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This paper is part of a two-part series on practical approaches to theories of change in conflict, security and justice programmes.

Part I first explores the fundamentals of theories of change: what they are, why they are important, and how to create a theory of change. It explores theories of change at different levels, and concludes with advice on how theories of change can enhance the effectiveness and relevance of programming.

Part II continues to build upon Part I by focusing on how theories of change can be used in the monitoring and evaluation stages of the project cycle. It provides practical guidance on how and why to use theories of change-focused monitoring and evaluation strategies, particularly exploring the ways in which theories of change can be included in any evaluation approach.

Key questions this document addresses:

• Why are Theories of Change important in evaluating programmes and projects?
• How can Theories of Change be used in Monitoring and Evaluation?
• How can Theories of Change be used to generate programme and project indicators?
• What are the limitations of Theories of Change and how can they be overcome?

Key messages/essential “take aways”:

• Using theories of change during the monitoring stage of project implementation provides feedback on whether a project, programme or strategy is ‘on track’ to accomplish the desired change and if the environment is evolving as anticipated in the project or programme design.
• The power of using theories of change is not only important in monitoring but also in evaluation. Using theories of change during the evaluation enables evaluators to ask hard questions about why certain changes are expected, the assumptions of how the change process unfolds, and which outcomes are being selected to focus on and why.
• Developing and explicitly articulating multiple levels of theories of change allows for a greater efficiency in evaluation and identifying problems and successes.
• The process of monitoring our assumptions and theories of change is the same as traditional monitoring of output and performance indicators: it involves an iterative cycle of regular data collection, analysis, reflection, feedback and action. The only thing that changes is what you are monitoring.
• Theory-based Evaluation helps assess whether underlying theories of change or assumptions of a programme are correct by identifying the causal linkages between different variables: from inputs to expected results. In a broad definition, any evaluation uncovering implicit or explicit assumptions, hypotheses or theories can be categorized as theory-based evaluation. This approach is particularly useful for learning and accountability as it allows for identifying whether
• the success, failure or mixed results of the intervention was due to programme theories and assumptions, or implementation.
• Theories of change are not a solve-all panacea for challenges in design, monitoring and evaluation for conflict, crime and violence initiatives: they must be used in conjunction with other tools and concepts.
• Theories of change are more than simple ‘if-then’ statements. As testable hypotheses, we need theories of change to be as reflective of the actual environment as possible without overly complicating the situation. Clearly defining the boundaries of the theory and its assumptions is critical.

This paper is part of a two-part series on theories of change in conflict, security and justice programmes.

Part I first explores the fundamentals of theories of change: what they are, why they are important, and
how to create a theory of change. It explores theories of change at different levels, and concludes with
advice on how theories of change can enhance the effectiveness and relevance of programming.

Part II continues to build upon Part I by focusing on how theories of change can be used in the
monitoring and evaluation stages of the project cycle. It provides practical guidance on how and why to
use theories of change-focused monitoring and evaluation strategies, particularly exploring the ways in
which theories of change can be included in any evaluation approach.

Key questions this document addresses:

• What are theories of change& why do we care?
• What are the different types & levels of theories of change?
• How should I develop theories of change?
• How should I use theories of change?

Key messages/essential “take aways”:

• A basic definition applicable to all initiatives that seek to induce change is as follows:A theory of change explains why and how we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context.
• In their simplest form, Theories of change are expressed in the following form:
  • “If we do X (action),then we will produce Y (change/shift towards peace, justice, security)”
    or
  • “We believe that by doing X (action) successfully, we will produce Y (movement towards a desired goal)”
• It is often helpful and clarifying to extend the statement a bit further by adding at least some of the rationale or logic in a “because” phrase. This then produces the formula: “Ifwe do X…,thenY...,becauseZ….”
• Making a theory of change explicit allows us to reveal ourassumptionsabout how change will happen, how and why our chosen strategy or programme will achieve its outcomes and desired impacts, and why it will function better than others in this context. Revealing these assumptions also helps identify gaps and unmet needs, including additional necessary activities or actors that should be engaged. We may also detect activities that are extraneous, weak or that fail to contribute to achieving the overall goal.
• Theories of changed are embedded in a particularcontextand should be considered incontext. How change can or will occur in one context cannot be automatically transferred to another setting. Theories of change must therefore be linked to a robustconflict analysis, in order to ensure that programming addresses the key drivers of conflict and fragility in the context.
• Theories of change can be developed or identified at severaldifferent levels. These range from the strategic or policy level, through broad sectoral or program levels, to project--‐level theories, and finally micro--‐level theories about specific limited activities.
  • Strategic Level:What is the change logic that informs the choice of priority areas within a country strategy (formal or informal)—and why were other options not chosen?
  • Portfolio/Sector/Programme Level:What are the two or three dominant theories of change embedded in the programming within the sector/portfolio? How will the combined efforts of the range of funded projects achieve desired changes (results) within a priority area?
  • Project Level:What is the core theory of change informing the project approach? How will reaching the project goal/objective contribute to the larger goals/objectives at the sector/programme level?
  • Activity Level:How will the activity (training, dialogue…) produce the intended micro--‐ level change(s) and, ultimately, lead to the project objectives/goals?
• It is never too late to develop a theory of change;it can be useful during all stages of the programming cycle.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the need for conflict sensitivity in security and justice sector reform (SJSR) programming. It is intended to help those involved in designing or implementing SJSR programming understand how conflict sensitivity could ensure their programming avoids inadvertently contributing to conflict.
 
