OECD

Context

In 1994, Yemen finally achieved unification and began the process of modernising its government structures and activities. Although results are being achieved, the process is slow, the justice and security system in Yemen is weak, and linkages within the sector are in need of further development. Violence and disorder remain problematic in various regions throughout the country, as large areas do not have either a police or a judicial presence. It is estimated that over 80% of all judicial and security services are provided by non-state actors. Access to justice and safety for marginalised and excluded social groups is also poor in many areas.

Entry point

The government of Yemen requested international donor support for their ongoing justice and security development activities. Over the course of 12 months, an international and national multidisciplinary team — including security, judicial, prison, governance, and public administration practitioners, along with an anthropologist and legal sociologist — went on a series of missions to Yemen to develop a one-year inception phase assistance programme. As a result of this assessment, the inception phase activities will focus on a police management support programme to assist government planning, performance evaluation, and local police station problem-solving initiatives, while judicial support is to concentrate on providing concrete assistance with information management, particularly with regard to enhancing judicial inspections and court administration. The third element of the support programme is attempting to establish a social fund for justice, whose activities would seek to improve access to justice for all, particularly marginalised and vulnerable groups.

Lessons learned

Be aware of the sensitivity of conducting needs assessments — It may sometimes be politically impossible to conduct extensive performance, management and needs assessments of security and justice institutions. One strategy may be to incorporate multiple, narrowly defined evaluations as outputs of a “quick win” initiative designed to achieve an immediate improvement of service delivery

Carefully design pilot projects — Pragmatism and political realism are vital in the formulation and delivery of pilot projects. If such projects are to build the trust and confidence of the partner government they must meet its needs while seeking to verify their commitment to sustainable justice and security development.

Management arrangements are important — An inception phase may be well designed, but it will be ineffective if equal consideration is not given to managing its implementation. It may be beneficial to ensure that people involved in designing the inception phase and planning long-term assistance remain closely involved in the management of the inception activities to ensure continuity, institutional memory and the confidence of local stakeholders.

*From the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice 

Context

The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) mandated that a Joint Assessment Mission identify and quantify post-conflict economic recovery, development and poverty eradication needs. The key issues identified were: to restore peace, security and social stability; to establish the physical, institutional and social infrastructure required by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees and conflict-affected citizens to re-establish their livelihoods; and to strengthen civil administration so it could
perform its basic functions.

The parties to the DPA agreed to adopt a two-track approach to the DJAM and its financing. A first track, led by the UN (Early Recovery or Track I), would focus on the normalisation of life in waraffected communities and lay the foundation for the transition to reconstruction and development. The Early Recovery Programme focuses on the fi rst 18-24 months and proposes initiatives to support peace efforts that set the stage for development. A concurrent second track (Track II), led by the World
Bank, has focused on post-conflict economic recovery, reconstruction and development needs, with the eventual aim of reaching the Millennium Development Goals.

Entry point

The peace agreement and high-level international engagement provided the entry point for the DJAM. The 30-person assessment team included Sudanese and international experts gathered in six main clusters to address three cross-cutting issues. The clusters were: basic social services (healthcare, water and sanitation, education); war-affected communities (food security and livelihoods, basic infrastructure, resource and livestock management); rule of law (police, judiciary, corrections, access to justice, and sexual and gender-based violence); governance and capacity building (policy planning,
civil service); peace and security (land and confl ict, reconciliation) and returns (protection, logistics). The cross-cutting issues focused on gender, the environment and HIV/AIDS.

Due to the deteriorating security situation in Darfur during the two-month field mission, access to certain various groups, IDP camps, and aspects of Darfurian society (particularly those of the non-signatory rebel groups) was limited. Nevertheless, the DJAM team members were able to meet formally and informally with a representative sampling of government, civil society, IDPs, and war-affected villagers, and relied on limited secondary data.

The findings of the Rule of Law cluster were quite sobering. Notwithstanding the signing of the peace agreement, the continued armed conflict has led to repeated violations of human rights and humanitarian law and a significant deterioration in safety and security where women and children in particular are especially vulnerable to physical harm and sexual abuse. The restoration of credible rule of law institutions is crucial to the success of any peace initiative and early recovery programme. Trust between IDP communities and the government of Sudan remains extremely low. Much work needs to be done to bridge this impasse, rebuild a sense of community and trust, and to establish credible and transparent institutions that provide a tradition of service. Official actors or representatives of rule of law institutions are simply overburdened and unable to cope with the demands
placed on them. The traditional and informal dispute mechanisms appear to be politicised, minimising their effectiveness and viability as an alternative to an overwhelmed and under-performing justice system. The police have little or no access to, or working relationships with, IDP communities.

