Cette vidéo présente la réunion de travail des chefs de gouvernement Français, Allemand, Espagnol, Italien, Tchadien, Nigérien, et Libyen, en présence de Mme Federica Mogherini, Haute Représentante de l'Union Européenne pour les Affaires Etrangères et la Politique de Sécurité sur la Mission de Protection en vue de la Réinstallation de Réfugiés en Europe, 29 août 2017.
Pour accéder à la Déclaration Finale de la Réunion, veuillez suivre le lien.
One of the challenges facing Libya as it builds democracy following the fall of the Muammar Qadhafi regime is the reform of the security sector.
During the uprising, a number of Libyans took up arms to confront pro-Qadhafi government forces.
After the revolution, these fighters have to be either included in the national army and other parts of the security sector or reintegrated into civilian life.
Zahra Langhi, a gender specialist and civil society consultant tells UN Radio's Derrick Mbatha that Libyan women want to participate in this process.
Un processus de paix en Libye est-il possible ? C'est tout l'enjeu de la conférence à Berlin qui se tient ce dimanche 19 janvier sous l'égide des Nations unies. Avec Shoshana Fine, docteure en science politique et relations internationales, spécialiste des questions migratoires, Nathalie Tocci, politologue et directrice de l’Institut des Affaires Internationales (IAI), Ali Bensaad, professeur à l’Institut Français de Géopolitique, Virginie Collombier, professeure à l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence, Sinan Ülgen, président du think tank EDAM à Istanbul et ancien diplomate et Igor Yurgens, président de l’Institut du Développement contemporain (Russie), membre du conseil d'administration de l'Union des industriels et entrepreneurs de Russie.
Policy and Research Papers
This Centre for Security Governance publication provides a summary of its inaugural eSeminar event "Libya: Dealing with the Militias and Advancing Security Sector Reform".
The purpose of this eSeminar, held on November 6, 2013, was to take stock of the volatile security situation in Libya and discuss the progress of SSR and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives. The event brought together a panel of four experts — two from Libya and two from the United States — to dissect this multidimensional challenge and provide insight on the way forward.
The recent conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen might seem to point to progress in that fractured state. But the absence of the rule of law and impartial authority is allowing violence to fester and the international community needs to act decisively.
This messy panorama is characteristic of the kaleidoscope of violence in Yemen, with its multiple, overlapping issues and complex relations between power-brokers. It also typifies the associated impunity: with little to fear by way of legal repercussions, acts of violence are attractive instruments in pursuit of partisan agendas. As @BaFana3 tweeted, “Laws must be designed with the underlying assumption that they will be violated & have to be enforced. That concept is missing in #Yemen.”
You can find the paper here.
This document draws lessons on what it means to uphold and promote core policing principles in our overseas assistance, providing a crucial insight into both ‘what works’ and the many challenges that we must navigate to achieve success. It is based on the collective UK international policing experience over recent years including Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and most recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Libya.
The success of Libya's 2011 revolution has given way to political disarray, an institutional vacuum, and an extraordinary proliferation of non-state and quasi-state armed groups operating across the country. However, rather than pursuing political or ideological objectives, these groups increasingly focus on resource predation.
Through an empirical study of various axes of violence in contemporary Libya, this report highlights the critical role played by criminal accumulation, land grabs, and protection rackets in the actions of tribal militias and jihadist groups, and in the fighting that has blighted one major urban hub. Whereas conventional representations of Libya's post-revolutionary period dwell on the political battle between Islamists and secular forces, the reports suggests that the cause of the country's increasing levels of armed violence can be found in the absence of a functional state and the fragmentation of a local, tribal, ethnic and ideological forces, which together make the violent acquisition of material resources essential to group survival.
The paper can be found here.
During and after Libya’s revolution, national media outlets became known and popular for their balanced reporting. The situation in the few years since has changed, however. The security landscape in Libya today is a confusing array of institutional and non-institutional actors each asserting legitimacy. The country is on the brink of full-scale civil war. Its media has become both polarized and a key tool for many security actors. This report looks at three primary television channels to offer insights into the media’s role in shaping public perceptions and building political constituencies.
