The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is seeking a Senior Researcher and Programme Director for its Arms and Military Expenditure (AMEX) programme. The SIPRI AMEX programme is a part of SIPRI’s Armament and Disarmament research area. The programme collects data, maintains SIPRI’s renowned databases in the field and conducts research related to these.
For full access to the vacancy, Senior Researcher and Programme Director at SIPRI, kindly follow the link.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is seeking a Research Assistant to work on Emerging military and security technologies. The Research Assistant will provide research and administrative support to SIPRI researchers. The work will explore the implications of emerging technologies on armaments, arms control and disarmament as well as armed conflicts, peace and security.
The successful candidate will have a strong research profile, an entrepreneurial spirit and a demonstrated interest and knowledge in policy issues related to new military and security technologies. S/he has the ability to work independently.
Applications will be accepted until the position is filled. Please note that only shortlisted candidates will be contacted.
For full access to the vacancy, Research Assistant, kindly follow the link.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international institute whose core mission is to undertake research and activities on security, conflict and peace. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. SIPRI provides excellent opportunities for scientific and personal development. SIPRI is an equal opportunity employer.
SIPRI seeks a Senior Researcher and Deputy Programme Director for its Sahel/West Africa Programme. The successful candidate will actively support the implementation of the projects in the Sahel and West Africa region, with a specific emphasis on Chad and Mali. As Deputy Programme Director, s/he will also coordinate the programme’s other projects and take an active part in reporting activities.
SIPRI’s Sahel/West Africa Programme is a part of SIPRI's Conflict and Peace research area. The programme conducts qualitative and quantitative analyses of key conflict, security and peacebuilding issues affecting the contemporary Sahel and West Africa region. The programme aims to document and understand the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding at a local level. Based on this understanding, the programme disseminates evidence-based analysis targeted to generate policy impact. For this purpose, the programme works in close cooperation with African civil society organizations, research centres, international NGOs, as well as other external partners. Funding partners of the programme are embassies, European ministries of foreign affairs, the European Union and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).
The programme’s work will be conducted, when relevant, in cooperation with other SIPRI programmes and researchers as well as SIPRI’s network of associates and guest researchers.
The Senior Researcher and Deputy Programme Director will work under the guidance of the Programme Director and together with partner organizations in West Africa and the Sahel.
The general responsibilities are the following:
- The implementation of the West African projects in collaboration with SIPRI’s Sahel/West Africa Programme staff, other SIPRI researchers and partner organizations;
- The development of a research and publication strategy (qualitative and quantitative) for the programme;
- Direct engagement with African partner organizations and civil society organizations involved in research and outreach activities;
- Regular contribution to the programme’s research output, including seminar presentations, panel discussions and high-quality research publications;
- Proactive input to the programme’s fundraising plan (identification of coherent themes, possible partnerships and funding opportunities) and grant and proposal writing, including complex applications to multilateral institutions;
- Strategic dissemination of research results through engagement with other relevant actors in order to maximize the projects’ impact and visibility;
- Involvement in the design of programme activities and participation in the collective life of the Institute through seminars, Research Staff Collegium meetings and other collaborative initiatives; and
- Management and mentoring of junior and senior staff.
The role requires fluency in written and spoken English and French. The position is based in Stockholm and involves travels to West Africa and the Sahel.
The successful candidate will have the following:
- More than five years of policy-oriented research experience, including initiating and carrying out her/his own research projects within an international environment;
- A record of publications that include qualitative and quantitative analytical components and is commensurate with the length of time worked in research;
- Extensive and broad knowledge of the Sahel/West Africa region;
- Previous project management experience, including reporting and financial responsibilities;
- A sound understanding of project development procedures (log frame, theory of change, etc.);
- A track record of funding acquisition, with attendant proposal and grant writing skills;
- A demonstrated ability to manage researchers and other junior staff;
- Several years working in an international environment with a multinational staff; and
- Fluency in English and French (both written and spoken).
Starting from 1 June 2019, or as soon as possible thereafter. The appointment will initially be for two years, renewable. The post is full-time, and the successful applicant will be expected to reside in Stockholm with travel to West Africa. The salary package will be negotiated individually.
