so as to ensure human security, local ownership, security and stability in Haiti. DDR and rule of law are critical to ensure sustainable peace, therefore these must receive a strengthened and renewed focus from MINUSTAH and the new Haitian government. The international community and the Haitian government should take advantage of the current window of opportunity to promote sustainable reform and reduction of violence in the Haitian context.
The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to the under-theorised field of Security Sector Reform (SSR) studies (Egnell and Halden, 2009) and to support better design, implementation and review of SSR programmes. We borrow, from economics and strategic management, some perspectives on institutional change and we consider the implications of these insights for approaches to SSR.
The aim of this study, besides giving an overview on the most important stages on the way to an independent Kosovo, is to provide an analysis of the political and economic situation in Kosovo since the independence declaration and to put under the microscope the priorities and expected problems of the EU mission, which, in coming years, will cost European tax payers millions of euros. The present investigation is based on a book published in 2005 and revised in 2006 and on interviews and research in Kosovo since 2002.
‘The rule of law’ draws extraordinarily diverse supporters. Theorists from the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson to the conservative economist Friedrich Hayek have embraced it; in September 2005 the entire membership of the United Nations committed themselves to it. Such widespread endorsement is possible only because of relative vagueness as to what the term might actually mean.
This poses particular problems in states where rule of any sort is uncertain. The facilitation or imposition of the rule of law in fragile or conflict-affected countries has been something of a growth area since the rediscovery of the rule of law — long discredited after the failed ‘law and development’ efforts of the 1960s and 1970s — in the post-Cold War era.
Yet the enthusiasm and resources devoted to programming in this area have not been matched by much success. Rule of law is invoked as a kind of mantra, but efforts to support or promote it tend to be technical quick-fixes or rhetorical abstractions. In part this is due to the absence of agreement on a definition.
The author’s presentation (from which these brief notes are drawn) will examine the fall and rise of the rule of law, some of the lingering definitional questions, and the use and abuse of the term ‘ownership’ in particular.
The focus of this paper is the “demand-side” model of administration of justice/rule of law (AOJ/ROL) reform as developed by USAID and increasingly adopted by other donors. It explores the basic arguments as they have been presented in USAID documents, compares them with actual experience of Latin American projects, and suggests some lessons to be incorporated in a revised theory of “demand-side” reform.
The rule of law is increasingly regarded as a precondition for sustainable peacebuilding and development, and has become a central element in international approaches to crisis management and conflict resolution. This guide explores the challenges of transferring responsibility for public order and the rule of law after conflict to local ownership. It does so by taking a closer look at the principle of local ownership—a participatory framework through which the needs and views of all stakeholders can be articulated and addressed—and how it can be implemented.
The report seeks to assist field personnel—from the police officer on the street to the head of mission—with the difficult task of implementing the principle of local ownership in justice and security sector reform during peacebuilding operations. It is intended to assist with the process of deciding how, where and when local ownership should be promoted, where it may not be an option, whether different circumstances call for different types of strategies for transition and what factors should be taken into consideration. It identifies potential stumbling blocks and encourages practitioners to ask critical questions that can guide the transitional process.
The report builds on the experiences of recent peace-building efforts, including those in Kosovo and East Timor, where the international community has taken the lead in bearing responsibility for law and order. It also builds on peace-building efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where primacy has rested with local authorities.
Over the past two decades, in response to the underwhelming results of international development efforts across the Third World, arguments concerning the importance of local ownership have been gaining currency within the international development community. At its core, the discourse around ownership revolves around fundamental questions of agency: who decides, who controls, who implements, and who evaluates. The growing emphasis on local ownership, then, emerged as a critique of mainstream development practice and the broader cult of Western expertise which underpins it. As Joseph Stiglitz argued a decade ago, a vision of development in which all the answers and all the agency are seen to lie in the hands of foreigners is inherently problematic and ultimately self-defeating: ‘We have seen again and again that [local] ownership is essential for successful transformation: policies that are imposed from outside may be grudgingly accepted on a superficial basis, but will rarely be implemented as intended’. Since then, the principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective development assistance, even if
the translation of the principle into actual practice remains an ongoing challenge.
The report is intended to serve both as a general knowledge resource and as a practitioner’s guide for national bodies seeking to employ traditional justice mechanisms as well as external agencies aiming to support such processes. It suggests that in some circumstances traditional mechanisms can effectively complement conventional judicial systems and represent a real potential for promoting justice, reconciliation and a culture of democracy.
In addition, even in situations where communities are more inclined to demand straightforward retribution against the perpetrators, traditional justice mechanisms may
still offer a way both of restoring a sense of accountability and of linking justice to democratic development.
Legal And Judicial Rule of Law work in Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons-Learned Study
Within the last 15 years, peacekeeping has undergone a rapid and remarkable transformation. Today, peacekeeping enjoys a much more expansive definition, which acknowledges the complexity and difficulty of truly winning the peace. The absence of the rule of law is a common cause and byproduct of conflicts, and in recognition of this fact, the United Nations (UN) has begun to regularly incorporate rule of law programming into complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (hereinafter, peacekeeping operations).
This study reviews the recent experience with judicial and legal reform programming in UN peacekeeping operations and proposes measures to strengthen and integrate this programming within the mission to maximize its contribution to lasting peace and security. Though this relatively new aspect of peacekeeping has grown consistently in recent years, this study represents one of the first introspective examinations of its status and integration within the UN system.
While significant progress has been made in integrating judicial and legal reform programming into peacekeeping, this study concludes that the effort is still in its early stages, and a number of additional steps are needed to prepare the UN to address judicial and legal system issues in a post-conflict environment. Some of these measures may require additional resources, but more importantly, some demand changes in the way the UN plans and administers the rule of law dimension of peacekeeping operations.
A new Working Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project provides an in-depth analysis of the trade in small arms and light weapons in the online marketplace. The Working Paper ties together interviews with marketplace participants with a detailed analysis of a dataset derived from long-term monitoring of some of the closed social media-based groups listing small arms and light weapons for sale. It explores the types of weapons offered and their likely routes into the Libyan online markets. It concludes with a policy-relevant analysis of the current state of Libya’s online markets and discusses the caveats and utility of such online monitoring for supplementing field-based research.
For full access to Web Trafficking - Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms Light Weapons in Libya, kindly follow the link.
L’année 2016 a été pour la police française parmi les plus difficiles à vivre depuis plusieurs décennies. La menace terroriste est devenue une réalité installée qui s’est démultipliée en agressions ciblées et répétées contre des policiers. L'institution policière a eu à faire face aussi à une tension des mouvements sociaux et à gérer également des évènements nationaux extrêmement lourds en matière de mobilisation d’effectifs, comme la COP 21 ou l’Euro 2016. Ce contexte a produit des réactions de colère interne à l’institution et posé de manière concrète la question de la protection de ses agents. Ce numéro des "Cahiers de la sécurité et de la justice" (publié par l'Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice) revient sur cette situation en proposant une série d’analyses sur la problématique de la protection des policiers dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, en abordant le problème au plan du droit pénal et du droit public, mais aussi avec une réflexion d’ordre sociologique et historique.
Pour accéder à Violence contre la police : quelle protection ?, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.
This DCAF publication gathers five "Food for thought papers" based on the OSCE Focus Conference titled "Ukraine and European Security: Prospects for the Future" that took place on 10th-11th October 2014 at the WMO in Geneva.
To access the full report, kindly follow the link.
This report from the Institute for Security Studies explores Africa’s main transitions and what they mean for continental growth, human development and stability.Africa is undergoing several major transitions, including demographic, economic, technological, urban and socio-political. These transitions are all connected, and together they will shape the future of the continent. Looking to the future, Africa’s overall story reveals a positive trend. Yet this trend is neither stable nor even. Things are getting better in some places, but not everywhere, not for everybody. The objective of this report is to frame the future of Africa in a way that does justice to the complexity of the continent and yet communicates common trends and challenges in a succinct manner.For full access to African Futures: Key Trends, please follow the link.
This publication has been developed in joint cooperation between DCAF and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as part of an ongoing research project on ombuds institutions for the armed forces. It is the result of an effort to conceptualize and examine issues and challenges related to oversight of the armed forces and the promotion of human rights based on the feedback provided by the institutions themselves. It maps prominent capacity development needs of ombuds institutions in the OSCE region, and offers best practices through which these needs can be addressed. The study also examines different models, functions and approaches of ombuds institutions for the armed forces in the OSCE region.
The mapping study will hopefully help states that wish to establish ombuds institutions by identifying the best format for doing so but it can also support existing ombuds institutions, scholars, policy-makers and armed forces commanders by offering a reference instrument on the current state of ombuds institutions in the OSCE region.
You can download the full study in English here.
Since the 1990s, internationally-supported peacebuilding interventions have become increasingly prominent. Activities focusing on rule of law and security institutions are a key component of this agenda. Despite increasing calls for more rigorous analysis of the impact of peacebuilding interventions, conceptual advances have been limited. There is little clarity on what is working, what is not, and why. This SSR Paper seeks to address this gap by mapping relevant approaches and methodologies to measuring impact. It examines how international actors have approached these questions in relation to support to rule of law and security institutions in complex peacebuilding environments. Most significantly, the paper demonstrates that measuring impact is not only feasible but necessary in order to maximise the effectiveness of major international investments in this field.
Available for download at:
This publications, one of two, presents the final results of a collaborative project onOperationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC), carried out by DCAF, the Laboratory of Urban Sociology at the EPFL Lausanne (EPFL-LaSur), the National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South at the Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), University of Bern, and the Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace). The project was funded by SDC and the Swiss National Science Foundation. It examined the link between human security analysis and human security provision to improve the lives of people living in threatened communities and to sensitize security providers about means and ways to channel existing resources and capacities more effectively towards the alleviation of serious threats in specific local contents. Operationalizing Human Security: Tools for Human-Security-Based Threat and Mitigation Assessments (Cahier 21) offers a series of practical suggestions and tools to allow the replication of some or all of the project’s practical assessment and mitigation components.
Available for download here.
Many countries today produce a security 'strategy' document to cover the full range of military and non-military challenges facing them. By their nature such policy papers deserve careful parliamentary scrutiny, but do they receive it? Published by DCAF, this case-study from the five Nordic states shows that governance arrangements for strategy-making vary considerably and sometimes leave parliament only a limited role. This does not necessarily mean the strategies themselves are wrong, but it does underline the problem of updating parliamentary roles to keep pace with new security practices.
You can download it in English here.
There is a clear need to better understand the relationship between two concepts at the heart of peacebuilding: the Rule of Law (RoL), and Security Sector Reform (SSR). If it is acknowledged in principle that they are interdependent, in practice enduring conceptual ambiguities and contradictions undermine latent synergies. As a consequence, international donor agencies are under increasing pressure to demonstrate the benefits of their RoL and SSR assistance. This SSR Paper moves the RoL-SSR debate forward through examining these activities jointly within a peacebuilding context. It proposes a heuristic framework that helps to rationalize this relationship on a conceptual level, demonstrating that RoL and SSR are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The resulting framework provides a basis for the development of coherent policies that can support the development of coordinated, complementary programmes on the ground.
Available to download at:
This Working Paper presents the conclusions of a joint task force which had convened to discuss amending the Palestinian Council of Ministers’ Regulation on Complaints No. 6 of 2009. It aims to raise Palestinian decision-makers’ awareness on the importance of improving the existing complaint handling mechanisms of the executive authorities and to provide concrete recommendations for legal reform. While DCAF focuses on complaints handling in relation to complaints against the behaviour of police and security forces, enhancing the overall complaints handling system will also benefit other parts of the public administration and thus the wider Palestinian population.
To access the paper, click here.
