Location: Southern Africa
Population: 16 million, with 52% women and 48% men (World Bank, 2016)
Capital: Harare, with 1.5 million (UN, 2015)
Area: 390,757 km2
Mineral wealth: Platinum, gold, asbestos, coal, nickel, iron, copper, lithium, emeralds, diamonds.
Local authorities: 31 urban authorities comprising cities, municipalities, town councils and town boards and 60 rural district authorities (UN 2012)
Languages: English (Official), Shona, Sindebele (major) and around 13 others.
Constitution: Constitution of Zimbabwe 22 May 2013.
Political System: Republic
GDP Growth Rate: 2.7% (World Bank, 2017)
GDP per Capita: 1029 USD (World Bank, 2016)
Most Productive Sectors: Agriculture, Mining, Financial Services and Telecommunications.
Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Line: 72.3% (World Bank 2011)
Literacy Rate, Adult Total Age 15 and Above: 91.3% (UN 2013)
External Debt: 8.9 Billion USD (UN 2013)
Ibrahim Index for African Governance 40/53 (2017)
Freedom House Index Not Free (2018)
Corruption Index 157/180 (Transparency International 2017)
Human Development Index 154/188 (Human Development Report 2016)
Table of contents
- Introduction and General Background
- Political Overview
- Current Political Context
- Security Sector Overview
- Security Sector Reform - Sectoral Overview
- Donor Relations
- Future Considerations
- Additional Readings
This country profile is also part of the ISSAT Case Study on the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme.
a) Cultural and Geographic Background
Zimbabwe’s capital is Harare. Located in southern Africa, Zimbabwe, formerly known as Southern Rhodesia and officially known as the Republic of Zimbabwe, is landlocked and bordered by Zambia, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique. The country covers 390,759 km2 across ten provinces: Harare, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Masvingo, Midlands, Bulawayo, Matebeleland South, and Matebeland North.
Of the 14 million people residing in Zimbabwe, almost 98% are related to the two major Bantu-speaking groups: the Shona (about 82% of the population) and the Ndebele (about 14%). There are 16 official languages , and English is also widely spoken.
b) Economic Background
Zimbabwe has been historically known for its agricultural and mineral wealth. Previously known as the “bread basket” of Southern Africa, it is rich in some 30 different mineral deposits dispersed throughout the country. According to the World Bank, Zimbabwe’s current potential economic strong points are its generous endowment of natural resources, an existing stock of public infrastructure, and comparatively well-skilled human resources.
In reality, Zimbabwe has struggled with a massive budget deficit and a very weak economy since the late 1980s. In 1991 the implementation of a structural adjustment programme by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Zimbabwe resulted in high unemployment, which in turn favoured the creation of a politicised trade union, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999.
The early 2000s saw a pending land reform agenda which materialised as a Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (FTLRP), in response to the crippling impact from the government-sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) of the 1990s. In 2001 Mugabe signed a Presidential decree “permitting expropriation of all White-owned farms without compensation.” This was a violent chapter in Zimbabwe’s recent history and had considerable impact on its economic, financial and foreign policy situation. By October 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that half of the country's population were food insecure, lacking enough food to meet basic needs.
The World Bank considers Zimbabwe to be a Low Income Country with approximately 72 percent of the country’s population living in chronic poverty, and 84 percent of Zimbabwe’s poor living in rural areas. Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic Product growth rate has been declining from a high of 11.9% to 2.8% in 2017. It is now projected to reach 3.4% in 2018 mainly on the back of improved performance of the agricultural sector as a result of weather improvement (Ministry of Finance, 2017; World Bank, 2017). Hyperinflation plagues all potential economic stability of the country adding to the mounting challenges due to the mismanagement of funds, natural resources and national infrastructure.
Pre-colonial Zimbabwe comprised a multi-ethnic society in the context of huge Southern Africa empires. These emerged strengthened by agricultural conditions, cattle-keeping, great mineral wealth and most significantly, both regional and long distance trade.