Lessons learned

While the DJAM is at the time of writing a work-in-progress, several initial lessons can be drawn from this experience:

• The challenges of ensuring a nationally owned JAM process. Broad-based consultations and a concerted effort are often needed to build local ownership.
• The need for an overarching strategic framework to guide priorities, set targets and monitor progress.
• The need for a nationally driven JAM process to link with national budgets and local systems — without this, sustainability is difficult

Context

During the transition to democracy in South Africa, the nature of police institutions and the process of policing itself were dramatically reformed. At an institutional level, the South African Police Service (SAPS) was created as a result of the integration of the former South African Police and the ten “homeland” police agencies. Considerable work was required to align and integrate these structures and their various procedures, ranks and administrative systems. In terms of delivery of policing itself, there were also significant reforms, including a focus on improving relations between police and community; redesigning systems for selection and training; preventing and actively responding to torture or other human rights abuses; and inculcating a culture of service delivery into police work. The complexity and multi-faceted nature of the reform process, along with the requirement for police, policy makers and the newly created civilian secretariats at national and provincial level to manage and monitor the process more effectively, led to the establishment of a performance management system based on indicators.

Entry point

The critical entry point for establishing the system was the desire of the new political leadership to track the impact of the police reform process, including on the level of security experienced by local people. On an annual basis, the police, the civilian secretariat and elected policy makers set the overall performance targets. Detailed performance indicators were agreed with civilian policy makers (at both national and provincial level) and then published. The police established a data management system to record and report on performance. Finally, levels of performance were evaluated by the civilian secretariats.

Lessons learned

Too many indicators — Given the number of issues requiring monitoring, the early years of the process focused on an excessive quantity of indicators, numbering well over 100. This required a significant bureaucratic effort to collect data and resulted in the presentation of detailed tables of numbers that were difficult to interpret. The indicators also held data on widely varying topics, from levels of reported crime to the percentage of formally disadvantaged officers receiving promotion. That made it difficult to provide clear answers as to how well overall reform efforts were proceeding. Many of the indicators were also difficult to verify independently (for example the number of patrols conducted or meetings held), leading to suspicions from civilians and operational police alike that the reporting system lacked integrity. Fewer, more focused and clearly verifiable indicators would have simplified and increased the influence of the system.

Difficulty of analysis — The civilian secretariats responsible for the analysis of the data at both national and provincial level were short of skilled human resources and ill-equipped for the task. While some progress was made at national level in producing reports on police performance, this was seldom replicated further down the system at the level of provincial secretariats. The analysis produced was also heavily data-driven (reflecting the statistical inputs provided by the police), and given the complexity of the task it was difficult to produce information that policy makers could use effectively. Indicators that measured activities (patrols or meetings) were impossible to reconcile with those that measured outputs (reducing crime) in a way that produced useful analytical outcomes. In combination with a simplified set of indicators, greater investment in analytical capacity would have significantly enhanced the quality of the reporting, and thereby the impact.

Weakness of the feedback loop to policy makers — Analysis of police performance in relation to the indicators was seldom made public, reducing the pressure to use the system as a management tool. While the minister for safety and security was briefed quarterly on the results by the national secretariat, given the challenges spelled out above it was difficult to integrate findings directly into a set of formal policy directives. Nevertheless such briefings, as well as those to parliament and provincial
legislatures, contributed to an understanding of the complexity, challenges and overall progress of the reform effort. A more clearly established and widely recognised reporting process in which the findings were presented and debated and decisions taken could have strengthened the link to national policy making.

Impact

While the system suffered from clear weaknesses, it provided the only country-wide data-driven system to determine overall progress with regard to police reform. Indeed, the system of indicators was often taken much more seriously at the level of local and area police, several of whom established a dedicated and often very sophisticated monitoring capacity. In the longer term the use of indicators during the transition inculcated a much stronger culture of measuring performance in the SAPS than
would otherwise have been the case.

An overview of the current process of using indicators for measuring police performance in South Africa, as well as its links to the system of police oversight, can be found in “The Police We Want: A Handbook for Oversight of the Police in South Africa”, Open Society Justice Initiative, 2005, http://www.justiceinitiative.org.

Context

Following agreement in 2005, DFID was faced with the challenge of successfully managing the transition in Sierra Leone from a programme of support primarily focused on the police to a broader approach engaging other government departments, the judiciary, and non-state actors in the informal justice sector. This significant challenge was not managed particularly well, which impacted negatively on progress made in sensitising the police to the change in approach to justice sector development.

Entry point

The entry point should have been the finalisation of the Justice Sector Development Programme documentation itself (the planning for a system-wide reform programme). Those engaged in the established Commonwealth Safety and Security Programme (CSSP — the programme focused on police reform) should have been tasked with developing an exit strategy complementary to the inception phase of the Justice Sector Development Programme. While the latter programme produced a
“migration document” to manage the transition from their perspective, none was forthcoming from the CSSP management. The Sierra Leone Police were thus only provided with limited support to assist them in the change of thinking required for a sector-wide approach.