- The Libyan security landscape is broadly divided into two camps: revolutionary-Islamist and institutionalist-conservative. The country’s resurgent media sector is split along similar lines. This polarization and related partistan reporting reinforce polarization among security sector actors and the public and could further undermine established peace in Libya.
- Media narratives dominating Libya’s security sector revolve around three axes: whether actors are legal or illegal, whether they supported or opposed the 2011 revolution, and whether they are correct or deviant Muslims. Security actors use these narratives to build their legitimacy.
- Of the three channels monitored, Libya Al Ahrar was the most balanced but displayed a cautiously anti-Islamist, institutionalist agenda. Al Nabaa was mainstream Islamist and a staunch supporter of revolutionary units, such as the Libyan Shield Force. Libya Awalan was strongly anti-Islamist, conservative, and a vocal supporter of Haftar’s actions in Benghazi.
- Libyans have little trust in any of the main regional and Libyan national television channels, including the national broadcaster, Libya Al Wataniyah, which fares no better than the private channels.
- Channels with clear anti-Islamist credentials were more trusted than their pro-Islamist counterparts, reflecting the general anti-Islamist sentiment among Libyans today.
- Channels advance their opinion on the legality of security actors, have thus contributed to related consumer perceptions about those actors, and in turn play an important role in how the security situation in Libya continues to unfold.
For full access to The Role of Media in Shaping Libya's Security Sector Narratives, kindly follow the link.
Dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du Nord, la Syrie et la Libye sont en proie à l'instabilité politique et se distinguent en tant que pays générateurs d'importants flux migratoires. Dans cette analyse, le visage syrien et libyen de la migration africaine est présenté avec un regard particulier sur le contexte régional dans lequel il se situe. En particulier, il s’agit de faire état de l’intensification de la pression migratoire de la Syrie et de la Libye sur leurs pays voisins.
La crise humanitaire et sécuritaire qui fait rage en Syrie et en Lybie est un lourd fardeau que partage la région du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord dans son ensemble. Bien que les naufrages en Méditerranée fassent l’objet d’une attention médiatique accrue, ils ne sont pas la seule conséquence de l’instabilité dans la région. Des conséquences aussi tragiques peuvent être repérées au Liban, en Jordanie, en Turquie, en Tunisie et en Egypte.
Vous pouvez lire l'article ici.
The formation of a Government of National Accord (GNA) between Libya’s warring factions has been delayed once more as representatives of the General National Congress (GNC) withdrew from talks a few weeks after refusing to sign the preliminary agreement initialed by all other participants on 11 July.
While there is still hope that agreement on a GNA can be reached shortly, such a consensus government will not be able to durably carry out their mission unless simultaneous progress is made on interim security arrangements. For a GNA to take office in Tripoli and effectively run the country, it will first and foremost have to be able to use government buildings in the capital city, which will require that pro-agreement armed groups seize and secure them.
This article explores the need to include all stakeholders, including opposing military factions, and the need for more coordination between military actors and politicians for the political dialogue to become a success.
Brian McQuinn argues in this paper published by Stability - the International Journal of Security and Development that demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) trajectories of non-state armed groups are shaped by a group’s internal organisation. Extensive research by political scientists has demonstrated a correlation between internal features of armed groups and their behaviour (e.g. extent of violence used against local communities). He extends this analysis to DDR outcomes by illustrating how two features of an armed group’s internal organisation – command profile and financing architecture – influence post-conflict DDR trajectories. To substantiate the theory, three case studies from Colombia, Nepal and Libya are reviewed. The article concludes with the limitations and opportunities of this approach, including the potential of predicting DDR challenges.
For full access to the article on DDR and the Internal Organisation of Non-State Armed Groups, kindly follow the link.
Cet éclairage du groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) par Federico Santopinto s'intéresse au commerce des armes vers la Libye. Malgré les sanctions du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, le contexte de fragmentation de l'autorité politique et les multiples exceptions à l'embargo sur les armes contre la Libye résultent en une situation d'opacité et d'ambiguïté. Ainsi, connaître les exportations légales d'armements vers le pays est particulièrement difficile.
Pour accéder à l'éclairage Le casse-tête des transferts d’armes à la Libye, veuillez suivre le lien.
