Population: 10.3 million (World Bank, 2013)
Languages: French (official), Creole (official)
Major Ethnic Groups: black 95%, mulatto and white 5%
GDP per Capita (current US dollars): 897 (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2015)
GDP per Capita PPP (current international dollars): 1,430 (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2015)
Security Sector Stats
Active Armed Forces: Haiti has no official active armed force. It currently relies on a paramilitary defence and security force (Military Balance, 2014)
Small Arms: the estimated total number of guns (both licit and illicit) held by civilians in Haiti is 200,000 firearms; the defence forces are reported to have 13,00; and police in Haiti are reported to have 10,000 firearms (Gun Policy, 2015)
Military Expenditure: n/a
Haiti is a fragile state, considered by some to be a failed state. Its poverty and history of political instability have prevented the development of robust security and justice institutions. The country returned to democracy in 2006, following a period of violence after a coup in 2004, and then was hit by a massive earthquake on January 2010. It killed some 250,000 people, and dealt a serious blow to the functioning of the state. Court buildings and police stations were destroyed, along with the presidential palace and parliament, and police and other officials were killed.
Despite the chaos left by the earthquake, Haiti still has a murder rate below that of many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, with preliminary figures pointing to a rate of 9.2 per 100,000 in 2012. Crimes such as sexual assault, however, are thought to have risen sharply since the disaster.
Haiti has not had a military since it was disbanded in 1995, leaving the police in charge of security, aided since 2004 by the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a force of several thousand. President Michel Martelly has announced plans to reconstitute the army, despite opposition from international partners such as the United Nations.
Very large amounts of foreign aid have been poured into Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas, particularly since the earthquake. Much of it is directed at security and justice sector reform, but it is questionable how much of an impact this has had.
Security and Justice Context
The January 2010 earthquake left Haiti’s justice and security institutions in tatters, with courts and police stations destroyed, government officials dead, and some 2 million people homeless. Some 358,000 were estimated to still be living in 500 tent camps around Port-au-Prince by the three-year anniversary of the disaster, with poor services.
There were 617 murders in the country between January and August 2012, according to the United Nations (UN) audit on MINUSTAH operations. If murders continued at the same rate throughout the year, this would give Haiti an annual murder rate of 9.2 per 100,000 inhabitants for 2012.
This would be a significant increase from the rate of 5.1 in 2007, which dipped to 5.0 in 2008, before rising to 6.1 in 2009, and 6.9 in 2010 (See Figure 1.). Despite this rise, the figure remains far lower than the 2010 rates of other Caribbean countries such as Jamaica (52), Trinidad and Tobago (35), and the Bahamas (28). Up-to-date figures on the number of homicides are hard to come by. A study carried out in Port-au-Prince between November 2011 and February 2012 found a dramatic escalation in criminal violence during the period, with the capital’s murder rate at 60.9 per 100,000, up from less than 10 per 100,000 in 2007.
Haiti has an extremely high prevalence of sexual assault, which has been used as a tool of intimidation under past dictatorships, and by criminal gangs as a method to control communities. Sexual assaults surged in the chaos that followed the earthquake, but comprehensive statistics on this crime have not been collected. One study found that some 10,800 people in Port-au-Prince suffered sexual assault in the six weeks after the quake, compared to an estimated 30,000-50,000 per year in the preceding three years. Women and children living in tent camps, sometimes having lost male family members in the earthquake, made vulnerable targets for this crime.
There is evidence that crime overall increased after the earthquake. The Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), found a significant rise in the level of crime victimisation in those areas worst affected by the quake, going from 15 to 26 percent between 2008 and 2010.
Kidnapping rates are high in Haiti, and have seen big fluctuations over recent years, from 266 cases in 2008 slashed to 11 in 2009, then up again to 107 in 2010, according to United Nations Police (UNPOL) figures. MINUSTAH figures put the numbers of cases at 121 in 2010 and 159 in 2011 (See Figure 2.). There was a decline in March-July 2012, with cases at a monthly average of 10, compared to 14 the same period the year before.
However, despite the disorder and lack of security that followed the earthquake, it is not clear that all metrics of security showed a deterioration. A study by the Small Arms Survey found that since the quake, Haiti’s security continued the improvement that had been taking place over the past decade.