Lessons learned

Effective management of change is vital within donor agencies — The challenges outlined occurred during DFID’s devolution process from London to Freetown. Given large staff turnover and the challenges of office transition, a short-term approach to programmatic transition occurred. Before embarking on any change to the status quo, it is important to identify the risks such a change poses, as well as mitigating measures to reduce the impacts of spoilers. That did not occur in this instance, though the error was rectified upon devolution through ensuring that both the security and justice programmes were brought under the authority of one programme manager.

The importance of effective communication — In any environment unused to enacting change, effective communication to all stakeholders at each stage of the change process is critical. Broadening any programme from a focus on one institution to an entire sector is bound to entail shifts in approach, and there will be some perceived winners and losers. Informing all stakeholders of the need for this change — and of their role in relation to it — at an early stage is vital, if local ownership is to occur and other donors are to be able to factor the step change into their own programmatic processes.

Impact

The failure to address the difficulties of transition led to significant differences within DFID and within the international community more broadly as to the role of the police in Sierra Leone. Entrenched positions developed as to whether the police should be viewed as having primary responsibility for security, or whether they should be embraced as part of the justice community. The answer is both, but a weak migration plan between two discrete programmes encouraged these conceptual differences to take root.

Context

In 2003, the government of Afghanistan requested support from the World Bank and DFID to conduct a review of public finance in the security system. The review followed concerns of the minister of finance that the entire security system was rapidly becoming fiscally unsustainable, mainly due to large off-budget transfers that had direct impact on government on-budget spending. In 2006, DFID commissioned a similar review of public expenditures in Sierra Leone to gauge the overall effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the security system. The main objectives of both reviews from a public financial management (PFM) and development perspective were to:

• Gain as complete an understanding as possible of the current level and structure of security expenditures, recent trends, and likely future expenditure requirements based on current plans.
• Assess the extent to which the strategies that are used are coherent and the government institutions guide public expenditure allocations.
• Review processes for determining funding levels, expenditure allocations, budget execution and post-execution functions, and assess the extent to which they follow sound PFM principles.
• Describe the institutional framework for the security system and ascertain the extent to which it embeds or is conducive to sound PFM.

Entry point

In both cases the reviews were conducted with and for national authorities in order to strengthen national analytical capacities in policy making, planning and budgeting. The reviews were able to consolidate lessons learned across a wide range of stakeholders, and the various findings strengthened reform-related decision making with regard to institutional mandates, staffing and policy management issues. In Afghanistan, the review allowed the ministry of finance to engage in discussions with
the National Security Council, as well as international partners funding the military and police reform programmes. In the case of Sierra Leone, the review has provided a platform for costing the entire five-year security sector reform programme.

Lessons learned

PFM principles are applicable — The reviews have demonstrated that standard PFM reviews can be applied to the security system just as they can to any other sector, such as education and health.

PFM reviews are valuable to assess sustainability — The reviews have allowed national governments and their international supporters to rapidly assess the extent to which national authorities will be able to take control of functions that are currently funded externally, off-budget or through grants.

Support for SSR should be consistent with PFM principles — Continued off-budget financing of security sector reform programmes undermines national ownership, co-ordination, and potentially long-term fiscal discipline.

Impact

The failure to address the difficulties of transition led to significant differences within DFID and within the international community more broadly as to the role of the police in Sierra Leone. Entrenched positions developed as to whether the police should be viewed as having primary responsibility for security, or whether they should be embraced as part of the justice community. The answer is both, but a weak migration plan between two discrete programmes encouraged these conceptual differences to take root.

Context

Security system reform issues have been integrated into national development frameworks in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Uganda. In Uganda, armed violence and insecurity — particularly in the north and northeast — were identified as primary contributors to structural poverty and inequality. The result was that the Ugandan Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (2004-08) highlighted existing commitments to regional agreements on security promotion, including small arms control. In Burundi, the government’s 2005 Strategic Framework to Combat Poverty (CSLP) was a deliberate effort to promote post-conflict recovery and was based on a multi-stakeholder and multi-sector dialogue of 145 community-based and non-governmental organisations. In Sierra Leone, the recently agreed PRSP (2005-07) shifted planning and programming from direct post-conflict concerns to a more development-oriented agenda designed to promote inclusive civil society participation.

Entry point

In all three cases, the real and perceived threat of escalating armed violence in the so-called postconflict period, and earlier positive experience with small arms control, catalysed a commitment to investing in accountable and responsible security sectors. In Uganda for example, the PEAP was purposefully designed to increase awareness of the costs of armed violence, but awareness also of the positive dividends of military and police reform in relation to the enhanced safety of communities. The Burundi CSLP addresses the need for a permanent ceasefi re with all remaining armed groups, the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, the professionalisation of the security forces, and civilian disarmament. The PRSP in Sierra Leone sought to build on previous successes in relation to DDR and small arms control, and to defi ne the appropriate size, shape and structure of a reformed security sector.

