Jean Guisnel, journaliste à l'hebdomadaire Le Point et spécialiste des questions de défense, répond à nos questions à l'occasion de sa participation aux 10e Entretiens européens d'Enghien organisés par l'IRIS et la Ville d'Enghien-les-Bains, le 10 février 2018 :
- Quels défis l’Union européenne doit-elle relever pour rendre sa stratégie de défense plus lisible ?
- Nombre de pays de l’UE font des opérations de maintien de la paix leur politique étrangère. Comment dépasser ce plafond de verre ?
- Comment expliquer le soudain regain d’intérêt de certains pays européens pour le Sahel, notamment le Mali, alors qu’il n’était pas perceptible au plus profond de la crise sécuritaire ?
Afin d'accéder à la vidéo, Quelles menaces, quelle défense ? L’Union européenne, actrice de la sécurité internationale ?, veuillez suivre le lien.
Les vagues migratoires seront-elles le défi majeur des années qui viennent, défi pour les pays occidentaux comme pour les pays africains ? En 2015, près de 2 millions de personnes ont rejoint le Vieux continent, dont 1 million en traversant la Méditerranée. La Méditerranée où, la même année, 4 000 candidats à l’exil ont péri. Depuis, l’afflux de migrants, même s’il a baissé, ne s’est jamais tari.
Cette crise migratoire est-elle ponctuelle, ou l’Europe doit-elle se préparer à une immigration massive provoquée par la pression démographique en Afrique ? Quels sont les scénarios possibles ? Quelles conséquences pour le continent africain ? Faut-il revoir l'aide au développement ? Un partenariat gagnant-gagnant peut-il être mis sur pied ?
- Stephen Smith, ancien journaliste (Libération, Le Monde, RFI –correspondant en Afrique de l’Ouest), enseigne les Etudes africaines à l’Université de Duke en Caroline du Nord, vient de publier chez Grasset « La ruée vers l’Europe. La jeune Afrique en route pour le Vieux continent »
- Cécile Kyenge, députée européenne pour l’Italie depuis 2014, au sein du groupe de « L’alliance progressiste des socialistes et démocrates ». Originaire du Congo Kinshasa, nommée en 2013 en Italie, ministre pour l’Intégration dans le gouvernement d’Enrico Letta.
- Serge Michailof, chercheur associé à l’Iris, l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, ancien directeur exécutif chargé des opérations de l’AFD, l’Agence Française de développement, a publié en 2015 chez Fayard « Africanistan » L’Afrique en crise va-t-elle se retrouver dans nos banlieues ?
Afin d'écouter le podcast, L’Europe face à la crise des migrants, veuillez suivre le lien.
Policy and Research Papers
At their meeting in June 2010 Defence Ministers tasked the Council in Permanent Session
to prepare political guidance on ways to improve NATO’s involvement in stabilisation and
reconstruction for review by Ministers in October 2010, taking into account related strands
of work. This paper responds to that tasking. It offers political guidance that NATO should
follow when stabilisation and reconstruction requirements are expected to be part of a
future operation. It thus provides the basis for further work to be done by NATO staffs and
militaryauthorities inthefieldof stabilisationandreconstruction,andwillalsoinformNATO’s
ongoing HQ and command structure reforms. The guidance should also be used to inform
and guide the conduct of current operations. It should also contribute to and complement
the work on the response to the tasking by Heads ofState andGovernment to report at their
next Summit on further progress with regard to the implementation of the Comprehensive
Approach Action Plan and NATO’s ability to improve the delivery of stabilisation and reconstruction effects as part of the international community’s efforts and NATO’s intrinsic contribution to a civil-military approach.
Access the full paper at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110922-political-guidance.pdf
Recent years have seen protracted attempts to agree and then to consummate a durable strategic partnership between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the globalisation of security concerns and with the series of major terrorist attacks beginning on 11th September 2001, it has become increasingly difficult to rationalise a Cold War-style separation of the two organisations, with NATO offering ‘hard’ or military power, and the EU offering a ‘soft’ or civil alternative. There are compelling reasons to expect close collaboration between the two organisations: there is considerable overlap in membership; members of both organisations, new and old, are constrained in their defence spending and cannot maintain commitments to support two entirely separate multilateral military structures; and contemporary security challenges no longer respect institutional boundaries, if indeed they ever did. Furthermore, the simple proximity of the two organisations in Brussels creates a widespread expectation that the EU and NATO should be in constant dialogue on issues of mutual concern. It can only appear inefficient and dysfunctional, for example, that the representative of a foreign government might visit one body but not the other, that NATO does not offer a conduit to the EU, and vice versa, and that the two organisations have not developed mutually reinforcing diplomatic positions.
Collaboration between NATO and the EU has become an enduring theme in speeches and
statements concerning transatlantic security.