For more information about the job, Senior Researcher, Deputy Program Director, please follow the link provided.
In the context of the Stockholm Security Conference 2017, this session on cities' responses to insecurity. It looks at the nexus between organized crime, violent extremism and its prevention, as well as state and police response. A keynote is delivered by Dan Eliasson, National Commissioner of the Swedish Police.
For full access to Stockholm Security Conference 2017: Secure Cities in an Insecure World, kindly follow the link.
This new SIPRI film evaluates how far we have to go to achieve peace, justice and strong institutions in the world by 2030—one of the goals set by the United Nations in its sustainable development agenda set out in 2015.
There is a clear concern raised throughout the film that current global trends are working against peacebuilders, particularly with regard to reducing violence everywhere.
The challenges explored include, but are not limited to: a lack of inclusion of populations in decision making, particularly youth globally; a lack of understanding of what causes structural violence; and the difficulty in convincing power holders to open up the political space.
SIPRI a lancé un nouveau film de réflexion sur le conflit au centre du Mali, appelant à une meilleure compréhension de la dynamique locale afin de résoudre le conflit et de construire la paix dans la région. Le film est accompagné d’une série de brèves interviews présentant les vues de l’Union européenne, du Fonds de consolidation de la paix de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), du Programme alimentaire mondial et de Point Sud, une organisation de recherche basée à Bamako et partenaire de SIPRI au Mali.
Policy and Research Papers
Security sector reform (SSR) is a relatively new concept that now shapes
international programmes for development assistance.1
Originating within the
development community, the concept is based on the assumption that democracy and sustainable socio-economic development—including the objectives
of poverty reduction and social justice—cannot be achieved without meeting
the basic security needs of individuals and communities. Recognizing that it is
often state security institutions themselves that threaten the security of individuals and society, whether through inefficiency, unprofessionalism, inadequate state regulation, corruption or human rights violations, SSR focuses on
the sound management and accountability of the security sector consistent
with the principles and practices of good governance. The objective of SSR is
to achieve efficient and effective security institutions that serve the security
interests of citizens, society and the state, while respecting human rights and
operating within the rule of law and under effective democratic control.
Access full paper at: http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2003/files/SIPRIYB0307.pdf
Ce rapport est le résumé en français du SIPRI Yearbook 2016 (892 pages), un annuaire prisé dans le monde entier par les politiciens, les diplomates, les journalistes, les académiques, les étudiants et les citoyens, comme une source fiable et indépendante de données et d’analyses sur l’armement, le désarmement et la sécurité internationale.Il propose un aperçu des évolutions dans les domaines de la sécurité internationale, des armes et de la technologie, des dépenses militaires, du commerce et de la production des armes, des conflits armés et des inititiatives de contrôle des armes classiques, nucléaires, chimiques et biologiques.
Cette brochure est le résumé de la 47e édition de l’Annuaire.
Pour accéder au document, veuillez suivre le lien suivant: Résumé du SIPRI Yearbook 2016 - Armements, désarmement et sécurité internationale
Three-dimensional (3D) printing is an evolving technology that can produce objects from plastics and metals. It works by building up layers of material hardened by a laser. Popular press and more serious analysts have speculated that a complete nuclear weapon or gas centrifuge could be built using a 3D printer, detailed and accurate computer drawings, and appropriate materials. However, very specialized starting materials such as plutonium powder or high explosives would be required and are not readily available. In fact, there are many barriers to successfully manufacturing a complete nuclear weapon and in most cases 3D printing gives no advantage to a non-state proliferator, or even a state, trying to clandestinely build a weapon. This paper examines the technical limitations of the technology and makes suggestions for how European export regimes can build up and maintain an awareness of cases where it could enable the bypassing of nuclear proliferation barriers.
To access the full paper Is Three-dimensional (3D) Printing a Nuclear Proliferation Tool?, kindly click on the link.
Climate change is increasingly viewed as the world’s greatest global security risk. However, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has not consistently or systematically addressed climate-related security risks.
In practice, the UNSC has predominantly focused on crisis management and hard security interventions but more recently the demand for investment in conflict prevention has grown rapidly. Supported by the confidence in global action on climate change generated by the Paris Agreement, there is a window of opportunity for the UNSC to take action on climate security. That is, the management of the direct and indirect consequences of inadequate or mismanaged climate mitigation and adaptation.