Lessons learned

Ensure a multi-stakeholder and multi-sector dialogue — The PRSP, PEAP and CSLP were forged after extensive and inclusive dialogue processes that emphasised the inclusion of SSR priorities in development frameworks. For example, the PEAP focuses specifically on enhancing the justice, law and order sector to improve the security of persons and property, law enforcement, and access to justice. Moreover, it emphasises disarmament and arms control as major contributors to security promotion
and development.

Use an international agency to co-ordinate a multi-stakeholder and multi-sector dialogue —International agencies had the necessary distance from local politics, legitimacy in the eyes of the governments and populations, and resources to foster successful outcomes of the dialogue processes.

Seek to include SSR in development frameworks to enhance commitment — The PRSP, PEAP and CSLP each include concrete commitments and strategies for managing public expenditures to meet poverty reduction and SSR-enhancing goals. This is valued by donors, who provide direct budgetary support.

Impact

The introduction of SSR as a priority issue in national development frameworks raised its profile among partner governments and donors. It also provided an opportunity to stimulate a more inclusive public debate on security issues. While progress has been made in some areas, there is still much to be done. Including security issues in development frameworks is an important step, but government and donors then need to ensure that commitments are financed and implemented.

Context

The government of Uganda carried out a defence review with UK assistance from 2002 to 2004. The comprehensive review was the fi rst in Uganda’s history and a politically sensitive and risky undertaking for both countries. The review sought to lay the groundwork for changes in how Uganda formulates and delivers defence and wider security policy, by attempting to anchor this process more firmly in wider governmental planning and budgeting processes. It was undertaken at a time when Uganda was facing a number of serious security problems, both in the north and along its border with the Congo.

This marked the first time that the United Kingdom had supported a review process of such scope and complexity. Like Uganda’s other development partners, the United Kingdom was particularly concerned about rising levels of defence spending. The methodology drew upon both the United Kingdom’s own experience with a strategic defence review in the 1990s and current SSR thinking in order to develop a more holistic and developmentally sensitive approach to analysing defence
requirements. Close collaboration was required at both political and technical levels in order to manage the immense expectations generated by the review process.

Entry point

Both the government and its development partners believed that the defence sector offered the most promising entry point for addressing the country’s security problems. Priority was placed on developing an understanding of the role of defence in relation to other security actors, a clear description of the defence forces needed to fulfil this role effectively, and a plan for defence transformation set within the context of competing needs and resource constraints across the public sector.

Lessons learned

Agree objectives at the outset — A clear and shared understanding of the rationale for and objectives of a defence review process should be developed by the government and its development partners before the actual review exercise is launched. Where views differ as to the objectives of a review or how it should be carried out, careful attention should be paid to managing the diverse expectations of stakeholders as to the concrete outcomes the process will deliver.

Ensure methodologies are appropriate to the local context — Experiences can be drawn on from other countries but should be carefully adapted to the local context before being applied, and adequate training for national staff should be provided.

Develop national ownership throughout the process — Where conditions for strong national ownership are not in place from the outset, a strong partnership between a government and its development partners is necessary. A successful partnership implies commitments and responsibilities on both sides, including the need for assistance to be provided in ways that enhance national leadership and political responsibility for the process.

Context

In 2003, following the end of the war in Liberia, a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants was begun. DDR was followed by limited SSR in 2004 and small arms and light weapons (SALW) control in 2005.

Entry point

DDR, small arms control and SSR are related if distinct categories of intervention in post-conflict contexts. In Liberia DDR provided a platform for intervention in the immediate post-confl ict environment, and small arms control and SSR were integrated at a later stage. Baseline assessments and studies undertaken to shape DDR — including a review to determine appropriate levels of security services for meeting national needs and the availability of small arms — proved crucial for the small arms and
SSR programmes that followed.

Lessons learned

DDR, SSR and SALW control should be integrated — The integration of DDR, SSR and SALW control initiatives prior to and during the post-conflict recovery process increases the sustainability of peacebuilding.

Poor performance in one component of DDR can undermine SSR and SALW control — unrealistic expectations in disarmament initiatives led to riots in Monrovia after ex-combatants received mixed messages concerning cash payments for weapons surrender. Moreover, weak entry criteria and a shortage of qualified personnel staffing the screening process contributed to the admission of too many ex-combatants, leading to funding shortfalls.

Regional approaches to DDR, SSR and SALW control are essential to increasing programme performance — During the disarmament phase only 27 000 weapons were collected. This was partly attributed to weapons collection programmes in Cote d’Ivoire. Perceived higher compensation for weapons in that country led to their being trafficked there from Liberia. Regional approaches could increase the effectiveness of disarmament by avoiding false economies and falsely raised expectations.

Impact

It is too early to assess the overall impact of DDR and related SSR activities in Liberia. However, DDR contributed to a reduction in violence and increased stability for the 2006 elections and subsequent SSR. By early 2006, recruitment and training of the new armed forces started with plans to create a 2 000-strong army. Future challenges include ensuring parliamentary oversight and civilian control over all security forces; developing a comprehensive and inclusive national security policy; and securing
stable donor support.