Access the full paper at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/eunatorelations_/eunatorelations_en.pdf
Over the past decade or so, the EU has gradually adopted the concept of ‘human security’ in its support for security andjustice programming. A commitment to human security implies that security and justice strategies and programmesshould proactively seek to take into account and address citizens’ needs and concerns, as primary recipients ofsecurity and justice provision. One way to ensure these requirements are met is to promote public participation in thedesign, implementation and monitoring of security and justice mechanisms.The EU has a number of policies, tools and frameworks which commit its institutions to taking a ‘participatoryapproach’ to programming, including in the areas of security and justice. These commitments are gradually, ifunevenly, being translated into practice. However, research by the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) Security Clusterhas identified a number of institutional, cultural and operational challenges which hinder the understanding anduse of participatory approaches by EU institutions. This paper gives an overview of the challenges faced by EUactors in understanding and using participatory approaches and suggests steps that EU institutions can take to overcome them.
Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, the premise of the study is simple: before discussing at Brussels-level what defence strategy the EU should adopt, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Follow the link to the publication: http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1150#sthash.UcKoF3Ib.dpuf
With the possible exception of the UK, it is quite difficult to grasp what member states really want from CSDP, so any debate over a possible European grand strategy would appear to be premature.
This study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the European strategic debate. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strict national interests. Five researchers thus took the opportunity to immerse themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses – away from potentially distorting influence of the ‘Brussels-mentality’ or rhetoric.
In brief, this book does not set out to analyse European defence policy as an end in itself or as a collective project, but rather as a vector of individual – indeed self-interested – visions for the member states studied. By following this rather more pragmatic path, the survey aims to identify the common denominators, misunderstandings and rigid deadlocks on the strategic debate around CSDP, with a view to enriching it.
The Functioning of Judicial Systems and the Situation of the Economy in the European Union Member States
The EU Justice Scoreboard is a comparative tool, which seeks to provide reliable and objective data on the justice systems in all 27 Member States, and in particular on the quality, independence and efficiency of justice, which are the key components of an 'effective justice system'. Effective justice systems are crucial for growth and for the effective implementation of EU law, as national courts play an essential role in upholding EU law. Improving the quality, independence and efficiency of judicial systems already forms part of the EU’s economic policy coordination process under the European Semester.
When preparing the EU Justice Scoreboard for 2013, the European Commission asked the Council of Europe’s Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) to collect relevant data and produce a Study on the functioning of judicial systems and the situation of the economy in the European Union Member States.
In 2011 the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) adopted the Vilnius Declaration which lists a set of recommendations for the judiciaries of Europe on how to respond to the actual challenges and opportunities they are facing due to the new economic landscape. The recommendations call for the development of long term policies that include necessary reforms of the judiciary.
The ENCJ report on Judicial Reform which was adopted in Dublin in 2012 does not attempt to solve system problems in individual Member States, but it presents to the Member States the ENCJ view on judiciary reform and best practices in facing the challenges for the judiciary.
At the General Assembly in Dublin 2012, the Councils for the Judiciary decided to further develop the report with a second part (Part 2). This part seeks to identify more clearly the role that the Judiciary and Judicial Councils can play in the whole process. That process embraces proposals for, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of those reforms within justice systems in order to provide justice delivery as evidenced through the Judicial Scoreboard of the European Commission.
Reform of the judiciary is a matter of special interest for the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ). This report examines the reform measures implemented or planned in the countries which participated in the works of the Project Team “Judicial reform in Europe”, providing the ENCJ view and identifying recommendations.
To view the second part with concrete guidelines, please follow this link.
Devant les événements politiques qui secouent actuellement le monde arave, les Pays-Bas s'interrogent sur la façon de soutenir les forces démocratiques dans la région. Par le biais de la motion de MM. Pechtold et Timmermans déposée le 23 mars 2011, la Chambre des représentants a prié le gouvernement de solliciter un avis de l'AIV sur la capacité, notamment financière, des politiques néerlandaise et européenne à appuyer la démocratie de l'état de droit dans les pays arabes et perses. La demande en ce sens adressée à l'AIV le 18 avril 2011 se décline en deux questions.
- Les instruments dont dispose actuellement l'Union européenne (dialogue dans le cadre des accords d'association, aide, préférences commerciales, prêts de la BEI, PESC, etc.) lui permettent-ils d'appuyer adéquatement la transition du monde arabe vers la démocratie et l'état de droit?
- Comment les Pays-Bas peuvent-ils utiliser efficacement leurs dispositifs bilatéraux actuels pour soutenir ce processus?
Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis
In this article, author Monica Den Boer seeks to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As ‘intelligence’ is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.
To cite this article: Monica Den Boer (2015) "Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU:Governance Challenges for Collection, Exchange and Analysis", Intelligence and National Securit y, 30:2-3, 402-419, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2014.988444
This DCAF publication gathers five "Food for thought papers" based on the OSCE Focus Conference titled "Ukraine and European Security: Prospects for the Future" that took place on 10th-11th October 2014 at the WMO in Geneva.
To access the full report, kindly follow the link.
The implementation of the Gender Perspective in the EU civilian and military missions: Leadership wanted
Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through which time the EU has grown as a security actor. The keys to producea change in implementing gender mainstreaming in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well known by member states; the EU and external implementation reports1 are repeated again and again, but real change requires real willingness on the part of member states, and leadership.