The UNSC’s modest investments in conflict prevention have generated considerable progress in a few discrete areas. It has established four clear functions for conflict prevention: (a) political elevation of root causes; (b) institution building and reform; (c) coordination of the UN system; and (d) mainstreaming into security operations. In taking action on climate security, the UNSC could help to strengthen climate risk-informed decision making and facilitate a coordination function on climate security across the UN system.
For full access to the policy paper A Resolution for a Peaceful Climate: Opportunities for the UN Security Council, kindly follow the link.
The Silk Road Economic Belt (the ‘Belt’) component of the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China in 2013 is an ambitious vision that has evoked enthusiasm among many stakeholders. Among other objectives, the Belt intends to promote infrastructural development and connectivity, and stimulate economic integration across the Eurasian continent. Europe is an integral part of China’s transcontinental vision, and the European Union (EU) has its own vested interests in the Belt—as the EU–China Connectivity Platform demonstrates. This one-year desk and field study examines the Belt from a security perspective. The report elaborates on whether the Belt is a platform for European Union (EU)–China cooperation on mitigating security threats throughout Eurasia, and provides policy recommendations to the EU on how to proceed. In the context of the report, ‘security’ is defined broadly in relation to intra- and interstate stability: it encompasses human security and developmental conditions.
For full access to the report, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU–China Cooperation Prospects, kindly follow the link.
This SIPRI commentary assesses the evolution of the Russian-Chinese arm trade relations since the 1970s. While China's demand of Russian weapon systems had been in decline over the past decade due to an increase in Chinese manufacturing, recent arms sales data indicates that this trend might currently be shifting.
For full access to China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales, kindly follow the link.
This paper advocates for a new and dedicated effort to deal with the problems related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for The European Union (EU). More specifically, one or more new strategy documents are required and, in this context, the EU should also pursue WMD-related contingency planning to increase preparedness and prevent or counter crises. The differentiation of WMD-related threats over the past decade, however, has risked making crisis response too slow and uncoordinated at all levels, from the local to the global. In parallel, there is the constant risk that the lessons learned from the more or less successful application of deterrence and other types of influencing methods are being forgotten. If a multi-sector crisis were to occur in some way linked to WMD, the lack of a level playing field in this regard could cause existential problems for certain EU member states.
For full access to the report The European Union and weapons of mass destruction: A follow-on to the global strategy?, kindly follow the link.
Over the past 70 years, international frameworks to deliver peace and development have evolved considerably to accommodate transformations in the global security and geopolitical landscape. Although significant progress has been made, the multilateral system faces new challenges that demand its continued evolution in order to remain fit for purpose. Protracted conflicts and complex transnational threats, such as climate change and violent extremism, are fueling displacement and perpetuating humanitarian emergencies. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, the fourth annual Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development set out to identify examples of ‘what works’ in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. Lessons and illustrative cases from the Forum sessions are discussed in the paper.
For full access to Peace solutions: Learning from what works and adapting to a changing world, kindly follow the link.
SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Database currently covers 11 South American countries and contains data going back to 1960. everal key sources of military expenditure are not covered in the data, which leads to an underestimation of military spending. Off-budget expenditure is used to fund a large proportion of the arms purchases not captured in the current military expenditure data on South American countries. This topical backgrounder begins to address this issue, using Venezuela as the initial country case for improvement.
For full access to Improving South American military expenditure data, kindly follow the link.
Building peace in post-conflict countries is rarely, if ever, straightforward. International actors often face insurmountable challenges when programming and implementing their projects. In addition to stopping violence, the aim of their work is to set states and societies on a peaceful path. Yet, the food-security situation clearly shows that the indirect, long-term effects of war further exaggerate this challenge.
The Lake Chad Basin is sadly one of the key examples of this dynamic. The ongoing insurgency in the region and the continued shrinking of Lake Chad (which is the main source of livelihood for millions of inhabitants) are causing a massive humanitarian crisis, intensifying the fragile security situation and increasing the cross-border displacement of populations.
