CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE STATE DIVISION

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ABBREVIATIONS

CSJ	Citizen security and justice
DEM	Development Effectiveness Matrix
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
GCI-9	Ninth General Capital Increase, or Ninth General Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank
KNL	Knowledge and Learning Sector
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MBC	Movimento Brasil Competitivo [Competitive Brazil Movement]
NEET	Not in education, employment or training
OAS	Organization of American States
OVE	Office of Evaluation and Oversight
PCR	Project completion report
POP	Problem-oriented policing
PPPs	Public-private partnerships
SCL/EDU	Education Division
SCL/GDI	Gender and Diversity Division
SCL/LMK	Labor Markets Division
SCL/SPH	Social Protection and Health Division
SFD	Sector framework document
SNEEP	National Statistical System on the Serving of Sentences
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization

I. CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE
IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING REGULATIONS AND THE
INSTITUTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT SECTOR STRATEGY

A.   The Citizen Security and Justice SFD as part of existing regulations

1.1   This sector framework document (SFD) sets out the Bank's priorities in the citizen security and justice sector ("the sector"). It also establishes guidelines for the Bank's work through its financial and nonfinancial instruments, including sovereign-guaranteed and non-sovereign guaranteed loans. Lastly, it lays out the Bank's goals in the sector and provides guidance for its operational work, dialogue, and knowledge creation activities with the 26 borrowing member countries, their governments, and the private sector.

1.2   The Citizen Security and Justice SFD is complemented by the SFDs for Urban Development and Housing (document GN-2732-2), Labor (document GN-2741-3), and Education and Early Childhood Development (document GN-2708-2). These address issues including the revitalization of degraded urban areas, the recovery of public spaces, and the workforce integration of at-risk youth and juvenile offenders; activities to develop social and cognitive skills through recreational, artistic, and stay-in-school programs; and vocational training programs for young people who neither work nor study.[1] It is also complemented by the upcoming SFDs for Gender and Diversity and Poverty and Social Protection, which will address issues of prevention and treatment of violence against women, and skills development among socially excluded or impoverished young people.

1.3   This SFD has been developed with in accordance with document GN-2670-1 (Strategies, policies, sector frameworks, and guidelines at the IDB), which calls for sector guidelines to be updated, in order to make the Bank more effective, consistent with mandates of the Ninth General Capital Increase (GCI-9). In keeping with the requirement of paragraph 1.20 of document GN-2670-1, the Bank will prepare an updated SFD three years after the approval of this document.

1.4   This SFD is a flexible framework for the Bank to address the challenges and dynamic contexts faced by the countries of the region in this sector. Implementation of the SFD can also be adapted to the specific conditions, needs, and demands of each country. Thus, the intention of this SFD is not to set limits; it is a strategic and indicative document, whereas the specific nature of interventions, as well as the prioritization of activities and comprehensiveness of actions in the sector will be analyzed in the respective sector notes and country strategies, subject to country needs.

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[1]   These young people are often referred to as "ninis," the Spanish term for "neither-nor."

B. **The Citizen Security and Justice SFD as part of the Sector Strategy on Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare**

1.5 The Citizen Security and Justice SFD falls within the framework of the Sector Strategy on Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare (document GN-2587-2). The objective of the "institutions strategy" is to make the Bank more effective in strengthening the institutional foundation for development in the region, focusing resources on areas with high value-added where the institution has a comparative advantage. One of the priority components of the institutions strategy is to reduce crime and violence[2] by strengthening the institutional capacity of agencies responsible for guaranteeing security and justice, as well as through comprehensive and differentiated interventions in the areas of prevention, care, and rehabilitation, focused on vulnerable groups such as youth and women.

1.6 The SFD is also consistent with the Bank's Strategy on Social Policy for Equity and Productivity (document GN-2588-4) and the Operational Policy on Gender Equality in Development (document GN-2531-10). These seek to promote investment in the individual, as well as actions to prevent gender-based violence and to promote mainstreaming of the gender perspective.

1.7 This sector framework document has five sections. This section describes the relationship between the SFD and the existing policy framework. Section II presents the available international evidence on the effectiveness of citizen security and justice policies and programs. Section III describes the sector's principal challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean. Section IV summarizes lessons learned in the sector based on the evaluations performed by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), the development effectiveness matrixes (DEMs), project completion reports (PCRs), and reports by the Knowledge and Learning Sector (KNL). It also identifies the Bank's comparative advantages in the sector. Lastly, Section V discusses the Bank's goals in the sector, establishes dimensions of success and lines of action, and presents specific activities to be prioritized in the Bank's sector work.

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[2] Crime and violence are two separate concepts. The first refers to the set of activities deemed illegal or in violation of legal norms in a country that, as such, are subject to punishment or penalty by the relevant authorities (Tilly, 2003). Crime may be violent in nature, but not all types of crime are violent (such as white-collar crime). Moreover, the legal treatment of violence varies from one context to another: some violent acts are not universally regarded as crimes, such as domestic violence, or psychological violence such as stalking. Violence, on the other hand, can be understood as "the intentional use of power or physical force, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or a group or community, that either results in or has a high probability of causing injury, death, psychological harm, developmental disorders, or deprivation" (Krug et al., 2002 in "Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence," Discussion Paper IDB-DP-232, Institutions for Development Sector (IFD), 2012).

II. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CITIZEN SECURITY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE IDB'S WORK

2.1   The area of Citizen Security and Justice (CSJ) has been developing as a sector for less than two decades, and is characterized by substantial gaps in data, knowledge, and evidence. As an area of public policy and an academic research discipline, it is still being consolidated. Gaps thus persist in the region in terms of capabilities, knowledge, and evidence regarding the effectiveness of policies, strategies, and interventions in the sector. It is noteworthy that much of the available empirical evidence stems from evaluations conducted in countries outside the region, albeit with good indications as to the external validity of the results.

2.2   One of the greatest obstacles to the preparation of evidence-based assessments and effective policy responses is the scarcity of high-quality data. Information on crime and violence is generally fragmented and heterogeneous, and so does not allow for adequate evaluation of the profile of crime and crime trends. There are major challenges in crime statistics in terms of their reliability, timeliness, and specificity for supporting public policy design, guiding the implementation of sector strategies, and contributing to the generation of evidence based on rigorous evaluation. The reasons for this include an under-reporting of incidents on the part of victims, a lack of systems for compiling and storing data, and the scarcity of analysis and evaluation undertaken by the responsible agencies.

2.3   The general consensus emphasizes that crime and violence have multiple causes and are multidimensional in nature. According to general consensus and the current state of knowledge in the sector, effective crime and violence prevention requires comprehensive assessments and comprehensive responses (Buvicnic and Morrison, 1999; WHO, 2002; World Bank, 2007, 2011; UNDP, 2013). This SFD will address the topic of justice by focusing on criminal justice in particular. Criminal justice is a subsector of the wider spectrum of the justice sector, focusing on participants and processes in the criminal justice system from the time that a criminal act is committed.[3] Of importance in this context is the integrated operation of the criminal justice system. This means, for example, that police inefficiency and weaknesses in managing and solving criminal cases lead to prison overcrowding. The latter, in turn, affects reintegration mechanisms and therefore recidivism.

2.4   Crime and violence are serious obstacles to human development, social inclusion, and economic growth (IDB, 2014; ECLAC, 2011; UNDP, 2013; World Bank, 2011). According to the WHO, for example, high levels of crime and violence have

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[3]   The literature on criminology defines criminal justice as the governance and management system for the penal process, encompassing all of its formal and informal institutions as well as the processes and services involved in the prevention, investigation, adjudication, and treatment of, and response to, illegal behaviors. Institutional participants in the penal system therefore include the police, prosecution, the courts, judges and lawyers, victim support services, mediation services, civil society groups involved in the criminal justice system, and penitentiaries.

dramatic consequences for social and human capital, in that they reduce life expectancy and lead to the loss of years of healthy life (disability adjusted life years, or DALYs). The associated cost is estimated at 1.2% of GDP annually in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (WHO, 2004). Other studies have demonstrated that the direct and indirect economic costs of violence have a substantial economic impact. These costs in LAC are estimated at an average of 13% of GDP (Soares and Naritomi, 2010). According to a survey of 12,855 businesses in LAC, the costs associated with crime were around US$760 million in 2010. One of every four businesses was victim of a crime (World Bank, 2014).[4] At the same time, violence destroys social capital, engenders mistrust, breaks down social cohesion, and erodes confidence in public institutions (McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; Corbacho, Ruiz, and Phillip, 2012).

2.5 Evidence based on observational studies and a number of evaluations available on the effectiveness of CSJ policies and programs is presented below for each of the six priority areas within the Bank's framework for work in the sector (see paragraph 4.9):[5] (i) social prevention; (ii) situational prevention; (iii) policing; (iv) criminal justice; (v) penitentiary system and rehabilitation; and (vi) citizen security governance. It is worth noting that the available evidence and research on criminal justice and penitentiary issues yield mixed findings, so continued deeper research in these areas is necessary. Nevertheless, this field is well positioned to strengthen its foundation of evidence, and several innovative initiatives are being pursued in LAC, some with a rigorous impact evaluation. In addition, an increasing number of researchers in the region are studying and deepening our knowledge in this field.

A. Social Prevention

2.6 Social prevention is multisectoral in nature. The aim is to develop a common core of skills and capabilities among children and young people that will allow them to cope with risks associated with poverty, social exclusion, counterproductive behaviors in the workplace, crime, and violence. Although evidence suggests that intervention at an early age (preschool or younger) is effective in reducing criminal and violent behavior (Aos, Miller, and Drake, 2006), this SFD will focus on specific social prevention actions to address vulnerabilities among young people (12 to 25 years old) that may lead them to become either victims or perpetrators of violence.[6]

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[4] For example, in countries with high levels of insecurity like El Salvador and Guyana, 87% of businesses report expenditures on private security, whereas in countries like St. Lucia businesses spend only 25%.

[5] "Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence," IFD, Discussion Paper IDB-DP-232, 2012.

[6] In LAC, the majority of murder victims and perpetrators are young people (see paragraph 3.9). Interventions in the case of children younger than five years of age are covered in the early childhood development thematic area (SFDs for Education and Early Childhood Development, Health and Nutrition, and Poverty and Social Protection).

2.7   Research into youth violence has deepened understanding of the risk factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to becoming victims (Mercy et al., 2002; Rosay et al., 2000; Williams et al., 1999). The literature identifies risk factors linked to youth violence at the level of (i) the *individual* (psychological trauma, personality disorders, aggressive behaviors, previous experiences with violence, the use of drugs and alcohol, fractured family relationships, etc.); (ii) *interpersonal relationships* (domestic violence, marital instability, divorces or separations, weak channels of communication with parents, relationships with aggressive or delinquent friends or peers, etc.); and (iii) the *community* (high concentrations of poverty, widespread violence in society, access to drugs and weapons, gang presence, high levels of inequality, a lack of recreational opportunities, high rates of mobility among residents, etc.) (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2001; Lipsey and Derzon, 1998; Resnick et al., 2004). Given that individuals are exposed to a variety of risk factors and require differentiated programs, the youth population has been disaggregated according to three levels of intervention (Duryea, 2012), as presented in the following table:

Table II. 1. Mapping of youth risk groups based on levels of intervention[7]

Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Group 1: Low risk Youth attending school, age 18 and younger.	**Group 2: Medium risk** Disengaged youth. • Younger than 18 who have not completed secondary school and are not attending school. • Youth ages 18-29 who are neither in school nor working ("ninis"). **Group 3: High risk** Youth engaged in externalizing behaviors (substance abuse, aggression, theft, teenage pregnancy).	**Group 3: High risk** Youth engaged in externalizing behaviors. • Youth in conflict with the law.

Source: "Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence," 2012.

2.8   To mitigate risk factors, protective factors[8] need to be identified, understood, and developed. An improved understanding of protective factors is required for

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[7]   From a public health (disease prevention) perspective, preventive programs may be classified into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary prevention involves measures focused on improving the general wellbeing of individuals. Secondary prevention focuses on intervening with populations at risk to stop them from becoming offenders or victims. Tertiary prevention involves measures directed toward those who have already been involved with crime or victimization (Krug et al., 2002 in "Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence," IFD, Discussion Paper IDB-DP-232, 2012).

[8]   Protective factors are understood as those personal, social, and institutional resources that foster the successful development of adolescents, or that reduce the risk of impaired development or delinquent behavior (Jessor et al., 1995).

effective violence prevention, as well as the identification of effective programs for the different groups of youth at risk (Farrington et al., 2012). Some of the protective factors that can be reinforced by means of specific interventions include school attendance and training programs; flexible and adaptable temperament; conciliatory personal traits; positive social interaction; stable and positive links with family members, teachers, or other adults; a commitment to education and school activities; and friends or peers with positive behaviors (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2001; Resnick et al., 2004).

2.9   Applied knowledge suggests that risk factors must be identified precisely if prevention is to be effective, and that success in doing so can lead to a reduction in several types of violence (Welsh and Farrington, 2010). The vast majority of this evidence stems from developed countries (particularly the United States and the UK), where substantial progress has been made in the area of criminological research. In the case of individual-level risks, for example, positive relationships between adults and young people (positive role models) are fostered under the "Big Brothers, Big Sisters" program, which focuses on at-risk youth in single-parent households.[9] Evaluations of the effectiveness of this program show that 46% of participating youths are less likely to use drugs, and 32% are less conflict-prone (Waller, 2014). Similarly, the Chicago-based "Becoming a Man" program, which focuses on providing counseling services and psychosocial therapy to adolescents, has led to reductions of as much as 44% in arrests for violent crimes (University of Chicago Crime Lab, 2012). Other examples of programs focused on individual and family risk factors include the "Functional Family Therapy" program. Young people participating in therapy under this program were 25% less likely to be arrested. In England, the "Youth Inclusion Program" seeks to link at-risk youth to their communities as productive members through mentoring, academic assistance, and developmental support. A preliminary evaluation of the program carried out from 2003 to 2006 reported a 65% reduction in juvenile arrests and a 16% decline in criminal acts in targeted communities. Lastly, a good example of a program that tackles risk factors at the community level is "Cure Violence Chicago" (originally known as "Chicago Ceasefire"), which aims to prevent violent acts and social intolerance by developing peaceful dispute resolution capabilities in vulnerable young people. The impact evaluation of this program (Wesley et al., 2009) highlights a reduction of 41% to 73% in the number of gang-related shootings and murders in five of the eight targeted communities (Skogan, 2010).