Après les attentats du 13 novembre, quels enseignements, quelle politique de sécurité et de défense, quelle diplomatie pour la France et l’Europe ?
"Ce qui s’impose à nous, c’est donc une réflexion de fond sur notre système de défense : objectifs, dimensionnements, budgets. Il n’est pas question d’en revenir – pour de simples raisons stratégiques – aux armées de masse de notre enfance… Mais les armées étiques actuelles risquent fort de ne correspondre bientôt à aucune hypothèse d’emploi concrète… Les temps changent. L’heure n’est plus aux opérations de police des années 1990, où nous rêvions de simplement ramener les déviants à notre raison supérieure : c’est un monde qui se défait, et notre intérêt national est d’avoir les moyens de nous y sauvegarder. "
Cliquez sur le lien pour avoir accès au document: Le 13 novembre, et après ?
The November 13th attacks on carefully chosen targets in Paris have been claimed by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) and were deliberately meant to kill and injure as many civilians as possible. The attacks were complex and well-coordinated, involving homegrown as well as (returned) foreign fighters (FFs). Judging by the terrorists’ tactics and methods, the Paris attacks indeed bear IS’s trademark. “Paris” was the latest in a string of IS attacks outside Syria and Iraq, and suggest that IS has shifted its attention away from the caliphate to external targets to create fear and undermine societies elsewhere, notably in anti-IS coalition members. As such, it marks a significant shift in IS’s operations and illustrates the vulnerabilities of European security services and the impossibility of exercising full control.
Read the full policy brief: Paris: 11/13/15 - Analysis and Policy Options
This new report provides an in-depth study of the role of the European Union as a security actor in Africa. It features analysis on ‘work currently being done on proposals for a new dedicated instrument – or a modification of the existing instruments – for capacity building in the security sector, as well as on a comprehensive EU strategic framework for the reform of the security sector.’
Full report: The EU as a security actor in Africa
One important corollary of the Comprehensive Approach is the so-called ‘security-development nexus’, according to which security and development are two sides of the same coin. In any crisis situation, a decent level of security is a precondition to sustainable development, while development, in turn, allows for peace to endure.
Over the last two years, this nexus has led to fresh debates within the EU on how best to combine security activities – including CSDP operations – and the longer-term building of third states’ and international organisations’ capacity for crisis management. The African continent has been the primary focus of these discussions, mainly in the context of Mali and Somalia – where two EU training missions are deployed alongside a wide range of support activities – but also in the framework of EU support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
In these different cases, the provision of military equipment has been given particular attention. Both the December 2013 European Council and the April 2014 EU-African Union (AU) summit stressed the importance of enhancing partner countries’ capabilities through the supply of equipment, either as a complement to CSDP operations or as a separate measure.
The High Representative and the Commission were then tasked to further work on the issue and, on 28 April 2015, released a Joint Communication on ‘Capacity-building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’. The forthcoming European Council is expected to give further guidance on the way forward.
For the full report about Enabling partners to manage crises: From ‘train and equip’ to capacity-building, kindly follow the link.
Europe’s unprecedented security challenges call for a step change in the EU’s approach to security and defence. This Clingendael report reflects the main topics of discussion at the high-level Netherlands EU Presidency Seminar on Defence held on 20 and 21 January 2016.
The new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, to be submitted to the European Council in June, will require translation into actionable proposals for a stronger Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and deepening defence cooperation. A CSDP White Book is necessary to define the level of ambition, required capabilities and how to obtain these capabilities.
Political commitment and follow-up are essential to achieve progress in defence cooperation. A system of accountability and positive peer pressure with ‘naming and praising’ as opposed to ‘naming and shaming’ has to be developed. To achieve this, the member states should commit to benchmarks, regular reporting and sharing information on defence plans and budgets. In addition, financial incentives, such as allocating EU budget for defence related research should be explored.
Please kindly follow the link to access to full document: Towards a stronger EU security and defence policy
This article by Thierry Tardy from the European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) explores the recent developments in the conceptual and practical boundaries of EU civilian crisis management (CCM), an issue that comprises security sector reform, good governance, support to the rule of law and to political processes.
The author argues that the current evolution of the security environment and of the EU's institutional setting has transformed CCM in at least two ways. First, CCM has become a broad-ranging activity that not only cuts across all forms of EU external action but also concerns the internal security agenda. Outside of the EU, CCM implies the combination of security-related activities and Commission-led programmes. Closer to the EU or even within it, security challenges such as organised crime, illegal migration or terrorism have made the traditional divide between internal and external security increasingly irrelevant and led to calls for greater interaction between different levels of EU action. Second, the range of EU bodies that now deal with CCM goes beyond the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and European Commission entities to include the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies.
To access the article on Civilian crisis management: Towards a new paradigm, kindly follow the link.
The three major crises the EU has faced since 2009 – concerning the euro, migration and Brexit – reflect a broader crisis of its intergovernmental governance. There are a number of negative spillover effects of this crisis of governance: a disproportionate focus in the European Council and among political elites on internal EU matters to the detriment of political attention to external foreign policy issues; a more challenging political and public opinion environment that opposes greater involvement abroad; constrained resources for international engagement; and commercialization of national foreign policies.