The interconnectedness of food security, natural resources, peace and conflict is not new to anyone familiar with fragile and conflict-affected states. The question is how to reverse this negative spiral.
For full access to Climate Change, Food Security and Sustaining Peace, please follow the link.
Export Controls, Human Security and Cyber-surveillance Technology: Examining the Proposed Changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation
This paper focuses on the European Commission’s proposed changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation—the main regulatory instrument for EU member states’ controls on the trade in dual-use items.It outlines the existing relationship between human rights, international humanitarian law, terrorism and dual-use export controls and details the origins of the discussion about applying export controls to cyber-surveillance technology.
For full access to the paper, Export Controls, Human Security and Cyber-surveillance Technology: Examining the Proposed Changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation, kindly follow the link.
Multilateral peace operations are increasingly confronting a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing security challenges that are relatively new to them, that do not respect borders, and that have causes and effects which cut right across the international security, peacebuilding and development agendas. As a result, the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations III: Non‑Traditional Security Challenges initiative seeks to enhance understanding about peace operations and non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and violent extremism, irregular migration, piracy, organized crime and environmental degradation. As a part of this initiative, this SIPRI Background Paper explores the ‘non-traditional’ security challenges that organized crime presents to multilateral peace operations.
For full access to Multilateral Peace Operations and the Challenges of Organized Crime, please follow the link.
Initially, the 2012 crisis affecting Mali was understood to be primarily focused on the northern regions of the country, as were the previous rebellions that had been errupting at regular intervals since independence. However, the dramatic increase since 2015 in violence targeting security forces, elected or traditional officials, market places and schools in Mopti, the central region of Mali, has shifted attention.
This change in the geographic centre of the violence has led national and international security actors to re-assess their analysis on the root causes of the conflict affecting Mali.
Based on key interviews, a literature review and original documentation, this paper confronts the diverging narratives on the origins and drivers of the conflict in central Mali, as well as the interactions between them.
For full access to Central Mali: Violence, Local Perspectives and Diverging Narratives, please follow the link.
Under the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export, which was replaced in 2008 by the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, member states of the European Union have committed themselves to achieving ‘high common standards’ and ‘convergence’ in their arms export controls. The standards are outlined in eight criteria that require member states to abide by certain standards when assessing licences for arms exports. This includes denying licences when there is a ‘clear risk’ that the arms ‘might’ be used to commit violations of human rights or international humanitarian law (IHL) and ‘[taking] into account’ the risk that they will be diverted to an unauthorized end-user or end-use. Meanwhile, convergence in member states’ controls is promoted through systems of information sharing and—in cases where one state wishes to issue a licence for an arms export that another state has previously denied—a commitment to consult one another. However, decision-making in arms export licensing falls under states’ national competence and there is no formal mechanism at the EU level to sanction non-compliance with the Common Position. As such, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians and academics have often questioned whether EU member states are applying the criteria of the Common Position correctly and consistently.
Questions about the implementation of the Common Position have been particularly highlighted by the contrasting policies of EU member states on the export of arms to states in the Saudi-led military coalition engaged in the conflict in Yemen since 2015. There have been multiple reports by United Nations agencies and NGOs alleging that the coalition has violated IHL standards, including through widespread and systematic attacks on civilian targets and a failure to appropriately distinguish between civilian and military objects. These reports will be the subject of a ‘comprehensive examination’conducted by a group of experts appointed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. They have also led some EU member states to restrict or halt arms exports that are likely to be used in Yemen to certain members of the coalition, and the European Parliament has called for the EU to impose an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia. However, other member states have implemented no such constraints, and others have allowed exports to the coalition to increase.
For full access to, The conflict in Yemen and EU’s arms export controls: Highlighting the flaws in the current regime, please follow the link.
The NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme is a defence capacity-building programme that aims to provide member states, partners and other states with tailored support to reduce the risk of corruption and enhance the understanding and practice of good governance in their defence establishments. This assessment examines the impacts achieved since the previous assessment was conducted in 2014. The assessment is based on statements of impact made in questionnaires completed by serving defence department officials of participating states.
For full access to the report, Policy Impact Assessment Report on the NATO Building Integrity Programme, please follow the link.
