NATO

The Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Security Sector Reform Working Group held a workshop entitled “Gender & Security Sector Reform” from 17 to 19 February 2010. The workshop, hosted by DCAF, was an opportunity for thirty-six practitioners, researchers and policy advisors from sixteen NATO and PfP countries to discuss and exchange on ongoing efforts and challenges to integrating a gender perspective into SSR. The workshop focused on best practices and examples from the ground in both national and international security sector institutions, including NATO peace support operations, ministries of defence, and armed forces.

Why did Western European states agree to the enlargement of the EU and NATO? Frank Schimmelfennig analyzes the history of the enlargement process and develops a theoretical approach of 'rhetorical action' to explain why it occurred. While rationalist theory explains the willingness of East European states to join the NATO and EU, it does not explain why member states decided to admit them. Using original data, Schimmelfennig shows that expansion to the East can be understood in terms of liberal democratic community building. Drawing on the works of Jon Elster and Erving Goffman, he demonstrates that the decision to expand was the result of rhetorical action. Candidates and their supporters used arguments based on collective identity, norms and values of the Western community to shame opponents into acquiescing to enlargement. This landmark book makes an enormous contribution to theory in international relations and to the study of European politics.

Access full paper at http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item1170965/?site_locale=en_GB

The subject of learning lessons is fraught with difficulties, not least because lessons,like beauty, are often in the eye of the beholder. It has been the author’s experience that many lessons that are formally identified as such are not learned. The reasons for this are varied: those identifying the lessons may be biased; the resources to enable learning may be lacking; and the lessons simply may not “stick.” Nonetheless, those lessons that do become embedded in the human and organizational psyche are those that have created new doctrines, reshaped institutions, become an integral part of new training standards, and demonstrably shown an improvement in the conduct of business. NATO’s involvement in the Western Balkans over the past fifteen years has provided a rich vein of experience and has fomented considerable change. This article examines that experience and analyzes some of the major lessons that have been identified. Some will have been learned, while others have not; in some instances, the lessons that were identified will subsequently prove to be flawed. Throughout this analysis the paper will attempt to chart the metamorphosis of NATO from a passive Cold War military alliance to an active political and security actor on the world stage.

Access or download the full paper at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=eb06339b-2726-928e-0216-1b3f15392dd8&lng=en&id=122284

Recent years have seen protracted attempts to agree and then to consummate a durable strategic partnership between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the globalisation of security concerns and with the series of major terrorist attacks beginning on 11th September 2001, it has become increasingly difficult to rationalise a Cold War-style separation of the two organisations, with NATO offering ‘hard’ or military power, and the EU offering a ‘soft’ or civil alternative. There are compelling reasons to expect close collaboration between the two organisations: there is considerable overlap in membership; members of both organisations, new and old, are constrained in their defence spending and cannot maintain commitments to support two entirely separate multilateral military structures; and contemporary security challenges no longer respect institutional boundaries, if indeed they ever did. Furthermore, the simple proximity of the two organisations in Brussels creates a widespread expectation that the EU and NATO should be in constant dialogue on issues of mutual concern. It can only  appear inefficient and dysfunctional, for example, that the representative of a foreign government might visit one body but not the other, that NATO does not offer a conduit to the EU, and vice versa, and that the two organisations have not developed mutually reinforcing diplomatic positions. 

Collaboration between NATO and the EU has become an enduring theme in speeches and
statements concerning transatlantic security.

Access the full paper at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/eunatorelations_/eunatorelations_en.pdf

In the post-9/11 world, the United States (U.S.) has had to cope with “long wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is common between the cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts is that even after major combat operations ended, the military presence of multinational forces has not been scaled down as planned. In Afghanistan, the size of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been expanding. As post-conflict stabilization operations have not made smooth progress as anticipated, allies and coalition partners have to accelerate reform of the security sector including armed forces and police. With current realities of Afghanistan and Iraq flatly contradicting the prewar optimism  entertained by the Bush Administration, Western powers will have to stay engaged in postwar peacebuilding for some time.

In the post-9/11 world, the United States (U.S.) has had to cope with “long wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is common between the cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts is that even after major combat operations ended, the military presence of multinational forces has not been scaled down as planned. In Afghanistan, the size of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been expanding. As post-conflict stabilization operations have not made smooth progress as anticipated, allies and coalition partners have to accelerate reform of the security sector including armed forces and police. With current realities of Afghanistan and Iraq flatly contradicting the prewar optimism  entertained by the Bush Administration, Western powers will have to stay engaged in postwar peacebuilding for some time.

Access full paper at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2009/bulletin_e2009_5.pdf

This paper has been written from a practitioner’s perspective. The author spent 6 months embedded with the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) command team, spending hours in their company during its de-activation. Whether visiting KPC headquarters across the country; sitting in meetings at the highest echelons of Government; or accompanying the Commander and Deputy Commander to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ in Pristina, the author had unprecedented access and exposure at the heart of the organisation.

This is a draft report by Mr Dick Marty to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe on Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo.

The NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme is a defence capacity-building programme that aims to provide member states, partners and other states with tailored support to reduce the risk of corruption and enhance the understanding and practice of good governance in their defence establishments. This assessment examines the impacts achieved since the previous assessment was conducted in 2014. The assessment is based on statements of impact made in questionnaires completed by serving defence department officials of participating states. 

For full access to the report, Policy Impact Assessment Report on the NATO Building Integrity Programme, please follow the link.