During and after Libya’s revolution, national media outlets became known and popular for their balanced reporting. The situation in the few years since has changed, however. The security landscape in Libya today is a confusing array of institutional and non-institutional actors each asserting legitimacy. The country is on the brink of full-scale civil war. Its media has become both polarized and a key tool for many security actors. This report looks at three primary television channels to offer insights into the media’s role in shaping public perceptions and building political constituencies.
- The Libyan security landscape is broadly divided into two camps: revolutionary-Islamist and institutionalist-conservative. The country’s resurgent media sector is split along similar lines. This polarization and related partistan reporting reinforce polarization among security sector actors and the public and could further undermine established peace in Libya.
- Media narratives dominating Libya’s security sector revolve around three axes: whether actors are legal or illegal, whether they supported or opposed the 2011 revolution, and whether they are correct or deviant Muslims. Security actors use these narratives to build their legitimacy.
- Of the three channels monitored, Libya Al Ahrar was the most balanced but displayed a cautiously anti-Islamist, institutionalist agenda. Al Nabaa was mainstream Islamist and a staunch supporter of revolutionary units, such as the Libyan Shield Force. Libya Awalan was strongly anti-Islamist, conservative, and a vocal supporter of Haftar’s actions in Benghazi.
- Libyans have little trust in any of the main regional and Libyan national television channels, including the national broadcaster, Libya Al Wataniyah, which fares no better than the private channels.
- Channels with clear anti-Islamist credentials were more trusted than their pro-Islamist counterparts, reflecting the general anti-Islamist sentiment among Libyans today.
- Channels advance their opinion on the legality of security actors, have thus contributed to related consumer perceptions about those actors, and in turn play an important role in how the security situation in Libya continues to unfold.
For full access to The Role of Media in Shaping Libya's Security Sector Narratives, kindly follow the link.
Despite peaceful elections and the withdrawal of peacekeepers, Liberia’s long terms future is still precarious. This article highlights the need of a sustained focus and political will by the UN member states as well as innovative ways to work in partnerships to sustain peace in Liberia.
For full access to Liberia now needs more attention, not less, please follow the link.
Security sector reform has been a central component of post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes, and the restoration of state authority since the 1990s. However, these reforms have rarely been successful in the long run. In the DRC, police reform has been a staple of statebuilding and governance strengthening efforts. Despite some reform successes, however, the Congolese National Police largely remains a reflection of the state. It is mostly unaccountable to those it is meant to serve, and used as a tool by some to extract resources and protect elite interests.
As a key state institution, sustainable reform of the police is impossible without a considerable overhaul of the larger governance framework of which it is part. While acknowledging this major systemic challenge, this briefing suggests that there may nevertheless be some more modest, yet impactful, gains to be made through police reform. By focusing on the everyday work and life of police personnel, future reforms could contribute to changing police behaviour on the streets and in police stations, at the interface between the police and the population where it may arguably matter most.
Based on seven months of qualitative research on the PNC conducted in Bukavu between 2016 and 2017, this briefing argues that targeted police reforms, informed and driven by local actors, can affect change, and often in a more sustainable—and financially viable—fashion than past large-scale donor-driven reform support programmes.
Since 2008, after a period of relative growth and social stability, the situation in Tajikistan has been steadily deteriorating, leading to increased speculation that the country could emerge as a failing state. Given its proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the role it plays in the Northern Distribution Network (a line that funnels military supplies from Europe to NATO ISAF troops in Afghanistan), the ramifications of potential instability in Tajikistan would resonate beyond the country. The current briefing assesses to what extent such danger is in fact real by outlining developments in the key areas of economy and security, and examining the regime’s capacity to cope with emerging challenges. The briefing concludes with recommendations for the EU and an outlook for future.
For full access to Tajikistan: Revolutionary Situation or Resilient State?, please follow the link.
Le G5 Sahel a été créé en 2014 comme un partenariat intergouvernemental entre le Burkina Faso, le Tchad, le Mali, la Mauritanie et le Niger pour promouvoir la coopération économique et la sécurité dans la région du Sahel. La virulence croissante des groupes de militants islamistes, tirant parti de la faible densité de population des zones frontalières, a cependant posé un sérieux défi à la vision du G5.
En réponse, en 2017, le G5 Sahel a augmenté ses efforts de sécurité en lançant une force de sécurité commune pour lutter contre le terrorisme, le trafic de drogue et la traite des êtres humains. La force a été approuvée par la suite par le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine et par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et a l’appui de divers partenaires internationaux. La force conjointe du G5 Sahel doit maintenant jouer un rôle de premier plan dans les futurs efforts de sécurité transnationale dans le Sahel.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, La force conjointe du G5 Sahel prend de l’envergure, veuillez suivre le lien.
A distinct characteristic of United Nations peacekeeping is its impartiality. It is also a reality that for UN peacekeeping to function properly, partnering with regional organizations and other groups is essential. Experiences in Mali and Somalia have, however, exposed the political and operational challenges that partnerships create in maintaining impartiality. The challenge at hand is the dynamic between peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts, especially as partnerships have expanded—notably in Africa, where regional actors have deployed increasing numbers of counterterrorist forces in the Sahel, Somalia, and Lake Chad Basin.
In order to read, Counterterrorism and Challenges to Peacekeeping Impartiality, please follow the link.
On the 30th of March 2018, UNMIL completed its mandate in Liberia setting the county on a new path towards a Security transition phase. The Security Council hailed the mission’s overall progress toward restoring peace, security, and stability in the country. The drawdown, which UNMIL head Farid Zarif called “one of the most significant milestones for the country and the international community since the end of the civil war in 2003,” will have important repercussions for the future of Liberia and the UN’s broader efforts to sustain peace.
In order to read, Sustaining Peace in Security Transitions: The Liberian Opportunity, please follow the link.
The incoming administration of Liberian President-elect George Weah will need to address numerous pressing challenges related to the country’s security and stability. This is all the more critical as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is drew down and departed the country in March 2018, after 15 years in country.
In order to read, Priorities for Security and Justice during Liberia's Transition, please follow the link.
Secretary-General António Guterres launched the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative on March 28 with the aim of rethinking aspects of United Nations peacekeeping. A4P is designed around five “Ps”: politics, performance, partnership, people, and peacebuilding. Others have written on some of these “Ps,” and this piece will delve into the peacebuilding dimension of A4P. To understand peacebuilding, it is important to draw out lessons from how the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding has changed over time, and identify how the A4P initiative can apply these lessons to aspects of peacekeeping.
In order to read, What Peacekeeping Can Learn from Peacebuilding: The Peacebuilding Dimensions of the A4P, please follow the link.
The intensity of the conflict against Boko Haram in Cameroon’s Far North has diminished, though the movement still poses a threat and the humanitarian situation remains precarious. Long-term stability hinges on how the government resolves two principal security challenges: first, dealing with former combatants and other Boko Haram members; and, secondly, determining the future of community self-defence, or vigilante, groups. A well-designed policy toward former Boko Haram members could lead those that are still active to surrender while vigilantes could turn to crime if left to their own devices.
In order to read, Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram, please follow the link.
People are affected by different kinds of insecurity in the Ituri Province in the northeastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This article investigates donor-driven attempts to improve security governance there. More specifically, it investigates bottom-up approaches to security governance in Ituri’s capital of Bunia and in Irumu territory. Whereas in Bunia people are faced with high levels of violent crime, Irumu is the site of a violent conflict between the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force (FRPI), an armed group connected to the Ngiti community, and the Congolese army.
Despite international and national actors promoting a 'bottom-up' approach to security governance, this article argues that localised efforts will be ineffective in changing the status quo in Ituri as the drivers of insecurity are translocal and too complex.
In order to read, The Limits of Bottom-Up Approaches to Security Governance in Ituri, please follow the link.
Alors que le conflit entre les forces de sécurité camerounaises et Boko Haram baisse en intensité dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun, deux enjeux sont essentiels pour une paix durable : le devenir des anciens membres, y compris combattants, du mouvement jihadiste, et celui des comités de vigilance. Une politique adéquate à l’égard des anciens membres de Boko Haram pourrait pousser les combattants camerounais encore actifs à se rendre. De leur côté, certains membres des comités de vigilance pourraient se tourner vers des activités criminelles après la fin du conflit s’ils ne sont pas encadrés.
Le gouvernement camerounais devrait poursuivre en justice les militants les plus dangereux et préparer la réinsertion dans leurs communautés des anciens membres de Boko Haram considérés comme un moindre risque. Il devrait aussi dissoudre certains comités de vigilance et en maintenir d’autres comme auxiliaires des forces de police.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Extrême-Nord du Cameroun : nouveau chapitre dans la lutte contre Boko Haram, veuillez suivre le lien.
Alors que la diplomatie régionale et internationale se concentre à juste titre sur la fin immédiate des hostilités, le Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique a demandé à une sélection d’universitaires sud-soudanais et internationaux, de spécialistes de la sécurité et de leaders de la société civile de partager leurs visions sur les obstacles stratégiques que le pays doit surmonter pour accomplir une transition de son état actuel de dissimilation à une réalité plus stable.
Ces visions, prises individuellement et collectivement, ont pour but d’aider à définir certaines des priorités et conditions préalables pour transformer le paysage sécuritaire hautement fragmenté d’aujourd’hui au Soudan du Sud en un environnement où les citoyens sont en sécurité dans leur propre pays et protégés des menaces extérieures.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Envisager un Soudan du Sud stable, veuillez suivre le lien.
Somalia’s state-building efforts, including initiatives to strengthen security and rebuild the political system, have proceeded steadily since the inauguration of President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo in February 2017. Nonetheless, serious challenges remain. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies spoke with Abdisaid Ali, National Security Advisor to the President of the Federal Government of Somalia, to take stock of the progress.
In this interview, Abdisaid Ali presented Somalia's political will, security reforms in the country's Transition Plan, and the commitment to domestic and international coalition building to sustain the country’s progress.
To access to the full article, Q&A: Somalia Charts Security Transition, please follow the link.
Last April's High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, convened by the president of the General Assembly, comes two years after the concurrent resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council that adopted a new approach called “sustaining peace,” which is aimed at significantly bolstering the international effort to prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.
The secretary-general recently released his first report on how he will implement and operationalise the sustaining peace approach. It is now an ideal time to take stock of how the concept has developed since it was adopted and assess the challenges to its implementation.
To access the full article, "Sustaining Peace: Can a New Approach Change the UN?", please follow the link.
La sécurité mondiale s’est fortement détériorée cette dernière décennie. Le nombre, la complexité et la létalité des conflits armés ont augmenté, avec de longues périodes d’une violence choquante au Moyen-Orient, en Afrique et en Asie du Sud.
Le SIPRI Yearbook 2018 présente des données originales – notamment sur les dépenses militaires mondiales, les transferts internationaux d’armes, la production d’armements, les forces nucléaires, les conflits armés et les opérations multilatérales de paix – combinées à des analyses pointues des aspects importants du contrôle des armements, de la paix et de la sécurité internationale.
Afin d'accéder au rapport, Résumé du SIPRI Yearbook 2018 - Armements, désarmement et sécurité internationale, veuillez suivre le lien.
Des affrontements entre les jeunes Hema et Lendu dans la province de l’Ituri, au nord-est de la République Démocratique du Congo, ont éclaté en décembre 2017 et ont dégénérés en attaques au coup-pour-coup qui se sont rapidement propagées dans toute la province. Plus de 70 villages ont été détruits et environ 350 000 personnes ont cherché refuge en Ouganda voisin ou ont été déplacées à l’intérieur du pays. En juillet 2018, le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) a déclaré que ses équipes avaient reçu des informations faisant état de groupes armés commettant des massacres et rasant des villages entiers.
