In addition to historical contradictions and inadequacies, implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has further exposed the need to address critical issues in Liberia’s security sector, in order to consolidate the gains of post-conflict reconstruction and to pave the way towards good governance. In view of the role played by ill-governed security institutions in the Liberian civil war, the success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia will to a large extent depend on the extent to which the security sector is reformed to operate more efficiently and within a framework of effective democratic control. Within this context, a dialogue on SSR would help broaden the constituency of actors working to develop a collective vision of security in Liberia. Moreover, such a dialogue would facilitate the inclusion of debates around the security sector prior to elections, so as to sustain interest on the issue in a post-election reform agenda. Significantly, a dialogue on SSR would serve as a crucial step in bringing voice and accountability into the process of creating an inclusive, locally driven SSR process in Liberia.
Against this background, the Ministry of Justice of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) convened a National Dialogue on Security Sector Reform, which was held in Monrovia 3-4 August 2005. The event was jointly facilitated and funded by the Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG) of King’s College, University of London; the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Lagos, Nigeria; and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland. The dialogue served as an avenue toward a structured but informal conversation on SSR among relevant stakeholders, including
the United Nations, the transitional legislature, the judiciary, civil society, relevant ministries, civil society, and organizations responsible for implementing reform.
The dialogue was guided by, and sought to provide answers to, the following interrelated
1. What kind of security (and security sector) does Liberia have?
2. What kind of security (and security sector) do Liberians want?
3. What are the necessary key steps for achieving the desired security?
4. Who are the critical actors for attaining such security?
5. How can a locally driven, inclusive and accountable security sector reform process be
Source: Source found in: Security Sector Reform: Integrated Technical Guidance Notes , United Nations SSR Task Force, 2012. pg 20.
Policy and Research Papers
This paper attempts to account for the gap between donor policies in support of SSR in developing countries, in particular in post-conflict African states, and their record of implementation. It explores the inadequacies of the present development cooperation regime and argues that a substantial part of this gap can be explained by the tension that exists between the prevalence of a state-centric policy framework on the one hand, and the increasing role played by non-state actors, such as armed militia, private security and military companies, vigilante groups, and multinational corporations on the other hand, in the security sector. This paper, which acknowledges the growing importance of regional actors and questions the state-centric nature of SSR, recommends a paradigmatic shift in the current approaches to development cooperation. The external origin and orientation of SSR needs to be supplemented by more local ownership at the various levels of SSR conceptualisation, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation in order to enhance synergy between donor priorities and interests on the one hand, and local needs and priorities on the other hand.
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The aim of this paper is to account for the evolution of the draft Code, and to examine its relationship (if any) to similar initiatives within and beyond Africa. Following this brief introduction therefore, the paper attempts to place the draft Code within the context of general trends in civil-military relations in Africa. It then traces the evolutionary process of the African Code, within the context of similar and related initiatives and processes in Africa. The paper also identifies the main provisions of the Code. It compares the OSCE Code to the draft African Code, pointing out similarities and differences and the extent to which the former was a model for the latter. The paper then identifies matters arising in the drive to achieve the adoption and implementation of the present draft African Code. The paper is concluded with recommendations which could enrich the CoC and create the basis for more viable articulation of the agenda of democratic control of armedand security forces in Africa.
This chapter argues that although Mali has come a long way (and in some respects presents examples of civil-military relations that other countries could learn from), weaknesses in parliamentary oversight remain. Old habits of secrecy and corruption, an unwillingness to assert the role of parliament in relation to the executive, a lack of resources, and parliamentarians’ lack of expertise need to be addressed. It is important to promote a new culture of parliamentary oversight, linking this to broader regional and sub-regional security regimes and best practices.
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