In the 1880s, the British arrived and Zimbabwe was referred to as Southern Rhodesia. It remained a British colony until 1964. During this period, natural resources and land were redistributed favouring European settlers, and marginalising the indigenous population. Several resurrections attempts were carried out but failed, and Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing British colony in October 1923.
After the Second World War, and due to shifting international political dynamics (including British Empire descent and other African independence movements), Southern Rhodesia’s white Prime Minister, Ian Smith, declared independence unilaterally in 1965. Neither the British nor the international community officially recognised the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Domestically, the declaration was strongly opposed by the two-wing African nationalist movements, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), formed in 1961 and 1963 respectively. This paved the way for a liberation war. The main actors of the armed conflict consisted of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of the ZANU party, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) of the ZAPU party, and the security forces of Ian Smith’s regime.
The end of hostilities was finally achieved in 1979, after key mediation by the British under a Commonwealth mandate. The Lancaster House Agreement transitioned the country towards the independent Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980. During the negotiations, the issues of land, transitional arrangements, cease-fire, and elections were discussed, yet no reference was made to reforming the security sector. In spite of this, the new independence Constitution provided clauses to remove the white minority's monopoly of control over various government sectors – including the military (Lalá 2009, Chitiyo 2009).
In February 1980, the first general elections post-independence were held and ZANU won the majority of seats (57/100). As a result Robert Mugabe became independent Zimbabwe’s first Prime Minister. However tensions remained between ZANU’s ZANLA and ZAPU’s ZIPRA. Perceived threats and resistance to Mugabe’s leadership led to a state-led operation aimed at clamping down dissent. Thousands of civilians (some estimates are as high as 20,000) were killed in Matabeleland during a series of massacres between 1983 and 1987 called the “Gukurahundi”.
On 22 December 1987 a unity pact was signed, ending the violence and forming the current Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF (Zakeyo, 2012) through merging ZANU and ZAPU. The ZANU-PF became the ruling party since then, led by Robert Mugabe, first executive President of Zimbabwe since 1987. Also during that year, a Constitutional reform abolished the ceremonial presidency and instated a presidential system with the President combining functions of Head of State, Head of Government and Commander in Chief of Armed Forces. Robert Mugabe went on to govern Zimbabwe between 1987 and November 2017, when it was removed from power through a “military assisted transition”.
Years 1998-2000 were a turning point for Zimbabwe. The 2000 elections, which were criticised widely for being fraudulent and for widespread violence, were run by 16 parties. However, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was the most successful and became quickly the main political actor of the opposition in Zimbabwe, and the only real competition for ZANU-PF. The election results denied ZANU-PF a Parliamentary majority for the first time since 1980. The MDC won 57 of the 120 elected seats, with 47% of the popular vote, and ZANU-PF won 63 seats carrying 43% of popular vote.
The 2008 elections marked the end of ZANU-PF’s one-party rule. Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-T President) secured more votes than Mugabe in the first round of the presidential race, triggering the highest level of political violence since a decade. The results of the run-off secured President Mugabe’s rule, but the tension and unrest did not subside. South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mediated a power-sharing agreement between the ZANU-PF and the MDC. The outcome was the signing of a Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the parties, and the creation of Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity (GNU) on 15 February 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2013).
Zimbabwe was governed through the ZANU-PF controlling the key functions of the State from 1987 till 2008. As a result, the Government of National Unity faced many challenges between 2008 and 2013. Notwithstanding the GPA provisions that recognised the MDC as partner in the inclusive government, the state security sector remained opposed to the coalition government (Chitiyo, 2009). This show of resistance to the opposition goes back to 2002 when security chiefs made public statements that they would not acknowledge or support “politicians without liberation war credentials” (Chitiyo, 2009; Noyes, 2013; Hendricks and Musavengana, 2010).