La crise politique en cours en RDC met à rude épreuve les accords de paix conclus après la deuxième guerre du Congo, ce qui pourrait mener à une situation encore plus instable.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Ituri devient la dernière poudrière du Congo, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le primat donné aux réponses militaires a jusqu’à présent accentué les antagonismes locaux plus qu’il n’a jugulé les violences. Les interventions militaires internationales s’inscrivent essentiellement dans le cadre de la lutte antiterroriste, au risque de négliger les autres facteurs d’instabilité. Le recours à des groupes politico-militaires contribue à nourrir un cycle inquiétant de violences intercommunautaires, et fait probablement le jeu des jihadistes.
Les autorités nigériennes doivent adopter une approche plus politique, incluant dialogue, réconciliation entre communautés et proposition d’amnistie pour les militants n’ayant pas commis de crimes graves. Les partenaires occidentaux doivent mettre leurs opérations militaires au service d’une telle approche, plus adaptée aux besoins locaux.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Frontière Niger-Mali : mettre l’outil militaire au service d’une approche politique, veuillez suivre le lien.
Traiter de manière adaptée les infractions complexes transnationales et internationales requiert une approche multiforme apportant une réponse ferme en matière de justice pénale. Les témoignages jouent dans ce cadre un rôle essentiel. Les témoins, et bien souvent les membres de leurs familles, peuvent faire face à un grand danger en raison de leur aide crucial dans l’obtention d’une condamnation. L’Afrique a connu de nombreux exemples d’intimidation ou de violence à l’égard de témoins qui ont mené à des non-lieux ou à des acquittements.
Dans ces cas-là, la justice aura finalement échoué. Il est donc indispensable de s’attaquer à l’insuffisance du financement, à la pénurie de compétences et au manque de volonté politique, autant d’obstacles entravant le travail de la Justice.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Protection des témoins: Aider la justice face aux infractions complexes, veuillez suivre le lien.
Peacebuilding begins with open dialogue: Engaging Colombian communities to enable an inclusive approach
As part of the work carried out by Interpeace with the Police Unit for Peacebuilding – UNIPEP -, a visit was made to one of the Territorial Areas of Training and Reincorporation in Colombia, with the objective to talk with community members, and learn about the challenges they face in the implementation of the peace agreements.
Through several dialogue sessions, the State authorities were able to define priorities and specific actions to be developed by their local representatives to enforce security measures in their communities, and continue working in the implementation of the peace agreements in the rural areas of Colombia.
For full access to the article, Peacebuilding begins with open dialogue: Engaging Colombian communities to enable an inclusive approach, please follow the link.
Colombia has made some improvements in terms of rule of law in the last decade. The current peace talks with the FARC (Colombia´s Revolutionary Armed Forces) are a clear symptom of increasing political stability. Additionally, a mining boom and improved security conditions have driven strong economic growth since the early 2000s. Nevertheless, neither these developments nor the new institutional reforms promoted by the government of President Santos—the new Anti-corruption Act of 2011, and the creation of a new Anti-corruption office in the Presidency—have contributed to curbing corruption. To the contrary, in Transparency International´s 2012 Corruption Perception Index, the country received the worse score in ten years, going from 57 in 2002 to 94 in 2012.
For full access to the report, Colombia: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption , please follow the link.
La conférence générale anglophone peut constituer une étape décisive dans le règlement de la crise anglophone, en cours depuis plus d'un an. Les organisateurs, les différents acteurs anglophones, la société civile, et les partenaires internationaux du Cameroun doivent pousser le gouvernement et les chefs de file séparatistes à dépasser leurs réticences.
L’International Crisis Group salue l’initiative de quatre représentants religieux d’organiser une conférence générale anglophone à Buea, dans la région du Sud-Ouest, au Cameroun. En avril 2018, Crisis Group avait proposé l’Eglise catholique comme potentiel médiateur du conflit dans les régions anglophones (Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest). Le 25 juillet, le cardinal émérite Christian Tumi a annoncé que cette conférence aurait lieu les 29 et 30 août ; elle a depuis été repoussée aux 21 et 22 novembre. Ce report est bienvenu, car il devrait permettre de mieux préparer l’évènement et d’assurer la participation de toutes les parties concernées.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Cameroun : la conférence générale anglophone mérite un soutien national et international, veuillez suivre le lien.
Alors qu’un sommet historique entre le président américain Donald Trump et le leader nord-coréen Kim Jong-un s’est déroulé il y a trois mois à Singapour, il semble que les négociations vers une dénucléarisation « complète, vérifiable et irréversible » de la Corée du Nord soient retardées et qu’une nouvelle stratégie soit nécessaire pour les États-Unis.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, Dénucléarisation de la Corée du Nord: quel bilan trois mois après le sommet Trump-Kim?, veuillez suivre le lien.
En 2017, la Somalie a tenu des élections parlementaires et présidentielles dans une atmosphère relativement calme. La Mission de l’Union africaine en Somalie (AMISOM), qui est présente en Somalie depuis 2007, a joué un rôle primordial dans l’obtention de ce succès. Néanmoins, al Shabaab, le groupe militant islamiste qui avait déstabilisé la Somalie, demeure une menace sérieuse. Dans l’espoir d’obtenir une meilleure compréhension de l’état actuel de la mission, le Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique s’est entretenu avec M. Simon Mulongo, le représentant spécial adjoint au Président du Conseil de la Commission en Somalie (D/SRCC) au sein de la Commission de l’Union africaine basée à Mogadishu.
Dans une interview avec le Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique, Simon Mulongo, le représentant adjoint à la Commission de l’Union africaine à Mogadishu, a déclaré qu’AMISOM n’aurait pu obtenir le succès qu’elle a eu si elle avait continué à utiliser le modèle traditionnel du maintien de la paix.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, Les difficiles leçons qu’AMISOM a dû apprendre en Somalie, veuillez suivre le lien.
L’ Algérie et le Maroc comptent parmi les plus grands importateurs d’armes sur le continent africain. Étant donné leurs capacités de production limitées, ces pays représentent de nos jours un marché important pour l’industrie mondiale de l’armement. Cette note d’analyse propose d’étudier les dynamiques d’exportation d’armes des États membres de l’UE vers des pays du Maghreb, plus concrètement vers le Maroc, l’Algérie et la Tunisie entre 2012 et 2016. Cette analyse tentera d’identifier et de vérifier la cohérence entre l’application des critères d’évaluation « préexportation » établis dans la Position commune de l’UE et les intérêts stratégiques des pays membres.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Exportations d’armes au Maghreb : quelle conformité avec la Position commune ?, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le Cameroun se trouve dans une situation difficile. L’élection présidentielle du 7 octobre, qui laissait déjà bon nombre de Camerounais indifférents en raison du peu de suspense sur son issue, est éclipsée par le conflit qui sévit dans les provinces du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest. La situation s’y est tellement dégradée que les nombreux autres défis auxquels le pays fait face semblent relégués au second plan.
Une réponse autoritaire à des manifestations pacifiques s'est transformée en un test pour l'identité camerounaise en tant qu'état multiculturel, et a placé le pays face au risque d'un conflit prolongé.
Lancée le 20 janvier 2018, l'opération Rameau d’olivier était destinée à chasser les Unités de protection du peuple kurde (YPG) qui contrôlent la région depuis 2012. En effet, les YPG sont considérés par la Turquie comme le prolongement militaire du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), responsable de nombreuses attaques terroristes sur son territoire.
La majorité des États, tout comme le Conseil de sécurité, n’ont pas explicitement condamné l’opération militaire turque, ce qui suggère une acceptation tacite des arguments turcs. Cependant, l’examen de la Résolution 2401 du Conseil de sécurité montre que celui-ci cherche à répondre, de manière indirecte, aux arguments avancés par la Turquie et aux inconsistances juridiques qu’ils soulèvent.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, L’intervention turque en Syrie: entre droit et diplomatie, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le mercredi 26 septembre a été un jour particulièrement important au tribunal de première instance de Gafsa. L’émotion était à son comble quand les militants et les meneurs de la révolte du bassin minier de Gafsa, en 2008, sont entrés dans la salle d’audience où ils avaient été roués de coups, jugés de façon inique et condamnés, il y a presque 10 ans jour pour jour.
Mais cette fois, ils sont entrés par la porte principale, en tant que victimes attendant de voir condamnés les auteurs de ces actes, et non en tant que prévenus accusés de comploter contre l’État. Leur seul crime en 2008 ? Avoir osé manifester pacifiquement contre ce qu’ils considéraient comme des pratiques déloyales en matière d’embauche, du népotisme et un manque de transparence de la part de la Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa, une entreprise détenue par l’État et le principal employeur de la région.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, Révolte de Gafsa & Justice transitionnelle: La portée symbolique ne suffit pas, veuillez suivre le lien.
If victims become perpetrators: Factors contributing to vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in the central Sahel
Violent extremism is affecting the lives of millions in the Sahel, but the essentially military responses to date have failed to reduce violence and have instead undermined community resilience. This research adds to the analytical evidence explaining the rise in violent extremism in the Sahel and provides guidance for governments and international actors to step up responses for the peaceful resolution of this crisis.
For full access to the report, If victims become perpetrators: Factors contributing to vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in the central Sahel, please follow the link.
Ce monitoring trimestriel, publié par le GRIP depuis 2011, a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l’Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, la Guinée, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Il se penche sur les questions de sécurité interne au sens large, les tensions régionales, la criminalité et les trafics transfrontaliers.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l'Ouest, veuillez suivre le lien.
« Action pour le maintien de la paix » : dernier avatar de l’éternelle réforme des opérations de paix de l’ONU
L’ « Action pour le maintien de la paix » s’inscrit dans un processus de longue haleine qui, depuis plusieurs années, alterne la réflexion doctrinale et les réformes des activités de maintien de la paix conduites par l’ONU. Pour bien saisir la portée de l’initiative d’Antonio Guterres, il s’indique de revenir sur les principales étapes de ce processus et de comprendre le lien étroit qui le relie au contexte international. On pourra alors analyser à cet aune le contenu de l’ « Action pour le maintien de la paix » et évaluer les perspectives d’une issue positive.
Depuis leur premier déploiement, les opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies sont engagées dans un perpétuel processus de réforme. Il suffit d’un rapide coup d’œil sur ce processus, toujours en court, pour identifier sa caractéristique essentielle : absentes de la Charte des Nations unies et, pour cette raison, longtemps dépourvues de conceptualisation doctrinale, les opérations de maintien de la paix se sont développées de manière essentiellement ad hoc et incrémentales au gré des crises internationales et des expériences de terrain. Ce processus évolutif est ainsi balisé par une succession de rapports qui adoptent une perspective à la fois rétrospective – tirer les leçons du passé – et prospective : dessiner le cadre des opérations de la décennie suivante.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, « Action pour le maintien de la paix » : dernier avatar de l’éternelle réforme des opérations de paix de l’ONU, veuillez suivre le lien.
This policy brief assesses EU programmes in the Sahel and aspects of the G5 Sahel, focusing on CSDP missions and other security-related initiatives in Mali and Niger. It is particularly important to re-examine the merits and evolution of these programmes, and the EU’s pursuit of an integrated regional approach, in the current environment, given Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s recent re-election – and the departure of two long-serving EU chiefs of mission in Niger and Mali, as well as several other senior EU officials.
For full access to the report, Halting ambition: EU migration and security policy in the Sahel, please follow the link.
Le 29 octobre, une kamikaze a déclenché un engin explosif improvisé placé dans son sac à dos, sur l’avenue Habib-Bourguiba au centre-ville de Tunis, l’artère la plus fréquentée de la capitale, à quelques centaines de mètres du ministère de l’Intérieur et de l’ambassade de la France. Il s’agit du premier attentat terroriste d’envergure à Tunis depuis 2015 et celui-ci pourrait bien mettre à mal l'équilibre succint de la politique tunisienne. En effet, les tensions entre le President et le Premier Ministre se sont envenimées et l'attaque terroriste a ranimé les clivages entre islamistes et anti-islamistes de 2013.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, la polarisation politique s’aggrave en Tunisie après le premier attentat d’envergure en deux ans, veuillez suivre le lien.