Key questions this document addresses:
What is conflict sensitivity and why is it relevant to SJSR programming?
How might SJSR programming become inadvertently caught up in conflict dynamics?
What tools are available to enable conflict sensitivity in SJSR programming?

Key messages/essential “take aways”:
All interventions introduce resources into a context, be they equipment, funding, training or process enhancement. All resources coming into a conflict context have the potential to become caught up in the conflict dynamic, and thus no intervention is neutral. Unless there is specific analysis of how any type of intervention may inadvertently contribute to tensions there is a real risk that conflict or tensions may escalate – this applies to SJSR programming as well as any other type of intervention in a fragile and conflict affected state.

Support to the security and justice sector can contribute to tensions by:
 inadvertently replicating or amplifying existing tensions;
 reinforcing patterns of domination and exclusion – often causes of conflict;
 Introducing resources which then become the focus of a struggle for control;
 Challenging power and vested interests triggering a violent backlash.

Additionally, for the security and justice sectors the potential exists that skills, facilities, processes or hardware may be misused and promote conflict or violence.

There are a range of tools that have been developed to enable conflict sensitivity in the development and humanitarian sector. Key to these are:
 Conflict analysis;
 Identification of possible interactions between programming and conflict; and
 Revision of programming in light of that analysis.

These are also applicable to SJSR programming.

The report, produced by Isabel Vogel and commissioned by the DFID evaluation division,considers the current uses and definitions of Theory of Change (ToC). A methodology which maps the assumptions which inform planned interventions within all stages of an initiative, ToC is increasingly regarded as an essential tool in designing and appreciating the complex network of factors which influence project outcomes.The review considers the practical aspects of ToC implementation and to develop a more consistent approach which is gaining in reputation and use within the international development community.

Vogel acknowledges that lack of consensus exists around the specific definition of ToC. The review highlights the necessity for flexibility in developing a successful ToC. Through consideration of different approaches, outlining examples of ToC in practice within the appendix, Vogel identifies and draws together a short list of the core elements, generally agreed upon as essential requirements for any discussion centred on theory of change. The review further examines the most effective means of establishing a logical pathway to desired outcomes using the ToC model. Vogel highlights the need to establish ToC as an ongoing process developed alongside all phases of a programme from inception to impact evaluation and emphasises that assumptions should be made explicit within the organising framework of a project.

ToC, as the review makes clear, has the potential to provide an invaluable framework for discussion and critical thinking surrounding project implementation and evaluation. It allows for subjective analysis to be discussed and represented, through diagrams and visuals, which can in turn support more dynamic exchange between policy actors, grantees and donors.

For full report, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf

This document is a review of security and justice sector reform (SJSR) programmes and lessons learned from 2001 to 2005 that were part of DFID's Africa Conflict Prevent Pool (ACPP). The programmes were reviewed based on the criteria of coherence, effectiveness, and impact.

Stabilisation Issues Notes provide a short summary of what the Stabilisation Unit has learned to date. They have been developed on the basis of experience and are aimed at improving the effectiveness of our practical engagement in various aspects of stabilisation. They are aimed primarily at the Stabilisation Unit‟s own practitioners and consultants, and those of other HMG departments. They are not a formal statement of HMG policy.