As a response to these developments, the EU must adapt its foreign policymaking processes. It must find ways to integrate long-term strategic debates into European Council deliberations and build on the expertise that its expanded and variegated membership has to offer. It should also clarify the division of labour between the European External Action Service and the European Council, with the former acting as its main diplomatic operator and the latter as the prime locus of political authority.
For full access to The EU’s Crisis of Governance and European Foreign Policy, kindly follow the link.
Unresolved conflicts and breakaway territories divide five out of six of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership countries, most of them directly backed by the Russian Federation. But a policy of isolating the people living in these conflict regions narrows the road to peace. Based on the daily experiences of people in regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Donetsk, Lugansk and Transnistria this paper sheds light on the daily life in conflicts that are unlikely to be resolved soon.
For full access to Isolation of Post-Soviet Conflict Regions Narrows the Road to Peace, kindly follow the link.
What common security challenges face the European Union and India, and how can the two regions cooperate to find common solutions? The Observer Research Foundation, the EU Institute for Security Studies, and Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs, undertook a project to discuss and provide potential policy proposals for India-EU collaboration on three areas of common concern: West Asia (the Middle East), Maritime Security, and Radicalisation/counter-terrorism. This report explores these areas and contains recommendations for the next steps required to reinvigorate the security component of the EU-India Strategic Partnership.
For full access to the report Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation, kindly follow the link.
There can be no doubt that the refugee crisis possesses a security dimension. Armed conflicts with scant prospect of speedy resolution are driving people to seek refuge abroad. Their growing numbers represent an enormous challenge for a string of states — from the immediate neighbourhood with its gigantic refugee camps through the transit countries to the Member States of the European Union. What does this mean for the European security order and its central actors, first and foremost the United Nations (UN), the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CSDP) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)? How does the refugee crisis alter the role and self-perception of the security institutions, and what influence does it exert on ongoing strategy processes?
The present analysis points to the impact of the so-called »migrant and refugee crisis« on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP): The dramatic spike in asylum applications to EU member states in 2014/2015 has put to the test the added value and legitimacy of the European Union as a Foreign Policy actor. It has demonstrated to what extend the boundaries between external and internal security have become blurred.
For full access to the report New Thrust for the CSDP from the Refugee and Migrant Crisis, kindly follow the link.
This paper advocates for a new and dedicated effort to deal with the problems related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for The European Union (EU). More specifically, one or more new strategy documents are required and, in this context, the EU should also pursue WMD-related contingency planning to increase preparedness and prevent or counter crises. The differentiation of WMD-related threats over the past decade, however, has risked making crisis response too slow and uncoordinated at all levels, from the local to the global. In parallel, there is the constant risk that the lessons learned from the more or less successful application of deterrence and other types of influencing methods are being forgotten. If a multi-sector crisis were to occur in some way linked to WMD, the lack of a level playing field in this regard could cause existential problems for certain EU member states.
For full access to the report The European Union and weapons of mass destruction: A follow-on to the global strategy?, kindly follow the link.
The Silk Road Economic Belt (the ‘Belt’) component of the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China in 2013 is an ambitious vision that has evoked enthusiasm among many stakeholders. Among other objectives, the Belt intends to promote infrastructural development and connectivity, and stimulate economic integration across the Eurasian continent. Europe is an integral part of China’s transcontinental vision, and the European Union (EU) has its own vested interests in the Belt—as the EU–China Connectivity Platform demonstrates. This one-year desk and field study examines the Belt from a security perspective. The report elaborates on whether the Belt is a platform for European Union (EU)–China cooperation on mitigating security threats throughout Eurasia, and provides policy recommendations to the EU on how to proceed. In the context of the report, ‘security’ is defined broadly in relation to intra- and interstate stability: it encompasses human security and developmental conditions.
For full access to the report, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU–China Cooperation Prospects, kindly follow the link.
Ce rapport a été rédigé à partir d’entretiens approfondis avec des représentants officiels de l’UA et de l’UE et de leurs Etats membres, effectués à Addis-Abeba, Bruxelles, Berlin, Djouba, La Haye, Londres, Nairobi et Pretoria entre janvier et octobre de cette année. Il fournit une analyse détaillée des relations entre les deux institutions, identifie et évalue les points de désaccord, examine les préoccupations et les doléances et suggère des moyens de consolider les liens en réduisant l’écart qui les sépare aujourd’hui.
Pour accéder à l'article Nouveau départ pour les relations entre l’Union africaine et l’Union européenne, veuillez suivre le lien.
This report is based on extensive interviews with AU and EU officials and member states’ representatives in Addis Ababa, Brussels, Berlin, The Hague, Juba, London, Nairobi and Pretoria, between January and October this year. It provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the two institutions, identifying and assessing key points of divergence, elucidating concerns and complaints, and suggesting ways to strengthen future relations by bridging the divides that currently separate them.
For full access to Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations, please kindly follow the link.