Résultat d’une recherche documentaire et de dizaine d’entretiens menés à Cotonou, Lomé et à Abuja en mars et juin 2018, ce rapport s’interroge sur la manière dont le mécanisme d’alerte précoce et de réponse de la CEDEAO contribue à la prévention des conflits en Afrique de l’Ouest.
Partant des obstacles politiques et techniques auxquels la CEDEAO a été confrontée, il présente tout d’abord ses évolutions en matière de collecte de données ainsi que la récente réforme de décentralisation au plan national. En outre, il passe en revue les réponses que la CEDEAO, les États et la société civile sont susceptibles d’apporter pour combler le décalage persistant entre l’alerte et la réponse.
Enfin, il conclut sur l’idée qu’au-delà des difficultés techniques et financières, le déficit d’alerte précoce et les délais de réponse, souvent trop longs, résultent aussi d’une culture de la prévention encore très théorique. Des pistes de réflexion sont proposées pour en permettre une meilleure opérationnalisation.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Afrique de l'Ouest: Faire de la prévention des conflits la règle et non l'exception, veuillez suivre le lien.
Penser la sécurité de demain: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau mot d’ordre européen pour la politique de paix et de sécurité
Au niveau mondial, un large éventail de systèmes étatiques et de systèmes de contrôles de la violence existe (à l’avantage ou aux dépens de la population locale). Dans le même temps, l’ordre et le droit international se fondent sur l’existence d’Etats-nations souverains.
Dans ce contexte, la Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung a initié le Groupe de réflexion mondial «Monopole de la violence2.0? », qui vient de rendre son rapport final «Garantir la sécurité en des temps incertains"». seront Les principaux résultats de ces recherches sont résumés dans cet article qui se concentre sur les conséquences politiques pour l’Allemagne et l’Union européenne et plaide pour un nouveau mot d’ordre européen dans la politique de paix et de sécurité, tendu vers un modèle de sécurité soumis au contrôle démocratique.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Penser la sécurité de demain: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau mot d’ordre européen pour la politique de paix et de sécurité, veuillez suivre le lien.
In the non-permissive environments where they are often deployed, UN peace operations need to be increasingly creative to implement their mandate to protect civilians. They face particularly acute challenges in contexts marked by violent extremism, such as Mali, where attacks by terrorist groups have greatly constrained the capacity of peacekeepers to protect local populations.
This paper explores the operational challenges that the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) faces in implementing its protection mandate. It analyzes protection threats related to violent extremism in Mali and explores the protection strategy, tools, and activities developed by the UN mission to address those threats. It highlights some of the practical constraints of operating in a hostile environment and added complications related to the mission’s proximity to non-UN counterterrorism forces.
To read the report, Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali, please follow the link.
Cet article du groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) revient sur la conférence des États parties au Traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA) de cet été. La conférence fut l'occasion d'accueillir le Brésil, qui ratifia le traité, et de remercier l'engagement de la société civile dans le contrôle externe des contrats d'armements. Cet article analyse aussi l'implication des industriels de l'armement dans la conférence ainsi que la participation des chargés d'octroi de licences.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, Traité sur le commerce des armes: des acteurs en mouvement, veuillez suivre le lien.
La sécurité frontalière en Afrique de l’Ouest : migration, construction des États et nouvelles technologies
Cette analyse se penche sur les multiples pratiques de sécurité frontalière en Afrique de l’Ouest, regroupées autour de trois dimensions : la gestion des flux migratoires par une coopération policière de plus en plus étroite, le renforcement de capacités matérielles et infrastructurelles facilitant la construction de l’État, et une confiance accrue dans les technologies de l’information telles que l’identification biométrique.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, La sécurité frontalière en Afrique de l’Ouest : migration, construction des États et nouvelles technologies, veuillez suivre le lien.
Depuis la guerre civile en Libye de 2014, la capacité de gouverner du pays s'est effondrée. Depuis l'instabilité n'a fait que s'aggraver en raison de querelles politiques et notamment l'émergence d'un gouvernement rival. Maintenant, de nouvelles mesures pour stabiliser le pays sont nécessaires.
Pour les Européens, le sort de la Libye reste une priorité centrale étant donné son rôle de pays de transit pour les migrations et d'éventuel incubateur de menaces terroristes. Cette publication de l'ECFR invite les acteurs européens à intensifier leurs efforts de stabilisation en vue d’obtenir des résultats durables.
Dans cette optique, une nouvelle stratégie et une approche multilatérale demeurent le meilleur espoir de mettre fin au cycle destructeur d'instabilité et de reprise des conflits en Libye.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, L’ordre dans le chaos : stabiliser la Libye au niveau local, veuillez suivre le lien.
Face à l’insécurité rampante, ils se sont étendus dans une grande partie du pays pour pallier le manque d'effectifs policiers. Ces milliers d’associations citoyennes entendent ainsi s’attaquer à l’injustice et à la corruption des forces de l’ordre, des élites politiques et judiciaires. Leur efficacité est reconnue de tous, mais en mettant la main sur la chaîne répressive dans son ensemble, les Koglweogo s'arrogent les rôles de policiers, justiciers et bourreaux.
Pour accéder au dossier, Koglweogo, Miroir d’une faillite d’Etat, veuillez suivre le lien.
“By Day We Fear the Army, By Night the Jihadists” - Abuses by Armed Islamists and Security Forces in Burkina Faso
Since 2016, armed Islamist groups have dramatically increased their presence in Burkina Faso, creating an environment of fear throughout the country. They have attacked government buildings and schools, intimidated teachers, conducted brutal assaults on cafés and other gathering places, and executed those suspected of collaborating with authorities. In response, Burkinabè security forces have conducted counterterrorism operations in 2017 and 2018 that resulted in numerous allegations of extrajudicial killings, abuse of suspects in custody, and arbitrary arrests.
Victims of violence by both the armed Islamists and security forces complained about the slow pace, or complete lack, of investigations into human rights cases since 2016. Community leaders from the north complained about what they perceived to be a partial response to abuses by the authorities. They said killings and abuses by armed Islamists almost always triggered an investigation and, often arrests, while alleged abuses by security force personnel were rarely, if ever, investigated by the security forces or the judiciary.
To access the report, “By Day We Fear the Army, By Night the Jihadists” - Abuses by Armed Islamists and Security Forces in Burkina Faso, please follow the link.
La région de Gao est au centre d’une crise multidimensionnelle ayant frappé le Mali depuis 2012. Les populations de Gao ont vécu une série d’événements importants du début de la rébellion, avec le départ de l’Etat, l’occupation de la région et l’intervention militaire qui a suivi. La compréhension des facteurs historiques, des enjeux communautaires et les dynamiques conflictuelles dans les trois cercles de la région de Gao - Ansongo, Bourem et Gao – est fondamentale pour l’apport de solutions inclusives et durables. De même, la confiance entre les acteurs engagés dans la résolution de la crise (nationaux mais aussi les nombreux acteurs internationaux présents) et les populations locales reste cruciale pour l’application de ces solutions.
Ce rapport, issu d’un processus de recherche participative de plus de quinze (15) mois, a comme vocation de faire remonter les opinions de toutes les couches de la population de Gao et de proposer aux acteurs, tant nationaux qu’internationaux œuvrant dans la région, une analyse approfondie de la situation actuelle et du contexte des dynamiques locales.
Pour accéder au dossier, Analyse locale des dynamiques de conflit et de résilience dans les cercles d’Ansongo, Bourem et Gao, veuillez suivre le lien.
Maintien et pérennisation de la paix: Quelles conditions et stratégies de sortie des opérations de maintien de la paix?
Les Casques bleus, acteurs essentiels des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies, récompensés d’ailleurs par un prix Nobel de la paix en 1988, sont à la croisée des chemins. Le contexte des conflits a changé. Le rôle des Casques bleus et plus largement des opérations de maintien de la paix (OMP) évolue donc également.
À l’occasion du 70e anniversaire de cette « entreprise des Nations unies » (entamée donc depuis 1948), l’ensemble des parties prenantes ont adopté une Déclaration d’engagements communs concernant les opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies intitulée : « Action pour le maintien de la paix » (A4P). Son principal objectif, d’après le Secrétaire général Antonio Guterres, est de « combler le fossé entre les aspirations et la réalité », en donnant aux opérations de maintien de la paix des objectifs plus réalistes, en rendant les missions plus fortes et plus sûres et en mobilisant un meilleur soutien politique en faveur de solutions politiques d’une part, et de forces bien équipées et bien entrainées d’autre part ».
Pour accéder au rapport, Maintien et pérennisation de la paix: Quelles conditions et stratégies de sortie des opérations de maintien de la paix?, veuillez suivre le lien.
Depuis 2016, les tensions montent entre l’Etat tchadien et la jeunesse du Bahr el-Ghazel (BEG) et du Kanem, dans le centre du pays. Elles sont alimentées par la crise économique et par des exactions commises par des individus considérés comme proches du pouvoir contre des ressortissants de ces régions. Une perception d’impunité génère un profond sentiment d’humiliation chez les jeunes. En outre, les restrictions de mouvements imposées aux habitants, dont beaucoup partent vers le nord et en Libye pour trouver du travail, exacerbent ce ressentiment.
Pour regagner la confiance des jeunes du BEG et du Kanem, les autorités devraient démontrer leur capacité à juger et à sanctionner les auteurs d’exactions, même lorsqu’ils gravitent autour du pouvoir. Elles devraient aussi se garder de cultiver l’amalgame entre migrants et futurs rebelles et assouplir les restrictions de mouvements.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Tchad : désamorcer les tensions dans la bande sahélienne, veuillez suivre le lien.
Dans un entretien avec le CESA, Stephen Twebaze, chercheur sur les Parlements africains et conseiller auprès de l’Assemblée législative ougandaise, explique que, lorsque les membres du Parlement se considèrent avant tout comme des représentants constituants plutôt que comme des cadres déployés par leurs partis politiques, les Parlements sont à même d’exercer un contrôle effectif, même s’ils sont subordonnés à un parti au pouvoir. Depuis 1986, M. Twebaze a recueilli, analysé et publié des indicateurs de performance sur le Parlement ougandais.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Contrôle parlementaire dans le secteur de la sécurité : L’expérience ougandaise, veuillez suivre le lien.
Que le Brexit se déroule de manière ordonnée ou non, tôt ou tard les Européens et les Britanniques seront appelés à redéfinir leur relation. Les désaccords restent pourtant nombreux des deux côtés de la Manche. En matière de défense, ils sont surtout paradoxaux.
Depuis que Londres a signifié son intention de quitter l’UE, ses appels du pied pour conserver un rôle central au cœur de la PSDC ne se comptent pas. Tout à coup, le Royaume-Uni n’apparait plus comme cet acteur sceptique et désintéressé qui haussait systématiquement les épaules face au projet d’une défense européenne. Il se retrouve dans l’inconfortable position du demandeur.
La perspective s’est donc inversée. Les Européens ne doivent plus retenir les Britanniques par la veste, en essayant de les convaincre du bien-fondé de la PSDC. Désormais ils doivent éviter que, en sortant par la porte, le Royaume-Uni ne tente de revenir par la fenêtre.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Le Brexit et la défense européenne: un choix de fond pour l’Union, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le 27 juin 2017 s’achevait le processus de remise des armes prévu par l’Accord de paix entre les Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) et le gouvernement du président centriste Juan Manuel Santos. Cette première étape de l’Accord devait permettre d’améliorer le climat de sécurité et d’amorcer le processus de réintégration des ex-combattants des FARC à la vie civile. La démarche, complexe et inédite après des décennies de conflit, a mené au retrait et à l’élimination définitive de plus de deux millions d’armes et de munitions utilisées par les membres des FARC.