This paper by Yezid Sayigh from the Carnegie Middle East Center explores the evolution of the security sectors in Libya and Yemen in the years following the popular uprisings of 2011. The author argues that, as struggles for control over the security sectors became central to transitional politics, the security institutions collapsed by 2014 instead of being reformed and upgraded to enhance the legitimacy of the interim governments.
The paper first looks at the similarities in the security sector dynamics in both cases and the challenges of security sector reform, before going on to an in-depth account of the security sector of Libya and then Yemen. Finally, political lessons from the countries' experiences as well as recommendations are presented and conclude the paper.
To access the paper Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen, kindly follow the link.
This United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report by Peter Cole and Fiona Mangan examines the different directions that policing in Libya has taken since the fall of Gadhafi in 2011. Using two cities, Tobruk and Sabha, as representative case studies, the report examines how competing and overlapping groups have assumed policing functions and traces the social and political inclinations of those groups. Acknowledging that local variation prevents countrywide generalization, the report identifies features and tendencies of the Libyan landscape that are relevant to future reform.
To access the USIP report Policing Libya: Form And Function Of Policing Since The 2011 Revolution, kindly follow the link.
This report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines the prison system in Libya. With the permission of the Libyan Ministry of Justice and Judicial Police, USIP research teams conducted two assessments of the Libyan prison system, visiting detention facilities throughout the country in 2012 and again in 2015–16 to evaluate organizational function, security, infrastructure, and prisoner well-being. This report combines and compares the findings of the two assessments, discussing the broader context of detention issues in Libya, with analysis centering on prisons under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and operated by the Judicial Police. The 2012 assessment team consisted of Fiona Mangan, a USIP senior program officer, and Dr. Mark Shaw, an expert consultant. The 2015–16 assessment team consisted of Rebecca Murray, a researcher and journalist; Rami Musa, a journalist; and Fiona Mangan. Mohamed Abouharous provided invaluable translation and logistical support during both visits. The assessments, part of a multiyear portfolio of rule of law programming and analysis conducted after the 2011 revolution, were supported by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau of the U.S. Department of State.
To access the Prisons and Detention in Libya report, kindly follow the link.
This report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines the renewed role of tribes as guarantors of social stability and providers of security and justice services in Libya since the 2011 revolution. Supported by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau of the U.S. Department of State, the study is part of a portfolio of rule of law work carried out by the USIP in Libya. Report findings are based on qualitative field research and a nationally representative survey carried out by USIP in partnership with Altai Consulting. A companion report discusses how political currents in Libya since 2011 have shaped policing and security actors on the ground.
To access the Tribe, Security, Justice and Peace in Libya Today report, kindly follow the link.
This report is a detailed assessment on the failure of the UN-brokered peace process in Libya and on the unresolved pressing issues like worsening living conditions, control of oil facilities, people-smuggling, and the struggle against jihadist groups. The report concludes that regional and global actors involved in the diplomatic process over Libya should converge on common goals, push for a renegotiation of the accord, use their influence to restrain the belligerents and nudge them toward a political solution and participation in a security track.
For full access to The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset, kindly follow the link.
Since late 2010, an unprecedented wave of protests has swept across much of the Arab world. The aim of this paper is to examine the role of the armed forces when confronted with anti-regime uprisings that demand greater political freedoms or even regime change. Drawing on the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, it argues that the degree of institutionalization of the armed forces and their relationship to society at large can account for different responses to pro-reform uprisings.
To access the full report Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance, kindly click on the link.
This paper is part of DCAF's SSR Papers series. Click on the link for more DCAF publications on security sector reform.
A new Working Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project provides an in-depth analysis of the trade in small arms and light weapons in the online marketplace. The Working Paper ties together interviews with marketplace participants with a detailed analysis of a dataset derived from long-term monitoring of some of the closed social media-based groups listing small arms and light weapons for sale. It explores the types of weapons offered and their likely routes into the Libyan online markets. It concludes with a policy-relevant analysis of the current state of Libya’s online markets and discusses the caveats and utility of such online monitoring for supplementing field-based research.
For full access to Web Trafficking - Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms Light Weapons in Libya, kindly follow the link.