Context

Vetting to ensure minimum standards of integrity in public service is widely recognised as an important SSR measure. Between 1999 and 2002, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) vetted all law enforcement personnel in the country. Of the total of 23 751 personnel registered, 16 803 were provisionally authorised to exercise police powers (those not authorised were mainly administrative support personnel working at local ministries of the interior); of those, 15 786 were certified as police officers. Three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC), made up of international and national personnel, restructured the court system and reappointed all judges and prosecutors between 2002 and 2004. Almost 1 000 posts were declared vacant and there was open competition to fill them.

Entry point

The Dayton Agreement stipulated that police offi cers and civil servants responsible for serious violations of minority rights should face “prosecution, dismissal or transfer”. The presence of the UN Mission facilitated the process of vetting.

Lessons learned

Review or reappointment? UNMIBH applied a review model to vet the police: serving police officers were screened to determine their suitability for continued service. Shortcomings in this process were caused by a failure to ensure basic standards of due process. The HJPC, on the other hand, applied a reappointment model to vet judges and prosecutors: all posts were declared vacant and serving judges and prosecutors also had to apply. Applicants in the reappointment process had no right to a hearing or to judicial appeal if they were not selected and the burden of proof was shifted onto them. These procedural simplifications streamline a vetting process significantly and provide a better opportunity for broader SSR measures. A reappointment process, however, represents a risk of arbitrary interference in otherwise independently operating sectors. It should therefore only be established when the institution is fundamentally dysfunctional; it should be implemented by an independent body that follows fair procedures; and it should be put in place as early as possible to avoid protracted periods of legal uncertainty.

Linking vetting to other reforms — Both the UNMIBH and HJPC processes pursued broader SSR goals. In particular, both led to a reduction in the overall personnel size and an increased representation of minorities. Vetting will normally have to be accompanied by other SSR measures to ensure an effective reform process.

The role of international organisations — Vetting processes under domestic leadership preclude resentment against external imposition and ensure the application of local know-how. Vetting processes are, however, often contested as they affect access to power, and considerable international involvement might be required. When an internationalised process is established, every effort should be made to broadly involve domestic actors and to guarantee a seamless changeover to regular domestic procedures. In this regard, the shortcomings of the UNMIBH process were significant. The HJPC process, on the other hand, was integrated into the domestic legal system and ensured a smooth transfer to a domestic follow-on mechanism.

Impact

The UNMIBH police review process resulted in the removal of personnel who did not meet established criteria, a reduction in overall personnel numbers, and an improvement in the ethnic and gender composition of the police. The HJPC reappointment process resulted in the closure of several courts, about 30% of the incumbent applicants not being reappointed, and the pre-war ethnic balance being largely restored. At the completion of the reappointment process, the HJPC turned into a permanent
appointment and disciplinary body

Context

The defence sector has long been seen by many outside observers as an obstacle to economic and social development in Uganda. Despite a major DDR process in the early 1990s supported by the World Bank, defence has continued to swallow a large share of the resources available to the country. External actors thus informally tied their assistance to a cap on military expenditures of 2% of GDP. The Ugandan government argued that this cap was not sufficient to provide security to its citizens,
particularly in the North. A significant portion of military spending went off-budget and military budget data became increasingly unreliable, which — combined with other cost overruns — resulted in total spending effectively exceeding the cap every year. At the same time, donors were critical of the involvement of the Ugandan armed forces in the DRC.

Entry point

The defence review process was triggered by the recognition among a number of donors, including the World Bank and UK DFID, that the spending cap was not having the desired effects. They were willing to go along with the view of the Ugandan military and political leadership that higher expenditures were needed to improve security, but they also were concerned about the ways in which money was spent. A 1998 expert Defence Efficiency Study provided suggestions for improvements in transparency and management but could not solve the underlying issues of the appropriateness of Ugandan military spending. The logical next step in facilitating a rational debate between donors and the Ugandan government about the appropriate level and spending of defence funds was a detailed assessment of security threats to Ugandan citizens and defence needs. This was initiated
by the Ugandan government in the form of a thorough defence review process supported by UK DFID
during 2002/03.

Lessons learned

Broadening the process — The defence review process involved more than the military — it was a cross-governmental initiative and included some civil society organisations. It started out with an overall assessment of threats to the security of Ugandan citizens and territory, including an assessment of all potential policy responses available to the government, before focusing on options and issues for defence reform.

Professional approach — Sequencing of the various steps within the defence review process was well defined in advance. Implications for force planning and structure, as well as procurement and personnel, were logically derived from the threat and capability assessments.

Limited transparency — The military refused to provide transparency on all of its relevant activities; for example, some sections of the budget would remain classified. Outside observers, including external actors, thus were sceptical of the results of the review process, particularly of the proposals to greatly increase spending on equipment and to improve military capabilities.

