Policy and Research Papers

Codes of Conduct in Defence Ministries and Armed Forces

Corruption risk in defence and security establishments is a key concern for defence officials and senior military officers, as corruption wastes scarce resources, reduces operational effectiveness and reduces public trust in the armed forces and security services. Part of the solution to these risks is clear guidance on the behaviour expected of senior officers and officials, and strong application of those standards of behaviour. 

The report presents the conclusions of an analysis of the written codes of conduct and related documents from 12 participating nations: Argentina, Australia, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Kenya, Lithuania, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

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Civil-Military Working Paper 1-2013 | Police–military interaction in international peace and stability operations

In this document, the focus is on the interaction between the civilian police forces and the militaries of countries with Anglo–Peelian traditions of civilian policing, with a strong consent-based tradition and a tradition of professional volunteer military forces; examples are Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom. The document identifies the appropriate divisions of responsibility for the various forces, taking into account the hostility of the environment, in order to show areas where coordination, cooperation or collaboration might be beneficial and to point to ways in which such interaction might be profitably pursued.

Read more about the research project and download the report here.


Community Policing in Australia

This report present community policing from an Australian perspective. It is built around a compilation of chapters on different aspects of community policing.


Canberra Doesn’t Own National Security

This paper argues that the phrase ‘Canberra-knows-best’ doesn't apply to national security and that Australia needs a new federalism that recognises and integrates the role of Australia’s states and territories. 

For full access to the article, Canberra Doesn’t Own National Security, please follow the link. 


An Increased Spotlight: Australia in Timor-Leste

With the departure of United Nations peacekeepers, Australia becomes the largest international presence in Timor-Leste. It does so at not necessarily an easy time: despite the stark development challenges that remain, the government in Dili is tired of outside advice. Australia’s past actions over oil and gas in the Timor Sea still cast a shadow over the present. Although Australian aid in Timor-Leste is wide and varied, drawing broad conclusions about its effectiveness and impact is difficult owing to the relative absence of independent evaluations of these programs. Decisions made by each country’s leaders can impact detectably upon the bilateral relationship and complicate the work of Australian government personnel in Dili.


Australia Cyber Crime and Security Survey: Systems of National Interest 2012

The 2012 Cyber Crime and Security Survey: Systems of National Interest was designed and conducted to obtain a better understanding of how cyber incidents are affecting the Australian businesses that form part of Australia’s systems of national interest, including critical infrastructure.

These businesses and industries underpin the social and economic wellbeing of the nation and deliver essential services, including banking and !nance, communications, energy, resources, transport and water.

The findings from this survey provide a picture of the current cyber security measures these businesses have in place; the recent cyber incidents they have experienced; and their reporting of them. These findings also provide baseline data from which the results of future annual surveys can be compared, to help ascertain overall trends.

Importantly, business is taking cyber security seriously. This is paramount for the security of the individual organisation and its clients, as well as the industry sector, and the business community more broadly. However, the survey results also indicate that many organisations are not con!dent that cyber security is sufficiently understood and appreciated by staff, management and boards.

In terms of cyber security incidents, more than half the organisations considered attacks on their organisation to be targeted. This indicates a shift from previous views or conceptions, that most attacks are non-targeted or indiscriminate. And while the majority of attacks were reported to come from external sources, the fact that 44% originated from within organisations serves as a reminder that internally-focused cyber security controls and measures are also important.

Reporting of cyber security incidents – which is critical to the effectiveness of the government-business partnership – clearly requires further attention. The CERT needs to articulate to business the benefits of reporting cyber security incidents to CERT Australia and to law enforcement, and that all information provided to the CERT is held in the strictest confidence.



All at Sea: The Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Maritime Migration


Just a tiny proportion of the world’s international migrants travel by sea. Yet the plight of these migrants—with more than 3,700 lives lost at sea in 2015 in the Mediterranean alone—receives an outsize share of media and policymaker attention. And in certain countries, it absorbs a significant amount of financial and human resources devoted to making and implementing migration policy. 

This volume reviews the policy responses to irregular maritime arrivals at regional, national, and international levels, focusing on case studies in five global hotspots: the Mediterranean, the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea region, the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea, Australia, and the Caribbean. 

For access to more details about the book on All at Sea: The Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Maritime Migration, kindly follow the link.