2.10   There is also emerging evidence concerning programs to prevent youth violence in LAC. Muggah et al. (2013) have identified 11 programs implemented in LAC that have had a positive impact in terms of preventing youth violence. The evidence is

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[9]   Some of the interventions in the social area, aimed at improving factors such as student retention, social inclusion, employability, or poverty prevention, foster a range of skills and behaviors in young people that support a positive life path and can create positive externalities in terms of reducing crime and violence. Thus, the planned activities in these areas will be coordinated with the Social Sector, which addresses such issues.

comparatively strong in the case of violence prevention programs that focus on schools. In Colombia, for example, a random experiment in targeted schools as part of the "Aulas en Paz" [Classrooms at Peace] program led to improved social integration and significant reductions (of up to 10%) in aggressive behavior (Chaux, 2012). In the case of a similar program in Jamaica—the YMCA-Youth Development Program, which aims to strengthen the soft skills of young people to cope with challenging situations—an evaluation showed a reduction in aggressive behaviors among young people that had dropped out of school and received counseling and training in life skills (Guerra et al., 2010). In Brazil, the "Abrindo Espaços" [Creating Spaces] program conducted in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco showed a reduction in youth violence of between 14% and 16% in participating schools compared to a control group (Waiselfisz and Maciel, 2003). There is promising evidence from Barbados, where the school-based "Peace Ambassadors" program (launched in 2006) has helped more than 150 young leaders in more than seven secondary schools to influence their peers to resolve disputes peacefully. In Chile, programs aimed at reducing exposure among young people to opportunities for risky behavior (for instance, by lengthening time spent at school from a half day to a whole day) showed a reduction of 21.7 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants (17.5%). The greatest reductions were seen in property crime, which fell by 22%.

2.11   Conditional cash transfer programs have also created positive externalities in terms of crime and violence prevention. Although the objective of these programs is not to reduce violence, there is evidence that they have helped to reduce family-based risk factors, while supporting positive behaviors among young people. The positive externalities of these programs were assessed in the cases of "Bolsa Familia" [Family Grants] in Brazil and "Familias en Acción" [Families in Action] in Colombia. In the case of Bolsa Familia, which was initially designed as a strategy for poverty reduction, there has been a significant reduction in crime rates in neighborhoods close to schools (Chioda et al., 2012; Loueiro, 2012). Familias en Acción also helped to reduce crime (Camacho and Mejia, 2013), with robberies and car thefts declining by 7.2% and 1.3%, respectively. However, in this case, the incapacitation effect, which prevents young people from becoming involved in delinquent activities, was not observed.

2.12   Early exposure to violence is a predictor of future violence. Studies from the United States demonstrate that exposure to violence at an early age increases the likelihood that individuals will subsequently become aggressors and commit violent acts (Heise, 2011). The most common risk factors empirically linked to violence against women (Heise, 2011) are the following: (i) at the *individual level*: witnessing intimate partner violence as a child, child abuse, child sexual abuse, etc.; (ii) at the level of *interpersonal relationships*: association with gangs or criminal groups, multiple partners (in the case of men), alcohol and substance abuse; (iii) at the *community level*: areas with high rates of crime, lack of economic opportunities; and (iv) at the *social level*: accepted cultural norms that are violent and discriminatory, policies or laws that discriminate against women in social, economic, and political spheres.

2.13   There is some evidence regarding the effectiveness of programs in Africa, United States, and Australia aimed at preventing and reducing violence against women, particularly those seeking to change gender attitudes and behaviors, educate parents, and economically empower women.[10] The evidence in LAC is preliminary, but there are some programs that have shown positive results. For example, Brazil's "Program H" uses educational activities and community campaigns to help young men question traditional gender and behavioral norms, including violence against women. An evaluation of the program showed a positive change in 10 out of 17 gender attitudes (Pulerwitz et al., 2006). In Chile, an evaluation of a similar program demonstrated significant improvements in attitudes to violence and gender equality among participating students (Obach et al., 2011). However, in terms of the effects of economic empowerment programs for women, the evidence is mixed. Perversely, in fact, the economic empowerment of women can increase the incidence of domestic violence in some situations, at least in the short term (Heise, 2011). An evaluation of the "Oportunidades" program in Mexico found that conditional cash transfers to households had reduced alcohol-related violence against women by 37%. However, violence increased in households where the men had low levels of education (and presumably more traditional gender expectations) and the woman was entitled to sizeable transfers (Heise, 2011).

2.14   The private sector and civil society play a key role in supporting wellbeing and security in communities. If citizen security strategies are to achieve greater impact, results, and sustainability, they must involve not only different areas of government, but also civil society and the private sector (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime [ICPC], World Bank, Sou da Paz Institute, 2011). The private sector creates employment and helps to support social and economic progress in communities. It can also provide innovation, resources, and skills to local communities (Centre for Security and Crime Science, 2011). Over the last decade, interest in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the area of crime and violence prevention has grown. There are several reasons for this, including concern regarding the additional costs imposed by criminality, the high costs of doing business in violent environments, and the benefits of PPPs, as well as corporate social responsibility and the emergence of social philanthropy (ICPC, World Bank, Sou da Paz Institute, 2011).

2.15   An evaluation of Target's "Safe City" program in the U.S. found that the success of this PPP—which brings together local police, businesses, and community leaders to address criminal activity in retail stores—was linked to the level of collaboration in analyzing problems of delinquency and the shared development of a response plan.

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[10]   In the Oxfam program "We Can," tolerance of violence against women was reduced among the target population. Community randomized trials of the "Stepping Stones" and "Sister for Life" programs in South Africa found that violence against women was reduced by up to 51% over two years (Jewkes et al., 2008). Also in South Africa, the "IMAGE" program (which combines group credit-based microfinance with training in gender issues) succeeded in reducing the prevalence of physical and sexual domestic violence against women participants by 55% (Pronic et al., 2006).

Positive changes were observed in perceptions of safety of personnel in the communities, as well as reductions in crime in two of the four areas studied (La Vigne et al., 2009). In LAC, however, despite growth in PPPs, there is relatively little information regarding their outcomes or impact in terms of their ability to prevent or reduce crime and violence.[11] Among other significant examples is the case of Ciudad Juarez in Mexico. The city uses public-private sector forums, online tools, and social networks to promote collaboration between small- and medium-sized enterprises and the federal police for addressing reported crimes, combating violence, and transforming neighborhoods into safe areas with prosperous businesses. In addition, Movimento Brasil Competitivo [Competitive Brazil Movement] (MBC) introduces private sector management processes in the public sector, resulting in better public services at lower cost.[12]

2.16   Lastly, an innovative financial instrument in LAC, social impact bonds, offers the potential to leverage additional funding and promote innovative solutions in social policy. Social impact bonds are contracts between the government and an external organization, where the government pays for a service only when the external organization meets preset targets.[13]

B.   Situational prevention

2.17   Several studies indicate that urban crime and fear of crime may be reduced by comprehensive approaches that include security as a component of urban renewal and neighborhood improvement programs. The "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" (CPTED) model is based on the theory that physical surroundings influence crime and its prevention (Cooke, 2003). The model makes practical recommendations for the planning, design, and management of the physical environment with a view to reducing urban crime (Kruger et al., 2001). Descriptive qualitative evidence demonstrates that improvements in urban infrastructure help to reduce crime (Cerda et al., 2010; García, 2005). This approach has been adapted to the Latin American context in Chile, Brazil, and Honduras, though rigorous impact evaluations are not yet available.

2.18   The physical and social integration of informal urban neighborhoods, as well as the introduction of mechanisms to reduce crime opportunity, have shown positive effects in terms of crime reduction, perceptions of the risk of violence, and confidence in institutions. For example, a quasi-experimental evaluation of the Metrocable transportation system in Medellín, Colombia, underlines these benefits

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[11] Promising examples of PPPs in the region that involve various private, public, and community stakeholders include "Bogotá Cómo Vamos" [How's It Going, Bogotá], in Colombia; "Paz Activa y Paz Educa" [Peace Activates and Peace Educates] in Chile; "Sistema de Formación de Animadores Juveniles Comunitarios" [Training System for Young Community Leaders] in Argentina; "Papo Responsa" [Chat Projects] in Brazil; and "Tijuana Innovadora" [Innovative Tijuana] in Mexico.

[12] In Pernambuco, the government, with MBC assistance, lowered the crime rate from 54 to 47 per 100,000 inhabitants, a reduction of 13.4% in a period of 12 months.

[13] For example, in 2014 the MIF launched a US$5.3 million program to promote social impact bonds in Latin America.

(Cerda et al., 2010). Similarly, support for activities in which the community plays an active part fosters a sense of belonging and solidarity and minimizes feelings of segregation. The effects of the social stigma of living in informal neighborhoods and its adverse impact on job prospects have been documented (Perlman, 2003). Although there are no quantitative evaluations that measure the effectiveness of such interventions, there are a number of interesting candidates for future evaluations, such as the community policing programs being implemented in urban areas in Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala (Moser et al., 2003). Examples of reducing opportunities for crime include several cases where the sale of alcohol was restricted as part of comprehensive actions to reduce crime. This measure instituted in Bogotá (Colombia) and in Diaedema (Brazil), along with others, reduced the number of homicides in Bogotá by around 74% in 1993-2004, and in Diaedema by 70% in 1999-2005 (Di Tella et al., 2010).

2.19   The Safer Cities program is an example of a comprehensive neighborhood improvement program designed with a focus on security. This model promotes the planning and implementation of safe urban designs through partnerships among local governments, the police, the private sector, and civil society, with a view to (i) strengthening the social fabric, (ii) reducing inequality, (iii) improving the urban physical environment, and (iv) promoting governance design (UN Habitat, 2007). The improvement of informal urban neighborhoods is approached using combined investments in basic infrastructure and social and urban services. These programs have become increasingly integrated over time, incorporating other variables such as support for vulnerable groups and citizen security (Brakarz et al., 2002; Urban Development and Housing SFD, 2013). The "Programa Urbano Integral" [Comprehensive Urban Program] in Medellín, Colombia, is another example of this type of intervention that has shown substantial reductions in rates of violence and insecurity, particularly crimes such as robbery and domestic violence. The program focused on creating public commons that support civic coexistence, as well as infrastructure improvements and the promotion of economic activity in targeted communities (UN Habitat, 2011).

C.   Policing

2.20   A lack of efficiency and effectiveness in policing creates mistrust on the part of citizens and heightens perceptions of insecurity. A perception that the police force is incapable of maintaining order creates a lack of confidence among citizens regarding the capacities of the criminal justice system and law enforcement (Ahmad, Hubickey, McNamara, and Batista, 2011). Victims of crime tend to trust institutions (including the police) 10% less than those who have not been victims. Similarly, there is a correlation between crime and the behavior of citizens. Where levels of insecurity are higher, citizens exhibit less willingness to value the work of the police force and to collaborate with it (Corbacho, Ruiz, and Philipp, 2012).

2.21   Dramatic cases of corruption or abuse of power on the part of the police have a significantly negative impact on public confidence, particularly among ethnic and racial groups. Although only a limited number of police are responsible for a

disproportionate number of complaints by citizens, this has a negative impact on public perceptions. In the U.S., effective early warning systems are being developed to facilitate identification of those officers at greatest risk of engaging in misconduct (Durose et al., 2002; Kenney, 2004; and Kenney, 2008). Internal control mechanisms and protocols have also been developed for case management, including the identification, investigation, and resolution of complaints (Kenney, 2013). Nonetheless, given a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of such control processes carried out by the police themselves, a wide range of other, externally based control mechanisms has arisen (Miller, J., 2002) (see Annex II, Table 2).

2.22   Evidence shows that police effectiveness in preventing and addressing crime depends on close interaction with citizens. Experience has shown that the main role of the police is to prevent, identify, and address problems experienced in the community (Goldstein, 1979; Wilson et al., 1982). Although technological improvements are essential, greater willingness on the part of citizens to report crimes and provide detailed information to the police has a significant effect on police effectiveness (Kenney, 2013). In fact, with the exception of cases such as corruption and organized crime, citizens do report the majority of crimes that occur in their communities to the police (Bayley, 1998).

2.23   Police effectiveness and efficiency cannot be ensured by implementation of any single model. Policing models can be categorized according to three types of objectives: controlling crime, maintaining order, and providing public or social services. The weight of each of these categories depends on the expectations of citizens, the nature of crime, social cohesion, and the capacity of each police agency (Wilson, 1978; Kenney, 2013). Thus, no single model can ensure police effectiveness and efficiency, but it is possible to implement local adaptations of policing practices that have been evaluated positively, such as community-oriented policing (Wilson et al., 1982; Wycoff, 1998) or problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979).

2.24   Models of community (or proximity) policing have helped to strengthen relations between police forces and communities for the prevention, investigation, and resolution of criminal incidents. The concept of community policing has been used to describe a variety of programs (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). However, community policing consists of organizational changes and alterations in decision-making processes regarding policing and proximity of the police force to the community. Where priorities and the means of achieving them are defined by the community and the police officers assigned to the area. In other words, it is a process rather than a product, structured around three components: citizen engagement, problem resolution, and decentralization (Skogan, 2005). The success of these actions depends on the ability of the police to listen to citizens, take on board the problems they identify, and try to solve them (Wycoff, 1988). The interventions that have been evaluated, such as Chicago's "Alternative Policing

Strategy,"[14] show a statistically significant reduction in crime in the majority of areas where the model has been implemented (Skogan, 1996). In LAC, community policing models such as Chile's "Plan Cuadrante de Carabineros" [Quadrant Policing Plan] and Colombia's "Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes" [National Plan for Quadrant Community Policing] have succeeded in reducing the rates for certain types of crime. An evaluation of the Colombian program's effectiveness pointed to a 22% reduction in homicides in the eight targeted cities. Police officers' sense of responsibility towards citizens and their level of motivation also improved (Mejía et al., 2013). There is also qualitative evidence regarding efforts to increase legitimacy and trust in police agencies in the Caribbean countries by taking a community policing approach. In Barbados, for example, the results of a citizen security survey in 2010 showed very positive public opinion of the community police force compared to the other seven Caribbean countries (UNDP, 2012).

2.25   Recent assessments have demonstrated the effectiveness of the problem-oriented policing (POP) model in reducing crime. More than a policing practice, this model is a philosophy derived from community policing, which seeks not only to address the immediate concerns of the community, but also the underlying factors leading to crime and criminal behavior in the long term (Goldstein, 1979). The model has been used and evaluated in various scenarios. The number of crimes fell, and perceptions of safety and of the police force improved significantly (Kenney, 2013). Given the success of this approach, the intervention has been expanded to address specific problems such as gangs (Police Executive Research Forum, 1993), drugs (Eck, 1992), crime in schools (Kenney and Watson, 1992), and the handling of emergency calls (Sherman, 1989).