Underestimating the fundamental nature of the problem — The main objective of the defence review, namely to improve the quality of dialogue on military spending, was undermined by a lack of common understanding about the main reforms necessary: those to improve military capabilities and governance reforms.

Impact

While the defence review process has not resulted in an agreement between donors and government about the appropriate level of military spending in Uganda, it has laid the groundwork for additional reforms in the Ugandan defence sector. Work has been done on a Defence Corporate Plan, and the Defence Reform Unit established as part of the Review has now become the Defence Reform Secretariat.

Context

An OECD member country initiated a programme of intelligence and security reform in a Middle Eastern country that had little experience of working with OECD countries and few trusting relationships with outsiders. The purpose of the reform was to rationalise a security sector bloated with many competing agencies, which led to wasted resources and potential instability. Some security officials were suspicious of the language of reform, which was seen as an attempt to impose alien cultural
concepts on a tribal political system. The country faced a number of trans-national threats including terrorism, people trafficking and arms smuggling, and was under international pressure to bring these activities under control.

Entry point

The country’s ministry of interior approached the OECD country’s donor organisation with a request for a wide range of capability-building activities across policing, justice and security. The ministry primarily sought exposure to international thinking on operational effectiveness, and the original requests were not couched in the language of reform.

Lessons learned

Modesty of ambition — The initial assessment found that the OECD member country had insufficient political knowledge of the country to credibly advocate or manage a comprehensive programme of reform, and was not trusted enough to be able to gain access to the most sensitive parts of government. The assessment recommended a small-scale, experimental approach consisting of a portfolio of government-to-government co-operation activities, while recognising that not all of these would necessarily prove successful. The aim was to build knowledge and trusting relationships and to identify what worked and what did not, to the point where a more sophisticated programme could be designed and managed in the future. The management team had to adjust its practices and expectations to implement a flexible, iterative approach that emphasised learning and relationship building rather than immediate reform outcomes.

Care with vocabulary — The word “reform” was banned by the practitioners’ team. Proposals were described in terms of their benefi ts to operational effectiveness and responsiveness to citizens’ needs, rather than to higher-level principles of democratisation.

Early delivery of results — Some senior security officials criticised the team for conducting “endless scoping studies whilst never delivering”. The management team attempted to rationalise the assessment process to avoid duplication of meetings and over-analysis, and sought to implement practical activities as soon as sufficient evidence became available that they might be productive.

Impact

The programme is still in its infancy; it is not yet possible to judge its impact.

Context

The first peaceful transfer of power in Ghana from one elected government to another occurred in January 2001 when opposition leader John Kufuor became President. Part of the remaining challenge of democratic consolidation was full civilian, democratic control and further professionalisation of the security sector.

Entry point

Through the good relationship developed by the UK defence attaché with senior figures in the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ghanaian armed forces, the UK Security Sector Development Advisory Team was invited by the Ghanaian MoD to advise them on how to develop a human resources management and development strategy for the civilian component of the MoD. It became clear that before such a strategy could be developed, there was a need for greater clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the civil wing in relation to its military counterparts. The process of helping Ghanaian partners think through what these roles and responsibilities might be provided an opportunity to draw upon the experiences of other African countries that had strengthened the governance and management structures of their own security systems. It also enabled broader participation among Ghanaian stakeholders in this debate, including the wider security system, parliamentarians,
academia and relevant civil society organisations.

Lessons learned

Build networks through dialogue — Through the participation of a wide range of stakeholders in a series of workshops, greater understanding of SSR issues was developed, and a network of those interested in supporting progressive change was established. It was through this network that a locally designed and led course on security sector governance and management was developed. Delivered by an alliance of local institutions, the annual course is managed by a steering team jointly chaired by the Office of the President and the Office of the Head of the Civil Service.

Empower and strengthen local organisations — The series of workshops was organised by a local NGO called the African Security Dialogue and Research. ASDR built upon its extensive contacts and local knowledge to ensure a tailored approach that was effective in guiding the agenda forward within a complex political environment. Its engagement in this programme has helped them build trust, credibility and relationships with a range of individuals and organisations across government and beyond. This is reflected in the fact that the Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee later asked ASDR to provide a series of seminars and training for parliamentarians.

Flexibility — The willingness to adapt to a changing environment and to take opportunities as they arose was crucial to the successes that were achieved through this initiative. Although the initial objective of supporting a signifi cant enhancement in the capacity of the civilian wing was not fully realised, real progress was made in areas that were not originally envisaged, such as catalysing a public dialogue on security issues that in turn help catalyse broader reforms.

Build on ongoing initiatives and link to wider processes — Directly linking the initiative to the ongoing cross-government civil service strengthening programme was important in placing change within the MoD in the wider context of public sector reform and in broadening participation in the process to include those from outside the security system.

Impact

The Security Sector Governance and Management Course which is delivered by ASDR, Ghana University and the Ghana Institute for Management and Public Administration is now well established and provides an important forum for building understanding and promoting discussion on a range of security and justice issues. Enjoying high-level support and profile, the course is helping Ghanaians to lay the foundations for greater governance of their security system, and therefore in consolidating Ghana’s democratic transition.