Malgré des progrès vérifiables, les civils et les leaders des mouvements sociaux continuent à payer un lourd tribut de la violence en Colombie. Les 300 victimes mortelles depuis la signature de l’Accord sont preuve que la paix réelle et tangible promise est encore loin d’être totalement acquise.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Désarmement des FARC : mise en œuvre et bilan d’un processus inédit, veuillez suivre le lien.
Depuis deux ans, des dizaines de milliers de citoyens togolais descendent dans la rue pour exiger des réformes gouvernementales. L’une de leurs principales revendications est de limiter le mandat présidentiel contraignant le président Faure Gnassingbé à quitter son poste en 2020, à la fin de son mandat actuel. La question est au centre d’un effort de Gnassingbé de faire adopter un amendement à la constitution pour lui permettre de se maintenir au pouvoir.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Les manifestants au Togo continuent d’exiger l’application des limites de mandats, veuillez suivre le lien.
L'ambassadeur spécial pour le Sahel, Jean-Marc Châtaigner, fait un bilan sur la situation au Sahel. Les réussites, les progressions, les difficultés mais aussi les échecs rencontrés dans le cadre de l'intégration de la stratégie "Diplomatie, Défense et Développement" sont évoqués.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Où va le Sahel ? Entretien avec Jean-Marc Châtaigner, ambassadeur spécial pour le Sahel, veuillez suivre le lien.
The most violent countries in the world are increasingly countries considered ‘at peace’. From Honduras to Mexico to South Africa, armed violence, often by gangs, has led to high levels of casualties. Disruption of daily life due to armed violence is similar to the challenges experienced during wartime, though often without the markers or recognition associated with war. With gang violence primarily viewed as a domestic criminal issue, external support for conflict mitigation and humanitarian assistance is often low. Yet the disruptive impact of such high rates of violence is significant, and the humanitarian impact is severe. New theoretical frameworks are needed to better problematize extreme armed violence in ‘peacetime’ states. This article seeks to bring an understanding of the severity of armed violence in states such as El Salvador into engagement with the critical and theoretical foundations of the women, peace and security (WPS) field. Gendered dynamics shape gang violence in El Salvador, and a gender lens helps reimagine its impact. Aligning critical theory with the lived experience of this subset of armed conflict allows new directions for engagement and, in particular, offers the opportunity to re-examine long-standing assumptions of what initiates, maintains, and challenges armed violence by non-state actors in communities considered ‘at peace.’ This article seeks to encourage greater debate and scholarship to inform our understandings of armed conflict and gender in communities affected by gang violence, such as those in El Salvador. In these communities, the level of violence often replicates the experiences of war, and thus a WPS lens is a critical tool for analysis.
To access the full paper, Women and ‘New Wars’ in El Salvador, kindly follow the link.
Security, justice and governance in south east Myanmar: a knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in Karen ceasefire areas
Saferworld and the Karen Peace Support Network present unprecedented insights into people's perceptions of security, justice and governance in south east Myanmar.
In 2017 and 2018, Saferworld and the Karen Peace Support Network spoke to over 2,000 people across 72 villages across south east Myanmar about their experiences during the 69-year-old armed conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and the Karen National Union.
They found that people in Myanmar’s Karen ceasefire areas face severe insecurity amid protracted armed conflict, routine violence, abuse and exploitation. Eighty per cent of households stated experiences of violence or abuse by the authorities, such as shootings and burning of villages. The survey also found relatively high levels of legitimacy of the KNU controlled areas, low levels of trust in the peace process, and fairly high levels of anxiety that fighting will break out again.
Their survey constitutes a unique evidence base to support more conflict-sensitive humanitarian and developmental assistance. It is intended to support efforts to address the root causes of conflict and insecurity.
To access the full paper, Security, justice and governance in south east Myanmar: a knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in Karen ceasefire areas, kindly follow the link.
For over two decades, keeping the peace in Africa has occupied a major slice of the United Nations Security Council’s time, resulting in many more peace operations deploying on the continent than any other region. Since 2011, one trend has been an increase in ad hoc coalitions intended to stabilize certain conflict zones in Africa. Advocates suggest these coalitions are well suited for dealing with some of the continent’s deadliest transnational armed groups. Yet debate continues over who should authorize, finance, and provide them with various forms of technical, logistical, and security assistance. Outside of their benefits and drawbacks, it is clear that the coalitions pose particular challenges for the African Union (AU).
For full access to Can Ad Hoc Security Coalitions in Africa Bring Stability?, kindly follow the link.
Secondary displacement from Syria’s Yarmouk Camp to Lebanon has rendered Palestinian refugees more vulnerable and compounded their lack of protection and assistance. Their dire living conditions in Lebanon's refugee camps push them to seek ways to leave the country but most are reluctant to return to Syria for security and other reasons. Without a genuine political change in Syria, deals of reconciliation and compromise will have no credibility, and talks of refugees’ return will remain hollow.
For full access to For full access to Palestinian Refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk Camp: Challenges and Obstacles to Return, kindly follow the link.
One of the main obstacles to peace in Mali is the recurrence of unresolved conflicts. This has largely been due to limitations and failures in conflict management and conflict resolution methods applied by state and non-state actors throughout Mali’s history. According to Malians consulted through dialogue processes led by IMRAP and Interpeace, most citizens do not feel consulted by national, regional and local resolution processes and feel abandoned by the state. Consequently, communities often lack trust in government institutions and their representatives, such as the defense and security forces (DSF).
In addition to this, women are lacking participation in governance and decision-making spheres. Paradoxically, it is especially women who play a key role in fueling and resolving conflicts in Mali, particularly outside of the formal spheres. Therefore, it is essential to improve women’s participation in Mali’s security apparatus in order to foster trust between civilians and DSF.
For full access to Women’s participation in the defense and security forces in Mali: A vehicle for trust, kindly follow the link.
Drug trafficking in northern Mali is generating a level of violence that is unparalleled in the subregion. The Malian state’s inability to bring the area under control has spawned particularly fierce conflicts among traffickers. Weapons circulating after the rebellions of the past two decades have exacerbated the progressive militarisation of trafficking networks, whose rivalries fuel political and inter-communal tensions. Smuggling narcotics is not only a means by which armed groups gain funds but a source of conflict in itself. Thus far, policies against drug trafficking have proven ineffectual; indeed, it is unrealistic to expect the problem to be eradicated any time soon.
Malian authorities and their international partners could take steps to at least demilitarise trafficking and reduce violence. These include backing regional stability pacts that informally regulate smuggling, redoubling efforts to rid all armed groups who signed the 2015 peace agreement, including those working with traffickers, of heavy weaponry, and using coercive measures (notably targeted sanctions) against those who refuse to disarm.
To access the full paper, Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali, kindly follow the link.
Prépondérantes sur le plan démographique, les jeunes générations restent défavorisées sur le plan économique et quasi-absentes des institutions démocratiques. Leur redonner un rôle actif est un impératif pour la construction de sociétés plus apaisées.
Ils sont plus de la moitié du monde : jusqu’à 70 % de la population en Afrique. Leur représentation politique est insignifiante : ils forment moins de 2 % des effectifs des parlements nationaux. Leur situation économique est précaire : trois quarts de leurs emplois sont dans l’économie informelle, leur taux de chômage est deux fois plus important que la moyenne mondiale. Ils sont plus facilement enrôlés dans des milices : ils meurent plus que les autres dans les batailles armées. Et « elles » ? Leur condition est souvent moins enviable encore. Ils et elles ont moins de 30 ans.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Créer du dialogue entre générations, veuillez suivre le lien.
On January 24, peace talks aimed at ending the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) opened in Khartoum. Brokered by the African Union (AU), the dialogue brings together government representatives and fourteen armed groups. Difficult negotiations lie ahead, partly because several transitional justice initiatives have already gotten off the ground in recent months. An examination of these initiatives raises a variety of questions about CAR’s peace process.
For full access to Negotiating Peace and Justice in the Central African Republic, kindly follow the link.
The Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks, hosted by SIPRI, launched a new report on Central Asia.
The report, entitled ‘Central Asia: Climate-related security risk assessment’, is the final in the series produced by the Expert Working Group during 2018. It identifies four priority climate-related security risks in Central Asia such as border conflicts intensifying as climate changes reduce access to natural resources.
Previous reports in the series have focused on the Lake Chad Region, Iraq and Somalia respectively. Each report builds on research and insights from the field in order to provide integrated assessments of climate-related security risks—as well as social, political and economic aspects.
To read the full report, Central Asia: Climate-related security risk assessment, please follow the link provided.
International efforts to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons go back over four decades. With the so-called Middle East resolution of 1995, such efforts—and the broader goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the region—became part of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) review process. While tying the NPT to progress on disarmament in the Middle East helped to ensure consensus on extending the NPT, it came at the cost of reduced treaty legitimacy; after more than two decades since its adoption, the Middle East resolution remains unimplemented.
Describing the political dynamics around the issue, this paper assesses the prospects for the 2020 NPT Review Conference and presents two alternative approaches for taking the WMD-free zone process forward—a WMD-free zone process without Israel or the inclusion of such a process as part of a broader regional security and arms control dialogue.
For full access to The lack of disarmament in the Middle East: A thorn in the side of the NPT, kindly follow the link.
La signature de l’accord revitalisé sur la résolution du conflit au Soudan du Sud (R-ARCSS) par les rivaux de longue date Salva Kiir et Riek Machar à Khartoum en septembre 2018 a été saluée comme une percée décisive dans la résolution du conflit civil qui a coûté la vie à 400 000 victimes et a forcé le déplacement de plus de 4 millions de personnes depuis le début du conflit en décembre 2013. Cette analyse, qui s’articule autour des principaux éléments de l’accord, évalue l’évolution de la situation depuis la signature et les perspectives de mise en pratique pour l’avenir.
Pour accéder à l'article, Bilan de l’Accord revitalisé sur la résolution du conflit au Soudan du Sud, veuillez suivre le lien.
Un avion pour lutter contre le braconnage transfrontalier : une autre facette du soutien à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité
La Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité est un élément essentiel du retour durable de la paix et de la stabilité au Mali. Celle-ci touche de nombreux aspects, allant de la révision des textes de loi à la sensibilisation des citoyens, en passant par le renforcement des capacités des forces de sécurité. Il en est d’ailleurs ainsi en ce qui concerne la lutte contre le braconnage transfrontalier et la protection des espèces animales et végétales. Dans ce domaine, la MINUSMA a apporté un appui de taille en mettant à la disposition des gardes forestiers du Mali, un avion ULM (ultra léger motorisé).
Pour accéder à l'article, Un avion pour lutter contre le braconnage transfrontalier : une autre facette du soutien à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, veuillez suivre le lien.
Malawi: The Road to the 2019 Tripartite Elections. Reflections on Corruption, Land and Multiparty Politics
On May 21st 2019, Malawi will hold its tripartite elections, where voters will vote for the President, Members of Parliament and local Councillors. 2019 will also mark the 25 years of multiparty politics in Malawi since the one-party regime presided by Hastings Kamuzu Banda came to an end in 1994.
The transition to multiparty democracy has been encouraging with the number of large political parties steadily growing and power peacefully changing hands between the four presidents, the country has known since 1994. In this context, the race to the 2019 elections is particularly competitive. The most recent polls place voter intention for the outgoing president Peter Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at a near tie with the lead opposition candidate Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The MCP used to be the only authorized political party under Hastings Kamuzu’s rule. Its return to the forefront of voter intentions signals important changes in the landscape of political actors in Malawi.