Export Controls, Human Security and Cyber-surveillance Technology: Examining the Proposed Changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation
This paper focuses on the European Commission’s proposed changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation—the main regulatory instrument for EU member states’ controls on the trade in dual-use items.It outlines the existing relationship between human rights, international humanitarian law, terrorism and dual-use export controls and details the origins of the discussion about applying export controls to cyber-surveillance technology.
For full access to the paper, Export Controls, Human Security and Cyber-surveillance Technology: Examining the Proposed Changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation, kindly follow the link.
The fight against illegal arms transfers requires regulation and an effective monitoring of arms brokers. Their business primarily consists of facilitating and arranging transactions in exchange for compensation or material recompense. Indeed some of them manage to circumvent existing controls by exploiting different national regulations or conducting their activities from countries where controls are weak or non-existent.
In 2003 the EU member states took an important initiative by setting a harmonized system of control of arms brokers. With the adoption of a European Common Position they introduced controls on brokering activities taking place on their territories. Yet, six years later, all EU member states still have no legislation on arms brokering, while others need to adapt their national legislation to EU standards. Furthermore this European instrument reflects minimum standards which currently appear insufficient to effectively fight against ill disposed brokers.
This report reviews the extent to which EU member states implement the Common Position on arms brokering and suggests some improvements for a better control on brokering activities and an effective fight against illegal arms transfers. One section of the report also considers a major gap in the national regulations: extraterritorial controls on brokering activities. Finally, the report presents the case study of the Belgian legislation on arms brokering.
One of the key weaknesses in controls on the international arms trade is the absence or penury of national regulations on arms brokering activities. At present, only about sixteen countries in the world are known to control the activities of those negotiating, arranging or otherwise facilitating arms transfers between buyers and sellers. Moreover, unscrupulous brokers have demonstrated their ability to circumvent existing controls by exploiting differences in national approaches, or by simply conducting their activities from another country with lax or no controls at all. This weak link in arms control allows unscrupulous brokers to engage with impunity in undesirable or illicit activities such as arranging arms transfers to embargoed governments or non-state actors.
An important regional initiative to counter this phenomenon is the EU Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering. Under this instrument, EU member states have committed themselves to establishing a clear legal framework for brokering activities taking place within their territory. By creating common standards, the EU Common Position thus represents a significant step forward. However, there remain concerns that these standards still fall short of what is required to effectively combat undesirable or illicit brokering activities.
The first part of this report identifies key issues in this respect and suggests concrete measures governments should consider when deciding on what controls they deem appropriate. The second part of this report presents an overview of already existing or planned brokering controls in certain EU member states. The report concludes that despite the progress presented by the EU Common Position, there are still shortcomings regarding the controls that would seem necessary for effectively combating unscrupulous brokers and their activities. Where appropriate, governments of EU member states should therefore individually be encouraged to ensure that their national approach fully addresses arms brokering. This would also facilitate possible future efforts on the level of the EU to further strengthen common commitments. In turn, such further efforts to counter undesirable brokering will be required to strengthen member states’ abilities to combat and prevent illicit arms transfers.
Les États membres de l’UE disposent de normes et de procédures destinées à renforcer les contrôles des exportations d’armements et notamment à prévenir et lutter contre leur détournement, qui sont considérées parmi les plus strictes au monde. Pourtant, aujourd’hui, il ne se passe plus un mois sans qu’un État membre ne soit interpellé quant à ses décisions en matière d’exportation. Les publications de cas de détournements – présumés ou avéré – d’armes européennes au Moyen-Orient se multiplient, et désormais depuis des pays considérés comme des alliés et comptant parmi les meilleurs clients des pays de l’UE. Cette Note d’Analyse présente certains des défis en matière de prévention et de lutte contre les détournements d’armes auxquels les États membres de l’UE font face lorsqu’ils autorisent des exportations.
Pour accèder à l'article, Prévention des détournements d’armes: faiblesse des pratiques européennes, veuillez suivre ce lien.
L’autonomie stratégique est le dernier concept à la mode, aussi bien à Paris qu’à Bruxelles. Elle est citée pas moins de vingt-quatre fois dans la dernière revue stratégique française et il n’est pas un document stratégique européen, un tant soit peu important, qui n’en fasse mention.Au-delà des déclarations politiques, l’autonomie stratégique est entrée dans le champ juridique, puisqu’elle figure désormais au rang des objectifs assignés au programme européen de développement de l’industrie de défense. Elle constituera donc l’un des critères à l’aune desquels seront évalués les projets de R&D de défense susceptibles de bénéficier de fonds européens.Mais qu’est-ce que l’autonomie stratégique ?Le présent rapport retrace, pour la première fois, et avec précision, la brève histoire de ce jeune concept apparu à la fin du XXe siècle et qui a fait l’objet d’un chassé-croisé permanent entre les planificateurs de défense français et les leaders européens.Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Autonomie stratégique: le nouveau Graal de la défense européenne, veuillez suivre le lien.
En novembre 2015, l’Union européenne a créé le « fonds fiduciaire d’urgence en faveur de la stabilité et de la lutte contre les causes profondes de la migration irrégulière et du phénomène des personnes déplacées en Afrique ». Cet instrument financier, présenté comme un outil flexible pour désamorcer les migrations irrégulières, est une traduction politique concrète de l’engagement de l’Union européenne pour l’Afrique. La présente note apporte un éclairage sur l’approche et les priorités de la France dans ce cadre, la coordination mise en place au niveau national et la gouvernance globale du fonds.
Cette note a été rédigée sur la base d’entretiens menés en septembre 2017 par Coordination SUD dans le cadre de l’étude Partenariat ou conditionnalité ? Analyse des Pactes migratoires et du Fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique réalisée avec Concord, la confédération des ONG européennes d’urgence et de développement1. Ces entretiens ont ciblé les ministères et les acteurs français impliqués dans la mise en oeuvre du fonds fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique de l’Union européenne (FFU)2 : le ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères et ses opérateurs, l’Agence française de développement et Expertise France, ainsi que l’opérateur du ministère de l’Intérieur, Civipol.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique : l’approche française, veuillez suivre le lien.
The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Fundamental Rights Tribunal: Challenges for the Effective Delivery of Fundamental Rights in the Area...
This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights.To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.
L’ Algérie et le Maroc comptent parmi les plus grands importateurs d’armes sur le continent africain. Étant donné leurs capacités de production limitées, ces pays représentent de nos jours un marché important pour l’industrie mondiale de l’armement. Cette note d’analyse propose d’étudier les dynamiques d’exportation d’armes des États membres de l’UE vers des pays du Maghreb, plus concrètement vers le Maroc, l’Algérie et la Tunisie entre 2012 et 2016. Cette analyse tentera d’identifier et de vérifier la cohérence entre l’application des critères d’évaluation « préexportation » établis dans la Position commune de l’UE et les intérêts stratégiques des pays membres.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Exportations d’armes au Maghreb : quelle conformité avec la Position commune ?, veuillez suivre le lien.
This evaluation was commissioned by the Joint Evaluation Unit in DG DEVCO on behalf of the European Commission. It provides an independent assessment of the Commission’s past support to Justice and Security System Reform (JSSR), and makes recommendations with a view to improving current and future Commission strategies and programmes. The evaluation covers the period 2001-2009 and all regions where the Commission provides JSSR assistance, with the exception of those countries that
fall under the mandate of DG Enlargement. Only those aspects of justice reform which mostly directly fall under Security System Reform, such as strengthening of criminal justice systems and the legal institutions involved in the oversight of security institutions, are considered. The evaluation covers all funds provided by the Commission geographical programmes (EDF, ENPI, DCI) and the thematic budget lines (such as the IfS, EIDHR, NSA), with the exception of humanitarian funds managed by ECHO. This represents a total of €1bn of funds contracted over the evaluation period. An inventory and typology of these funds is presented in Annex 9 of this report.
Penser la sécurité de demain: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau mot d’ordre européen pour la politique de paix et de sécurité
Au niveau mondial, un large éventail de systèmes étatiques et de systèmes de contrôles de la violence existe (à l’avantage ou aux dépens de la population locale). Dans le même temps, l’ordre et le droit international se fondent sur l’existence d’Etats-nations souverains.
Dans ce contexte, la Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung a initié le Groupe de réflexion mondial «Monopole de la violence2.0? », qui vient de rendre son rapport final «Garantir la sécurité en des temps incertains"». seront Les principaux résultats de ces recherches sont résumés dans cet article qui se concentre sur les conséquences politiques pour l’Allemagne et l’Union européenne et plaide pour un nouveau mot d’ordre européen dans la politique de paix et de sécurité, tendu vers un modèle de sécurité soumis au contrôle démocratique.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Penser la sécurité de demain: Plaidoyer pour un nouveau mot d’ordre européen pour la politique de paix et de sécurité, veuillez suivre le lien.
Que le Brexit se déroule de manière ordonnée ou non, tôt ou tard les Européens et les Britanniques seront appelés à redéfinir leur relation. Les désaccords restent pourtant nombreux des deux côtés de la Manche. En matière de défense, ils sont surtout paradoxaux.
Depuis que Londres a signifié son intention de quitter l’UE, ses appels du pied pour conserver un rôle central au cœur de la PSDC ne se comptent pas. Tout à coup, le Royaume-Uni n’apparait plus comme cet acteur sceptique et désintéressé qui haussait systématiquement les épaules face au projet d’une défense européenne. Il se retrouve dans l’inconfortable position du demandeur.
La perspective s’est donc inversée. Les Européens ne doivent plus retenir les Britanniques par la veste, en essayant de les convaincre du bien-fondé de la PSDC. Désormais ils doivent éviter que, en sortant par la porte, le Royaume-Uni ne tente de revenir par la fenêtre.
Pour accéder à l'analyse, Le Brexit et la défense européenne: un choix de fond pour l’Union, veuillez suivre le lien.
The European security strategy was drawn up under the authority of the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council of 12 and 13 December 2003. It identifies the global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union and clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with them, such as building security in the EU's neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. It also assesses the policy implications that these objectives have for Europe.
To view the publication, follow this link.
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World
The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on our core values.
This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It examines how the European Union has fared in practice, and what is to be done to improve implementation.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform in partner countries. The EU has a broad range of civilian and military instruments which are able to support SSR activities. A case-by-case analysis will always need to be undertaken to assess whether any proposed activities are most appropriately carried out through CFSP/ESDP or Community action or indeed a combination of both. This concept is deliberately broad in order not to constrain future CFSP/ESDP or Community activities but in any situation, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission will need to work in close co-operation both to ensure a clear, functional division of responsibilities and to ensure maximum coherence and effectiveness of overall EU effort.
The paper sets out principles and norms for the European Community’s engagement in SSR, based on current support in different countries and regional settings, the relevant policy frameworks under which the EC supports SSR, and the rationale for SSR as an important part of Community support. In this way the policy framework will help to ensure more coordinated and strategic approaches to Community activities falling under the different policy instruments, recognising that SSR needs to be treated as a cross-cutting issue, spanning the various strands of EC external assistance. In addition, the concept seeks to define the Community’s role in the wider framework of EU external action in the area of SSR in order to ensure complementarity between EC activities and those undertaken by the EU as part of CFSP/ESDP and by Member States bilaterally. The aim is that this concept and the EU Concept for ESDP support for Security Sector Reform (SSR), which was agreed under the UK Presidency, will complement each other and be joined within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR.
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These council conclusions reviews the policy framework put in place to implement a coordinated and comprehensive EU-wide policy framework, acknowledges the work done during the Finnish presidency with the Commission to develop this framework and exhorts future presidencies and the Commission to continue developing and operationalizing the framework.
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The 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2005 European Consensus on Development acknowledge that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. These Council Conclusions re-affirm the nexus between development and assert that security should
inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action, whilst recognising that the responsibilities and roles of development and security actors are complementary but remain specific.
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There have been considerable developments in security-policy thinking since the end of the Cold War, and a complex set of transnational threatsand challenges necessitates new security policies and strategies. Not only the attacks of 11 September 2001, but also the dark side of globalisation such as climate change, the global spread of dangerous technologies and international organised crime have changed the security perspective and policy procedures in recent years. Consequently, new
national-security strategies, white papers and security-policy documents have been drafted in order to take into account the changing security landscape.
On 6 April 2009, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) welcomed a group of leading security experts for a seminar entitled “Security Strategies Today : Trends and Perspectives”. The goal of the seminar was to provide a forum for experts from different European states, major international powers and regional and international organisations to take stock of current security polices in the European region and beyond. The participants had an opportunity to assess the direction of security-policy thinking by analysing a number of key security-policy documents such as national-security strategies, defence concepts and white papers, among others. Assumptions regarding future threats were considered, as were a variety of drafting processes and methodologies.
More than 30 participants attended the seminar, including representatives of the Defence Ministries of Finland, Germany and Sweden, as well as representatives of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to faculty members from the GCSP, regional and international experts from a range of academic and policy institutions participated, including speakers from PricewaterhouseCoopers, the International Affairs Institute (Rome), the Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing), the Royal Institute of International Relations (Brussels) and the Foundation for Strategic Studies (Paris).
Governance is not just about rules. In the end, it is about (access to) power, the influence of small versus big countries, transparency, accountability and, ultimately, trust. The Clingendael Institute observes in this new report, an emerging split between policy areas that are governed by the Community/Ordinary method such as more technical single market issues, and Transgovernmentalism, which is charaterised by a bigger role for Member states within the EU and less strategic role for the European Commisson. The consequence for the further development of defence policy is that it assumes development along the lines of transgovernmental governance, even though the European Commission and potentially other EU institutions might favour the “efficiency” of a single, Ordinary method, with a more focal role for the European Commission in the interinstitutional balance.
For full access to the report, From the 'Ordinary' Method to the Transgovernmental Method, kindly follow the link.
The present study aims to present lessons learnt by the EU and EU Member States in recent year when implementing Joint Programming in fragile contexts. The objective is to improve the effectiveness and impact of EU and EU Member States ́ joint external action in these particular settings.
For full access to the report Joint Programming in Fragile States, please follow the link.
Introducing the Rule of Law in Security Sector Reform: European Union Policies in the Palestinian Territories
This paper examines the efforts of the European Union to advance Security Sector Reform and to bridge the gap with the Judiciary Sector Reform and the rule of law in the Occupies Palestinian Territories. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the EU engaged actively in the state-building project in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by taking a number of initiatives in situ . Security has been a key issue in all Israeli-Palestinian agreements concluded during the post-1993 Oslo interim period up to 1999 and then, with the resumption of the Palestinian intifada in 2000, security became primordial to all internationally-sponsored diplomatic initiatives and peace plans. The article analyses the EU initiatives undertaken to help the Palestinian Authority reform its security and judiciary sectors, and argues that while the European Union has, in theory, supported the rule of law perspective in Palestinian Security Sector Reform, in reality it has not paid much attention to improving democratic civilian oversight and accountability.
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This study focuses on EU support to SSR in the form of CSDP missions, analysing recent developments in the EU's internal set-up, capacities and training arrangements for mission personnel. It is based on interviews with mission personnel, Brussels-based officials and secondary sources.