*From the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice 

Context

In one post-conflict country, intelligence reform became a key element of the political transition from multinational control to self-government. A national security review identified significant internal threats, mostly from corruption, organised crime and unconstitutional activity, which could properly be dealt with by a security service. Foreign intelligence agencies were willing to support the formation of a new service by providing training, infrastructure and advice on legislation and oversight.

The public’s understanding of a security service, based on historical experience, was of an authoritarian secret police who committed political murders and intimidation, particularly of minority ethnic groups. As rumours of the formation of the service began to emerge in the media and parliament, such misunderstandings led to a decrease in trust in the new government institutions and fears of a return to the ethnic repression that had caused war in the past.

The political sensitivity of forming a new service was increased by the existence of several semi-legitimate security bodies, linked to political parties that wished to be involved. Debates about who should be allowed to join and lead the new service became an inherent part of the overall struggle to allocate power in the new political settlement.

Entry point

State-building and reform were seen as key elements in a modernisation process that could underpin economic growth and membership of multinational bodies. The international community was already conducting a wide range of activities to develop the country’s capability in the executive, judiciary and parliament, and it was possible to include intelligence reform in these programmes.

Lessons learned

Open debate — The multinational community engaged in a programme of public diplomacy to persuade the country’s media, parliamentarians and the public that a new service would be effectively controlled and not become the instrument of narrow party-political or ethnic interests. The proper role of a security service in a democracy was debated in a series of seminars.

High-level management of sensitive issues — The discussion on who should be allowed into the new service was managed as part of the overall political negotiations towards self-government, and clear guidelines were agreed on vetting procedures and selection criteria. It was emphasised to political parties that, in a well-functioning system, it should not be necessary to insert a “party man” into the operational leadership of the service; influence could instead be gained through legislation and oversight. 

Emphasis on local decisions on tasking — A discussion of threats and tasking was conducted as part of the public debate and linked to the national security review, in order to ensure that the new service’s priorities were not skewed by the international agencies that were assisting with training and advice.

Impact

The programme is still in its infancy; it is not yet possible to judge its impact.

Context

Attempts at defence reform in Ukraine in the early 1990s were hampered by a lack of experience in state-building, a poor legislative basis, vague political objectives, the lack of qualified experts, the non-existent role of civil society, and continued Soviet-style thinking. Sustainable international engagement coupled with conditionality and a step-by-step approach towards political and institutional rapprochement started with the signing of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (1994) and the NATO-Ukraine Charter (1997). Defence reform got off to a slow start but quickened after 2002. Ukraine’s decision to seek NATO membership led to a more intensive reform process, with NATO playing a major role in supporting defence reform.

Entry point

The strong move towards democratisation of the political elite and civil society, the resulting desire to join western regional organisations, and the continued interaction with international actors, especially NATO, were all important entry points. From an initial focus on defence reform, SSR efforts have just begun to broaden; new entry points include major deficits in law enforcement in Ukraine.

Lessons learned

Central role of political will — The speed of reforms picked up with growing political support from both the majority of Ukraine’s elite and the public for engaging with NATO and the EU. This led to a demand to extend general moves towards democracy to defence reform.

Establishment of structures for reform — Reform has been institutionalised through a framework of political co-operation that includes a Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. The group focuses on a growing range of issues such as civil-military relations, resource planning and management, and professional development. The adoption of an action plan in 2002 containing jointly agreed principles and objectives and supported by a detailed annual target plan provided concrete steps on the path to
defence reform. After the “Orange Revolution”, an intensified dialogue on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations was launched. This resulted in a State Programme of Development of the Armed Forces 2006-2011 that was more realistic than previous programmes.

Balancing costs and the speed of reforms — The economic constraints of the Soviet legacy continue to restrain the pace of reform. Confronted with a weak economy, limited resources and a broad reform agenda, SSR-related costs in terms of financial investment and human adaptability must be bearable for all stakeholders. The initial concentration on defence reform is justifiable, but as a result other security sectors are lagging far behind. Increased pressure for change has to be generated primarily via civil society and parliament.

Impact

The defence reforms have had an impact but, as the head of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, John Colston, says, “the major challenge faced by Ukraine is the need for a comprehensive transformation of its security sector to align it more closely with Euro-Atlantic and the European standards. In other words, for the Ukraine’s security sector efforts to be successful, they should cover not only the Ministry of Defence and the Ukrainian armed forces, but also all other
security forces or law-enforcement institutions including internal security forces”.

Context

In 2001, after 20 years marked first by armed confrontation and then by dictatorship, Peru experienced a peaceful democratic transition when the regime headed by Alberto Fujimori fell under accusations of corruption.