This paper explores some of the reasons behind this changing political landscape. It looks at the DPP’s recent loss of support due to discontent with rampant corruption and a controversial land reform passed in 2016. It also examines the landscape of challengers, including the current Vice President Saulos Chilima, following his departure from DPP ranks to form a new political movement, the United Transformation Movement (UTM). Given the diversity of large political parties in contention, which also includes Atupele Muluzi’s United Democratic Front (UDF) and Joyce Banda’s People’s Party (PP), the possibility of securing victory in the 2019 presidential election may rest on the ability of political parties to form strategic electoral alliances. This may require moving past political parties formed solely around the personality and identity of their leaders to a more issue-based political debate.
For full access to Malawi: The Road to the 2019 Tripartite Elections. Reflections on Corruption, Land and Multiparty Politics, kindly follow the link.
Cette étude compare les niveaux de sécurité et d'accès à la justice dans 4 villes de Guinée à partir de données de sondage récoltées en 2018.
Ce rapport réalise un portrait des quatre villes majeures – Kindia, Kankan, Labé et N’Zérékoré – de la province guinéenne et analyse les questions liées à la sécurité publique et l’accès à la justice tout en traitant l’insécurité présentes dans les quatre villes. L’objectif est de prendre connaissance des problèmes de sécurité rencontrés par les résidents de ces villes en amont de l’introduction de la police de proximité dans deux d’entre elles : Kindia et Kankan. Le rapport se livre donc à un exercice diagnostic qui doit permettre de mieux assister la police locale dans le renforcement de ses capacités et sa stratégie. Ensuite, une étude de l’accès à la justice dans ces mêmes quatre villes sera menée dans la perspective de l’installation ou du renforcement des Maisons de justice dont le mandat est d’améliorer l’information sur la justice, guider la population dans un système qui leur paraît trop souvent compliqué et opaque, et offrir des services de médiation aux parties qui le souhaitent.
Pour accéder au rapport, Quatre villes provinciales de guinée: de la sécurité à l’accès à la justice, veuillez suivre le lien.
IDLO has produced a practitioner brief which is part of its series on "Navigating Complex Pathways to Justice: Engagement with Customary and Informal Justice Systems” to advance policy dialogue and distil lessons from programming and research but also to help strengthen customary and informal justice systems as an integral part of providing access to justice for all. This Practitioner Brief offers a set of concrete tools, recommendations and good practices to support engagement with customary and informal justice systems.
For full access to the practitioner brief, Engagement with Customary and Informal Justice Systems, kindly follow the link.
You can also have access to their policy and issue brief on the same topic, Engagement with Customary and Informal Justice Systems, by kindly following the link.
Dernière analyse d'une série de cinq éclairages publiés par l'IRIS et le GRIP sur le concept d'armée européenne, cette recherche s'attarde sur les éléments qui permettent de former une armée, à savoir : un budget conséquent, des ordres clairs, des équipements efficaces et une organisation industrielle et technologique capable de les fabriquer. C’est tout cela à la fois qu’il faudra réunir afin de donner corps au rêve d’une armée européenne.
Pour accéder à la publication, Une armée européenne sous quelle forme ?, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le « Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières » a été adopté à Marrakech les 10 et 11 décembre 2018, à l’issue de 18 mois de consultations et de négociations.
Il est présenté comme le premier accord des Nations unies sur une approche globale des migrations internationales dans toutes ses dimensions. S’il vise à devenir la pierre angulaire d’une gouvernance mondiale des migrations, souhaitée par la communauté internationale, il se heurte pourtant à des priorités nationales contradictoires en fonction des enjeux migratoires de chaque État, au gré d’une opposition entre Nord et Sud, pays d’origine et pays de destination.
Le pacte illustre par ailleurs une évolution des objectifs de la gouvernance mondiale des migrations, originellement placés, dans le contexte d’après-guerre, sous le signe de la protection des droits humains. Avec le tournant des années 1990 et la fin des régimes communistes, les migrations ont été perçues comme un risque pour la stabilité et la sécurité des États. Les Nations unies ont alors renouvelé leur approche en soulignant plutôt l’apport positif des migrations comme facteur de développement. En mettant l’accent sur les coûts et les bénéfices des flux migratoires, cette approche peut s’accorder aussi aux politiques de contrôle des frontières et de lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière des pays du Nord.
Les instruments de la gouvernance mondiale des migrations illustrent cette évolution. L’approche fondée sur les droits a abouti à la Convention internationale de 1990 sur la protection des droits des travailleurs migrants, limitée par le refus des pays du Nord de la ratifier. Près de trente ans plus tard, le pacte mondial sur les migrations poursuit une démarche plus pragmatique. Le texte est juridiquement non contraignant. Il reflète une préférence pour des instruments de soft law , capables de répondre à des problématiques de manière plus ciblée et flexible.
L’enjeu du pacte dépasse les seules questions migratoires et touche au rôle de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) dans un contexte de remise en cause du multilatéralisme. L’approche managériale des migrations promue par le pacte permet à l’ONU de jouer un rôle d’appui technique aux États sur une base volontaire. Cela conduit également à une évolution de différences agences, en conférant un rôle central à l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM).
Pour accéder à la publication, Le pacte de Marrakech: Vers une gouvernance mondiale des migrations?, veuillez suivre le lien.
“Nigeria has been ravaged by a two-decade old insurgency led by Boko Haram” says Dr. Fatima Akilu, a psychologist, author, former government official, now Director of the Neem Foundation, and a member of the global Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL).
“Though based mainly in the north eastern part of the country, they have been able to carry out attacks in many other cities across the country. More than 20,000 people have been killed, thousands abducted and in excess of 2 million displaced in the North East and thousands more across the country. Resources meant for development have had to be used to quell the insurgency and we have one of the largest humanitarian response needs in the world currently. Many children have been separated from caregivers, their education and means of livelihood truncated.”
The devastation in Nigerian communities is matched by the overcrowded prisons where thousands of Nigerians – mainly men – reside. They are suspected of belonging to Boko Haram, the insurgent group renowned for waging a war against ‘Western education’ and claiming to uphold strict Islamic values. Years into Boko Haram’s terrorism, Nigeria’s military failed to stop the murders, abductions, and extremist ideology. In 2012 the government of Goodluck Jonathan adopted a new ‘soft approach’ of deradicalization. Dr. Akilu was appointed to run the country’s first official counter-extremism program.
A psychologist and an author who writes children’s books with an educational theme, Akilu developed and integrated deradicalization and prevention programs across the prison service and the ministry of education. Akilu spoke to ICAN’s Aya Nader about how extremism affects women in her country, discussed rehabilitation and reintegration of extremists, and shared what motivates her to keep the fight for peace ignited.
To read the full article, Peace Heroes: How Nigerian Psychologist Fatima Akilu Rehabilitates Extremist Societies, please follow the link provided.
En 2019, l’Union africaine (UA) sera confrontée à de nombreux défis, alors que les conflits anciens et nouveaux parcourent tout le continent. International Crisis Group a ainsi identifié sept crises particulièrement aigües qui vont façonner l'année et le travail de l’organisation régionale qui doit aussi poursuivre ses réformes institutionnelles.
Pour accéder à l'article, Huit priorités pour l’Union africaine en 2019, veuillez suivre le lien.
La violence sexiste, et plus particulièrement la violence sexuelle, est devenue une arme ainsi que l’une des caractéristiques des conflits armés contemporains. Cet article traite de la protection des femmes dans les conflits armés et du rôle central qu’elles jouent dans le règlement des différends et dans la consolidation de la paix. Les expériences des femmes et des filles dans les situations de guerre et de conflit y sont décrites. On évoque également les obstacles auxquels se heurtent les femmes lorsqu’il s’agit de participer à la consolidation de la paix après un conflit, et on analyse la contribution des Nations unies à l’instauration de la paix dans le cadre de la résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité.
La protection des femmes dans les situations de guerre et de conflit est l’une des préoccupations prioritaires de la communauté internationale, qui leur assigne un rôle central dans la prévention des conflits, la consolidation et le maintien de la paix. Pourtant, les actes de violence délibérés – meurtres et sévices sexuels – à leur encontre se poursuivent sans relâche dans les conflits armés contemporains.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de l'article, Les femmes, la guerre, la consolidation de la paix et la reconstruction, veuillez suivre le lien.
The 6 February peace accord between the Central African Republic (CAR) government and 14 recognised armed groups is the eighth such agreement since the country descended into violence in 2012.
It came after 10 days of talks in Khartoum, building on more than two years of intense negotiations under the African Union (AU) Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR. The AU initiative prevailed over all other parallel efforts and finally united them in one single process. Armed groups control about 80% of the country.
Although this agreement is a diplomatic success for the AU and its partners, some are sceptical about its viability. How is it different from the previous seven deals, and from the half-dozen major agreements signed since the 1997 Bangui Accord?
Learn more about the paper Will the latest Central African Republic peace deal hold? by following the link provided.
Les divisions au sein des instances dirigeantes empêchent le gouvernement tunisien de relever les défis politiques et socioéconomiques auxquels il est confronté. Dans cet extrait de l'alerte précoce 2019 à l’intention des décideurs européens (Watch List), Crisis Group appelle l’UE à soutenir certaines mesures afin d’éviter une polarisation accrue.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de l'article, Tunisie : 2019, année charnière ?, veuillez suivre le lien.
State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Committed by Armed Non-State Actors in its Territory
As a general fact, a state is only responsible for its own acts. But there are exceptional circumstances in which the conduct of an Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA) will invoke a state's responsibility.
The author, Tatyana Eatwell, explores various scenarios, including situations where an ANSA operates independently of any state and controls territory. She acknowledges that these situations of de facto control over a territory by an ANSA give rise to a protection gap where victims of human rights violations committed by the ANSA are left without recourse to remedy.
The author, therefore, concludes that in situations of armed conflict, the state’s loss of control over part of its territory will give rise to a protection gap with respect to the substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed under international human rights law (IHRL), and not protected under IHL.
To access the full paper State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Committed by Armed Non-State Actors in its Territory, please follow the link provided.
Beyond Social Pressure and Institutional Barriers: The Role of Women in Decision-Making in Guinea-Bissau
This report developed by Voz di Paz - Initiative for Peacebuilding and Interpeace wants to show the true picture of women involved in decision-making in Guinea-Bissau. It aims to contribute to a better understanding of women’s situation in this domain, and to document the issue in all its complexity and comprehensiveness, complementing previous analyses.
The participative and inclusive approach of this research offers new perspectives based on an intense series of interactions with a diverse set of key actors, including participants who either create, reproduce, fight against or suffer as a result of the limited participation of women in decision-making. The interviews provided the population of Guinea-Bissau with a unique opportunity to speak out, engage with each other, analyse and look for tentative solutions about this topic that concerns all Bissau-Guineans. It aims to function as a mirror reflecting various aspects of the actual situation, with their limitations and possibilities.
To access the full paper Beyond Social Pressure and Institutional Barriers: The Role of Women in Decision-Making in Guinea-Bissau, please follow the link provided.
La mondialisation telle que nous la connaissons aujourd’hui n’est pas sans conséquence sur l’émergence des facteurs d’insécurité qui dominent le paysage politique. Ces facteurs, au nombre de quatre, ont déjà été identifiés par les chercheurs du Oxford Research Group à Londres* : la compétition accrue pour les ressources, la militarisation globale, le changement climatique, et la marginalisation d’une large partie de la population mondiale.