Drug trafficking through Haiti has decreased since the 2010 earthquake, according to US government estimates, with traffickers discouraged by the extremely poor infrastructure, which makes it more difficult for them to move their product. The estimated amount of cocaine moving through Haiti dropped from some 11,050 kilos in 2009 to 3,685 in 2011, according to the US State Department, which warned that trafficking could increase again as the country recovers and rebuilds. In 2007, 10 percent of drugs going to the United States passed through Hispaniola, the island Haiti shares with the Dominican Republic, and as of 2012 some 3 percent of US-bound cocaine passed through the island.
Before the quake, Haiti had been used as a major transit point by drug traffickers taking cocaine from South America to the United States or Europe, attracted by its weak security forces and law enforcement. Then, as now, the Haitian security forces lacked the capacity to challenge traffickers, and carried out only limited anti-drug operations, seizing small quantities of drugs. Another attraction is the country’s 1,500 km of coastline, and poorly controlled 360 km border with the Dominican Republic.
Traffickers use sea and air routes, often landing small aircraft on clandestine landing strips, and the years before the quake saw a growing number of drug flights from Venezuela to Hispaniola. The US State Department highlighted Haiti as a passage for marijuana being trafficked from Jamaica to the United States or the Bahamas.
Haiti’s drug trade has traditionally been controlled by foreign criminal organisations, especially those from Colombia, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and the United States, working with local groups. In the last two decades, however, Haitian gangs have been moving to dominate the country’s criminal landscape. For the International Crisis Group, although trafficking networks in the country are well-established and involve government officials and police, they do not constitute a Haitian cartel.
As well as traffickers, Haiti is also home to violent neighbourhood-based street gangs, and self-defence forces known as “bazes.” There are groups with political agendas that pose a security threat, with rogue organisations numbering some 3,000 people identifying themselves as a new Haitian Army carrying out training sessions and forcibly disrupting a Congress session. This is reminiscent of the rebel army National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti (Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationale), headed by demobilised members of the armed forces, which carried out the 2004 coup.
Haiti has a gun ownership rate of 0.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, according to the 2007 Small Arms Survey yearbook, coming 164th out of 178 countries surveyed. The rate seems to have remained low, with 2.3 percent of Port-au-Prince households owning a firearm in 2010.
Haitian citizens are vulnerable to being trafficked, either within the country, over the border into the Dominican Republic, or to other countries in the region, for sexual exploitation or forced labour. It is estimated that there are between 150,000 and 500,000 children in the country working as forced domestic servants, known as “restaveks.” The UN warned of a significant rise in child trafficking after the earthquake, which broke up families and left many as orphans, with large numbers of children sold into slavery in the Dominican Republic.
The government’s ability to improve the security situation and carry out necessary police and justice reform has been hampered by political infighting. It took five months from Martelly’s inauguration for the parliament to approve one of his choices for prime minister and allow him to form a government.
Perceptions of Insecurity
Though the perceptions of insecurity actually decreased from 45.2 points in 2008 to 37.7 in 2010, according to LAPOP, it has risen in recent years to a score of 44.2 in 2012 (See Figure 3.). This gave the country the 4th worst perception of insecurity in the region out of 26 countries surveyed.
However, only 10.2 percent of respondents said that crime or violence was the country’s biggest problem in 2012, with over 55 percent pointing to the economy as the biggest concern.
Security and Justice Institutions
Haiti’s justice system is headed by the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), which rules on constitutional issues, and whose judges are appointed by the executive. The Supreme Court had no president between 2004 and October 2011.
Below the Supreme Court are three other levels: courts of appeal (Cour d'Appel), courts of first instance (Tribunaux de Premiere Instance), and, at the lowest level, magistrates' courts presided over by a justice of the peace (Juge de Paix-Tribunal de Paix). These courts are responsible for dealing with minor cases, both criminal and civil. The courts of first instance are divided into those that deal with civil, commercial, labour, property, and crimes—the most serious cases, including political violence, are handled by the specially-convened court of assizes (Cour d’Assises). Cases can then be taken to the Appeals Courts, or on to the Supreme Court.