If diplomatic pressure and the terrorist threat force Libya’s political factions to support the UN-backed Government of National Accord, Libya could provide a test bed for security sector reform (SSR) in a post-Arab Spring security environment that includes transnational terrorism and trafficking in drugs, weapons and migrants by international organized crime. This paper provides an overview of the Libyan conflict and current efforts to establish a transitional government. It maps the components of Libya’s security sector: military and police forces, justice institutions, and oversight institutions. It describes the elements of the proposed Government of National Accord and catalogues the tasks that must be performed to achieve SSR in Libya.
For full access to Libya: A Post-Arab Spring Test for Security Sector Reform, kindly follow the link.
Migrant boat crossings in the Mediterranean usually peak around July and August but the number of boats dropped dramatically in 2017. This comes largely as a result of a migration-focused unilateral intervention by Italy, which needed to show results to a frustrated electorate that has borne a lot of Europe’s migrant burden.
Italy needed to make tangible progress or risk a populist right-wing upheaval. Returning asylum seekers directly to Libya was not an option after it was declared unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012. The task was passed on to Libyan partners instead.
The February 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Italy and Libya’s UN-sanctioned Government of National Accord (GNA) was an important turning point. Rome pledged training, equipment and investment to help the Tripoli government improve border security and combat the smuggling of people. It engaged local government in smuggling hubs, promising investment in return for help with migration control.
For full access to the article, Human Smuggling and Libya’s Political End Game, kindly follow the link.
Cette note d'analyse du Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité se concentre sur la crise lybienne. Lorsque le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi s’est effondré sous les bombes de l’OTAN, en 2011, la France et le Royaume-Uni, principaux instigateurs et acteurs de la campagne libyenne, n’imaginaient pas que la Libye deviendrait le théâtre d’un conflit destiné à s’éterniser, digne de ceux qui tourmentent le Moyen-Orient.
Contrairement qu’au Moyen-Orient, toutefois, en Libye l’Union européenne et ses membres jouent un rôle prépondérant. En dépit d’enjeux et d’intérêts contradictoires, ils ont par ailleurs su préserver une certaine unité. La relation entre l’Italie et la France dans ce dossier demeure toutefois empreinte de méfiance réciproque et de malentendus.
Pour accéder à l'article Crise libyenne: rôles et enjeux de l’UE et ses membres, veuillez suivre le lien.
The past year has seen a ratcheting up and convergence of security concerns in the Sahel and Maghreb with the growing potency of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the influx of mercenaries and weaponry from Libya, the expanding influence of narcotics traffickers, and Boko Haram's widening lethality. Nonetheless, regional cooperation to address these transnational threats remains fragmented. In Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence , the latest Africa Security Brief from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Laurence Aïda Ammour examines the central role that Algeria plays in defining this cooperation and the complex domestic, regional, and international considerations that shape its decision-making...
◆ Efforts to counter al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) growing influence in both the Maghreb and the Sahel are fragmented because of the inability of neighbors to forge collaborative partnerships.
◆ Algeria faces inverse incentives to combat AQIM outside of Algiers as it gains much of its geostrategic leverage by maintaining overstated perceptions of a serious terrorism threat.
◆ The Algerian government’s limited legitimacy, primarily derived from its ability to deliver stability, constrains a more comprehensive regional strategy.
The full paper can be downloaded from
On 29 May France will host a summit on Libya bringing together the country's four principal competing leaders to sign an agreement on a roadmap to new elections in 2018. The event’s stated purpose is to unite international actors behind a single roadmap and ensure Libyan leaders adhere to it.
If successful, the meeting could signal the rival leaders’ willingness to compromise and inject new momentum into a sputtering peace process. However, this article from Crisis Group argues that both the meeting’s format and the accord that France has brokered have stirred significant controversy both in Libya and abroad. It also highlights a number of problems with the proposed agreement as well as suggesting ways to improve the agreement's effectiveness.
For full access to the article, Making the Best of France’s Libya Summit, please follow the link.