The Peruvian Congress installed a provisional government, which was committed to fundamental human rights standards that had been ignored by the former government. Some of the critical measures implemented were the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); a return to the jurisdiction of the Inter American Court of Human Rights (IACHR); the annulment of amnesty laws for human rights abuses committed by members of the security forces; the revision of anti-terrorist laws that violated due process guarantees for persons belonging to illegal armed groups; the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and the initiation of extradition proceedings against former dictator Fujimori, who sought asylum in Japan.

The TRC worked for two years in open proceedings and produced a comprehensive report including extensive information on 47 cases against members of the security forces; the report was forwarded to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Entry point

The provisional government acted with a sense of urgency on all these fronts to overcome Peru’s international isolation resulting from its failure to meet basic human rights standards. The new  government was supported by a broad civil society platform established by the national human rights organisations.

Lessons learned

Importance of addressing past crimes — After the demise of the dictatorship, the high-ranking military officers, members of the business community and media representatives allied with Alberto Fujimori were exposed as members of corruption networks. Many were arrested and others fled the country. Pro-democracy representatives, in particular the TRC, took positions of responsibility in  the military and media, and supported enactment of new human rights policies.

Role of international human rights institutions — At the time of Fujimori’s fall, Peru had lost several critical cases before the IACHR, and a signifi cant number of cases were pending with little prospect of success for the state. The new government sought a friendly settlement with the court and quickly implemented a number of critical measures — including the cancellation of amnesty laws and the reform of anti-terrorism laws — and initiated retrials for imprisoned members of illegal
armed groups.

Civil society engagement — Key civil society leaders took positions in government and established effective alliances between the state and civil society to channel expertise, conduct joint assessments, and mobilise social support.

Impact

The TRC had a decisive effect on the national political agenda of Peru. A comprehensive reparations programme for victims of human rights abuses was put in place and numerous civil society groups adopted the TRC’s final report as a guide for action. Several criminal cases were opened against members of the security forces, but resistance against the “democratic spring” by authoritarian elements weakened the resolve of the judiciary and slowed these proceedings. To date no member of the military has been tried and Alberto Fujimori remains in Chile awaiting the result of extradition proceedings.

Context

Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999. The country still has a legacy of conflict — six successful and numerous failed military coups, a civil war that cost well over a million lives, three inconclusive transitions to democracy and recurrent factional violence. Widespread corruption and persistent electoral malpractice continue to undermine politics as a whole. Military rule has cast a long shadow, and Nigeria remains dangerously reliant on oil revenues and patron-client networks. New challenges have arisen, with inter-communal clashes across the country causing more than 14,000 deaths since 1999 and displacing more than 3 million people. Militias have sprung up, notably in the oil-rich Niger Delta, where growing tensions are a direct result of decades of environmental harm and political neglect.

Entry point

In May 2001 DFID, the World Bank, USAID and UNDP, supported by President Obasanjo, agreed that there was a need for a national strategic conflict assessment (SCA). This was the first time globally that a national conflict assessment had ever been supported by a group of donors — usually assessments are done by individual donors who often do not share findings because of their sensitive nature. The Nigeria assessment was also significant because it was led by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). IPCR staff and consultants from Nigerian civil society and academia were responsible for leading research teams, conducting research and producing the assessment reports. The decision to conduct the SCA in this way was made in recognition of the considerable potential benefits of a shared and nationally owned assessment, and the constraints of acting without donor co-operation and without the participation and ownership of the Nigerian government.

Lessons learned

Effective donor co-ordination requires commitment and mechanisms — This type of multi-donor approach requires a high level of co-ordination and trust, which may take some time to establish. The assessment was jointly funded, and donors used their separate funding regulations and procedures. Co-ordinating and accounting for the various sums through different donor mechanisms was a complex undertaking. Harmonising disbursement, accounting and reporting requirements is a challenge for more effective co-ordination.

Accept that working together may take longer — The task of managing and co-ordinating the process was a very big undertaking that should not be underestimated. The numbers of partners involved and the complexity of the study often meant that much time was spent negotiating terms between partners. The ambitious nature of the assessment meant that considerable time had to go into designing and planning each stage of the assessment. This often ran counter to a demand for quick results. Such an assessment is labour-intensive and often takes longer than anticipated.

International actors need to leave room for local ownership — Committed donor engagement was important to the process, but the experience showed the need to leave room for ownership by in-country partners. There should have been a longer process of negotiation with the government partner, including a capacity assessment of the lead organisation, at the start of the endeavour. Technical assistance from donors in conducting assessments can carry the process forward and build the capacity of partner organisations, but this assistance needs to support rather than lead the process. The superior knowledge that national partners have of the country context should be recognised. Local protocol must be respected and donors should take care to offer support and advice rather than imposing externally conceived structures and models.

Impact

The assessment was successful in terms of developing donor co-ordination and encouraging government ownership and direction. The assessment process was therefore valuable in itself. Conflict and instability are still significant threats in Nigeria though, and more remains to be done to put a conflict-sensitive approach into practice in government and donor programmes.

*From the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice