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# SOMALIA

# 2012

## Ending the Transition?

**Knox Chitiyo and Anna Rader**

With contributions from  
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*Strengthening Africa's economic performance*



# SOMALIA

## 2012 Ending the Transition?



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## Abstract

This is a critical time for Somalia. There are less than 90 days until the end of the transitional federal government's mandate on 20 August 2012, and the stakes are high for the delivery of the key components of the political 'roadmap', not least a new constitution. At the same time, the five-year insurgency that has wracked the south and central regions has entered a new phase, with fighting now along numerous fronts as the African Union peacekeeping mission has expanded to include forces from Kenya, with more promised from Djibouti and Sierra Leone. Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qa'ida-linked conglomerate, appears to be on the back foot: it has been bruised by Somali Army and AMISOM offensives and is internally divided. But the complex, changeable dynamics of Somalia's recent past suggest that it is too early to call time on this persistent opponent of the TFG.

In response to the changing dynamics within Somalia and the growing regional and international interest in the country's future, RUSI and the Brenthurst Foundation convened a one-day roundtable discussion in London in November 2011 to discuss the key issues facing Somalia during this time of political transition. This report summarises the roundtable discussion. It also includes three important essays from leading Somalis and Somalia observers, each of which emphasise the centrality of Somalis in shaping their own political future, as well as the continued role of the regional and international community; together with a special focus on the situation of women in Somalia during this time of change.

## Introduction

This is a critical time for Somalia. There are less than 90 days until the end of the transitional federal government's mandate on 20 August 2012, and the stakes are high for the delivery of the key components of the political 'roadmap', not least a new constitution. At the same time, the five-year insurgency that has wracked the south and central regions has entered a new phase, with fighting now along numerous fronts as the African Union (AU) peace-keeping mission has expanded to include forces from Kenya, with more promised from Djibouti and Sierra Leone. Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qa'ida-linked conglomerate of Islamists, international jihadists and clan militants, appears to be on the back foot: it has been bruised by Somali Army and AMISOM offensives and is internally divided. But the complex, changeable dynamics of Somalia's recent past suggest that it is too early to call time on this persistent opponent of the transitional federal government (TFG).

Meanwhile Somalis are recovering from the devastating drought of 2011 that affected an estimated 10 million people across the Horn of Africa. In six regions of southern Somalia famine claimed lives and livelihoods, and displaced tens of thousands more Somalis across the country and into cramped and

Somalis who have supported the final phase of the transition period will now expect to reap the dividends of peace

overflowing refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. The long-term effects of the humanitarian crisis, compounded by more displacement from the co-ordinated military campaign near the Somali–Kenya border, will be felt for years to come.

Widespread food insecurity and displacement now join Somalia's other conflict drivers, such as the control of economic resources. The charcoal export industry that supported Al-Shabaab financially for so

long is now a focus of both economic and environmental scrutiny. More generally, Somalis who have supported the final phase of the transition period will now expect to reap the dividends of peace, but the sheer scale of the development infrastructure required suggests that many will be frustrated by the pace of change.

In response to the changing dynamics within Somalia and the growing regional and international interest in the country's future, RUSI and the Brenthurst Foundation convened a one-day roundtable discussion in London.

The roundtable focused on four central themes: recovery and rehabilitation following the 2011 famine in southern Somalia, and the current humanitarian aid picture; the political roadmap; securing Somalia, in particular against the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and piracy; and the role of the diaspora and external actors, including regional organisations and foreign donor countries such as the US and the UK. Overall, participants were optimistic that with international support and domestic political will, Somalia's key contemporary challenges – most notably countering the entrenched insurgency in the south and achieving important political and constitutional milestones – can be met. However, this was tempered by an awareness of the resource constraints, infrastructural obstacles and political dissonance that has marked the TFG's last five years in power; as well as the scale of assistance required on a number of different fronts.

This report summarises the engaging, comprehensive and thoughtful roundtable discussion: the panellists' comments are unattributed, and general themes and points of note highlighted. It also includes three important essays from leading Somalis and Somalia observers, each of which emphasise the centrality of Somalis in shaping their own political future, as well as the continued role of the regional and international community; together with a special focus on the situation of women in Somalia during this time of change.

## Political Transition and Transformation

Somalia has notoriously been without an effective central government able to fulfil the key functions of a state since 1991. It has been described as a ‘black hole’<sup>1</sup> and a ‘shattered state’,<sup>2</sup> and consistently tops the failed state index.<sup>3</sup> Since the Arta Declaration of 2000 that established the first transitional administration, Somalia has spent over ten years ‘in transition’ to a permanent political configuration. Efforts to draft a new constitution and federal system have been underway during this time, as well as discussion on how best to hold presidential and parliamentary elections to select representatives for Somalia’s political institutions. However, the insurgency by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) that erupted in 2006, following the demise of the Union of Islamic Courts, has complicated attempts to build political consensus and to roll out national initiatives. The TFG has been consistently portrayed as weak, corrupt and heavily factionalised: indeed, massive turnover in cabinet ministers is just one symptom of the fractious politics that have characterised recent years, a situation likely to be further inflamed by the prospects of national elections for the first time since 1969.

Somalia has spent over  
ten years in transition

### *The National Reconciliation Process*

Peace and reconciliation conferences began soon after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 when the president and leader of the two-decade military regime, Siyad Barre, fled Mogadishu in the midst of a devastating civil war. Efforts to build consensus between the clan-based opposition factions failed and the country descended further into violent conflict.