2.26   The POP model is an effective strategy for preventing delinquency and reducing the incidence of crime and violence. It focuses on locations where crime occurs, or on those people most likely to be victims or perpetrators of crime. This is based on evidence that criminal acts tend to be concentrated in certain locations at certain times of the day. Likewise, the majority of crimes are committed by a small percentage of offenders, while a small number of victims account for most cases of victimization (Braga, 2012). More recent studies carried out in U.S. cities confirm that criminal activity is concentrated in certain areas and is stable in a small number of "hot spots", and only on a limited number of specific city blocks (Weisburd and Tepel, 2014). Thus, careful analysis of crime problems in hot spots will therefore yield prevention strategies that are effective in altering the situations and dynamics that lead to crimes in those specific places (Braga and Weisburd, 2010). It is noteworthy that a systematic review of hot-spot policing (Braga, 2007) showed that this type of intervention did not cause crime to shift elsewhere, confirming the

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[14]   Evaluated by Northwestern University's Institute for Policy Research.

strong linkages between criminality, people, and places. Evaluations of POP programs have confirmed the effectiveness of these types of interventions.[15]

2.27 Studies have shown that police stations to deal specifically with violence against women have had mixed results. The existence of such stations facilitates official access by the victim to the criminal justice system. However, it has not necessarily contributed to reduction in violence against women. Studies of police stations in Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru have demonstrated that these have helped to boost public awareness of violence against women. However, victims do not generally receive the type of assistance guidance they need, and staff training is inadequate or absent (Jubb et al., 2010). Lastly, it should be emphasized that partnerships between police and communities are key to addressing violence against women. In the U.S., for example, a comparative study demonstrated the effectiveness of such partnerships for improving police services and victim protection, as well as for ensuring that these crimes do not go unnoticed or unattended (Worden, 2001).

D.   Criminal justice

2.28 Several studies have demonstrated the positive effects of programs of services offered in the pretrial period that focus on increasing the efficiency of decision-making, reducing waiting times, and reducing the unsentenced prison population through alternatives to pretrial detention (Pausadelas, 2013). Studies have warned of the danger of over-supervising or over-managing defendants that pose a low risk, and it is therefore crucial to determine the level of risk and needs of each one by gathering and analyzing social, family, and employment information, as well as their criminal record (Nostrand, Rose, and Weilbrech, 2011). Virtual courtrooms (based on video recording systems) have also been rated positively, corroborating improvements in simplification of procedures, cost reductions, and access to justice (Babcock and Johansen, 2011).

2.29 Experimental or quasi-experimental studies demonstrate that imprisonment does not only not reduce recidivism, but it also has criminological effects, particularly in the case of individuals rated as low risk (Bench and Allen, 2003; Chen and Shapiro, 2004; Gaes and Camp, 2009; Cullen, Jonson, and Nagin, 2011). A random evaluation of four juvenile courts in the U.S.[16] confirmed the positive impact of alternative measures when compared to prosecution through the regular courts (Cannel, Wilson, and Gottfredson, 2008). Similarly, a recent systematic review of

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[15] For example, Boston's "Operation Ceasefire" (which sought to deter gang-related violence involving guns) led to a significant reduction in the number of youth homicides, as well as in attacks involving firearms and the number of calls to police concerning firearms-related incidents (Braga, 2006; Braga and Weisburd, 2012). Hot-spot interventions focused on specific locations and situations proved more effective than preventive or reactive police patrols. "Those studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provided the most solid collective evidence regarding the effectiveness of policing" (National Research Council, 2004).

[16] Juvenile courts are venues in which alternative programs (community service, addiction therapies, educational projects, etc.) may be mandated for young people accused of minor offenses instead of prison.

29 U.S.-based experimental studies involving a total of 7,304 juveniles concluded that the processing of minors through the criminal justice system is linked to an average increase of between 5% and 6% in crime rates (Petrosino and Guckenburg, 2010). An alternative approach is electronic monitoring, which has been the subject of recent evaluations with favorable results in Switzerland, Sweden, and Argentina. Other studies, from the U.S., however, have shown mixed results in terms of effectiveness.[17] There is also evidence supporting the effectiveness of community work programs (Wermink, Blokland, Nieuwbeerta et al., 2010) and day centers[18] for chronic offenders who commit minor offenses, have problems with drugs and alcohol, and lack the basic skills necessary for daily living (Martin, Lurigio, and Olson, 2003). Similarly, experimental studies of the effectiveness of drug courts as an alternative sentence for those found guilty of minor offenses and suffering from addiction have found that recidivism rates among participants are substantially lower than in control groups. They have also been shown to be more cost-effective (Gottfredson and Exum, 2002; Gottfredson, Najaka, and Kearly, 2003; Solop and Wonders, 2003).

2.30   A number of LAC-based initiatives that promote access to criminal justice and alternative dispute resolution strategies represent promising practices for reducing social conflict. However, the operation and effectiveness of these methods have not yet been the subject of rigorous evaluations (Pausadelas, 2013). These institutions generally operate at the local level. Examples include "juzgados de paz" [magistrates' courts], the objective of which is to bring the justice system closer to the population by offering an affordable forum for resolving disputes—particularly in the area of civil law. There are also Colombia's conciliation centers, the purpose of which is to resolve family and civil disputes without recourse to the courts.

2.31   Recent qualitative studies of programs that promote access to justice for women have shown positive effects in improvements in victim support and the prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators. However, the evidence on the causal relationship between impunity and violence against women is still rudimentary. Several countries have recently experimented with innovative approaches to improving access to justice for women, such as specialized courts for domestic violence in Brazil, Spain, the U.S., Uruguay, and Venezuela. The impact of these reforms on violence against women remains to be seen, but some studies show that they are improving attitudes and encouraging rejection of these behaviors (UNFPA, 2009). Protective orders can help to reduce violence against women under certain conditions (Logan and Waker, 2010). Lastly, "comisarías de familia" [family police

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[17] The study in Argentina (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2013) found a rearrest rate of 13% among individuals subject to electronic monitoring, compared to 22% among ex convicts with similar profiles not subject to electronic monitoring. A systematic review of these programs carried out in the U.S. (Mackenzie, 2006) concluded that programs based solely on surveillance and extreme forms of control are not effective in reducing recidivism.

[18] Day centers are establishments that provide community-based supervision and opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation.

services] or *"coordinated community response"* provide interdisciplinary support to protect the rights of women and children in cases of domestic violence, sexual abuse, and restraining orders. These have proven effective in improving service coordination and the quality of assistance to victims, but results have been mixed in terms of their impact on the reduction and prevention of violence against women (Post et al., 2010).

E.   Penitentiary system and rehabilitation

2.32   Punitive conceptions of the penitentiary system have been shown to lack effectiveness, and this has caused a philosophical shift in favor of rehabilitation (MacKenzie, 2007; Hedeerson, 2007). The concept of rehabilitation may be defined as "a structured effort to change the attitudes and behavior of prisoners, focused on eliminating future criminal behavior" (Pollock, 1997). Well-designed and effectively implemented rehabilitation programs can provide stability and order in prisons, reduce idleness among prisoners, and relieve the stress of being incarcerated. They also improve social, economic, and workforce reintegration, thus reducing criminal recidivism (Mears et al., 2002). However, an essential element for the success of these programs is a conscious and voluntary decision in favor of individual transformation (Villagra, 2008). Moreover, the evidence has confirmed that overcrowded conditions prevent the effective implementation of treatment and rehabilitation programs (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006).

2.33   The key to effectiveness in rehabilitation programs is knowing how and for whom these work (Mertz et al., 2004). Rehabilitation programs that have been proven effective are those that combine individual needs, circumstances, and learning styles (Petersilia, 2003). Methodologies to identify basic principles of "Risk, Need, and Responsivity" (RNR) have been developed for such purpose. These have helped to make interventions in prisons effective in terms of reducing recidivism (Bonta and Andrews, 2005) and targeted, using multiple components that facilitate the development of social, work-related, and behavioral skills (MacKenzie, 1997). Evidence also supports the importance of designing and implementing interventions that meet the specific needs of female prisoners, including mental and physical health, economic self-reliance, and social and workforce reintegration (Faith, 1993; Green et al., 2005; O'Brien, 2001; Richie and Freudenberg, 2005; Young and Reviere, 2006; Taylor et al., 2012).

2.34   The most effective penitentiary rehabilitation programs for reducing recidivism are those based on cognitive behavioral therapies. (Mackenzie, 2007; Lipsey, 2010). The common factor in these programs is their focus on changes in the cognitive processes surrounding right or wrong behavior—thinking, reasoning, and decision-making—as well as on creating alternative solutions. (Landenberger and Lipsey, 2005).[19] In a meta-analysis that reviewed 58 experimental or quasi-experimental

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[19]   Examples include "reasoning and rehabilitation" (R&R), "moral recognition therapy" (MRT), "cognitive restructuring." "aggression replacement training" (ART), "thinking for a change" (T4C), and "cognitive intervention programs" (CIP).

studies of cognitive behavioral intervention programs involving adult and juvenile prison populations, recidivism fell by 25% in the targeted population (Landenberger and Lipsey, 2005). Lastly, applied knowledge has shown that programs focused on vocational education in prisons (completion of primary and secondary studies) have achieved reductions of up to 9.8% in recidivism (Drake, Aos, and Miller, 2009).

2.35   Programs based mainly on punishment and disciplinary control have been less successful in reducing recidivism (Mackensey, 2012; Lipsey, 2012). Examples include programs aimed at imposing discipline (e.g., boot camps); that emphasize supervision for the detection of bad behavior (conditional release under intensive supervision, curfew laws); or that use fear of the consequences of bad behavior to dissuade (prison visits, such as "Scared Straight"). The evidence shows that recidivism among young participants in the Scared Straight program was higher than among young people of a similar profile that participated in other programs (Lipsey, 1992). Generally, a meta-analysis of these types of programs concluded that they have no impact in terms of preventing juvenile delinquency; rather, they caused it to rise by 28% in the treatment group, compared to the control group (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Buehler, 2002).

2.36   A gradual transition from prison back into the community ("reentry") has become an essential mechanism for effective reintegration (Visher and Travis, 2012; Maruna and Immarigeon, 2004; Morgan and Owers, 2001; Petersilia, 2003; Seiter and Kadela, 2003; Travis et al., 2001). A number of interventions in the U.S. that have shown positive results for levels of recidivism are halfway houses (which provide vocational and work programs prior to release) and drug treatment programs (Seiter and Kadela, 2003). Similarly, the "Boston Reentry Initiative," which offers comprehensive interventions (social, health, mentoring, and counseling services) to high-risk, violent criminals, has reduced recidivism rates by 30% compared to the control group (Braga et al., 2009). Other promising examples in this area are the "Offender Notification Forums" in Chicago, and "reentry" courts, which focus on collaboration between the individual and the community (Visher and Travis, 2012).

2.37   Programs focused solely on work reintegration have not proven as effective in reducing crime and recidivism (Mackenzie, 2012). Although employment is an important aspect of reintegration, programs must adjust to the particular needs of each individual, their motivation for change, their willingness to work and attitude, and the specific circumstances associated with criminal activities (Tyler and Berk, 2009). A number of programs in the U.S. that have combined the creation of job opportunities with training and motivation for individual change—such as Jobstar, the Service and Conservation Corps, the National Job Corps, and the YouthBuild Youth Offender Project—have led to a significant decrease in criminal behaviors and activities (Cave et al., 1993; Jastrzab et al., 1996; Schochet et al., 2008; Wally Abrazaldo et al., 2009).

2.38   Private sector participation is an important element in the success of reintegration programs. In LAC in particular, there are innovative and promising experiences that

support the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners, including both public and private initiatives. For example, programs such as "Networking Academy," "Reintegra" [Reintegrate], and "Semilla" [Seed] in Mexico; "League Collegiate Wear Program" in El Salvador; and "Youth Upliftment Through Employment" in Jamaica represent promising private sector-led initiatives that attempt to channel the potential of young people into more productive activities. However, rigorous evaluations are still needed to demonstrate their effectiveness and impact.

F. Citizen security governance

2.39   The science of management of citizen security and for the prevention of crime and violence is a recent field of research (Fixsen et al., 2005), but it is growing rapidly (Homel and Homel, 2012). According to this literature, good sector governance requires (i) a strong apex agency and specialized institutional structures; (ii) management based on quality information and timely evidence; (iii) definition, implementation, and evaluation of the intervention strategy (Mertz, 2014); and (iv) effective mechanisms for horizontal coordination among relevant sector ministries and vertical coordination between levels of government.

2.40   The evidence indicates that citizen security and justice require a specialized management system with strategic vision and leadership. Such systems should be comprehensive (Homel and Homel, 2012) and include a set of established processes that link and coordinate public and private stakeholders both vertically and horizontally to support decision-making (Revesz, 2006; Velásquez, 2006). At this strategic level, several countries in the region have established "national citizen security systems" and are in the process of consolidating these. The systems coordinate multiple institutions and stakeholders, and define structures, methodologies, and decision-making processes within a regulatory framework. Countries such as Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and El Salvador have established national citizen security cabinets or councils encompassing not only traditional security and justice agencies, but also areas related to violence prevention, such as health, education, and social development institutions, for a comprehensive, multisector response to this multifaceted challenge.

2.41   Integrated citizen security policies that combine preventive action with control have proven more effective in reducing crime. Violence prevention has become an essential component of comprehensive strategies to reduce crime (Waller, 2006). Several recent studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of different kinds of prevention programs (Sherman et al., 1997, 2006; Welsh and Farrington, 2012), while these have also been proven more cost-effective (Drake, Aos, and Miller, 2009).

2.42   Specialized human resources, leadership, and accountability mechanisms are key elements for building legitimacy. This is also true of specialized technical capabilities, leadership in the definition and implementation of public policies in the sector (Homel and Homel, 2012; Fixsen, 2005), and the new approach to evaluating performance and impact, which involves establishing targets, responsibilities,

indicators, and outcomes (Mertz, 2013). Colombia and Chile offer examples of comprehensive citizen security strategies that define targets and mechanisms for monitoring results, using results-based management techniques and policies based on applied knowledge. Security contracts developed under the leadership of local authorities in several European countries (France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom) and replicated in Colombia and Chile also represent a promising experience in the area of public accountability (ICPC, 2006).

2.43   The quality of citizen security and justice services, and access to these, depends on the effective allocation of human and financial resources. Experience in LAC has demonstrated that a lack of sustained investment has increased the difficulty of attracting qualified human resources. Empirical evidence points to a positive correlation between the level of economic incentives on offer (salaries) and the capabilities of personnel selected in the public sector (Dal Bo, Finan, and Rossi, 2011). Similarly, a lack of adequate funding for scientific research, local-level implementation, and the proactive dissemination of knowledge also prevents effective operations in this sector. However, little is known about the fiscal burden and efficiency of spending in the sector. Given the absence of international standards for comparing public expenditure allocations in the sector, it still is impossible to determine whether a country is spending a lot or little in this area, or how in relative terms (Coelho, 2012). For example, the U.S. has significantly improved knowledge regarding effective preventive interventions in recent years, due to (i) private sector investment in evaluations (Fagan and Eisenberg, 2012); (ii) the creation of local-level financing mechanisms, such as conditional cash transfers to local communities for the implementation of prevention programs; and (iii) the creation of evidence-based project banks for the dissemination of knowledge.[20]

2.44   Effective public policy management in the sector depends on the existence of high-quality information and applied knowledge. The literature points to a lack of empirical knowledge and insufficient availability, quality, and timeliness of information as the main obstacles to developing effective policies for the sector in the region (Mertz, 2013). Crime statistics are also fragmented and inconsistent, and the main agencies responsible for managing them (police forces, public prosecutors, institutes of forensic medicine) keep separate statistics with different compilation methodologies, leading to largely unreliable data. In several countries, these statistics are not publicly available and lack consistent frequency and detail (Di Tella, Edwards, and Schargrosdky, 2010). At the same time, the efficient management of these policies depends on the selective identification of

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[20]   Examples include the "Blueprints for Violence Prevention" initiative, the Community Guide by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Child Trend LINKS database, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, the "Communities That Care" Prevention Strategies Guide, the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices, and the Delinquency Prevention Model Program Guide of the Office of Juvenile Justice.

interventions, adaptations based on theoretical models, and rigorous evaluation methodologies (Abad and Gómez, 2008; Frühling, 2012).

2.45   A number of studies have identified specific factors that support the effective implementation of programs in the sector.[21] These include (i) targeted interventions—various research projects have demonstrated that CSJ policies are most effective at the local level, addressing specific problems for specific populations and geographical areas (Bauman, 2003); (ii) adaptation of implementation arrangements to local institutional capacities, ensuring that execution periods and the sequencing of activities are tailored to the institutional context (OVE), 2014); (iii) citizen participation and societal oversight of diagnostic assessments and the identification of actions, helping to improve the relevance and effectiveness of programs and creating conditions for their sustainability. The role of societal oversight in targeted areas can help to inhibit crime in the community (collective efficacy) depending on the different levels of community organization (partnerships) (Sampson, 2004). A mapping of stakeholders, their roles, and interrelationships at the neighborhood level for preventing violence is therefore essential to strengthen and consolidate these partnerships and improve their effectiveness; and (iv) cooperation and partnership between the public and private sectors for the identification and financing of programs. Strategic public-private partnerships, involving chambers of commerce and organized producers' groups, are among the promising programs in the region.

III. KEY CHALLENGES FOR THE REGION

3.1   LAC is one of the most violent regions on the planet. According to the most recent study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2011), the total number of murders worldwide was 468,000 in 2010—equivalent to a worldwide murder rate of 6.9 per 100,000 inhabitants. Of these, 31% occurred in the Americas, surpassed only by Africa, where an estimated 36% of murders occurred. With 27% of homicides, Asia ranks below the Americas and Africa, while only 6% and 1% of murders were recorded in Europe and Oceania, respectively. Weighting these homicide rates by population, LAC is the region with the highest rate (23.5)—three times the worldwide average, despite its level of economic development (see Annex I, Figure 1).

3.2   Crime and violence do not affect all subregions symmetrically. Central America, in particular, has experienced a growing trend, reaching a murder rate of 32.8 per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC, 2011; see Annex I, Figure 2). (This exceeds the standard of 30 per 100,000 used to identify civil conflict in small states.) The Caribbean is also severely affected by crime and violence—particularly Jamaica, which has the highest murder rate of the entire subregion at 41 per 100,000 inhabitants. This compares to 36 in The Bahamas, 11 in Barbados, 17 in Guyana, and 26 in Trinidad and Tobago (UNODC, 2011). Among the many structural

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[21]   OVE, 2010-2014.

factors associated with insecurity that vary from place to place depending on local characteristics, the level of violence in these subregions is related to transnational organized crime and illegal trafficking in firearms and drugs (World Bank, 2010; UNDP, 2012), which facilitate manifestations of criminality and add complexity to this phenomenon (UNDP, 2013).

3.3   Perceptions of crime and violence are worsening in the region. The latest survey by Latinobarómetro concludes that crime is the top concern for citizens in the region, even ranking above unemployment in 12 of the 18 countries surveyed. Moreover, in ten of these countries, more than 25% of those surveyed believe that crime is the most important issue (Latinobarómetro, 2013; see Annex I, Figures 3a and 3b). Fear of crime and violence affects the way citizens behave. It restricts certain behaviors, curtails activities, and inflicts economic costs by inhibiting investment. Accordingly, insecurity has been recognized as one of the main challenges to the competitiveness of businesses in the region (World Economic Forum, 2012). According to the World Bank's Enterprise Survey (2011), losses stemming from crime and violence have been estimated at 9% of GDP in Honduras, 7.7% in El Salvador, 5% in Jamaica, and 3.6% in Costa Rica.

3.4   High victimization levels are accompanied by low levels of confidence in the institutions responsible for ensuring safety. Recent studies show that approximately one third of those interviewed (or their family members) had been victims of crime in the last 12 months.[22] Paradoxically, there is a significant lag between the reality of crime and perceptions of insecurity. A recent study of the factors that create perceptions of vulnerability to crime concluded that an absence of civic culture and confidence in the police force, as well as direct or indirect victimization, are the top factors influencing fear of crime (Vilalta, 2012). It is noteworthy that in countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which have some of the lowest homicide rates in the region (5.6, 3.7, and 6.7, respectively, in 2009), more than 20% of those surveyed reported having been the victim of a crime. There is no doubt that high rates of homicide and victimization have negative repercussions for confidence in institutions. The same surveys show that more than half of the population has either no confidence or low levels of confidence in the police force and public prosecutors (LAPOP, 2010; see Annex I, Figure 4).

3.5   The main challenges faced by LAC are presented in detail below, following the same thematic structure as the previous section.

A.   Social prevention. A multiplicity of risk factors that lead to criminal behavior in the youth population

3.6   Rapid growth in the youth segment of the population is not exclusive to the region. There are currently more people in the world under the age of 25 than ever before, with a total of almost 1.3 billion people between 12 and 24 years of age. The

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[22] Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2010. The AmericasBarometer currently covers 26 countries of the region, including the U.S., Canada, and the Caribbean.

majority of these live in urban areas. In LAC, there are currently 148 million people aged 15 to 29 (International Labour Organisation, 2012), so around 60% of the population is under 30. Young people also account for 40% of the population of working age in the region.

3.7   Young people are exposed to a variety of risk factors that make them even more likely to become involved in criminal activity. Young people account for 24% of the world's working poor, compared with 28% of global employment. At least 45% of all the world's young people (515 million) live on less than US$2 per day. Approximately 90 million young people (or 47%) are unemployed (UN Habitat, 2013). In LAC, it is estimated that approximately 39% of young people are poor, while 25% of those aged 15 to 19 years are unable to meet their basic needs, including food (ECLAC and UNFPA, 2012). Moreover, around half of all young people in Latin America continue to leave the school system due to severe poverty, malnutrition, and poor health, and a large number due to a lack of interest in education and the need to join the workforce early in order to support family finances (IDB, 2013). The rate of unemployment among young people aged 15 to 24 in LAC is 14.6%. In addition, one in every five young people in the region (15 to 29 years of age)—approximately 32 million people—neither work nor study ("ninis") (IDB, 2012). This problem mainly affects countries such as El Salvador, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Belize, which have more than 30% of the young people who neither work nor study (IDB, 2013).

3.8   Easy access to drugs, alcohol, and weapons fuels violent activity on the part of young people. The consumption of drugs and alcohol is a risk factor directly linked to violent crime (Taylor et al., 2008). Alcohol accounts for more than 60% of drugs consumed before a crime is committed, well above other psychoactive substances (UNDP, 2013). In addition, 60% of LAC's school population (young people between 12 and 17 years of age) drink alcohol frequently or have smoked marijuana, becoming the first step towards the consumption of other drugs and in developing other risk factors (Organization of American States (OAS), 2012). According to the 2012 OAS Report on Citizen Security, 78% of homicides in Central America involve firearms, while in South America the figure is 83% (OAS, 2012).

3.9   In LAC, the majority of homicide victims and perpetrators are young people. The most recent UNODC homicide report indicates that 43% of all murder victims worldwide are young people aged between 15 and 29, while 7.9% of victims are children aged between 0 and 14. Moreover, in the Americas, one in every seven victims is a young male (UNODC, 2014). Homicides take place mainly in cities, and are concentrated in low-income neighborhoods on the outskirts of the major metropolises (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999; Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002). As a result, young men living in low-income areas in LAC face a 1 in 50 chance of being murdered before reaching the age of 31 (Moestue, Moestue, and Muggah, 2013).

3.10   In the Americas, 30% of homicides are linked to organized crime and gang activity (UNODC, 2014). Young people make up the majority of gang members. Gangs

provide a sense of belonging, as well as protection in situations of poverty and family breakdown, and economic support through illicit activities (Jaitman, 2014). The Caribbean is also familiar with this reality. In Jamaica, 65.6% of reported murders in 2012 were gang-related (Jamaica Crime Statistics Review, 2012).

3.11 Women are increasingly affected by violence. There is a worrying trend in the region towards an increase in femicides. In Guatemala, for example, there was a 321% increase in violent deaths among women from 1996 to 2008, compared to an increase of 159% for men (Guatemala National Statistics Institute, 1996-2006; National Civilian Police, 2007-2008). Moreover, in the region, 84.3% of all murder victims are men, with women accounting for 15.5%. (The remaining 0.2% are undetermined.) The countries with the highest murder rates for women are located primarily in Central America and the Caribbean (see Annex I, Figure 5)—13.2 in El Salvador, 10.3 in Jamaica, 10.1 in Belize, and 10.0 in Guatemala—whereas the countries with the lowest rates are concentrated in the Southern Cone. Violence against women is also not limited to murder; women are also subjected to physical and sexual violence. Four out of ten murders of women are committed by their partners (WHO, 2013). According to demographic and reproductive health surveys, one in two or one in four women in twelve LAC countries experienced physical or sexual violence at the hands of their partner between 2003 and 2009. Intimate partner violence affects 29.8% of the female population aged between 15 and 49 years (WHO, 2013).

3.12 Violence against women[23] is one of the most serious silent threats in the region, and as such represents an obstacle to human development, public health, and human rights (UNDP, 2013). It has grave consequences for women's health in physical terms (chronic conditions, disabilities, and reproductive health), as well as in psychological and mental terms (Pan-American Health Organization, 2003). Similarly, violence against women has a negative impact on wages, expressed as the loss of earnings as a percentage of GDP. This varies from 1.6% of GDP in Nicaragua to 4% in Colombia (IDB, 2012).

B. Situational prevention. A deficit in the quality of the urban environment conducive to crime

3.13 Rapid urbanization, associated with an absence of adequate infrastructure, institutions, and basic and social services, contributes to high rates of crime. LAC's rate of urbanization is the highest among middle-income regions, at 79%. This compares to 50% in Europe and Central Asia and 60% in the Middle East and North Africa. It is projected that by 2050, 90% of LAC's population will be living in cities (United Nations, 2013). This growth is the result of natural expansion and intense rural-urban migration, which has seen the region attain levels of

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[23] Violence against women is understood as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life" (United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women).

urbanization similar to those of industrialized countries, but in a third of the time (Bonet et al., 2011). Although cities offer significant economic opportunities and the ability to access services and other facilities, these are not equally available to all urban residents. This rapid expansion in cities has also been accompanied by the growth of informal settlements. In 2010, 110 million LAC inhabitants lived in slums (United Nations, 2012). A typical feature of these poor urban settlements is the high degree of violence of various types. In fact, in LAC in particular, most crime and violence is concentrated in urban centers (World Bank, 2011; UN Habitat, 2007).

3.14   Insecurity is particularly acute in the region's cities. Murder rates are high in the major metropolises, underlining the strong correlation between population density and the number of homicides (UNODC, 2011). The murder rate in the capital city is higher than the national rate in 13 out of 22 countries surveyed in the region. This pattern is particularly marked in the Central American countries, where the capital is the largest city, with the highest rate of economic participation (see Annex I, Figure 6a). Homicides tend to be concentrated in specific urban areas ("hot spots"), and are most frequent in large cities with high rates of urbanization and a prevalence of informal settlements and exclusion. For example, the murder rate in cities such as Guatemala City, Belize City, and San Salvador is in excess of 80 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Annex I, Figure 6b). However, not all capital cities exhibit the highest numbers and/or rates of homicides. Smaller cities or rural areas can be the focus of violence, particularly where these are close to borders, in areas with limited government presence, or in areas where drug trafficking occurs.

3.15   Violence is highest in poor urban neighborhoods and on the outskirts of cities (Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002). Crime and violence in LAC's cities are of a complex and multidimensional nature, affecting citizens in both public places and their own homes. Several types of violence interact: political, gang-related, economic, gender-based, interpersonal, and domestic. Disparities in levels of violence depending on neighborhoods' income levels are another characteristic of violence in LAC's cities. Neighborhoods with higher levels of income are affected mainly by property crime (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999), while the most severe violence is generally focused in poor urban neighborhoods, to the point that in some cases it is considered a routine part of daily life (Poppovic and Pinheiro, 1995). Impoverished populations also face a higher risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of crime (Winton, 2004; Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002). This reinforces feelings of inequality in terms of opportunities and available resources with which to protect oneself against crime, as well as access to security services such as policing and justice (Di Tella et al., 2010).

C.   Policing. Current policing models do not respond effectively to the characteristics of crime, leading to a lack of public confidence.

3.16   The countries of the region have undergone police reform processes with mixed results. Subsequent to democratization in the region, significant police reforms were undertaken with the aim of ensuring that the police forces were fully civilian

in nature. Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Barbados, Peru, and the Dominican Republic are examples of police reform processes. The success of these reforms has been mixed, owing, among other things, to weaknesses in the selection and training processes for personnel, the lack of a police career path, insufficient financial and technological resources, and uncertain working conditions and remuneration (Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín, 2012). In addition to these are a lack of effective accountability and transparency mechanisms (Rico and Chinchilla, 2002) and an absence of evaluation instruments (Tudela, 2007).

3.17   Police forces rank among the institutions in LAC with the lowest levels of public confidence. The Latinobarómetro survey has demonstrated for fifteen years (1996 to 2011) that police forces are one of the institutions that inspires least confidence among citizens of the region. In the case of young people, confidence in the police is lower still. In Central America, Mexico, the Andean region, and the Southern Cone (with the exception of Brazil), levels of confidence stand at less than 20% (Organización Iberoamericana de Juventud [Ibero-American Youth Organization], 2013). Additionally, a high proportion of citizens believe that the police engage in criminal acts. At the regional level, 43% of those surveyed believe that police officers collude with criminals. The countries where this perception is strongest are Honduras (63%), Guatemala (61%), and Bolivia (60%) (LAPOP and UNDP, 2012).

3.18   A lack of police capacity[24] prevents crime from being anticipated, prevented, and solved. The under-recording of crimes means that LAC is the region with the highest so-called "dark figure"[25] (UNDOC, 2014). For example, according to Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), for every 100 crimes that occur in that country, only 8 undergo preliminary police investigation (INEGI, 2012). In Honduras, only 21% of crimes reported to the police result in a complete investigation report (Blanco, 2011). Moreover, there are more private security guards in the region than police officers. As of 2012, there were 3,811,302 private security guards and 2,616,753 police officers in the region (OAS, 2012), and recruitment of private guards was expanding at a rate of approximately 10% per year (UNDP, 2013). Honduras, Guatemala, Brazil, and Panama all have higher numbers of security guards than police officers (OAS, 2012). It should be noted that improvements in police efficiency and effectiveness are not linked to greater numbers of officers per capita (UNDP, 2013).

D.   Criminal justice. Operational deficiencies in the criminal justice system for addressing and resolving crime

3.19   The limited availability, quality, and reliability of information and statistics regarding the efficiency of the region's criminal justice system is a critical hurdle to its effective evaluation. The quality of information varies among countries, and existing data tend to relate to issues such as the institutional and financial

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[24]   According to this argument, capacity depends more on the level of technical specialization and expertise than on the number of police.

[25]   Crimes that are not reported and for which no preliminary investigation is initiated.

independence of the judicial branch, and public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. Statistics regarding results achieved, management effectiveness, and efficiency of judicial expenditure are not generally available. However, analysis of available indicators and data (while recognizing their limitations) does allow for an approximate understanding of the current panorama, as well as some noteworthy trends in criminal justice systems in the region.

3.20   Judicial independence in relation to the other branches of government is low. According to the World Economic Forum survey, average judicial independence in the region fell from 3.3 in 2008 to 3.0 in 2012 (where 1 is "heavily influenceable" and 7 is "fully independent"). Of the 21 LAC countries covered by the survey, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago score above 4.4, while Venezuela, Haiti, and Paraguay score below 1.9.

3.21   The majority of the countries of the region have reformed their justice systems with a view to improving their capacity, agility, and independence, as well as to professionalize their staff and expand citizens' access to justice (UNDP, 2013). These reforms have focused on transforming criminal procedure from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial one (Hammergren, 2007), in which specialized agencies (such as public prosecutors) head the investigation and enjoy discretionary powers to ensure the efficiency of processes. Accordingly, prosecutors investigate and indict, while judges concentrate on deciding cases (UNDP, 2013). The main changes in criminal procedure have included: (i) the implementation of oral trials; (ii) emphasis on ensuring due process in the investigation and indictment stages; (iii) strengthening of the agencies responsible for investigation (such as public prosecutors and attorneys general); (iv) the creation of alternatives to pretrial detention; and (v) the elimination of examining magistrates (Duce and Perez Perdomo, 2003; Hammergren, 2008; and Langer, 2007). In some cases, these changes have faced resistance and have been slow, costly, and complex to implement.

3.22   Citizen confidence in the criminal justice system is low, especially compared to other institutions. In 2012, 47.9% of citizens in 18 Latin American countries expressed confidence in the criminal justice system (LAPOP, 2012). (Only the legislative branch and political parties had lower approval levels.) The level of confidence in the system in 2012 reflects a slight increase compared to the previous three periods evaluated (2010, 46.5%; 2008, 45.7%; 2006, 45.9%), but a decline compared to 2004 (49.1%).[26]

3.23   The criminal justice system contributes to the cycle of violence and prison overcrowding by emphasizing pretrial detention, despite the negative effects of prisons. Pretrial detention is often used by courts and tribunals, and its excessive use is one of the most serious problems in LAC. These inmates have not been

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[26]   In 16 out of 18 countries, when asked the question "if you were a victim of robbery or assault, how much confidence would you have that the justice system would punish the offender?" more than 50% of citizens said that they had little or no confidence (LAPOP, 2012),

formally tried, yet they are serving a sentence and tend to remain in prison for many years (Carranza, 2009). In 2012, the percentage of inmates in pretrial custody ranged from 30% to 50%, reaching a maximum of 83.3% in Bolivia (see Annex I, Figure 8). There has also been a deterioration in conditions for women in pretrial custody. According to data from the Open Society Foundation (2013), approximately 4 in 10 women inmates are imprisoned awaiting trial, a fact attributable to explosive growth in the female prison population.

3.24   At the same time, laws penalizing gender-based violence are not effectively enforced. According to the UNDP and UN Women, 97% of countries have enacted laws against domestic violence, while eight have codified femicide or feminicide and ten have incorporated the concept of violence against women into their legislation (UNDP, 2013). Nonetheless, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, there is a problem of systematic impunity in cases of violence against women, in addition to a lack of specialized training for judges and prosecutors (UNDP, 2013). Reports of violence against women are low in number, and sentences are almost inexistent. In Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru, for example, women are 10 times more likely to report a robbery than a case of sexual aggression (UN Women, 2011).

E.   Penitentiary system and rehabilitation. A lack of effective rehabilitation and reintegration policies complicates the prevention of recidivism

3.25   Over the last few decades, LAC has faced a serious crisis in its prisons, reflected most acutely in high levels of overcrowding. Belize, El Salvador, Panama, and the Bahamas have more than 400 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants, while Barbados has 529, making it the country with the highest rate of incarceration in the region. This is cause for concern, given that the average rate of incarceration worldwide is 144 (see Annex I, Figure 9). Such high levels of prison overpopulation, in turn, affect the accommodation capacity of prison systems,[27] leading to extreme conditions of overcrowding. Lastly, the female prison population has grown at a higher rate than the male population. In 2012, women accounted for around 5% of the overall prison population worldwide (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2012; see Annex I, Figure 10). In Latin America, the number of incarcerated women doubled between 2006 and 2010, from 40,000 to more than 74,000 (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2012).

3.26   Overcrowding in penitentiaries has become a risk factor for the stability of these institutions (UNDP, 2013). The coexistence of a diverse incarcerated population—including minors and adults, those sentenced and those awaiting trial, those accused of minor offenses and highly dangerous criminals—leads to greater violence and creates what is called "criminal contamination" (Dammert, 2010). A number of countries have worrying numbers of inmates that have been held in juvenile detention centers, including, for example, Chile (40%), Argentina (19.4%) and

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[27]   According to the European Committee on Crime Problems (1999), severe overcrowding is defined as a situation in which the planned capacity of a prison or prison system is exceeded by more than 20%.

Brazil (18.6%) (UNDP, 2013). Overpopulation also hinders the organized, secure, and effective administration of prison systems and observance of the basic rights of inmates, leads to disease transmission, obstructs the work of prison officers and the delivery of services and rehabilitation programs, and prevents the maintenance of adequate prison infrastructure (Espinoza, 2014).

3.27   Limited human resources and meager budget also limit effective management. The number of inmates per officer is three times higher than the world average, which is between one and three (Carranza, 2012). For example, the figure in 2011 was estimated at between 6 and 10, with the highest rates in El Salvador and Panama, at 17 and 15, respectively. Weak institutional capacity is linked to weak selection, training, and preparation processes for personnel. In most countries in the region, prison officers are usually required to have some secondary level education, but they are not necessarily required to have completed it (Dammert, 2008). In countries such as Guatemala, only primary education is required, while in other countries such as Chile and Peru, the requirement is for completed technical or secondary-level schooling (Dammert, 2008). The prison officer career path, which encompasses education, training, professional development, evaluation, and promotion of prison staff, has not been established in many countries in the region. Moreover, few countries in the region have schools or institutes for the professional training of prison officers. Those that do include Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.[28] Financing for prison systems is also limited compared to other components of the justice system and security sector. In 2011 in El Salvador, for example, around 45% of total public spending on the security sector was focused on police surveillance and patrols, while penitentiaries and rehabilitation centers received approximately 7% (World Bank, 2012).

3.28   Far from being places of rehabilitation or springboards to a successful reintegration into society, prisons are incubators for crime and violence. A large prison population, saturated accommodations, and a low level of public investment have created an environment of scarcity of basic services, including those supporting rehabilitation and reintegration. Only a tiny proportion of inmates are reached by educational, work-related, and recreational activities within prisons or by addiction treatment and psychological support. For example, the proportion of inmates that work or study is only 9.6% in Brazil, 35.2% in El Salvador, 39.4% in Argentina, 41.1% in Chile, and 44.5% in Mexico (UNDP, 2013). Another important issue relates to the targeting of rehabilitation opportunities, as program target populations are not always defined according to clear selection criteria. On the contrary, conditions of overcrowding hinder equal access to the different programs and lead

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[28]   Academy of Prison Studies (Argentina), Prison Officers' Academy (Chile), Academy of Prison Training (Costa Rica), National Prison Academy (Colombia), Prison Academy (Ecuador), National Academy for Prison Administration (Mexico), National Center for Crime and Prison Studies (Peru), National Prison Academy (Dominican Republic), Prison Academy (Uruguay).

services to be allocated on the basis of demand, without individualized attention (Mertz et al., 2004).

F.   Citizen security governance. Weak institutional capacity at the national and local level for the design, implementation, and evaluation of citizen security and justice policies and programs

3.29   The formulation of effective citizen security policies is a challenge for most countries in the region. One of the key challenges is a lack of integrated sector management. This is reflected in institutional fragmentation of sector leadership, the shifting focus of public policies, a changing regulatory framework, a lack of planning, turnover at the management level, a lack of professionalization, and low levels of funding. At the regional level, several countries have developed national strategic visions for security, reflected in explicit policies to reduce crime and violence (Frühling, in Nespolo, 2011). These included Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile in the 2000 to 2004 period, and subsequently Costa Rica and Jamaica in 2007; Mexico in 2008; Colombia in 2011; Ecuador, Honduras, and Panama in 2012; and El Salvador in 2013. These plans have also focused on a number of cities, most notably Bogotá in Colombia (Mockus, Murrán, and Villa, 2012) and São Paulo in Brazil (Frühling, 2012), among others (Manzano, 2006).

3.30   At the local level, sectoral, regulatory, and functional limitations impede the effective implementation of prevention actions. Given their knowledge of the local area and of the specific needs of their communities, local governments enjoy a comparative advantage in addressing insecurity and violence and ensuring the effective implementation of programs. Despite this, in the cases of El Salvador, Ecuador, Venezuela, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the administration of security is the direct responsibility of the central government, with local authorities having only limited responsibilities (UNDP, 2009). In some cases, there are coordination problems between national policies for preventing violence and local policies. This situation is particularly marked in federal countries of the region (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) and in unitary states with high levels of geographic and population diversity (Colombia and Peru) where the credibility of actions is affected by a lack of leadership, flexibility, and adaptability to local sociocultural realities. All of this is aggravated by weak communication, coordination, and integration between central and local levels of government, and by the limited availability or absence of human resources with enough administrative and technical experience to manage programs (Tudela, 2013b; OAS, 2008; UNDP, 2009).

3.31   Integrated management of security policies based on information and evidence has not yet been fully established in the region. Although the lack of empirical information has not translated into a lack of government action, the reforms and public policies implemented have shown mixed results. Moreover, these policies have not been scientifically evaluated, and their use (or discontinuation) has been based, among other things, on subjective opinions, media pressures, or ideological

prejudice, and not on rigorous evaluations. The reasons for a lack of evidence-based management include:

(i) the fact that in most cases, the lead ministries for security issues (Interior, Governance, Public Security, or Justice) have responsibilities in addition to security, which partly explains the difficulty of building effective leadership in the area of citizen security (OAS, 2008);

(ii) the fact that the institutions in charge of preventive policies (such as, for example, Chile's Office of the Undersecretary of Crime Prevention, which receives 2% of the public security budget) are relatively new in comparison with those in charge of control, which many countries are established groups with substantial power (Bergman and Whitehead);

(iii) the small number of countries with integrated, long-term CSJ policies, as well as the lack of clear targets, objectives, and monitoring and evaluation arrangements in some of those that do exist;

(iv) timing inconsistencies in the planning of public security policies, which generally lead to the adoption of reactive control measures;

(v) a lack of information disaggregated and differentiated by race or ethnicity for measuring the intensity of crime problems and trends in each country, hindering evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions and, thus, of government performance in the security sphere. Nonetheless, there has been progress producing high-quality and timely information in countries such as Chile and Brazil (Dellasoppa, 2011). The literature also points to regional initiatives led by multilateral agencies, including the Regional System of Standardized Citizen Security and Coexistence Indicators, promoted and financed by the Bank through its Regional Public Goods program and coordinated and implemented by Colombia's Cisalva Institute (Instituto de Investigación and Desarrollo en Prevención de la Violencia and Promoción de la Convivencia Social [Institute for Research and Development of Violence Prevention and the Promotion of Social Coexistence]) (Bergman and Whitehead, 2009).

IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM IDB EXPERIENCE IN CITIZEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE

A. Reports of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)

4.1 OVE's analysis of the Bank's work in the area of citizen security has been through of three evaluations. The first evaluation, in 2010,[29] involved an analysis of the Bank's first 11 programs in the sector, designed between 1998 and 2009. Its main

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[29] OVE (2010). "Crime and Violence Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from IDB's interventions" (document RE-378).

finding related to the low level of project evaluability, due to both design issues and limitations in information. The study also highlighted the need to base the selection of interventions on sound theoretical frameworks and more rigorous empirical evidence.

4.2   The second evaluation, in 2013,[30] was comparative in nature, focusing on the implementation of five citizen security projects designed before 2010. It analyzed the key elements that influenced effective implementation of five Bank projects in the sector, and should be present in the program design and supervision phases. These are: (i) project design based on adequate knowledge of the context; (ii) inclusion in the design of the essential features for the intervention to produce the expected outcome; (iii) ensuring that all partners (communities, partners, executing agencies) are sufficiently prepared; (iv) communicating with the community about the benefits of the project and the community's role in a timely and effective manner; and (v) ensuring sufficient staff and budgetary resources for satisfactory project supervision.

4.3   The latest evaluation, in 2014,[31] conducted a broader and more strategic review of the sector, examining the Bank's response to the specific challenges of (in)security in LAC from 1998 to 2012. It concluded that the Bank has played a pioneering role in responding to this challenge through programs designed with an integrated perspective and multisector approach to preventing and addressing crime and violence. However, it identifies key challenges faced by both the Bank and the countries of the region in terms of complexity, risks, and evidence. It emphasizes the need to improve information, deepen sector knowledge, and develop technical capabilities, while managing reputational risks in sensitive areas of the Bank's operational framework for the sector (particularly policing and the penitentiary system). OVE's general recommendations were as follows: (i) although insecurity has multiple causes and its analysis must be comprehensive, focus on a narrower range of interventions to facilitate the development of inhouse expertise and enhance capacity to show results; (ii) simplify project design, pace interventions, and enhance supervision to strengthen operational performance and implementation; (iii) update risk analysis tools and strengthen mitigation mechanisms; and (iv) define a focused knowledge agenda to help build a stronger evidence base for project design and policy-making.

4.4   Since the results of the 2010 evaluation, the Bank has been strengthening its operational and analytical work in the sector. In accordance with its operational mandate, it has examined available empirical evidence for the sector and each subsector, as reflected in its 2012 conceptual framework document (document IDB-DP-232). It has also developed a protocol to improve the design of citizen security projects on an empirical basis (document IDB-TN-436, published in 2012). In addition, in over two thirds of projects recently approved in the sector, a rigorous

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[30] OVE (2013). "The Implementation Challenge: Lessons from Five Citizen Security Projects."

[31] OVE (2014). "IDB´s Response to Key Challenges in Citizen Security, 1998-2012."

evaluation (experimental or semi-experimental) is planned. Lastly, in 2012 the Bank approved the Citizen Security Initiative (document GN-2535-1) as an additional tool to support the countries in improving information, knowledge, and evaluation, and to facilitate regional dialogue and cooperation.

B.   Results of the Development Effectiveness Matrix

4.5   The evaluability of sector projects has improved significantly in recent years. The Development Effectiveness Matrix (DEM) for sector projects has shown improvements over time in key design aspects, from sector assessments to the evidence-based identification of interventions and planning of monitoring and evaluation activities. There has been a marked trend in the average annual DEM score for citizen security projects, rising from 4.6 in 2009 to 9.1 in 2013 (compared to an average of 8.7 for all Bank operations approved in 2013). Since 2011, all sector operations (with just one exception) have been rated as "highly evaluable."

Table IV.1. DEM Summary for Sector Projects (2009-2013)

Year	Number of operations	Program rationale section	Monitoring and evaluation section	Economic analysis section	Risk management section	Annual DEM average
2009	2	5.9	5.0	0.0	7.5	4.6
2010	1	4.9	7.9	7.0	7.5	6.8
2011	2	5.2	8.1	9.3	8.8	7.8
2012	4	7.3	6.6	10.0	9.4	8.3
2013	2	9.4	7.0	10.0	10.0	9.1

4.6   Documentation of the rationale for the projects was strengthened, with the score rising from 7.8 points in 2011 to 9.1 in 2013. This includes marked improvements in the quality of diagnostic assessments and the results matrix. Monitoring and evaluation plans also showed marked changes: the average for the sector rose from 5 in 2009 to 7 in 2013. The same trend was seen in risk management and mitigation, which increased from 8.8 in 2011 to 10 in 2013. The score for proposed solutions based on empirical evidence improved significantly. The 2011 average for the sector was 5.2, whereas in 2013 it was 9.4. Lastly, the category of economic analysis showed a marked positive trend, going from 0 in 2009 to 10 in 2013.

C.   Lessons learned from the experience of Bank operations

4.7   The Bank has been supporting the sector for two decades with pioneering work among multilateral banks in the region. The Bank has helped put the sector at the heart of the development agenda, approving 23 loan operations in the sector for 20 of the region's countries from 1998 to 2013, for more than US$500 million. Over the same period, the Bank approved approximately 60 nonreimbursable technical cooperation operations for a total of US$24 million. This growth, which has been particularly striking in the last few years, reflects growing concern and

demand for support among governments in the region, as well as the Bank's positioning to address it.

4.8 The Bank has directed its actions in within its development mandate, focusing on violence prevention and sector institutional strengthening, based on the conceptual framework and empirical evidence contained in discussion paper IDB-DP-232, "Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence." The Bank recognizes and faces the same substantial challenges in the sector as its regional member countries, given the complexity of the issues, information scarcities, and fledgling sector knowledge. These considerations underline the importance and urgency of investing more and better in the quality of crime statistics and information,[32] sector institutions and the generation of evidence through rigorous evaluations. Continuing to build solid knowledge foundations, information that can be compared across the region, and necessary technical capabilities will therefore be essential to manage the Bank's agenda in the sector and drive it forward. The following paragraphs summarize the lessons learned from project completion reports (PCRs),[33] OVE sector evaluations, KNL implementation workshops, and the Bank's operational experience.

4.9 At the strategic level, the Bank's work in the CSJ sector has been defined within a selective range of interventions, based on an integrated approach. Bearing in mind the need to prioritize and target operational and knowledge activities in the sector, the Bank focuses its work on the following areas: (i) reinforcing social prevention actions among young people and women to counteract the factors that raise the risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence; (ii) strengthening police professionalization to bring forces closer to citizens and help prevent and combat crime; (iii) improving access to the criminal justice system, rationalizing the use of pretrial detention, and supporting rehabilitation programs and alternatives to imprisonment; and (iv) strengthening the national and local institutional capacity of sector apex agencies, as well as institutional coordination. A cross-cutting area has

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[32] There is broad consensus among experts, policy managers, scholars, and decision-makers that the region has made great strides in the past decade contributing to better information crime, such as: (i) creation of regional, national, and local observatories and information systems to process, integrate, and disseminate information from relevant sources in a coordinated manner; (ii) establishment of mechanisms for standardizing crime and violence indicators; and (iii) victimization surveys. However, these advances have been too few and far between, and insufficiently widespread, so continued support is necessary for country efforts to improve the quality and availability of insecurity indicators and information.

[33] The following key lessons were drawn from a review of the PCRs for operations HO025 (Sula Valley Citizen Security), HO0210 (Judicial System Modernization, Stage II), UR0118 (Citizen Security and Crime Prevention Program), JA0105 (Citizen Security and Justice), and PN-L1003 (Comprehensive Security Program): (i) policy leadership from the central government and coordination of stakeholders at the local level; (ii) strategic direction to ensure that programs are aligned with national policies; (iii) a mechanism for strategically planning activities so as to meet execution deadlines; (iv) advisory support for the design of models of response; (v) an executing unit with highly qualified staff that provides strategic support and ad-hoc assistance for execution; (vi) a government commitment to gradually recruit trained and qualified staff; (vii) designs for effective impact evaluations available from the start; and (viii) systematic IDB support for the execution process.

also been to improve the quality and availability of information on crime and violence.

Table IV.1. Areas of Bank Activity in the Citizen Security and Justice Sector

Intervention Areas in Prevention	Institutional capacity Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the government to prevent crime and violence by enhancing policy formulation and implementation capabilities and promoting the use of empirical evidence				
	Social	**Situational**	**Policing**	**Justice system**	**Penitentiary system And rehabilitation**
The objective is to prevent crime and violence by:	Interrupting, addressing, and preventing violent and criminal behaviors in at-risk young people and women.	Reducing crime and promoting coexistence in urban environments.	Improving the capabilities of community police. Preventing crime from occurring.	Supporting access to the criminal justice system and enhancing its efficacy.	Increasing the effectiveness of rehabilitation to prevent recidivism and promote social reintegration.

4.10   The Bank has ruled out supporting certain areas outside its mandate, where human and civil rights abuses may exist or that may interfere in a country's political affairs. These activities include (i) support for military operations; (ii) activities to preserve state security or investigate politically motivated crimes; (iii) secret or covert operations; (iv) the purchase of lethal equipment such as weapons, munitions, and tear gas;[34] (v) support for special operations units involving highly complex management of force and exposure to violence;[35] (vi) training in the use of firearms or lethal weapons; and (vii) activities to combat international organized crime and drug trafficking. It should be emphasized that the aforementioned activities are merely illustrative in nature, given the dynamic context of the sector, so other activities may be included depending on their scope and characteristics. In these areas, other multilateral institutions have an appropriate institutional mandate and greater comparative advantage.

4.11   In addition, other sectors in which the Bank works have dimensions directly or indirectly related to the CSJ sector. These interventions have positive externalities for CSJ and are addressed in other sector framework documents, such as Social Protection, Transportation (document GN-2740-3), Integration and Trade (document GN-2715-2), and others.

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[34]   Patrol vehicle purchases may only be financed as part of the launch of a proximity policing strategy with community participation.

[35]   Examples include bomb squads, drug eradication units, antikidnapping units, and riot control units.

4.12   At the operational level, an important lesson learned in the execution of sector programs is the importance of striking balance between a comprehensive perspective and targeted interventions. A multisectoral perspective is required to understand and analyze the complexity of the challenges, their multiple causes, and their different dimensions. At the same time, achieving demonstrable results requires targeted interventions for the Bank to build capacity and refine its niches of excellence. At an operational level, there is a certain trade-off between the adoption of a multisectoral perspective, which is necessary to address sector issues, and the challenges that exist in the design and execution of interventions.

4.13   A multisectoral approach requires specialized aptitudes and abilities. Formulating effective public policies for the sector in the region is especially complex. Crime and violence are multidimensional problems that manifest in many ways and have numerous causes. For this reason, according to experts and international agencies, they should be addressed by means of a multisectoral approach.[36] There is a need, therefore, to continue promoting collaboration among the various divisions and units, so as to strengthen the Bank's experience across multiple sectors relevant to the prevention of crime and violence (education, health, social protection, urban development, and gender).

4.14   Another important lesson from experience is the need to tailor Bank interventions in the sector to the differentiated contexts of the countries of the region. Some sector interventions are innovative and face specific challenges in their implementation. This involves a process of learning by doing and, accordingly, intensive and ongoing supervision by the Bank and an ability to adjust programs to evolving circumstances during their implementation. In this sense, the size of the program, the complexity of its execution arrangements, the number of components and activities, execution periods, and expected outcomes all need to be kept in mind.[37]

4.15   The strengthening of quality-based, results-oriented management planning in the design and execution of sector programs is therefore key. Sector programs usually finance investments in infrastructure and equipment, as well as technical assistance activities, to ensure that sector strengthening objectives are met. The effective implementation of these activities demands complex sequencing. For example, the response model to be implemented must be identified before infrastructure bidding processes can begin. Accordingly, the Bank is focusing efforts on ensuring that a clear sequencing of interventions is planned.

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[36]   UNDP, 2013; World Bank, 2007, 2011; WHO, 2002; IDB, 2005, 1999.

[37]   OVE (2013). The following basic elements are required, among others: (i) clear intervention protocols, above all in the case of interventions for the prevention of social violence; (ii) effective multisectoral coordination mechanisms, including evidence of leadership by the institution responsible for coordination; (iii) channels of communication with agencies involved in the program and its beneficiaries, at the level of both design and execution; and (iv) supervision, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms.

4.16   It is also important to support ongoing technical dialogue with clients during the design and implementation of programs. Experience indicates that maintaining an active technical dialogue with counterparts, in addition to strengthening their capacities, is a primary factor for ensuring effective implementation, clarifying risks, and proposing possible mitigation measures. It also helps to establish fluid channels for exchanging information over the entire life of the project. Beyond the supervision of project execution, dialogue is also a key input into government policies, strategies, and programs in the sector, and constitutes a valued advisory service.

4.17   Gender-based approaches need to be deepened and consolidated as a cross-cutting theme in the sector. The inclusion of gender, diversity, and interculturality approaches in operations has been identified as a priority. This will help to ensure equitable access to programs for vulnerable populations, both transversely and through interventions focused on these issues.

4.18   The existence of lead agencies for the integrated management of CSJ, as well as a professional and stable civil service, are critical factors for the implementation of effective sector policies. Human resource capabilities in the areas responsible for implementing prevention policies are a strategic factor in establishing sustainable programs.

4.19   Local governments are key agents for the effective implementation of violence prevention interventions. Experience in the region points to the coordinating role of subnational and municipal governments in the prevention of crime and violence. Local governments enjoy significant comparative advantages, such as identifying hot spots for violence and their proximity to stakeholders for coordinated action among different levels of government. Several local governments in the region have are promoting "safer municipios" initiatives with the active support of the central government.

4.20   Community associations and participation are fundamental to ensuring transparency. Civil society can play an important role in strengthening social capital formation in public policies for citizen security and justice. This requires an institutional framework in which civil society can express itself and access to information, societal oversight, and social audits need to be promoted in support of transparency and accountability.

4.21   In relation to the generation and dissemination of knowledge, continued investment in the generation of statistical information and analytical capacity is needed. Among the main problems in policy management and project execution that stem from the scarcity of knowledge in the sector are: (i) a lack of theoretical and empirical foundations for interventions; (ii) a scarcity of the statistics and data necessary for rigorous diagnostic assessments and evaluations; (iii) a lack of evaluations from which to draw lessons regarding what works and what doesn't (OVE, 2010); and (iv) mechanisms for the dissemination of knowledge and exchange of experiences.

D.   The Bank's comparative advantages in the citizen security and justice sector

4.22   The Bank has been the first multilateral institution to support the sector in the region and to promote a violence prevention approach as a part of government agendas there. Since 2009, the Bank has consolidated its strategic position in a sector where the countries' demands for support have risen significantly. The portfolio grew modestly from 2001 to 2009, with the approval of only nine projects. From 2010 to 2013, however, another nine operations were approved, and these together comfortably exceed half of the total portfolio. There are currently six operations in preparation. In 2010, consistent with this challenge to the region's development, the Bank highlighted the security and justice sector as an institutional priority within regional targets under the Ninth General Capital Increase (GCI-9).

4.23   Through its funding for loan operations, the Bank has helped to build long-term outlooks and shared visions around priorities in the sector. The Bank's role has been instrumental in (i) building stable and lasting citizen security policies, supporting and strengthening the countries' efforts to prevent violence; (ii) helping to develop technical capacities; and (iii) strengthening government agencies important to the sector.

4.24   The Bank has positioned itself as a key multilateral institution in the process of coordinating and leveraging additional support for the region. The role of the Bank in the sector is being regarded positively by the international community, and this has helped to attract additional nonreimbursable financing resources through cofinancing.[38]

4.25   The Bank is focusing its efforts on addressing critical challenges in the sector. In particular, it is actively promoting actions to close information gaps and invest in knowledge through support for the generation of statistical information, the harmonization of information, and the promotion of evaluation. In this way, the Bank has aligned itself with the priority agenda of the region's countries, which includes the need to: (i) strengthen the quality, timeliness, and regional comparability of information; (ii) promote impact evaluations and disseminate evidence regarding what works; and (iii) identify effective mechanisms and methodologies to measure the effectiveness and impact of interventions.

4.26   The Bank has been strengthening its strategic comparative advantage through four exclusive strategic initiatives for the sector that contribute in a sustained and effective way to the countries' priority agenda:

         (i)   The **Citizen Security Initiative** (document GN-2660) was approved in 2012, with the objective of increasing the effectiveness of public policies in the region. The purpose of the initiative is to build knowledge and invest in innovative pilot initiatives. It is focused on

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[38]   For example, over the last two years it has become a multilateral conduit for bilateral cooperation with Switzerland in Honduras (US$7 million in cofinancing), with Canada and the United Kingdom in Jamaica (US$35 million), and with the European Union in Panama (US$28 million).

three pillars: (i) generating, processing, and analyzing crime statistics; (ii) strengthening the capacity of government agencies to manage and evaluate public policies in the sector, as well as developing and evaluating pilot projects; and (iii) promoting the exchange and dissemination of knowledge and best practices by means of regional dialogue and bilateral cooperation. Over the last two years, the Initiative has invested around US$4.5 million in data production and analysis, and US$6.34 million in the development of management capacities and impact evaluations.

(ii)   The first phase of the **Regional System of Standardized Indicators on Civic Coexistence and Citizen Security** was launched in 2008, with the second in 2012. Its objective is to promote the harmonization of concepts, criteria, and methods for the measurement of crime and violence across countries in the region and among the institutions responsible for this information in each country. The Bank has used this initiative to foster improvements in information systems, data collection, and policy formulation.

(iii)   The **Regional Dialogue on Citizen Security Policy** was launched in 2012. Its purpose is to provide a forum for discussions among senior government authorities in the sector, at the ministerial or vice-ministerial level. The dialogue was inaugurated in 2012 in the United States, and in 2014 it took place in Mexico. In 2013, the dialogue was held in Brazil with a focus on subnational governments. A Citizen Security Network has been established to bring sector authorities together in an ongoing dialogue process, with the exchange and dissemination of best practices.

(iv)   **Citizen Security Training Clinics** have been organized each year since 2008. Their aim is to provide a forum for the exchange of sector experiences and knowledge at the technical and operational levels. In 2012, for example, the central theme of the clinics was the evaluation of CSJ policies and strategies to prevent youth violence. In 2013, a subregional clinic was organized for the Caribbean on crime statistics and the management of sector information. The clinics are also an important tool for the training of Bank staff in the sector, as well as Bank counterparts and project execution units.

(v)   **Network of Experts.** The Bank has a technical support network for collaboration among specialists and scholars, to deepen analysis of the causes and factors behind crime, as well as assessment of the impact of certain public policies to reduce crime. This strategy includes the Visiting Scholars program hosted by RES and IFD since 2012, the Bank's strategic partnership with the America Latina Crime and Policy Network, the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, and others.

4.27   The Bank plays a valuable convening role in fostering dialogue and regional cooperation. For example, a high-level advisory network consisting of internationally recognized experts has been established to both support the Bank's work in the sector and provides advisory support to governments in the region. This is of great benefit to those responsible for policy formulation, as well as experts and members of civil society in the region.

4.28   Lastly, in terms of organizational structure, unlike other multilateral institutions the Bank has an operational unit devoted to the sector. This facilitates technical dialogue with borrowing member countries and strategic partners. It also allows the Bank to coordinate a consolidated operational and knowledge agenda that addresses the specific problems experienced in the countries with a comprehensive and multisectoral approach. The Bank has strengthened the technical dialogue in each country through the assignment and recruitment of sector specialists in the country offices, aimed at improving service, supervision, and ongoing support for project execution in the sector. However, further strengthening of human resources and technical capabilities in specialized areas is still required, through the recruitment of experts in each subarea[39] and the ongoing training of staff.

V. DIMENSIONS OF SUCCESS AND LINES OF ACTION TO GUIDE THE BANK'S OPERATIONAL AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

5.1   This SFD proposes that the fundamental goal of the Bank's Citizen Security and Justice (CSJ) activities over the next three years be to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of CSJ public policies in the region, in order to contribute to the reduction of crime and violence.

5.2   To help achieve the proposed goal and guide the Bank's operational and analytical work, four Dimensions of Success are proposed that are interrelated with the IDB's areas of activity in CSJ (see Annex 2, Table 1). These dimensions were based on a review of the best available evidence relating to the six areas of the Bank's operational framework in the sector,[40] as described in this sector framework document (SFD). Other inputs included operational experience from CSJ programs,[41] lessons learned identified by the Knowledge and Learning Sector

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[39] The details of how to achieve these objectives will be presented in the budget discussions.

[40] "Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety" (document GN-2535-1); "Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence," discussion paper IDB-DP-232, 2012. Sherman (2012), "Developing and Evaluating Citizen Security Programs in Latin America: A Protocol for Evidence-Based Crime Prevention," technical note IDB-TN-436.

[41] Given the diverse nature of CSJ within the region, and, therefore, the specific features of the countries in this sector, the Bank's actions will be tailored to the context and needs of each country. Accordingly, the diagnostic assessments prepared on the basis of sector technical notes, analytical work, and analyses prepared jointly with other Bank sectors involved in these issues will be taken into consideration, to facilitate a deeper understanding of the problems in each country.

(KNL),[42] as well as the evaluations conducted by the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE),[43] which point to the need for targeted, evidence-based interventions that generate quality information and promote evaluation.

5.3   As a cross-cutting area in each of the four Dimensions of Success, emphasis will continue to be put on the generation of relevant, comparable, and disaggregated[44] quantitative information through the strengthening of primary sources of crime statistics, victimization surveys, community surveys, and the analysis and development of crime observatories.

5.4   Furthermore, emphasis will be put the analysis, generation, and dissemination of knowledge through detailed review of the available evidence, to determine what is relevant for LAC. Likewise, experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations will continue in the region, to identify the causal effects of interventions. The guidelines for the risk analysis of interventions in sensitive areas (such as policing and the penitentiary system), as well as the identification of risk mitigation alternatives, will be updated.

5.5   The four proposed Dimensions of Success are interrelated as follows:

(i)   **First Dimension of Success: "Young people and women at risk have access to comprehensive, effective social prevention and response programs for crime and violence."** This dimension relates to support for evidence-based interventions to improve the coverage and offerings of relevant institutions of programs aimed at strengthening protection factors and neutralizing risk factors in these population groups, with a view to preventing crime.

(ii)   **Second Dimension of Success: "Police work is oriented toward solving problems in close collaboration with the community, with the aim of preventing, addressing, and solving crime."** This dimension focuses on actions to support institution-strengthening, management capabilities, and closer relations with communities on the part of police, with the aim of improving legitimacy and increasing levels of citizen confidence in the police.

(iii)   **Third Dimension of Success: "Citizens have access to efficient and timely criminal justice services, including rehabilitation and reintegration programs for prisoners, ensuring that their rights are protected."** This dimension supports actions to strengthen criminal justice institutions and improve the offerings and coverage of

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[42] KNL (2013). "Learning from the Operational Experience of Citizen Security Projects in Central America. Findings and Recommendations."

[43] OVE (2013). "The Implementation Challenge: Lessons from Five Citizen Security Projects;" OVE (2014). "The IDB's Response to Key Challenges in Citizen Security, 1998-2012."

[44] The disaggregation of information on crime and violence by race, ethnicity, social status, and gender will be encouraged, whenever possible.

rehabilitation programs for the criminal offender population, with the aim of supporting social reintegration, preventing recidivism, and improving the response to crime in a fair and efficient manner.

(iv) **Fourth Dimension of Success: "The institutions responsible for citizen security and justice administer comprehensive policies in an effective and coordinated manner at the national and local levels."** This dimension seeks to consolidate mechanisms for the vertical and horizontal coordination of public and private actors at both the national and local levels, in order to improve decision-making, expedite intersectoral coordination, and optimize the implementation of sector interventions.

5.6 The following sections describe the priority Dimensions of Success, their corresponding priority lines of action, and activities on which the Bank proposes to focus its efforts over the next three years.

A. **Dimension 1. Young people and women at risk have access to comprehensive, effective social prevention and response programs for crime and violence.**

5.7 This dimension seeks to improve the quality and coverage of programs to prevent and address violence in a targeted and selective manner, by addressing specific risk factors. It will take gender, diversity, and ethnic/cultural perspectives into account. The following lines of action are proposed in relation to this dimension of success.

5.8 **Lines of action:** (i) improve the coverage and sustainability of programs for the social prevention of crime and violence; (ii) promote the development of evidence-based models of response specific to the level of risk in the relevant population; and (iii) improve beneficiary monitoring and supervision mechanisms. To pursue these lines of action, financing is proposed for the following operational activities and knowledge and dissemination activities:

a. **Operational activities** will include selective interventions for: (i) young people and women in situations of medium or high risk (see Annex II, Table 2), through programs that have been proven effective, such as (i) extra-curricular services and positive use of free time; (ii) peaceful dispute resolution; (iii) improvement of sociocognitive, socioemotional, and psychological capabilities to support resilience and prevent situations of social risk; (iv) vocational training and education and support for business initiatives for social and workforce reintegration; (v) awareness-raising among parents, students, and teachers of ethical values and coexistence; (vi) social and cultural inclusion through sports; (vii) addiction treatment programs; (viii) substance abuse prevention; and (ix) tutoring and mentoring programs; and others. These interventions will be coordinated among IFD/ICS, SCL/LMK, SCL/EDU, SCL/SPH, the MIF, and the private sector. In addition, the following activities will be financed to prevent and address violence against women: (i) comprehensive assistance (medical, legal, police, and psychological) through programs such as integrated service centers (the

Ciudad Mujer [City of Women] project in El Salvador); (ii) promotion of women's participation in economic life through their economic empowerment, with programs such as the prevention of violence against women through microfinance; and (iii) transformation of social and cultural norms in the community (such as the model of transforming violent masculinity), through interventions such as the H and M Program. These programs will be undertaken in close coordination with IFD/ICS, the MIF, and SCL/GDI.

b. **Knowledge and dissemination activities:** (i) analytical studies to assess the effectiveness of programs for violence prevention and response;[45] (ii) creation of systems that allow program beneficiaries to monitored on an individualized basis; and (iii) design and development of victimization surveys and studies of risk factors.

B.   Dimension 2. Police work is oriented toward solving problems in close collaboration with the community, with the aim of preventing, addressing, and solving crime.

5.9   This dimension will emphasize activities to strengthen police management capabilities, including training, education, and professionalization, as well as promoting closer relations with communities and accountability mechanisms to improve citizen perceptions and confidence. The following lines of action are proposed in relation to this dimension of success.

5.10   **Lines of action:** (i) strengthen institutional capacity for strategic planning, performance monitoring, and human resource management; (ii) support development of community policing models; (iii) strengthen criminal investigation capabilities; and (iv) improve control and accountability mechanisms (internal and external). To pursue these lines of action, financing is proposed for the following operational activities and knowledge activities:

a. **Operational activities:** (i) strengthen sector leadership capacity and modernize information management systems and crime analysis at the national and local levels,[46] with a view to improving crime prevention and response; (ii) modernize the police officer career path;[47] (iii) promote community policing strategies, taking socio-demographic characteristics into account (age, ethnicity, and gender); (iv) strengthen mechanisms and capabilities for the intake, care, and referral of victims of violence against women; (v) improve criminal and forensic investigation capabilities; and

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[45] For example, evaluations of the "CeaseFire" programs in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago will make it possible to measure the effectiveness of dispute resolution interventions for young gang members. Specific studies will also be conducted to measure the effectiveness of economic empowerment programs on reducing violence against women.

[46] Support will be included for the disaggregation of information on crime and violence by race, ethnicity, social status, and gender, whenever possible.

[47] Including personnel recruitment, selection, and training processes, promoting the use of technology.

(vi) improve control and accountability mechanisms of the police system (performance evaluations and disciplinary procedures).

b. **Knowledge activities:** (i) comprehensive diagnostic assessment to analyze the risks of providing support to police forces, and identify mitigation mechanisms; (ii) development of criminal investigation protocols; (iii) evaluations to determine the impact of police education and training on police effectiveness; and (iv) evaluations to analyze the impact of community policing strategies.[48]

C. Dimension 3. Citizens have access to efficient and timely criminal justice services, including rehabilitation and reintegration programs for prisoners, ensuring that their rights are protected.

5.11   This dimension seeks to increase the offerings of criminal justice, rehabilitation, and reintegration services by improving the analytical, technical, and operational capabilities of criminal justice system actors at each stage of the process, as well as to improve the offerings and coverage of rehabilitation and reintegration programs for prisoners. The following lines of action are proposed in relation to this dimension of success.

5.12   **Lines of action:** (i) improve efficiency in the management and administration of criminal justice services in a coordinated manner; (ii) increase offerings and access to basic criminal justice services;[49] (iii) expand the offerings of alternatives to imprisonment, both before and after trial; (iv) promote rationalization of the use of pretrial detention; and (v) improve mechanisms for the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners. To pursue these lines of action, financing is proposed for the following operational activities and knowledge activities:

a. **Operational activities:** (i) improve the capacity of judicial processes through the generation and use of quality information, timely processing of cases, the quality of criminal investigation, handling of evidence, and use of technology; (ii) strengthen training programs for judges and criminal justice professionals to facilitate an effective transition to the new mechanisms; (iii) support pretrial services that take into account the risk profile and needs of each individual, as well as specific protocols for pretrial detention; (iv) support programs that offer alternatives to imprisonment based on the criminological characteristics and needs of the accused, to strengthen the preventive and rehabilitative functions of justice;[50] (v) facilitate access to formal and alternative criminal justice services, particularly among vulnerable groups (minors, women, minorities, disadvantaged communities, and victims of

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[48] For example, "hot spot" strategies in Uruguay, Ecuador, and Colombia.