Les quatre principaux dirigeants libyens sont réunis à Paris le 29 mai pour signer une feuille de route vers la paix, qui prévoit des élections en 2018 avec un soutien international unanime. Pour éviter de fragiliser le processus de paix en cours sous l’égide de l’ONU, les parties devraient plutôt se mettre d’accord sur une déclaration de principes.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Mettre à profit le sommet de Paris sur la Libye, veuillez suivre le lien.
On 30 March 2016, the Presidency Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) arrived at Tripoli’s Abu Sitta naval base by boat from Tunisia. The PC was created in December 2015 by the Libyan Political Agreement, which was signed in Skhirat, Morocco (ICG, 2016). From its creation, the PC was pressured by its external backers—the UN and Western governments—to relocate to Tripoli, even though it did not command any regular forces that could offer protection. By the time it arrived in Tripoli, the PC could rely on promises from a handful of armed groups in the capital that they would support it. A range of other militias were explicitly hostile, while most armed groups in Tripoli were non-committal.
From 2011, Tripoli’s security landscape was a highly fragmented and unstable patchwork of multiple armed groups. But in the year that followed the PC’s arrival, four militias that had associated themselves with the PC from the outset divided up the capital between themselves. These four militias—the Special Deterrence Force (SDF), the Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion (TRB), the Nawasi Battalion, and the Abu Slim unit of the Central Security Apparatus—expanded their control across central, southern, and large parts of western Tripoli, gradually displacing rival armed groups during a series of heavy clashes. In parallel, they converted their territorial control into political influence and financial gain, consolidating into a cartel.
This Briefing Paper analyses the implications and the risks associated with this evolution. The first part traces the rise of the Tripoli militia cartel and frames this development against historical struggles for power within Libya’s capital. The second part analyses changes in the financial basis of Tripoli’s armed groups over the past few years, their move towards capturing state institutions, and the implications of this development for conflict dynamics and the prospect of a wider political settlement. The Paper is based on 55 interviews with leaders of armed groups, government officials, and local observers in Tripoli and Misrata, which were undertaken during March and April 2018. It also draws on the authors’ previous interviews and observations during regular research visits made since 2011.
For full access to the briefing paper, Capital of Militias: Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State, please follow the link.
Depuis la guerre civile en Libye de 2014, la capacité de gouverner du pays s'est effondrée. Depuis l'instabilité n'a fait que s'aggraver en raison de querelles politiques et notamment l'émergence d'un gouvernement rival. Maintenant, de nouvelles mesures pour stabiliser le pays sont nécessaires.
Pour les Européens, le sort de la Libye reste une priorité centrale étant donné son rôle de pays de transit pour les migrations et d'éventuel incubateur de menaces terroristes. Cette publication de l'ECFR invite les acteurs européens à intensifier leurs efforts de stabilisation en vue d’obtenir des résultats durables.
Dans cette optique, une nouvelle stratégie et une approche multilatérale demeurent le meilleur espoir de mettre fin au cycle destructeur d'instabilité et de reprise des conflits en Libye.
Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, L’ordre dans le chaos : stabiliser la Libye au niveau local, veuillez suivre le lien.
In this new report, the Small Arms Survey explores the role of Tubu militias before and since the fall of the Qaddafi regime; the roles and alliances of Chadian and Sudanese combatants in the border area; the Agadez–Fezzan corridor, placing particular weight on recent changes in migrant smuggling and drug trafficking; and data and analysis of regional weapons flows.
To read Lost in Trans-Nation: Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border, please follow the link.
Libya has struggled to remain unified since the Arab uprising in 2011 and the ouster of Muammar Qaddafi eight months later. During the chaos of an unraveling regime, armed groups proliferated, and Islamism emerged as a powerful new political force. In Libya’s first democratic election, voters largely opted for a secular government. But the transition was undermined by rivalries among secular parties, Islamists and independents coupled with escalating clashes among the new militias.
Follow the link to access the full Libya timeline Since Qaddaffi's Ouster.
Conducted by UNDP, UN Women, UNFPA, and ESCWA, this study on Gender Justice & the Law in the Arab States Region provides a comprehensive assessment of laws and policies affecting gender equality and protection against gender-based violence in Arab countries. The report is composed of 18 country profiles, each of which maps a country’s key legislative developments and gaps regarding gender justice. This introduction provides an overall summary of these country chapters followed by a summary of each country examined.