There is a human rights ombudsman, the Citizen Protector’s Office (Office de la Protection du Citoyen-OPC), which has been in operation since 1995.
The legal system is based on the French Napoleonic Code, with outdated laws that have changed little since the 19th century. The laws are slowly undergoing reform, with steps to move the country from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system. The current system is very slow, and critics point to lack of coordination between prosecutors and investigating judges, along with poor systems of keeping records, further hindering progress.
Trials are held in front of a judge, with only the most serious being heard by a jury. Crimes are investigated by prosecutors, who determine the gravity of a crime, and refer the most serious to an investigative judge (Juge d'Instruction) for further investigation.
Judges have low salaries and little security provision—increasing the chance of corruption—and often lack the appropriate training. A 2002-2003 study found that judges’ salaries varied between $145 and $350 a month, though there have been pay rises since then. Courts are under-resourced, particularly the magistrates courts which are often in extremely poor condition, lacking office equipment and even toilet facilities, according to the US State Department. The poor state of judicial infrastructure was exacerbated by damage to many buildings after the 2010 earthquake.
Little legal aid is provided by the government, putting justice out of reach for the vast majority of the population who cannot afford legal representation. Another barrier to justice for most Haitians is that legal proceedings are generally carried out in French, when 90 percent of the population do not speak French, but Creole.
The judiciary has long been dominated by the executive, with all appointments made by the Justice and Public Security Ministry in the absence of a functioning judicial oversight body. An Organisation of American States (OAS) report noted that “political pressures affect the judiciary at all levels.” Haiti came 142nd of 144 countries for judicial independence in the most recent World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report. However, the newly-created Superior Judiciary Council (Conseil Supérieure du Pouvoir Judiciaire-CSPJ) is intended to ensure an independent judiciary. It is an independent body, headed by the Supreme Court president, in charge of training and appointing judges, monitoring their performance, and disciplining them. It is supposed to work alongside the Judiciary Inspection Unit (L'Unité d'Inspection Judiciaire-UIJ), part of the Justice and Public Security Ministry, though this body has reportedly not been very effective.
Confidence in the judicial system decreased after the earthquake, dropping from 43.1 points in 2008 to 36.2 in 2010 , according to LAPOP. Eighty-three lynchings were reported in 2010.
Prison conditions in Haiti are extremely poor. The penal system is run by the Prisons Administration Directorate (Direction Administration Pénitentiaire-DAP), part of the national police force. There were more than 7,000 inmates in Haiti’s prisons as of 2011, putting the prisons at five times overcapacity by international standards. Some 2,000 to 3,000 more people were held in police stations. Massive overuse of pre-trial detention contributed to the problem of overcrowding. Nearly three-quarters of prisoners in Haiti had not yet stood trial as of December 2011. Studies found that prisoners are locked up for on average 20 months before trial.
Some 5,000 inmates managed to break out of the national prison after the earthquake, and are thought to have contributed to a rise in crime.
Haiti’s military was demobilised by Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1995, due to its history of taking part in coups and carrying out abuses against the population. The Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haïti-PNH) was established the same year as the first civilian police force. The armed forces had previously been in charge of domestic security.
The PNH numbered some 10,132 officers in 2012, giving it a rate of 1 officer per 1,000 inhabitants —one of the lowest in the world. This included a 148-member Coast Guard (Commissariat des Gardes-Côtes-CGC). About 80 percent of police agents are located in Port-au-Prince, meaning that other parts of the country suffer an even greater lack of police presence.
Trust in the police has been historically very low in Haiti, thanks to the history of police abuse under previous dictatorships. However, the population is showing more confidence in the HNP, according to LAPOP. Haiti scored 61.8 points for public confidence in police in 2012 (See Figure 4.), putting the country significantly higher than regional neighbours such as the Dominican Republic (34.9) Jamaica (48) and Trinidad and Tobago (32.8).
However, the police remained severely understaffed, under-resourced, poorly trained, and with serious issues of corruption. The US State Department human rights country report for 2011 noted widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings by the police, including two claims that detainees were tortured to death, and many arbitrary arrests.
The shortcomings of the police have left impunity rates very high. Only 9 percent of murder cases were investigated by the police in 2011, falling to 7 percent in the first eight months of 2012.
The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has had a presence in the country since 2004, when more than 8,000 troops and police were deployed in the wake of the coup to uphold public security while the country held elections. Its numbers were boosted after the 2010 earthquake to more than 13,000 uniformed personnel. Its mandate was renewed in October 2012 for another year, with troops and police to be reduced from 10,000 to just over 8,800. MINUSTAH’s current missions include improving the capacity of the HNP, supporting the police in maintaining public order, and rebuilding the justice system. MINUSTAH forces cannot make arrests themselves.
Public resentment of foreign forces operating in Haiti was fuelled by accusations that MINUSTAH peacekeepers started a cholera outbreak, and by a number of cases of sexual abuse carried out by its members.
A Strategic Plan for Haiti’s Development (Plan Stratégique de Développement D’Haïti), published in May 2012, sets out measures to turn Haiti into an “emerging country” by 2030.
Justice measures include establishing a public commission to revise the civil and criminal codes, headed by the Justice and Public Security Ministry (Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique); strengthening the Ombudsman’s Office; setting up a national legal aid system; and rebuilding and improving court facilities. It also plans the creation of 12 youth detention centres, and the integration of prisoner information in a database.
In terms of security, the plan sets out measures to strengthen the School of Judges; finish constructing the new Police Academy; and provide affordable housing for police officers, to ensure that they are present in more locations around the country. It also mentions the goal of rebuilding the armed forces, based on a plan presented to by a presidential commission in August 2011.
State of Security and Justice Sector Reform
Justice Sector Reform and Initiatives
In 2007, Haiti passed a justice reform plan which set out several key measures to improve the system. These included the establishment of the Superior Judicial Council, a body headed by the Supreme Court president and tasked with ensuring that the judiciary is independent from the executive by overseeing appointments, training, and discipline of judges. Though the law mandating its creation was passed in 2007, the council was not launched until July 2012. It remains too early to judge the council’s effectiveness, but many, including President Martelly, have greeted it as a vital step towards guaranteeing an independent judiciary.
The 2007 laws also set out rules for the School of Judges (l'Ecole de la Magistrature - EMA), which had been closed since 2004. It was reopened in 2009, with support from France, Canada, the United States, the UN Development Program, and MINUSTAH.
The government raised salaries for judges in 2009, from their previous extremely low levels (see Security and Justice Context section).
An important event in promoting reform in the judicial sector was Martelly’s appointment of a new Supreme Court president in October 2011, ending a seven year gap. This allowed the court to function, and cleared the way for the Superior Judicial Council and School of Judges to begin work, as the Supreme Court president heads them both.
Haiti is in the process of moving from an inquisitorial to an adversarial justice system, including a thorough revision of its Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes (Code Penal, Code d’Instruction Criminelle), much of which is completely outdated, having changed little in nearly 200 years. The process of reforming Haiti’s penal and criminal codes began in 2008, with support from bodies including the US Institute for Peace (USIP), is still in progress. The criminal code reform commission submitted the proposed changes to the Justice and Public Security Ministry in September 2012, and as of January 2013 they were still being reviewed, before being sent to parliament (Assemblée Nationale) for approval.
The main aims of the reform are, as International Crisis Group sets out, to ensure more guarantees for defendants, speedier proceedings, and increased access to justice. The reforms include setting up a system of legal aid across the country, making investigations of crimes the job of a prosecutor alone, rather than an investigating judge, to streamline the process, and downgrading some crimes to minor offenses. Another aspect of the reform aims to increase access to justice for Creole speakers, who make up 90 percent of the population.
Constitutional reforms that passed into law in June 2012 established a Constitutional Court.
In terms of prisons, Haiti adopted a 2007-2012 Prison Reform Plan that was meant to improve infrastructure, train personnel, and improve treatment of inmates. Many donor projects have focused on increasing the capacity of the country’s penitentiaries. As a result, the amount of space per inmate has more than doubled since before the earthquake, from 0.3 square meters up to 0.72 in 2011, though this still falls well short of the international standard of 4.5 square meters per inmate.
Security Sector Reforms and Initiatives
One of the most fundamental needs of the Haitian police is an increase in numbers. In 2006, the government adopted a five-year development plan which set the target of 14,000 officers by 2011, but this was not reached.
The 2006 plan also called for all police officers to be vetted, in order to detect officers who were corrupt, connected to criminals, or unfit for the job. This process continues, although many police who failed tests have not been removed from their posts. Elements of the plan that involve bringing in community policing methods have not been fully put into practice, according to Crisis Group.
Police reform was set back by the 2010 earthquake, which killed officers and destroyed stations, rendering a quarter of the force non-operational. Later, as with justice reform, plans for police reform were held up by the delay in approving Martelly’s prime ministers, and forming a government.
A second five-year police development plan, developed in conjunction with MINUSTAH, was approved in July 2012. It set a target of 16,000 officers by 2014, though it is thought that a force of 20,000 is needed to provide adequate security for the country.
Police reform has moved at a faster pace than judicial reform, however. According to LAPOP, Haitians now have more trust in police than in the court system.
As a presidential candidate, Martelly promised to reconstitute the Haitian Army, arguing that an army is needed to protect the country’s borders, keep public order, and respond to emergencies like the earthquake. He chose to refrain from decreeing the re-establishment of the army when he came to power, however, instead launching a commission to examine the issue in December 2011. The scheme has some support within Haiti, based in part on opposition to MINUSTAH, but is opposed by many donor countries and organizations, whose help would be needed to pay for a new army. Critics say that a new army would take funds away from much-needed police reform. Martelly’s planned revival of a 3,500-strong army would cost $50 million, and take place over three and a half years.
There are forces in Haiti who are anxious to see the army revived. Groups of volunteers, headed by soldiers demobilised from the old Haitian army, began forming and carrying out training exercises before Martelly came to power in May 2011. By early 2012, these informal forces, calling themselves “the Haitian Army,” were thought to have some 3,000 members, and be occupying 10 old military bases. In April 2012, a group of these “soldiers” interrupted a parliament session to lobby for the reconstitution of the army.
Parliamentary/Congressional Capacity for Oversight
As discussed above, the Haitian parliament’s
capacity for oversight of the executive has caused problems, severely hampering the president’s ability to move forward with the legislative agenda. The five-month delay in parliament approving a prime minister after Martelly took office has delayed reconstruction efforts, as well as security and justice reform.
International efforts in this sector have focused on promoting dialogue between these two branches of government.
Security and Justice Opportunities
Haiti presents an abundance of opportunities for reform, with massive shortcomings in all aspects of security and justice delivery. Reform efforts were set back by the 2010 earthquake, which destroyed institutional capacity, forcing these institutions to work to get back to their previous level, as opposed to moving forward.
Many foreign organisations are present in Haiti, carrying out a variety of aid work. Some 560 local and international NGOs are registered with the government, in a country of only 10 million people. Many of these organisations have been criticised for failing to help, or even hindering, the recovery effort, being unaccountable, and failing to consult Haitians.
Corruption is an extremely serious problem in Haiti, which ranked 165th out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Haitians reported the highest level of corruption victimisation in the Americas in LAPOP’s survey, with 67 percent reporting an experience of corruption in 2012—more than 50 percent above the rate in the second-highest country.
Justice Sector Opportunities
The scope for aiding the justice sector in Haiti is broad. The government’s existing reform measures should be supported, and as Crisis Group points out, the day-to-day operation of much of the system is still reliant on donor contributions.
The Haitian government has recently put through a series of valuable reforms that have the potential to significantly improve the justice system, most notably the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council and the appointment of a Supreme Court president, but the system is lagging behind in the workings at the ground level, where most citizens interact with it. Access to justice remains extremely low, with one of the biggest problems presented by the slow progress of cases through the system.
International actors can help by improving the system’s capacity, including through the provision of basic supplies. The US government’s recent donation of items as simple as office furniture to the new Superior Judicial Council is a case in point. The provision of legal aid, and establishment of mobile justice services, are two initiatives in need of support, as well as the project to provide documents and services in Creole. As well as building system capacity, initiatives to combat corruption present many opportunities for productive engagement.