[49] Taking into account demand based on socio-demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, and gender), as well as victims of violence against women

[50] These programs include drug treatment courts, house arrest, electronic monitoring, and community service.

violence against women);[51] (vi) support inmate rehabilitation and postincarceration reintegration programs;[52] and (vii) promote strategic partnerships with civil society, incorporating it into mechanisms for supervision and evaluation of processes and interventions.

b. **Knowledge activities:** (i) impact evaluations of criminal justice interventions, in particular related to alternative justice and social and workforce reintegration, in terms of their effectiveness in preventing recidivism, reducing violence against women, and protecting victims (for example, the Young Builders Program, developed in collaboration with SCL/LMK and IFD/ICS); (ii) risk analysis tools and mitigation mechanisms, needs assessments,[53] and specific protocols to determine the grounds for pretrial detention and its duration; and (iii) systems for monitoring and expediting cases that facilitate individualized tracking, differentiated by race or ethnicity.

D.   Dimension 4. The institutions responsible for citizen security and justice administer comprehensive policies in an effective and coordinated manner at the national and local levels.

5.13   The evidence emphasizes the importance of sector leadership, coordination, and management by national and local authorities as a determining factor for the effective implementation of CSJ public policies. The following lines of action are proposed in relation to this dimension of success:

5.14   **Lines of action:** (i) strengthen the institutional and coordination capabilities of agencies involved in CSJ sector leadership and management at the national and local levels for the planning, design, management, execution, and evaluation of their public policies; and (ii) address urban crime, particularly in informal urban neighborhoods, as a complement to the proposals contained in the Urban Development and Housing SFD. To pursue these lines of action, financing is proposed for the following operational activities and knowledge and dissemination activities:

a. **Operational activities:** (i) improve central government capabilities for sector leadership and strategic planning, management, information, monitoring, evaluation, and horizontal coordination among ministries and sectors; (ii) strengthen the institutional capacity of subnational governments for security management at the municipal level, particularly urban municipios

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[51] These services include "casas de justicia" [legal advice centers], family police services, womens' police services, conciliation centers, and centers providing integrated access-to-justice services under one roof for women survivors of violence.

[52] These programs include academic education and vocational training, as well as support for business initiatives that enhance social and workforce reintegration, promoting private sector and civil society participation.

[53] For example, economic sector work (ESW): (i) an institutional analysis of prison systems in the region and prison censuses (RG-K1308); and (ii) surveys of the indirect costs to inmates' families of their imprisonment (RG-K1365).

(cities), including vertical coordination between levels of government, financing mechanisms, planning, information, monitoring, and evaluation; and (iii) support comprehensive CSJ programs in urban areas that promote management of the physical environment, with social and local governance interventions that involve the local authorities, police, civil society, and the private sector. This activity will involve IFD/FMM[54] and the Sustainable Cities Special Program (INE/IFD)

b. **Knowledge and dissemination activities:** (i) preparation of training programs in CSJ management for senior central, subnational, and local government officials; (ii) generation, dissemination, and analysis of comparable statistical information at the national and local levels, particularly through victimization surveys and local violence observatories; (iii) development of methodologies for the integrated and participatory analysis of CSJ at both national and local levels; (iv) studies to evaluate economic policy and budgetary resource allocation to finance citizen security; (v) strengthening of training for counterparts implementing security programs through the Bank's Citizen Security Training Clinics; (vi) support for exchange and cooperation through the Bank's Regional Policy Dialogues on Citizen Security and Justice, as well as knowledge dissemination through the implementation of networks of advisors and experts to provide strategic support to the countries (South-South and North-South cooperation), including the Visiting Scholars joint program hosted by RES and IFD since 2012.

5.15 To meet the proposed goal and achieve the Dimensions of Success, the Bank's operational and analytical work in the sector will be guided by the following principles:

a. **Targeted and contextualized interventions.** The Bank will seek to design projects and actions targeted both geographically and in terms of populations, with bounded interventions that emphasize the critical risk factors to be addressed. Additionally, given the diversity of conditions in the region, projects will address the regional, national, and local contexts and requirements, and promote the adaptation of solutions for reasons of race, ethnicity or gender.

b. **Expansion of knowledge and empirical evidence.** Given that the empirical evidence in large part stems from evaluations carried out in countries outside the region, projects must be based on the available quantitative and qualitative evidence, and take into account the global and regional experience with the design and implementation of policies and programs in the sector. Emphasis will be put not only on the "what," i.e., the identification of interventions of proven cost-effectiveness, but also on the "how," i.e., the most effective

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[54] For example, the Program for the Revitalization of Public Spaces in the Central District (loan HO-L1091).

execution mechanisms that help to simplify execution arrangements and improve implementation of these interventions.

c. **Strengthening of information and analysis on insecurity.** Given the pressing need for better diagnostic assessments and generation of knowledge and evidence in the sector, projects must lay the groundwork for improved data repositories and conduct rigorous impact evaluations. These efforts will be made through the inclusion of components to strengthen information management systems, improve capabilities for the collection, disaggregation by race and ethnicity, and analysis of data, and identify indicators and targets tailored to program objectives.

d. **Strengthening of risk identification and mitigation.** In relation to programs that include interventions in sensitive areas such as policing or the penitentiary system, the potential risks need to be evaluated, mitigated, and managed, justifying the Bank's value-added and comparative advantage from a technical and financial standpoint. Where the intervention can be justified, the parameters and limits of Bank intervention will be established, including appropriate mitigation measures.

e. **Interagency collaboration and intersectoral coordination.** Projects will be undertaken in close collaboration with the key players in CSJ policy-making: governments, sector ministries, subnational governments, local authorities, private sector, civil society, research institutes, and other international cooperation institutions. Such collaboration will help to address issues in a comprehensive manner. Similarly, at an internal level, the Bank will promote intersectoral collaboration, to leverage and empower its experience across the different sectors relevant to crime and violence prevention. In this way, solutions can be proposed that are tailored to the nature of the challenge, with the involvement of relevant sector units such as IFD/ICS, IFD/FMM, SCL/GDI, SCL/LMK, SCL/SPH, SCL/EDU, the MIF, SCF, SPD, RES, and others.

f. **Promotion of regional dialogue and horizontal cooperation.** Support will be provided for knowledge exchange, sector dialogue, and technical cooperation among countries of the region in the CSJ area. The Bank will act as a knowledge generator and broker, and will continue to disseminate knowledge through regional policy dialogues, knowledge seminars, and training workshops, as well as through networks of experts and strategic partnerships with other institutions. The purpose of these activities is to provide strategic support to the countries, as well to use new information technologies to facilitate the exchange of applied knowledge.

FIGURES

Figure 1: Growth and crime (2010)

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC, 2010. Data for Africa and Asia are for 2008. Homicide rate weighted by population. LAC encompasses the 26 countries included in the Bank's definition.

Figure 2: Homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (2000-2011)

Source: Own calculations based on UNODC data. Homicide rate weighted by population. The lighter points in each series indicate that the number of countries included in the average is less than 100%. Caribbean: 2000-2006 does not include the homicide rate for Haiti. Southern Cone: 2004 does not include the homicide rate for Chile. Andean region: 2004 (2010) does not include the homicide rate for Bolivia. The average rate for LAC is not reported before 2004 as the number of countries in the region with information for prior years is very low.

Figure 3a: Citizen perceptions of crime and public safety

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2013.
* Countries where crime and public security were the top concerns among those surveyed in 2013.

**Figure 3b: Trends in citizen perceptions of crime problems in Latin America (1995-2013)**

Source: Latinobarómetro, 2013.

**Figure 4: Confidence in the judicial system and police in
Latin America and the Caribbean (2010)**

Source: LAPOP, 2010. The regional average does not include the Bahamas or Barbados.

**Figure 5: Homicide rate for women in Latin America and the Caribbean
(latest year available between 2008 and 2010)**

[1.0,1.9]
(1.9,3.9]
(3.9,7.3]
(7.3,13.2]

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC, 2010.

Source: LAPOP, 2011.
Methodological note: Total population was used for the purposes of weighting, instead of the female population. The average homicide rate for women in the region is 4.08 per 100,000 women. However, there are significant differences between subregions. Countries with the highest rates are concentrated in Central America and the Caribbean: El Salvador (13.2), Jamaica (10.3), Belize (10.1), Guatemala (10). Countries with the lowest rates are concentrated in the Southern Cone.

Figure 6a: Homicide rate in capital cities (latest available year)

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC, 2010. The data for most countries is for 2009 or 2010. Guyana, Bahamas, Barbados and Chile are not included in this chart. The murder rate in the capital city is higher than the national rate in 13 out of 22 countries. This pattern is particularly marked in the Central American countries, where the capital is the largest city, with the highest rate of economic participation.

Figure 6b: Homicide rate in capital cities (latest available year)

Source: Own calculations based on data from UNODC, 2010. The bars indicate the homicide rate in each city, while the yellow and red diamonds indicate the number of homicides in the capital city as a proportion of total of homicides in the country. The red diamonds indicate countries where the capital city accounts for 50% or more of homicides. Not all capital cities exhibit the highest numbers and/or rates of homicides.

**Figure 7: Prison populations in Latin America and the Caribbean
(latest year available between 2009 and 2014)**

Source: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2014.
* Note: 77% of the 26 countries in the region have overcrowding problems.

**Figure 8: Prisoners awaiting trial as a percentage of the total prison population
in the region (2012-2013)**

% Prisión Preventiva

Sur América
BOLIVIA — 83.3
PARAGUAY * — 73.2
URUGUAY — 67.1
VENEZUELA * — 64.1
PERU * — 58.5
ARGENTINA * — 50.1
GUYANA * — 39.0
BRASIL * — 38.0
ECUADOR * — 37.0
COLOMBIA — 30.4
CHILE — 23.8

Centro América
PANAMA — 63.4
GUATEMALA — 50.3
HONDURAS — 50.1
BELICE * — 34.0
EL SALVADOR — 24.7
COSTA RICA * — 22.4
NICARAGUA * — 12.3

Caribe
HAITI — 70.6
REPUBLICA DOMINICANA — 53.2
BARBADOS — 44.1
TRINIDAD Y TOBAGO — 43.3
JAMAICA — 14.8

MÉXICO — 42.1

BAHAMAS y SURINAM sin datos
* datos año 2012

No data for the Bahamas and Suriname.
[*] 2012 data.

Source: Own calculations based on the World Prison Brief (2013); Espinoza, Villagra, and Martínez
(2012), and the National Statistical System on the Serving of Sentences (SNEEP, 2012).

Figure 9: Incarceration rate in the region per 100,000 inhabitants (2012-2013)

*2012 data

Source: Own calculations based on the World Prison Brief (2013); Espinoza, Villagra, and Martínez (2012), and SNEEP (2012).

**Figure 10: Female inmates as a proportion of the total prison population
(latest year available between 2011 and 2014)**

Source: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2014. Ecuador, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Suriname, and Belize: 2012. Bolivia, Argentina, Guyana, and the Bahamas: 2011. El Salvador: 2014. Other countries: 2013.

TABLES

Table 1. Citizen Oversight Mechanisms Used Internationally

Oversight mechanism	Example	Characteristics
Independent investigation	• Northern Ireland – Police Ombudsman • Minneapolis, USA – Civilian Review Authority • New York, USA – Civilian Complaint Review Board • Oakland, USA – Citizens' Police Review Board	• Fully independent of the police force. • Receives complaints from the public. • Investigations conducted by people who are not police offers. • Police informed of conclusions.
Police investigation with citizen oversight or subject to citizen authority	• United Kingdom/Wales – Police Complaints Authority • South Africa – Independent Police Investigative Directorate • Victoria, Australia – Deputy Ombudsman (Police) • Ontario, Canada – Royal Canadian Mounted Police Public Complaints Commission • San Diego, USA – Citizens Advisory Board on Police/Community Relations	• Civilian or police authority receives complaints. • Investigations conducted by police. • Civilian authority reviews investigation reports. • Civilian authority may request new investigations if it disagrees with the initial investigation report.
Inspectors general, auditors, and human rights commissions	• India – Human Rights Commission • San Jose, USA – Independent Police Auditor • Los Angeles, USA – Special Advisor • São Paulo, Brazil – Auditor	• Broad mandate to investigate and make recommendations regarding the process for presenting complaints and the conditions that lead to police abuses. • May investigate individual cases of abuse.
Other types of citizen oversight	• Chicago, USA – Meetings with residents • United Kingdom/Wales – Police authorities • Los Angeles, USA – Board of Police Commissioners	• Consultation and control authority over policies and more general policing objectives.

Source: Miller, J., 2002. "Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature." Vera Institute. New York.

**Table 2. Relationship of the Bank's CSJ Work Areas, Dimensions of Success, and
Lines of Action under the SFD**

CSJ-spectrum areas	Dimensions of success	Lines of action
• Social prevention	Young people and women at risk have access to comprehensive, effective social prevention and response programs for crime and violence.	• Improve the coverage, sustainability, and institutional structure of programs for the social prevention of crime and violence. • Promote evidence-based models of response specific to the level of risk in the population. • Improve beneficiary monitoring mechanisms.
• Policing	Police work is oriented toward solving problems in close collaboration with the community, with the aim of preventing, addressing, and solving crime.	• Strengthen institutional capacity for strategic planning, performance monitoring, and human resource management. • Support development of community policing models. • Strengthen criminal investigation capabilities. • Improve control and accountability mechanisms (internal and external).
• Criminal justice system • Penitentiary system and rehabilitation	Citizens have access to efficient and timely criminal justice services, including rehabilitation and reintegration programs for prisoners, ensuring that their rights are protected.	• Improve efficiency in the management and administration of criminal justice services in a coordinated manner. • Increase offerings and access to basic criminal justice services. • Expand the offerings of alternatives to imprisonment, both before and after trial. • Promote rationalization of the use of pretrial detention. • Improve mechanisms for the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners.
• Citizen security governance • Situational prevention (urban crime and violence)	The institutions responsible for citizen security and justice administer comprehensive policies in an effective and coordinated manner at the national and local levels.	• Strengthen the institutional and coordination capabilities of agencies involved in CSJ sector leadership and management at the national and local levels for the planning, design, management, execution, and evaluation of their public policies. • Address urban crime, particularly in informal urban neighborhoods.

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