To access the full report, Gender Justice & The Law, please follow the link provided.
The offensive that Khalifa Haftar launched in April 2019 to capture the Libyan capital, Tripoli, triggered the largest mobilization of fighters in western Libya since the revolutionary war of 2011. This latest round of civil war is transforming the landscape of armed groups fighting in and around Tripoli, provoking new rifts within and between communities, and laying the ground for future political struggles. This Briefing Paper examines the identities and interests of the forces fighting each other over control of Tripoli. It shows that the divides of 2011 are central in structuring the two opposing alliances and shaping the motivations of many forces involved in the war.
For full access to the report How the 2019 Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape, kindly follow the link.
The border regions of Mali, Niger, and Libya are far out of reach of these states’ central governments. Local governance is usually in the hands of traditional authorities, such as tribal chiefs and imams. Yet the ever-increasing presence of armed groups, as well as ensuing external interventions, are putting the delicate balances of power in these areas under pressure.
Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit investigated how this has affected the relationship between traditional authorities, the state and local communities. Can traditional authorities maintain their position as legitimate governance providers? What can policy makers actually do to advance new approaches to stabilization and good governance in fragile and conflict affected settings, where state authority is weak or absent? And what role can traditional authorities play in these approaches?
To access the full report The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya, please follow the link.
"Since the 2011 overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, Libya's path had been tumultuous. Despite a number of advantages compared with other post-conflict societies, progress on political, economic, and security fronts has fallen far behind, generating frustration and threatening the recovery altogether. Libya has teetered on the brink of a relapse into civil war on more than one occasion in the past year. In the absence of a functioning state, jihadist groups have made inroads. The broader Sahel and Maghreb regions, meanwhile, are becoming more and more fragile and southern Libya verges on becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda-linked groups recently chased from Mali by French military forces.
The right international approach to Libya could nevertheless still help avert a more serious breakdown and real damage to U.S. and European regional and global interests - above all counter-terrorism and the stability of world energy markets.
This study examines what has been accomplished in Libya to date, draws lessons from the experience, and identifies some possible ways forward."
Se dirige-t-on droit vers une nouvelle intervention en Libye ? La décomposition de nombre d’États de la couronne méditerranéenne rend-elle inévitable la multiplication des démonstrations militaires de la part des puissances traditionnelles présentes dans la région ?
Dominique David pour l’institut français des relations internationales (ifri) propose un triple niveau d’analyse de la situation en Libye.
Veuillez cliquer sur le lien pour accéder au document de l’ifri Libye : intervenir, encore?...
The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) published a fact sheet on the current situation in Libya. Addressing topics ranging from prison assessment and reform to the role of the media in shaping the security sector narrative, USIP's recent work in Libya is presented along with a number of publications (in-depth reports and policy briefs).
To access the USIP Fact Sheet on the Current Situation in Libya, kindly follow the link.
The SSR Newsletter, published on a quarterly basis, is aimed at providing an update on recent activities of the SSR Unit and an overview of upcoming initiatives, in addition to sharing relevant information and announcements with the greater SSR community.
The SSR Newsletter provides an update on recent activities of the SSR Unit, gives an overview of upcoming initiatives and shares relevant information and announcements with the greater SSR community.
In this issue:
- The Fifth Inter- Agency Senior SSR Practitioners Workshop
- SSR Chiefs and Advisers Discuss Common Challenges
- Spotlight on a Mission: SSR in Côte d’Ivoire
- Developing Guidance on Public Expenditure Reviews
- Opening of an Emergency Response Centre in Timor-Leste
- A Video on Defence Sector Reform
- Support Visit to Libya
- Coming Soon...
- About the SSR Newsletter
Successive Libyan governments and the international community have worked for eight years to stabilise and reform the country’s security sector. But all this has been halted by the outbreak of war between the internationally recognised Government of National Accord and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. There is little surety about how the battle in Libya will be resolved. But three things are clear: the conflict has significantly altered the situation in the country; there is no possibility of returning to the old status quo; and an effective security sector reform process is more necessary than ever.
For full access to the document, Reform of Libya’s security sector must not fail again, kindly follow the link.