Ces facteurs méritent non seulement d’être répertoriés, mais aussi additionnés. Ils sont tellement interconnectés qu’il serait inapproprié de les dissocier. Ce rapport développe la question de la compétition féroce pour l’accès aux ressources, en zoomant sur la situation qui prévaut sur le continent africain, un échantillon représentatif d’une situation qui se généralise. Cette course effrénée aux énergies fossiles et richesses minières mobilise les faiseurs de guerres, fait parler la poudre, donc contribue à la militarisation (2e facteur). Cette militarisation – qui est une tendance lourde – tire profit de l’extraction des ressources, attise de nouvelles convoitises et accélère d’autant le dérèglement climatique (3e facteur), dont le chaos risque à son tour de déclencher l’intervention de forces armées. Ce « climate change » constitue à son tour un multiplicateur de menaces, en raison de l’interaction explosive entre super-extractivisme et crise climatique. Mais ces deux facteurs, sur fond de militarisation et d’exclusion, s’imbriquent aux deux autres. L’acharnement pour s’approprier les matières premières et minerais stratégiques par la violence des prédateurs appauvrit les démunis. Pire encore, il accélère le processus de marginalisation d’une partie croissante des populations dans le monde, contribue à l’exclusion politico-économique (4e facteur), qui se manifeste à travers la prolifération des déplacés, des réfugiés (climatiques ou non) et d’États fragiles, dont 8 sur 12 se situent sur le continent africain. Ce « rideau de fer des inégalités », selon l’expression d’Amartya Sen**, suscite en ricochet des dérives militaristes, y compris les mesures contestables de sécurisation.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de l'article, L'Afrique des minerais stratégiques - Du détournement des richesses à la culture de la guerre, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le Traité INF (Intermediate nuclear forces, ou forces nucléaires intermédiaires ) est le traité de désarmement qui a mis fin à la crise des « euromissiles » dans les années 1980, une période de tension dans les relations Est-Ouest, marquée par déploiement de missiles soviétiques SS‑20 et Pershing II des deux côtés du rideau de fer. Il interdit aux signataires la possession, la production et les tests de missiles de croisière et balistiques ayant une portée comprise entre 500 et 5 500 kilomètres. Ces limitations s’appliquent aux missiles sol-sol, mais pas aux missiles embarqués à bord des navires de surface, des sous-marins ou des aéronefs. Le Traité couvre à la fois les missiles équipés de têtes nucléaires et conventionnelles. À l’été 1991, ses signataires avaient rempli leurs obligations puisqu’ils avaient démantelé tous les systèmes ciblés par le Traité. À ce stade, 1 846 missiles avaient été retirés du côté de l’Union soviétique et 846 du côté des États-Unis).
Le 1er février 2019, le président Trump a annoncé que les États-Unis se retiraient du Traité signé en 1987. Le lendemain, le gouvernement russe, par l’intermédiaire du ministre des Affaires étrangères Lavrov, a lui aussi annoncé la suspension de l’application du Traité, qui prendra donc fin en août 2019.
La fin de ce Traité est significative parce que le (re-)déploiement des systèmes visés rend le jeu de la dissuasion moins lisible et plus risqué mais également parce qu’il confirme le démantèlement progressif du régime de gestion des armements nucléaires hérités de la Guerre froide.
Afin d'accéder à l'intégralité de l'article, Fin du traité INF, fin du désarmement, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le problème du contrôle des groupes de vigilance en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone : Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Sénégal
En Afrique, les groupes de vigilance varient énormément dans l’espace et le temps. Généralement, on explique l’émergence des groupes de vigilance par une aggravation assez intolérable et persistante de l’insécurité. Ils suppléent ainsi les carences de l’État dans les zones peu ou mal desservies par la police publique.
Ainsi à travers eux, ce sont les populations directement touchées par des crimes spécifiques qui s’approprient leurs problèmes et génèrent une entité chargée de les résoudre. Ces groupes permettent en outre de rendre disponible le bien collectif qu’est la sécurité à des populations qui en sont dépourvues. C’est une sécurité privée pour les couches défavorisées de la société.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de la publication, Le problème du contrôle des groupes de vigilance en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone : Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Sénégal, veuillez bien vouloir suivre le lien.
Libya has struggled to remain unified since the Arab uprising in 2011 and the ouster of Muammar Qaddafi eight months later. During the chaos of an unraveling regime, armed groups proliferated, and Islamism emerged as a powerful new political force. In Libya’s first democratic election, voters largely opted for a secular government. But the transition was undermined by rivalries among secular parties, Islamists and independents coupled with escalating clashes among the new militias.
Follow the link to access the full Libya timeline Since Qaddaffi's Ouster.
Clarification of international humanitarian law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups is also crucial.
Military operations are taking place with increasing frequency in densely populated areas. In order to protect civilians, it is imperative that armed forces and groups comply with the rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, including the rule of proportionality.
Proportionality assessments before or during an attack must determine whether the expected harm will be caused by the attack, and whether that harm could be expected (that is, was it reasonably foreseeable).
Belligerents should develop methodologies so that those planning and deciding attacks are provided with all necessary information on expected incidental harm, and to assist them in assigning weight to the incidental harm to be considered.
If it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be contravened, the attack in question must be cancelled or suspended. Clarification of the law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups, inculcated by their leaders, is also crucial.
To read more about the paper Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment, please follow the link provided.
The institutional reforms put forth in the October 2016 Conakry Agreement have a long history in Guinea-Bissau. They are unavoidable and will have to be implemented sooner or later. In order to facilitate discussions on these reforms among political actors and in civil society, the Institute for Security Studies, at the request of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), has developed a series of policy briefs on constitutional reform, as well as on reforms to political party legislation, electoral laws, the justice sector, and the defence sector and security. This note discusses the main recommendations.
To have full access to the publication Which institutional reforms for Guinea-Bissau?, kindly follow the link.
Report by the Secretary General on the OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R)
In today’s world of complex and interdependent security challenges within and across borders, national security sectors need to adapt to fast-changing and unpredictable environments. Experience shows that an accountable, effective and inclusive security sector with full respect for human rights, including gender equality and the rule of law can effectively provide security to a State and its people, while at the same time promoting stability, trust and confidence in the OSCE area and beyond. This is of particular relevance when the threats being dealt with are neither unique to any State nor confined to a particular region. This is the case, for instance, with violent extremism that leads to terrorism, organized crime, the return of foreign fighters, and trafficking in human beings. Therefore, participating States need to be properly equipped and prepared, and must work together and share national experiences. Additionally, this will significantly contribute to preventing the outbreak and recurrence of conflicts, as well as to sustaining peace and supporting sustainable development.
A more coherent and co-ordinated approach to SSG/R support would mean taking full advantage of our available tools and expertise by placing greater emphasis on good governance, strengthening co-operation across all three dimensions of security, making more efficient use of limited available resources, and enabling increased co-ordination with other actors in this field. National ownership and leadership must be front and centre. The Organization would benefit from an increased recognition among participating States and Partners for Co-Operation that SSG/R is an integral part of the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, and, ideally, from their providing the executive structures with guiding principles on how to best support nationally led SSG/R processes.
To have access to the full report, Report by the Secretary General on the OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R), kindly follow the link.
Nearly a decade after the Arab uprisings, tempers in the outlying regions of the Maghreb are on the boil. Scarred by a history of states’ neglect, with poverty rates often more than triple that of urban areas, these frontiers of discontent are being transformed into incubators of instability. Bitterness, rage, and frustration directed at governments perceived as riddled with abuses and corruption represent a combustible mix that was brewed decades ago, leading to the current hothouse of discord and tumult. Into the vacuum of credible state institutions and amid illicit cross-border flows of people and goods, including arms and drugs, militancy and jihadist recruitment are starting to take root, especially among restless youth. The center of gravity for this toxic cocktail is the Maghreb’s marginalized border areas—from Morocco’s restless northern Rif region to the farthest reaches of the troubled southern regions of Algeria and Tunisia. Governmental response has been parochial with an overemphasis on heavy-handed security approaches that often end up further polarizing communities and worsening youth disillusionment. At a time when governments are playing catch up against a continually shifting terror threat—and with the menace of returning Maghrebi fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya—the disconnect between the state and its marginalized regions threatens to pull these countries into a vicious cycle of violence and state repression. Breaking this spiral requires governments in the region to rethink their approach to their peripheral regions.
To have access to the full article, The Maghreb’s Fragile Edges, kindly follow the link.
De plus en plus clivant, le processus de décentralisation tunisien risque d’alimenter les tensions sociales et politiques. Pour qu’il tienne ses promesses de réduction des inégalités socio-régionales et d’amélioration des services publics, il doit faire l’objet d’un nouveau compromis prévoyant notamment le renforcement des services territoriaux de l’Etat.
Afin d'accéder à l'article, Décentralisation en Tunisie : consolider la démocratie sans affaiblir l’Etat, veuillez suivre le lien.
Au tournant des années 1980 et 1990, les Émirats arabes unis entamaient un revirement de stratégie, dessinant de nouvelles ambitions militaires. Cette Note d’Analyse revient sur les origines de ce pivotement et cherche surtout à identifier les moteurs ayant soutenu depuis pratiquement 30 ans la trajectoire du pays en matière de défense. L’attention est portée sur la lecture de la menace (l’Iran, principalement), sur les moyens mobilisés afin de soutenir les objectifs du pays (dépenses militaires, acquisitions d’armes), sur la réforme des armées, le développement des partenariats stratégiques et, enfin, sur les engagements militaires des EAU.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de l'article, Origine, moyens et manifestations des ambitions militaires des Émirats arabes unis, veuillez suivre le lien.
Long spared by the Sahel’s jihadi groups, Burkina Faso is now confronted with increasingly frequent and lethal attacks in its northern and eastern provinces. Whereas the armed forces have launched some operations to contain the jihadi incursion, there has also been a spontaneous proliferation of vigilantes to counter bandits in the hinterlands. This policy brief aims to examine the latent informalization of the state security apparatus and its impact on the political trajectory of the country. By resorting to the ‘rule standardization1’ thesis, I argue that while the pluralization of security institutions may apparently provide the biggest opportunity for Burkina Faso to contain the jihadi incursion, any failure from the government to keep this patchwork of (new) security providers under tight control is likely to contribute to the country’s political fragmentation. This will constitute a blow to the resilience that the ‘land of honest men’ has shown until now and add Burkina Faso to the list of Africa’s fragile states.
To read the full paper Burkina Faso at Crossroads, please follow the link provided.
The principle of local ownership of SSR will have little import if it is treated simply as a romantic and woolly concept. In practical terms it means that the reform of security
policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors.
The principle is misconstrued if it is understood to mean that there must be a high level of domestic support for donor activities. What is required is not local support for donor programmes and projects but rather donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors. The question for donor governments is not “how can we undertake SSR in partner countries?” but “how can we support local actors who want to undertake SSR in partner countries?”.
The principle does not preclude donors seeking to stimulate and encourage local interest in SSR. Nor does it preclude international actors putting pressure on governments whose security forces violate human rights. Nevertheless, the actual reform of the security sector must be shaped and driven by local actors.
To read the full publication, No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, please follow the link provided.
Cette Note d’Analyse s’attache à présenter les liens entre acteurs politiques et groupes armés non étatiques en Turquie.
Historiquement, tant les partis politiques que l’État central sont habitués à recourir aux services de groupes violents, avec lesquels ils définissent des modalités de collaboration plus ou moins durables. Mais, depuis le coup d’État manqué de juillet 2016, le risque d’affrontement entre groupes partisans paraît d’autant plus important que le gouvernement entretient une rhétorique clivante, qui polarise à l’extrême la société turque.
Afin d'accéder à l'intégralité de la publication, Groupes armés et acteurs politiques en Turquie, veuillez suivre le lien.
Après vingt mois d’affrontements, Yaoundé et les séparatistes campent sur leurs positions.
Entre la sécession voulue par les séparatistes et la décentralisation en trompe-l’œil que propose le gouvernement, des solutions médianes doivent être explorées pour conférer plus d’autonomie aux régions.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité du rapport, Crise anglophone au Cameroun : comment arriver aux pourparlers, veuillez suivre le lien.