The National Unity Government was able to achieve some important advances. A National Security Bill was passed in March 2009, establishing a National Security Council. Also that year, the coalition approved the Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP), which set out a road map for stabilising and reconstructing Zimbabwe’s key agricultural, mining, manufacturing and tourism sectors. Furthermore, a referendum held in March 2013 approved a new Constitution that was implemented in May 2013. It contained provisions for constitutional change including a wider bill of rights with socio-economic rights, mandatory sharing of executive powers between the cabinet and the president, guidelines outlining the conduct of security services, and a series of provisions for internal control and external oversight over state institutions. The approval of the new Constitution was key to providing entry-points for upcoming reforms.
On 31 July 2013, elections were held and the country was commended for a “broadly peaceful election day”. However, results were postponed, and international pressure had to be applied for their earlier release (Ban, 2013). Mugabe was re-instated as President, ZANU-PF won a two-thirds majority in the parliament, and the power-sharing agreement came to an end, amidst speculation about the legitimacy of electoral results.
On 14 November 2017, units from the Zimbabwe Defence Forces deployed onto the streets of Harare, seizing control of key locations. Although the military leadership denied it was a coup, President Robert Mugabe was placed under house arrest, and subsequently a number of his key associated political and security figures were detained. On 19 November, Mugabe was formally removed by the party as ZANU-PF leader, and, under pressure, resigned as President on 21 November. Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former Vice-President whom Mugabe had fired in the previous days leading up to the transition, was sworn in as President on 24 November.
In the immediate aftermath of these events, numerous international and domestic observers expressed a hope for a change in the political climate of Zimbabwe. The European Union noted “high expectations” for reform, and the possibility for an opening up of governance in Zimbabwe. Civil society organisations called for greater transparency and inclusivity, especially with regard to press freedom and human rights.
The formal security sector of Zimbabwe consists of several actors, including:
- Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF),
- Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)
- Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS)
- Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), an agency directly underneath the Office of the President, and currently still outside the legislative framework.
In addition to the above, Zimbabwe has active
- Private security companies
- Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA)
- ZANU-PF Youth League
Since 2000, the security sector has contributed to a generally hostile political landscape and to the insecurity of citizens especially during pre-election stages. The partisanship of the leadership of the security forces’ permeates the entire security apparatus and manifests itself inter alia in the use of violence against opposition supporters and the criminalisation of those actors. Throughout the last decade, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) that includes the CIO, leaders of the ZDF and the ZPS, and other high-ranking ZANU-PF members have been known to engage in violent campaigns to suppress opposition, and CSO voices, so as to “guarantee ZANU-PF success” proceeding elections (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Impunity for crimes committed by members of the security forces is common, and there seems to be a lack of internal disciplinary action, coupled with an absence of effective external oversight, which impedes the prevention of further violence (Chitiyo, 2009; Noyes, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013).
The Global Political Agreement barely addressed issues of security and justice reforms. However, the ruling phase of the Government of National Unity provided a space, for the first time, for dialogue to emerge around potential pillars for future Security Sector Transformation (SST). Entry-points for such process could possibly be found in the National Security Bill approved in March 2009, which established the NSC to oversee the security forces. In addition, with the approval of the new Constitution, some ground has been gained in creating a legal framework that can potentially keep checks and balances on the different security actors.
Despite this a National Security Strategy and a National Defence Policy are not known, and if in existence, require revision to strenghten oversight and transparency, as well as to ensure that the country focuses primarily on human security in lieu of state security (Mwanaka, 2015). In addition, the regional security environment has changed over the years, and therefore an update of these policies would also contribute to improving performance and professionalisation of the defence and security forces. New dimensions of security require factoring-in such as for example the fact that despite the revised 2017 National Gender Policy the country does not have a National Action Plan to guide the implementation of the UN Resolution 1325, nor is being able to effectively tackle widespread gender based violence.