The Black Sea region is experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
The loss of Crimea and the conflict in the east of the country have dramatically changed Ukraine’s relations with Russia and its position in the Black Sea. The civil war has become by far the most important security issue for Ukraine and Russia has become the main threat to its security. These events have also caused Ukraine to prioritize membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
To read the full report, Ukraine and Black Sea Security, please follow the link provided.
The Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks, hosted by SIPRI, launched a new report on Central Asia.
The report, entitled ‘Central Asia: Climate-related security risk assessment’, is the final in the series produced by the Expert Working Group during 2018. It identifies four priority climate-related security risks in Central Asia such as border conflicts intensifying as climate changes reduce access to natural resources.
Previous reports in the series have focused on the Lake Chad Region, Iraq and Somalia respectively. Each report builds on research and insights from the field in order to provide integrated assessments of climate-related security risks—as well as social, political and economic aspects.
To read the full report, Central Asia: Climate-related security risk assessment, please follow the link provided.
International efforts to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons go back over four decades. With the so-called Middle East resolution of 1995, such efforts—and the broader goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the region—became part of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) review process. While tying the NPT to progress on disarmament in the Middle East helped to ensure consensus on extending the NPT, it came at the cost of reduced treaty legitimacy; after more than two decades since its adoption, the Middle East resolution remains unimplemented.
Describing the political dynamics around the issue, this paper assesses the prospects for the 2020 NPT Review Conference and presents two alternative approaches for taking the WMD-free zone process forward—a WMD-free zone process without Israel or the inclusion of such a process as part of a broader regional security and arms control dialogue.
For full access to The lack of disarmament in the Middle East: A thorn in the side of the NPT, kindly follow the link.
This essay reflects upon the climate-related security risks facing Africa and reviews the current policy responses. It contends that broad AU member state support for an AU Special Envoy for Climate Change and Security would be a viable strategy that strengthens the AU’s response to climate risks. The idea of the envoy—which stems from the AU’s Peace and Security Council meeting in May 2018—is an opportunity to pre-empt migration and forced displacement and moreover, ‘climate-proof’ the AU’s peace and security architecture.
For full access to The need for an African Union Special Envoy for Climate Change and Security, please follow the link provided.
The Horn of Africa is undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security environment. A wide variety of international security actors—from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced a proliferation of foreign military bases and a build-up of naval forces. The external militarization of the Horn poses major questions for the future security and stability of the region.
This SIPRI Background Paper is the first of three papers devoted to the new external security politics of the Horn of Africa. The paper maps the growth of foreign military forces in and around the Horn over the past two decades. The other two papers in this series are ‘The new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region’ (SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, April 2019) and ‘Managing the new external security politics of the Horn of Africa region’ (SIPRI Policy Brief, April 2019).
To have access to the full publication, The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa region, kindly follow the link.
Eight of the ten countries hosting the most multilateral peace operations personnel in 2018 are located in areas highly exposed to climate change. As such, climate change is not just an issue of human security—it is transforming the entire security landscape. Nonetheless, international efforts to build and maintain peace are not yet taking these emerging challenges systematically into account. This policy brief illustrates how climate change impacts the efficacy of peacebuilding, specifically the aim to provide peace and security; to strengthen governance and justice; and to ensure social and economic development.
For full access to the paper, Climate change, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, kindly follow the link.
The 45th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook includes coverage of developments during 2013 in
- The conflict in Syria
- Armed conflict
- Peace operations and conflict management
- Military expenditure and arms production
- International arms transfers
- World nuclear forces
- Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation
- Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
- Conventional arms control
- Dual-use and arms trade controls
For more information and to access the Yearbook, click here.
Managing the Military Budgeting Process: Integrating the Defense Sector into Government-Wide Processes
Sound fiscal management of the entire security sector is essential if a country is to have effective, efficient and professional security forces that are capable of protecting the state and its population against internal and external threats. Highly autonomous security forces that are able to act with impunity in the economic and political spheres are invariably professionally weak and highly cost-ineffective. Because the armed forces generally absorb the majority of resources allocated to the security sector and tend to have a high degree of political autonomy, this project focuses on the process by which military budgets are developed, implemented and monitored.