Ombudsman Florence Elie, who heads the Citizen Protection Ministry (OPC), has emerged as a force for human rights and rule of law, working to help those being held in pre-trial detention and advocating for prisoners’ rights. She received an award from the US State Department in 2011 in recognition of her work to protect children in displaced persons camps.
Security Sector Opportunities
The Haitian government’s initiatives to reform and build the capacity of the police will be key for the future security of the country, and a lot of external support will be needed for its successful completion, with a doubling in the number of officers thought to be necessary. More can be done to build capacity and combat corruption.
Much less desirable is the prospect of reviving the Haitian army, which would take funds away from the more urgent issue of police reform.
Civil Society Actors for Engagement
is a Brazilian NGO that has operated in Haiti since 2004, after arriving there as a consultant for the UNDP on peacekeeping. It carries out social programs aimed at reducing violence, including mediating conflicts and working to reintegrate child soldiers.
The International Lawyers Bureau (Bureau des Avocats Internationaux - BAI) , based in Port-au-Prince, takes on human rights cases, trains Haitian lawyers, and carries out advocacy for victims. It is backed by the US-based Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), which also works on behalf of victims of human rights violations in the country.
The Platform for Haitian Organisations for the Defense of Human Rights (Plate-forme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains-POHDH) is an association of eight Haitian non-governmental human rights organisations.
The Haiti Legacy Foundation (La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti - LFHH) is the Haitian chapter of Transparency International (TI), and works to fight corruption and bring about transparency in the country. It has set up public hotlines to report corruption in aid and reconstruction projects.
The National Observatory of Violence and Crime (Observatoire National de la Violence et de la Criminalité - ONAVC) was set up to monitor violence and crime in Haiti, as an initiative of Haiti’s State University (UEH l’Université d’Etat d’Haïti-UEH) and the UN Program for Development (UNDP).
Gouvernement d'Haïti, “Plan Stratégique de Développement D’Haïti,” May 2012.
International Crisis Group, “Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform” September 2011.
International Crisis Group, “Keeping Haiti Safe: Justice Reform,” October 2011.
International Crisis Group “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition,” August 2012.
Kolbe, A., and Muggah, R., “Haiti’s Urban Crime Wave?” March 2012
Small Arms Survey, “Securing the State: Haiti Before and After the Earthquake,” 2011
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University, “The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times,” December 2010
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University, “Haiti in Distress: The Impact of the 2010 Earthquake on Citizen Lives and Perceptions,” March 2011
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University, “The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity,” November 2012 (Preliminary Version)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Homicide Statistics 2012,” Data set retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html
UN Office of Internal Oversight, “Audit Report: The United Nations Police operations in MINUSTAH,” August 2012
UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” August 2012
U.S. Department of State, “2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control,” March 2012
US State Department, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011,” May 2012
World Economic Forum, “The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013,” September 2012
 Estimates on the number of homeless vary widely.
 Kolbe and Muggah (2012).
 The Small Arms Survey 2011
 LAPOP recodes respondents’ answers into a scale of 0-100 with a higher score representing a higher perception of insecurity.
 See discussion of the establishment of the CSPJ in Justice Sector Reform and Initiatives section.
 LAPOP recodes respondents’ answers into a scale of 0-100 with a higher score representing a higher level of confidence.
 Using the World Bank’s 2011 population estimate of 10.1 million people.
 An extended discussion of justice reforms in Haiti can be found in International Crisis Group (2011).
 Parliament is bicameral, split into the low Chamber of Deputies (Chambre des Députés) and upper Senate (Sénat).
 More information on their website: http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/contact/org/nc_haiti
 More information on their website: http://onavc.ueh.edu.ht/index.php?option=com_content
The Igarapé Institute is a southern think tank devoted to evidence-based policy and action on complex social challenges including global drug policy, citizen security and international cooperation. Its goal is to stimulate humane engagement on emerging security and development issues. Across all its programs, the Institute adopts a three-prong approach:
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- Design tailor-made solutions that are people-centered.
The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provides practical support to the international community in its efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. It does this by working with a group of member states and institutions to develop and promote good security and justice reform practices and principles, and by helping its members to build their capacity to support national and regional security and justice reform processes.