Zimbabwe has a unique security sector context given the fusion of three different rival armies (Rhodesian army, ZANLA and ZIPRA) into a unified armed force following independence. Whilst this was an entry-point for SSR in the post-Lancaster House Agreement period, provisions for restructuring were not institutionalised in a way that committed the new state to longer-term reform. For example, the lack of integrated policies tackling disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) favoured the reinforcement of a militarised mind-set in society. In addition, it strengthened interconnectedness and operational linkages between the security forces and the ruling party representing the state (Lalá, 2009). From the liberation war to the present, Zimbabwe’s security sector has swung between professionalism and politicisation. ZANU-PF’s rule was anchored in the liberation struggle, where a key principle prevailed that political ideology had to drive military action, although over time this principle suffered erosion. In addition, since independence ZANU-PF implemented a de facto one-party rule, which favoured the entrenchment of the symbiosis between the state, the party, and the security forces.
Following the 2017 military assisted transition, prospects for reform of the security sector appear mixed. While the change of power generated some ground for optimism, President Mnangagwa’s background – a key ally of Mugabe deeply entwined in politics and with the security apparatus over several decades – leaves many observers doubtful. Furthermore, Mnangagwa’s December 2017 State of the Nation address did not reference any specific security sector reforms to be undertaken beyond a general pledge to fight corruption and increase transparency. Given the symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean military, ZANU-PF and wider Zimbabwean government, reforming the security sector will be a key entry point for improving governance and human rights compliance in Zimbabwe.
Improving governance in Zimbabwe has been a consistent challenge since independence. In 2017, Zimbabwe was rated with 45.4 out of 100 in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and was ranked 157th of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, with only a handful of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa ranking below. A number of frameworks are in place but lack implementation and independent oversight to ensure that laws are respected. The CIO has been accused of human rights’ abuses against ZANU-PF’s political opponents, working closely with the riot police and the Police Internal Security Intelligence (PISI) in the ZRP to enforce state security. Many of the 25,000 ZRP have worked outside traditional policing tasks, despite their civil status. There is a high turnover with many personnel being relocated whenever recognised as being vocal about the militarisation of the police force (Chitiyo, 2009). The National Security Council Act 2009 provides a framework for oversight of national policies on security, defence and law and order, but lacks implementation, and the NSC has been inactive since the end of the National Unity Government.
Despite provisions in the GPA requiring state institutions to “remain non-partisan and impartial” (Article 13), no clause provided for security sector reform, nor for considering its implications in the context of constitutional review. Nevertheless, the 2013 Constitution contains a number of provisions that can be regarded as a significant first step in the creation of a framework for oversight at a higher level (Nyabeze, 2015). For example the 2013 Constitution provides for : a maximum threshold of two terms for Commanders of the Defence Forces or any of their branches; the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling complaints against members of the security services; emphasis on political neutrality of the Central Intelligence Organisation; proscription of the formation of armed militias and paramilitary groups outside the structures of established laws; and the prohibition of members of a security service from obeying an order that is manifestly illegal (Daily News, 2013). However, several years after the Constitution was signed into law, such provisions have continued to be ignored and bypassed regularly. The deficient implementation of the 2013 Constitution is thus illustrative of the significant challenges facing security and justice reforms in Zimbabwe.
In addition, the design and implementation of subsidiary Acts of Parliament to operationalise the new Constitution has been a slow moving process. From 2013 to 2017 the Government stalled the execution of Constitutional provisions, apart from passing two Bills through Parliament, which have not been made into Acts. Furthermore, in contravention to the spirit of the new Constitution, in July 2017 the Zimbabwean Parliament passed a constitutional amendment which granted the president additional powers to directly appoint the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice and the Judge President of the High Court. An apparent willingness of the Parliament to surrender oversight functions to the executive was a product of politics and a cause for major concern. However, in Mangagwa’s current dispensation a strong political discourse on anti-corruption has been prominent, favouring the role of oversight institutions, with for example the Parliament Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy summoning high ranking personalities to testify in their enquiry about missing diamond revenue.
Civil Society Organisations
Civil society performs watchdog functions such as following public opinion and trends, monitoring elections, political violence, and corruption. Numerous organisations exist that facilitate services in rural areas and ensure that those who are under-represented, such as the elderly, women and those impacted by HIV-AIDs are included in national dialogue on policies. The two entities that act as umbrellas for CSOs are the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations of Zimbabwe and The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.
Since the 2013 elections, CSOs have experienced a more flexible space to navigate in, including opportunities to enter into direct dialogue with the state. Examples of such interactions include dialogue during the drafting of the new Constitution in 2012 and 2013, and more recently, ZANU-PF’s engagement, to some level, with CSOs in preparation of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset).
Whilst CSOs have built their capacity and increased their visibility over the last few years, they face issues related to organisational management, transparency and accountability. Another weakness derives from their financial support being dependent on external donorfunding sources, and from being perceived as close allies of the opposition. Generally there is mutual mistrust between the state and CSOs, and there is a dearth of organisations working within an integrated SSR approach, although several work on compartimentalised human rights, legal reform, gender, justice, corrections and peacebuilding issues. An exception was the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPSP), which made inroads in creating space for multistakeholder dialogues around Security Sector Transformation. Such progress relied on the legitimacy and national ownership of the programme, but given lack of funding the ZPSP closed-down in early 2018, paradoxically in light of the beginning of the transition.
Prior to Mugabe’s exit from power in 2017, CSOs, under the banner of the ‘Platform for Concerned Citizens’ developed a plan for a post-Mugabe democratic transition overseen by a “National Transitional Authority”. The plan was superseded by the military assisted transition thatwas effective insofar as removal of Mugabe from power through non-violent means, but which left Zimbabwe awkwardly positioned with regard to democratic transition. The military intervention was subsequently declared to be entirely legal by the Zimbabwean High Court in a problematic ruling delivered by a judge who is a retired officcer. This compromised earlierConstitutional democratic advances and opened the possibility for further military intervention - particularly in light of the 2018 elections – to be legalised and legitimised.
The justice sector faces numerous key tensions and challenges that currently lie in the discrepancy between adequate legislation and corresponding implementation. Difficulties arise mainly in the inefficient administration of the legislative measures and criminal procedures. For example, 30% of prisoners are pre-trial detainees,indicating a clear marker of the inefficacy of the system, when coupled with. unacceptable detention conditions and violation of human rights. Capacity is another challenge with the justice sector suffering from severe funding shortages and high turnover of human resources. A lack of neutrality has been observed in particular in politically related cases, or in those involving high-ranking personalities and this prevails inkey justice delivery institutions such as the judiciary, the police, and the Attorney General’s office, with rulings affected by political dynamics hindering the delivery of justice (Chimbga, 2014). Mirroring this the World Justice Project 2018 ranks Zimbabwe 108th of 113 for rule of law, also entailing with low scores for judicial oversight.
Certain CSOs facilitate capacity building and the delivery of justice and reconciliation services. This is in addition to the prominent role played by traditional chiefs in delivering justice. Much of the population lacks means to access state institutions due to social, geographical or financial constraints. Traditional courts continue to hold a strong position in Zimbabwean society and exist alongside formal state structures. Customary law adapts over time and depending on context. However, the coexistence of formal and informal justice systems poses challenges. An example is where constitutional provisions for general law are not the same as customary law for marriage, where a woman has the right to opt out (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014). A prevailing challenge refers to state institutions capacity to hone in on customary law and traditions, and harness the status and power of traditional chiefs to implement general law that respects international human rights standards over time.