SSR activities are key for stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states through their emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance. The EU has engaged in aspects of SSR for the past decade through its CFSP/CSDP as well as development and enlargement policies. The recently launched CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa take place in a new institutional context, and address European security concerns in a fragile but geopolitically important region. The EU’s engagement with SSR in general and the Horn of Africa in particular shows the difficulties in simultaneously pursuing dual objectives of stability and institution-building and in adopting and coordinating long-and short-term approaches to the problems facing the region. To do justice to the holistic conception of SSR and its emphasis on accountability and democratic oversight, the training of security forces and capacity building needs to be framed in a long-term approach that aims for sustainable structural change. The creation of the EEAS has given the EU the right tools – but a continued emphasis on policy coordination is necessary to address old and new, institutional and operational, challenges so as to attain a comprehensive approach to SSR. The input and continued commitment of member states to CSDP also remains vital
This policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia andin what context these possible activities should be viewed. The main focus will be on direct engagement on security topics such as the EU Border Management project BOMCA.
However, indirect activities such as education programmes that might be beneficial to security and stability in Central Asia will not be ignored. After an exposé on EU security interests in Central Asia, in the second paragraph attention is devoted to national and regional threats to the security of Central Asian republics and engagement of the EU. The paper concludes with a few recommendations for EU institutions and member states that could help to strengthen EU–Central Asia security cooperation including aspects of Security Sector Reform.
Security Activities of External Actors in Africa is the first book to systematically map the security-related policies, strategies and activities of major external actors in Africa. It assesses the involvement of seven key external actors—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations—in sub-Saharan Africa. It pays special attention to military presences, military interventions, contributions to peace operations, arms supplies, defence and security agreements, military training, and other forms of military and security assistance.
Mapping the diverse security-related activities of external actors in Africa is an important first step towards understanding Africa’s evolving security environment. This book takes that step.
Selon le traité sur l’UE, l’impulsion politique en matière de sécurité européenne vient du Conseil européen. L’article vise ainsi à comprendre comment la Commission européenne a réussi avec une série d’initiatives, notamment en matière de recherche, à se positionner dans le champ européen de sécurité et de défense, et à y jouer un rôle déterminant. L’analyse de la configuration des relations permet de démontrer qu’en faisant un usage habile de ses atouts et de ses ressources au nom de l’approche globale, la Commission produit des effets et renforce sa position dans le champ à l’interface des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques.
Pour accéder à l'ouvrage La communautarisation de la recherche sur la sécurité, veuillez suivre ce lien.
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is increasingly becoming a cornerstone in international security and development cooperation. Indeed, the concept has often been seen as a panacea for many of the biggest threats to the world such as failed states, terrorism and poverty. In particular, this book focuses on the complexities of implementation of SSR across the globe and the actual and potential role for the European Union (EU) to play in SSR. As suggested in the title of the book, this involves not only opportunities, but challenges to be overcome as well. There are three core themes to this book: Policy, Policies and Practice. By presenting the themes in this particular order a greater appreciation of the influences on the process of SSR, from conception to implementation is relayed to the reader. This volume appeals to audiences interested in the EU as a global actor and the interrelationships between foreign, security, defence and development policies.
This collection of essays is divided in two parts. In the first part, security is considered from a theoretical angle, as a phenomenon that has become an integral part of modern society and inevitably interacts with law in many ways. The aim of the authors’ analyses is to emphasise the ambiguity of the notion of security and its tendency to expand and affect simultaneously different fields of law.
Depending on the adopted approach, security can be understood in many different terms and through various concepts: inter alia through exceptionality, from a constructivist viewpoint, or as human security. Whereas for example, an ‘existential’ approach takes risk and danger as a fact of life and is based on the assumption of the fragility of the human condition, leading to traditional and military understandings of security, a constructivist approach regards security as a discursive speech act enabling criticism of security claims. Analysing security in connection with law highlights both tensions and contradictions. From classical analyses on states of emergency to new conceptualizations of security as a specific dimension within the process of European integration (‘the European Security Constitution’), legal approaches to security and law today are facing many paradoxes and challenges.
The second part of the book considers some of these security dilemmas in two specific areas of law: human rights and criminal law. Here, the authors address the militarisation of the fight against terrorism, the distinction between administrative and penal sanctions, the limits of intelligence activities and the scope of criminalisation.
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Joint communication on elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform
This joint communication by the European Commission and the High Representative Federica Mogherini outlines proposed measures to enhance the European Union's effectiveness in supporting stability, security, and development in third countries.
The document first presents the rationale for an EU-wide Security Sector Reform (SSR) support framework, before developing its different elements. The objectives of the strategic framework are presented, namely ensuring security for individuals and the state as well as the legitimacy, good governance, integrity, and sustainability of the security sector. The key elements and principles to achieving these objectives are then detailed, notably enabling broad national ownership, systematic political and policy dialogue, or balancing long-term systemic change with immediate security needs, among others. The joint communication then details areas of engagement for EU support before touching upon the monitoring and evaluation of the policy recommendations.
To access the Joint communication on elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, kindly follow the link.