Key Messages
1) Stabilisation planning and implementation is about identifying / addressing the specific activities required to achieve political stability in countries emerging from conflict.
2) Promoting the rule of law in stabilisation environments can help a state to increase its legitimacy, allow fairer political negotiation and uphold the implementation of political agreements. The most urgent priority is often establishing law and order, meeting internal security needs and ensuring basic functioning of the criminal justice system.
3) Security Sector Stabilisation (SSS) activities enable essential and minimum security functions to be established and maintained to achieve stabilisation  objectives. They are not the same as Security System Reform (SSR) in more benign environments; they should however help create the conditions for SSR, when conditions permit.
4) The urgency of meeting security needs has often led to quick fix approaches and a singular focus on expanding the size of a single organisation often with a „train and equip‟ mentality. This will often fall short of providing the kind of support that will contribute to lasting security outcomes.

The lessons identified here are based on ideas that have been developing across Government and on our deepening understanding of what works and what doesn’t
work on the ground. They will hopefully be of use to policymakers, practitioners and programme managers working in and on conflict-affected environments.

The complexity of the challenges in stabilisation environments require integrated solutions at multiple levels. Rather than re-inventing our responses to each new
crisis, we need to identify relevant lessons from past experience, learn from these, and adapt them to the specific requirements of each new environment.

The identification of lessons remains just the first step. We need to ensure that the lessons are actually ‘learned’. This requires a genuine commitment at all levels to learning from the past, the dedication of resources (human and financial) to support the learning process, and the development of systems to feed lessons back into policy, planning and practice. The lessons learning process should be a continuous cycle.

In October 2010, ITAD was commissioned by the DFID Politics and the State team to conduct research and propose a way forward for Governance programmes in conducting value for money assessments as part of a consultancy on measuring the impact and value for money of DFID Governance programmes. The specific objective stated for our work on value for money (VFM) in the Terms of Reference was:

“To set out how value for money can best be measured in governance and conflict programming, and whether the suggested indicators have a role in this or not”.

This Report presents background on VFM from documentary research (section 2); explains the analytical framework that captures key concepts in VFM, and sets out options for improving VFM (section 3). It outlines one specific option, a “3 Es ratings and weightings approach to VFM” as presented to Governance and Conflict Advisers at a DFID Research Day on 25 November 2010, and includes their response plus some initial reactions from Finance and Corporate Performance Division (FCPD), particularly with regard to Business Case compatibility (section 4). Finally, the Report proposes ways in which initial findings can be refined and further developed to support Governance programming and build staff competence and confidence in conducting VFM assessments (section 5).

Human rights are key to stabilisation - both as a means and as an end in themselves. Although we need to promote universal adherence to human rights, we need to recognise that there can be different cultural and political approaches to dealing with human rights violations, especially during a fragile peace process. Human rights need to be embedded in planning and assessment for stabilisation; the selection of specific tools will depend on needs, opportunities and constraints in any particular context.

A good results framework that enables programme progress to be effectively monitored and explained has never been more important, particularly in times of financial austerity. As a public sector organisation, DFID must have the capacity to prove that its budget is spent wisely, and the ability to demonstrate the impact and value of its programmes to core constituencies.

Governance and conflict programming form an important part of DFID’s global programme portfolio and account for a significant proportion of annual resource allocation (GPR, 2010). This is likely to grow as DFID commits to expand its presence in fragile and conflict-affected environments (DFID, 2009).

It is however widely acknowledged that the effects of governance and conflict interventions on poverty reduction or enduring peace and security are seldom direct and easy to measure. International governance datasets (such as the World Governance Index), whilst comprehensive and well-resourced, seldom have relevance at actual country level as their measurements are often set at higher objective levels, yet there is a paucity of useful programme level tools available to enhance measurement in this area.

In October 2010, ITAD was commissioned by the DFID Politics and the State Team to assess the quality of a suggested list of governance and conflict indicators as part of a wider contract to support elements of the Results Action Plan.

The indicators have been tested using a set of normative criteria that collectively aims to ensure the types of measurements included in the list and the corresponding data sources are fit for intended purpose. Although the study has to some extent been constrained by lack of time and available information, attention has given to interrogating the traction of indicators with existing programme results chains and underlying theories of change, including in contexts of fragility and conflict, such as Nigeria and Afghanistan.

This Issues Note gives readers a basic understanding of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), so that they are in a position to consider whether DDR is an appropriate stabilisation intervention. It clarifies questions, issues and articulates the decisions that the practitioner may face with when considering a DDR programme. This note should be read in conjunction with Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A UK View, and with other Stabilisation Issues Notes, particularly those on Security and rule of Law and Economic Recovery.