Le 7 juillet 2017, Elayne Whyte Gómez, présidente de la conférence des Nations unies pour la négociation d’un instrument juridiquement contraignant visant à interdire les armes nucléaires, annonce l’adoption par 122 États du Traité sur l’interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN).
La dynamique de l’initiative humanitaire lancée en 2010 a donc permis l’arrivée d’une nouvelle norme dans la mosaïque de traités qui codifie les armes nucléaires. Vu le nombre d’États l’ayant signé et ratifié en quelques mois, l’entrée en vigueur du traité est envisagée pour la fin 2019 voire début 2020.
Le TIAN est la conséquence du non-respect par les États dotés de l’arme nucléaire de leur obligation de désarmement nucléaire. Son arrivée a fait l’objet de très nombreuses critiques de la part des États disposant d’armes nucléaires ou soutenant une politique de dissuasion nucléaire. Les principaux reproches sont que ce traité remettrait en cause le Traité de non-prolifération (TNP), serait incompatible avec des instruments comme le TICE ou encore ne serait pas en accord avec le système de garantie actuellement formulé par l’AIEA.
Comme toute nouvelle norme de droit, celle-ci dérange et est décriée. Pourtant, cette norme, qui vient combler un vide juridique, s’intègre non seulement aux traités existants (TNP, TICE) et futur (TIPMF) mais vient surtout assurer la sécurité internationale en renforçant le droit international humanitaire et en mettant en oeuvre ce processus de désarmement nucléaire.
Le Traité sur l’interdiction des armes nucléaires, qui est un traité dit "de désarmement humanitaire", offre une opportunité de faire travailler les États ensemble pour parvenir à ce monde sans armes nucléaires. Poursuivre une politique de refus et d’ignorance de son existence serait tout simplement un non-sens et une porte ouverte à la remise en cause de toute l’architecture internationale de sécurité.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de la publication, Le Traité sur l'interdiction des armes nucléaires, veuillez suivre le lien.
L’augmentation des attaques des groupes terroristes au Sahel, couplée aux défis transfrontaliers tels que le trafic de drogues, le trafic d’êtres humains, les migrations et les déplacements de population, ont provoqué un ensemble de réponses sécuritaires tant régionales qu’internationales.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de la publication, Aperçu des réponses sécuritaires régionales au Sahel, veuillez suivre le lien.
Les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) ciblent l’éradication de l’extrême pauvreté d’ici à 2030. Pour autant, alors que les deux tiers du chemin restent à parcourir, près de 900 millions de personnes vivent encore avec moins de deux dollars par jour et, dans les pays les plus pauvres du monde, les progrès sont au point mort.
On appelle généralement «États fragiles» des pays qui ne parviennent pas à surmonter les fléaux tels les conflits et la corruption. Leurs gouvernements sont souvent dépourvus de la légitimité et des capacités qui leur permettraient d’offrir les emplois, les services publics et les opportunités auxquels aspirent leurs peuples. Les dernières estimations suggèrent que d’ici à 2030, la moitié des pauvres du monde vivront dans des pays qui sont fragiles.
Le présent rapport analyse les caractéristiques de la fragilité et se penche également sur certaines conséquences plus larges. Les recommandations de ce rapport correspondent à une nouvelle approche de la fragilité des États et de l’aide internationale.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité du rapport, Sortir du piège de la fragilité, veuillez suivre le lien.
Already three months into 2019, disturbing reports of intercommunal violence in central Mali and in north central Burkina Faso underscore the tragic reality that the Sahel remains locked in crisis.
• The increased activities of violent actors have rightly raised alarm among regional government officials who believe that the situation may worsen or even begin to destabilize the coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea.
To read the article, The Deteriorating Security Situation in Burkina Faso, kindly follow the link.
The Horn of Africa is undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security environment. A wide variety of international security actors—from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced a proliferation of foreign military bases and a build-up of naval forces. The external militarization of the Horn poses major questions for the future security and stability of the region.
This SIPRI Background Paper is the first of three papers devoted to the new external security politics of the Horn of Africa. The paper maps the growth of foreign military forces in and around the Horn over the past two decades. The other two papers in this series are ‘The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region’ (SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, April 2019) and ‘Managing the new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region’ (SIPRI Policy Brief, April 2019).
To have access to the full publication, The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa region, kindly follow the link.
Although peacebuilders seek out creative ways to build social cohesion, reform institutions, and change political incentives in fragile contexts, they rarely consider local entrepreneurs as possible entry points for change. This is despite the fact that entrepreneurs can – and do – substantially contribute to all these goals as part of their day-to-day activities.
This new IFIT publication examines the various ways such actors can contribute to peace and the conditions that need to be established for them to do so. It is premised on the idea that only inside-out change can bring sustainable peace to the most difficult contexts, and that entrepreneurs offer a uniquely scalable mechanism to drive such change from within.
The publication provides analysis, case studies and a set of practical recommendations on how to leverage entrepreneurs' potential, highlighting the important peacebuilding role such actors play.
To have access to the full publication, Entrepreneurs as Peacebuilders in Fragile States, kindly follow the link.
Le consentement de l’État hôte est une pierre angulaire du maintien de la paix des Nations unies, aux côtés de l'impartialité et du renoncement au recours à la force, sauf en cas de légitime défense. C’est une condition préalable à la création d’une mission. À défaut de consentement, rappelle la Doctrine Capstone, une opération de maintien de la paix risque de devenir une partie au conflit et « de s’éloigner de sa vocation première qui est de maintenir la paix »...
Pour consulter la publication, Maintien de la paix et consentement de l’état hôte : une équation fragile, veuillez suivre le lien.
Corée du Sud : au-delà de l’enjeu régional, un enjeu global (1/3) – Un développement vertigineux, une démocratie enracinée
Les tirs de missiles de courte portée effectués par la Corée du Nord samedi 4 mai montrent que les espoirs sur une prochaine dénucléarisation de la Corée du Nord sont loin d’être réalisés. Ils montrent également les limites de la stratégie de Trump. La Corée du Sud fait son maximum pour en limiter les conséquences négatives.
Pour accéder à l'intégralité de la publication, Corée : au-delà de l’enjeu régional, un enjeu global (1/3) – Un développement vertigineux, une démocratie enracinée, veuillez suivre le lien.
We are entering an era of hybrid opportunities and threats generated by the combination of artificial intelligence (AI) and other powerful dual-use technologies, with implications for nearly every aspect of daily lives. The convergence of AI and affective computing, cyber and biotechnologies, robotics and additive manufacturing raises complex global implications that are poorly understood, leaving the multilateral system with limited tools to anticipate and prevent emerging risks. At the same time, the spread of AI convergence across a wide range of States, non-State and transnational actors and entities means that the challenges of tomorrow must be addressed collectively and innovatively.
How can the multilateral system better understand and anticipate risks as AI convergence with dual-use technologies intrudes increasingly into the political, social, economic, and security spheres, creating new potential for systemic vulnerabilities and distributive inequalities? How can actors within the multilateral system build better anticipation and prevention capacities in the face of these risks?
This report is the first step in developing a common understanding of the emerging impacts of AI convergence on the United Nations’ prevention agenda. It provides: an analysis of current trends in AI convergence; scenarios that examine emerging opportunities and risks; principles to guide how innovation should be deployed responsibly by actors in the multilateral system; and a recommendation for a foresight capacity housed within the UN and shared across key communities.
Click the link provided to access the full report, The New Geopolitics of Converging Risks: The UN and Prevention in the Era of AI.
La mer rouge : nouvel espace d’enjeux de sécurité interdépendants entre les états du golfe et de la corne de l’Afrique
Historiquement, « l’Arabie heureuse » formait avec la Corne de l’Afrique un continuum tissé de diverses influences croisées. Cette région est un carrefour où s’affrontent les appétits d’empire et de conquête des puissances globales (Chine, Inde, États-Unis et Europe) et des pouvoirs régionaux voisins (Arabie saoudite/Émirats arabes unis alliés à l’Égypte versus le Qatar allié à la Turquie). L’objectif des pays du Golfe est récent – religieux pour les Saoudiens (années 1980) puis concurrentiel afin de contrer l’émergence du Qatar et son influence dans la Corne (années 2000). La guerre au Yémen et les rivalités politiques entre les monarchies de la péninsule, notamment lorsque la crise du Golfe éclate en juin 2017, rehaussent l’intérêt stratégique de la région pour les pays du Golfe. Par ailleurs, ces événements ont des conséquences directes sur la stabilité des États de la Corne. Cette note de recherche a pour but d’analyser l’enchevêtrement croissant des enjeux de sécurité Corne/Péninsule/Golfe et les intérêts économiques que suscite la Corne.
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USIP has been working with lawmakers and other reform constituencies in Haiti as they strive to reform Haiti’s criminal laws that date back to the early 19th century. In March
2009, USIP commissioned two reports that were written by Louis Aucoin, a professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and Hans Joerg Albrecht, the director of the Max Planck Institute of Foreign and International Criminal Law. At the request of Haitian lawmakers, USIP has also provided copies of the Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, a law reform tool developed by USIP’s Rule of Law Program to assist in the drafting of new laws.
While there has been a growing interest in customary justice systems among rule of law practitioners, it has remained very much at the margins of justice reform strategies. This session will challenge us to view customary justice and other forms of legal pluralism not as a side issue, but as a fundamental part of the justice landscapes in which we work. It will take a critical stance in reviewing the current range of overall policy approaches to legal pluralism and the preconceptions and assumptions that underlie those approaches. It will seek to identify and critically review how different approaches (rights-based, developmental, expanding access to justice, peace-building, state-building etc.,) tend to “frame the problem” when it comes to engagement with legal pluralism and will reflect specifically on how these approaches affect a range of key post conflict objectives. Finally it will consider the building blocks needed to define strategic objectives for engagement with legal pluralism.
This report reflects views expressed during a March 5, 2010, conference held at the National Defense University entitled “Monopoly of Force: The Link between DDR and SSR,” cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Center for Complex Operations. The conference sought to dispel the notion that there is no connection between disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). The conference determined that, in reality, DDR and SSR are interrelated and mutually reinforcing and should occur simultaneously in a holistic manner.
This paper maps the difficulties with operationalising the gender discourse described in the peace accord and post-conflict documents, which guide Burundi’s peace-building process, through local women’s narratives from the security forces. The author claims that due to limited international and local investment, the local women involved in the security forces initiate small practical changes by referring to their vision of femininity, while theoretically legitimising these demands by linking them to the international human rights discourse in order to survive in an overwhelmingly masculine arena. International organisations and donors’ focus on traditionally feminine and softer areas, such as reconciliation and reintegration programmes, together with local elites’ tendency to view gender as an ‘add-on’ contribute to this development.
For full access to the article, Security Sector Reform, Gender and Local Narratives in Burundi, please kindly follow the link.
In 2015, the Swedish National Contact Group for Security Sector Reform (NCSSR) conducted an SSR assessment of Ukraine on behalf of the Swedish government. Building on this experience, and on the report submitted to the Swedish government, the FBA has continued to work on mapping international support to SSR in Ukraine. This publication is a contribution to information-sharing and coordination in favour of an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent security sector in Ukraine.
Find out more about this mapping here.
The Security Sector Reform Assessment Framework by the Folke Bernadotte Academcy is intended to facilitate information gathering and analysis in support of decision-making, programming, monitoring and evaluation. While primarily based on Swedish conditions, the framework may serve as an outline for assessments carried out by other governments, institutions and organizations. As such, the FBA sees the framework as a living document, to be continuously updated and developed, and therefore encourages feedback on the material to improve future editions.
For full access to the Security Sector Reform Assessment Framework, kindly follow the link.
This publication questions the relevance of considering capacity development synonymous with training as knowledge transfer. It argues that, whilst capacity development can mean or include training, it should move beyond training as the default and include other activities such as building institutional capacities and engage with substantive and relational skills.