A disputed topic within discussions around justice in Zimbabwe is the issue of accountability and trial for past crimes. Mugabe proposed not to put Rhodesian soldiers who were involved in the massacres of Nyaadzonia and Chimoio under trial. Later, the GNU provided for the creation of the National Organ for Healing and Reconciliation to carry out healing and justice-related initiatives in light of past events, but it was never implemented. Subsequently the 2013 Constitution provided forthe establishment of a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) to deal with transitional justice. Suggestions have been made that establishing the NPRC would compound agreements made in the past during the early years of the state of Zimbabwe.
Yet, in a positive development in February 2018 the NPRC began working following the appointment of a new Chairperson, and opened hearings into the Gukurahundi massacres. However, concerns remain as to the prospects for justice being realised, given the involvement of several high-ranking ZANU-PF officials, currently serving in Government. The legacy of systematic human rights abuses continues to loom large over the society and the justice sector in Zimbabwe, fueling perceptions of an entrenched ‘culture of impunity’ among those in power.
The NPRC – in common with several other national commissions: the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and Judicial Services Commission – continues to suffer from underfunding.
The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is one of the key national institutions that impact the lives of the Zimbabwe People on a daily basis. Police reform was discussed during negotiations on the Draft Constitution, including the creation of an anti-corruption police body to effectively help curb this malpractice given the dismal record of Police performance in this area.
According to the Police Act, members of the ZRP are not allowed to take part in politics and act out of partisanship. Ahead of the 2013 general elections, concerns were raised over police reform and police preparedness, given that the police had repeatedly failed to prevent violence escalation in 2008. The African Union Commission’s report recommendations on Zimbabwe’s 2013 elections, made explicit references to the role of the police in facilitating free and fair elections.
The ZRP stated approach to community policing includes the existence of Community Relations Liaison Officers (CRLO) based in all police stations, and responding to a District Community Relations Liaison Officer. The CRLO attend Crime Consultative Committee Meetings (other participants are businessmen, government officials, teachers, school heads, traditional leaders), carry out crime and social awareness campaigns, participate in recruitment and training of Neighbourhood Crime Watch Committees, provide advice on social matters, and deal with reports of sexual offences. This multi-pronged community policing strategy is complemented by the so-called ‘Home Officer’ scheme, in which a police officer is assigned to a particular policing area, to work with the community to develop specific strategies to combat localised crime. Positive developments are reportedly occurring within the realm of community policing, with a number of cases over the years where the police have engaged with civil society, particularly at the provincial and district level. It remains to be seen if isolated incremental episodes of cooperation will become the norm, and how decentralization of police services will be configured going forward, as well as how formal policing will interface with informal security arrangements.
Following the 2017 military assisted transition, several senior police officials were retired, and a new Commissioner General – Godwin Matanga – appointed, replacing Augustine Chihuri, who had held the post since 1994. Matanga has acknowledged the existence of widespread corruption in the police force – which can itself be regarded as a progressive move – and pledged to resurrect the defunct National Force Development Committee and strengthen the inspectorate unit. Significantly - from the perspective of citizen-police relations - Matanga also acknowledged the blight of police harassment of motorists, a major reason for Zimbabwe’s low ranking (102nd of 107 countries) on the IPSA Police Index. This has been matched by a decreasing rate of human rights abuses by the Police since November 2017, partially due to their removal from the streets. Whether these are temporary improvements or the beginning of a overhaul in police practice remains to be seen.
During the guerrilla war, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces were provided with training principally by the Soviet Union and China, Cuba and the German Democratic Republic as well as several African countries including Libya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia. After independence the new ZANU(PF) government turned to North Korea to provide the training for the infamous Fifth Brigade which was engaged in the Gukurahundi Operation. Zimbabwean soldiers continued to be trained by China and North Korea, alongside the legacy of British military professional training (Hendricks and Musavengana, 2010).
Despite the display of politicisation at home, the Zimbabwean military is generally seen as a positive contributor to peace support operations, even if significantly behind regional peers such as Zambia and South Africa. The country also provides peacekeeping officers from the ZRP and the ZPCS who were/are seconded to the UN for various missions including AMISOM, UNMIL, and UNMISS. On a positive note it exceeds the UNDPKO minimum requirement for number of woman peacekeepers, which reached around 41% in December 2014 (Dzinesa, 2015).
Whilst a motive of honour for the Zimbabwean defence forces, one of the most controversial issues around their behaviour relates to the intervention made in the DRC starting in 1998 and spanning over a number of years. At the time the military mission was contested internally, given the budget deficit and the shortage of external funding. Allegations have been made that the ruling ZANU-PF leadership diverted resources from basic public health towards state security benefits, and the enrichment of a selected few. In the end, the peacekeeping mission became an example of how the military looked for alternative sources of revenue, through exploring the concessions on extractives awarded to the Zimbabwe state by Laurent-Désiré Kabila (Dietrich, 2000). Over time, the connections of the military to mining abroad and at home have built powerful personal networks of patronage and influence (Maley, 2015; Global Witness, 2012). As such, the interaction between the political elite, the security apparatus and the extractive industry indicates the existence of defence forces with capacity to “enable” or “spoil” the country’s transition in the years to come (Chitiyo, 2009, Zimbabwe Democracy Institute Report 2017, Global Witness 2017).
Following the 2017 transition, the military continues to be the decisive player in Zimbabwean politics. Having positioned itself as the ‘guardian’ of Zimbabwean independence through the liberation war, the military has continued to involve itself in all areas of governance and acts as a gatekeeper to the executive branch.
President Mnangagwa’s appointment of a number of top generals to his cabinet, including the former Chief of Defence staff to Vice-President, the former Head of the Air Force to Minister of Agriculture, and a former General as Minister of Foreign Affairs suggests that the status quo of military involvement in Zimbabwean electoral politics will not be challenged by the new administration.
At the same time, whilst 69% of Zimbabweans disapprove or “strongly disapprove” of military rule Zimbabweans deposit a high degree of trust in the armed forces, with 64% trusting the army “somewhat” or “a lot”. Paradoxically, whilst 49% believe the army is professional and respects citizens’ rights,73% do not feel free to criticize the military (Afrobarometer Dispatch 195 (20/3/18).
In 2016, the Armed Forces manpower was below 30,000 (25,000 Army, 4,000 Air Force), despite a relatively high proportion of GDP (2.5%, compared to an average of 1.5% across Sub-Saharan Africa) being spent on defence.
The European Union and other international donors partially lifted sanctions in November 2014, and continued their policy of reengagement with the government of Zimbabwe, demonstrated, amongst others, through Belgium’s interest in buying Zimbabwe diamonds, as a manifestation of normalisation of relations.
With the increase of multilateral engagement a multi-donor support programme for the Parliament and for the Office of the Auditor General was launched on 8 May 2015, in a bid to contribute to alignment of legislation to the provisions of the 2013 Constitution.
The United Nations support to Zimbabwe is set out in the Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework, being implemented between 2016 and 2020, and from a total budget of $1.6bn, $73.8m have been allocated to governance-related programming, focusing on the public sector
The World Bank initiated a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment in October 2017, in order to assess viability of support provision to strengthen Zimbabwe’s Public Finance Management System.
The European Union continues to support justice programming in Zimbabwe as part of the National Indicative Programme, signed in 2015 for the period 2014-20. Funding tranches for 2018 were allocated to CSOs working in support of the justice sector, including for example,the Legal Resources Foundation project to deliver legal training for chiefs in the context of improving acess to justice for the majority of Zimbabwe’s rural population.
Further improvement of relations between international partners and Zimbabwean state authorities will be affected by the conduct and results of the 2018 general elections.
Crucial for the 2018 elections—and the government that comes to power—will be the provisions set for the role to be played by Zimbabwe’s defence, security and intelligence forces going forward.The legacy of partisanship by the security forces since independence will require addressing through institutional cultural and ethos change in order to navigate the unpredictable political climate, hopefully towards a democratic dispensation.
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes
FTLRP Fast Track Land resettlement Programme
GNU Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity
IG Inclusive Government
IMF International Monetary Fund
JOC Joint Operations Command
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
NANGO Non-Governmental Organizations of Zimbabwe
NPRC National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
PF Patriotic Front
PISI Police Internal Security Intelligence
SADC Southern African Development Community
SST Security Sector Transformation
STERP Short Term Economic Recovery Programme
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZNLWVA Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZPS Zimbabwe Prison Service
ZRP Zimbabwe Republic Police
“Progressive Reform in the New Constitution of Zimbabwe: A Balance Between the Preservative and Transformative Constitution Making Process,” Nyabeze, Tawana H., Harare: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (2015).
“Zimbabwe Case-Study,” Lalá, Anicia, African Security Sector Network, Research Project on SSR Provisions in Peace Agreements (2009).
 Northern Rhodesia being Zambia.
 Other languages spoken include: Chewa, Chibarwe, English, Kalanga, Khoisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangaan (Shangani), Shona, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda, and Xhosa.
 In the Shona language: "the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains".
 The JOC has been implicated in act of violence in the past elections as well as appearing to be operating as a military junta, making decisions on the part of the Executive. Mugabe has recently set steps to dissolve the JOC and rename it the National Security Council through an Act of Parliament to enable the body to advise the government on national security policy and strategies.
 43% of women in Zimbabwe have experienced some form of GBV, considerably affecting young women, and accompanied by high rates of impunity. Despite substantial legal protection societal discrimination and violence are rife including alledged use of rape as a political weapon during electoral periods, and female members of the opposition facing particular brutality at the hands of the security forces FAO – Zimbabwe Country Gender Assessment Report, 2017, http://www.peacewomen.org/profile/country-region-profile-zimbabwe, http://makeeverywomancount.org/index.php/countries/east-africa/zimbabwe
 The ideology of Black African Liberation conflated national security with the security of the state and led to the merging of the party, state and government. Therefore the discourse on protecting Zimbabwe's nationhood automatically tied the party to the government and the state, instead of being mutually exclusive.
 Civil society organisations voiced concerns regarding allegations of human rights abuses by members of the military in the immediate aftermath of the November 2017 events, Zimbabwe Peace Project Statement, December 2017.
 The Clemency Order of 1988 following the Unity Accord of 1987 pardoned all human rights violations committed by political parties between 1982 and 1987. This was then followed by the 1995 presidential amnesty pardoning all politically motivated violence perpetrated during the 1995 general elections. This set precedence for the Clemency Order of 2000, and pardoned politically motivated violence and human rights violations committed during and after the parliamentary elections of June 2000.
 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/matabeleland-killings-gukurahundi-victims-hearings-zimbabwe-180228080317378.html; http://kubatana.net/2018/02/23/statement-appointment-new-nprc-chairperson/
 Of the 828 cases reported to the ZRP between 1985 and 2011, 87.2% cases were not investigated. From the 12.8% investigated only 9% reached the court, 2% produced convictions followed by a Presidential pardon, and 7% were dropped. Stephen Moyo, “Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil Society in Combating Corruption”, Doctoral Thesis, March 2014, University of Central Lancashire.
 https://www.zimpeaceproject.com/statement-set-up-independent-mechanism-to-investigate-military-human-rights-abuses/; https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-03-11-op-ed-a-glimmer-of-sunshine-in-zimbabwe/
 The Necessity of Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe – Mediel Hove, Politikon 44:3 (South African Journal of Poltical Studies, 2017).
 Funded with a 1.8 million Euros from the EU, the programme aims to focus on the legislative and oversight roles of Parliament (UNDP, 2015).