Externally supported initiatives throughout the 1990s attempted to find a model of government that would appease the divergent interests of Somalia’s factionalised political elites. In 2000, a national peace conference held in Arta, Djibouti appeared to break the deadlock, facilitated in part by members of Somalia’s civil society and business community who for so long had been excluded from the peace

process. The subsequent Arta Declaration established a transitional national government that was recognised by the United Nations, a significant measure of progress. In 2002, a follow-up conference in Kenya agreed a federal structure for Somalia, which would be more fully fleshed out in 2003, with agreement to a transitional charter; and in 2004, with the creation of the transitional federal institutions, leading to the inauguration of the parliament that year and a government in early 2005. In 2008, these political structures were further endorsed following a peace accord with the oppositional Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia – a consortium of disgruntled warlords and former members of the Union of Islamic Courts – for whom the parliament was expanded to 550 members.

### *The Roadmap*

The transitional national charter, agreed as part of the Djibouti process, had mandated a number of requisite tasks to be completed within six years, including the drafting of a new constitution, the disarmament of militia groups and the resettlement of refugees and IDPs.<sup>4</sup> By 2011, however, little progress had been made on these essential milestones: with the transitional parliament’s term due to expire, Somalia faced a pressing deadline. The Kampala Accords signed in Uganda extended the transitional parliament’s term by an additional three years, a move that was roundly criticised; the government’s term was also extended by one year to August 2012, making 2012 a make-or-break year for Somalia’s political leadership.<sup>5</sup>

In September 2011, a political roadmap was agreed upon by major Somali constituencies that signalled the beginning of a new push towards the completion of mandated transitional tasks. The indigenous summit was the first in a series of meetings that included two constitutional conferences held in Garowe, Puntland that agreed principles for delivering the transitional milestones before the expiry of the TFG’s mandate.

The roadmap and its adjunct documents hence represent the latest in the long-running efforts to create a stable, secure government in Somalia. Recognising the importance of an inclusive process, the national security and stabilisation plan was

developed in consultation with key national stakeholders including Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaca (ASWJ) and the Galmudug and Puntland administrations, representing the first time that Mogadishu policy-makers had gone to the regional administrations for consultation. This political outreach chimed with the support for Somaliland and Puntland expressed by foreign governments, including the US, which though it explicitly supports a one-state solution, has developed a 'dual-track' process with Somaliland.<sup>6</sup> Regional and international actors have generally been supportive of the renewed zest for reform, but there has been concern expressed at the ambitious timetable of the roadmap, with the warning that international patience will wear thin if there is serious delay or even postponement of the move to an elected government.

### *Political Reform*

With less than three months to go to the end of the transition period, the urgency of delivering on promised political reform is mounting. Two of the most essential reforms – agreeing a new system of representation and reducing the number of MPs – have seen progress: at the second constitutional conference in Garowe in February 2012 (known as Garowe II), Somali policy-makers agreed to halve the number of MPs to 225 (or possibly 275), with 30 per cent of seats reserved for women candidates in the lower chamber. The contentious 4.5 formula that apportions seats according to clan and of which most Somalis strongly disapprove was, however, retained for the appointment of first-term representatives because of the difficulty of holding elections across the insecure territories of the south and central regions. Working to build the legitimacy of representatives selected by the old system will be of paramount importance post-August, particularly because, without elections to sweep clean the old guard, the political elite remains populated by individuals from the Barre era, an obstacle to political transformation in Somalia. A new political culture is considered a precursor to real political change.

Without the possibility of elections, 135 traditional leaders have been brought into the political process to assuage competing constituencies and instil a degree of legitimacy to decisions on representation. They are to select the new members of the slimmed-down parliament (who will elect the

president), as well as an 825-member National Constituent Assembly, which will in turn debate the new constitution. A transparent process of clan elder selection is vital if this interim solution is to move the roadmap forward, and keep the constitutional process on track.

The new constitution is emphatically regarded as essential to restoring trust in the government. The 1960 centralised constitution is seen as reinforcing

A new political culture is considered  
a precursor to real political change

ing clan competition by pitting the president and prime minister against each other in the absence of a clear division of executive and legislative powers. A new document will be a watershed in Somalia's political history by establishing a new constitutional footing for the state. A timetable for consultation and approval of the new constitution was laid out at Garowe II, with adoption scheduled for 1 April 2012.

However, whilst progress was made on drafting, by mid-May the constitution was still in the consultation phase. The adoption of a new constitution is particularly important for making clear the contours of the federal arrangement. The proliferating self-proclaimed administrations and statelets since the autumn of 2011 will need to be included in a national framework that can accommodate a range of forms of local governance, not least the federal state of Puntland which has its own constitution and government, established in 1998. Both Somalia and the international community need to work hard to understand how to co-operate with these new administrations in the south-central regions of Somalia. In particular, the confinement of Somali state authorities to Mogadishu will need to be addressed both in terms of political projection and national focus: the TFG needs to begin to think and act like a national institution, not just a Mogadishu one.

### *The London Conference*

The UK has the lead on Somalia in the UN Security Council, chairs the contact group on piracy and was the third largest international donor during the 2011 famine, as well as a leading contributor

to humanitarian and AMISOM funds. For the UK, Somalia is important because of its impact on British interests, including the links between Al-Qa'ida and Al-Shabaab, the kidnap risk to UK citizens, illegal migration to the UK and the impact of piracy on UK ships; as well as the humanitarian imperative and the transnational connections afforded by the 250,000-strong diaspora community based in Britain.

For these reasons, the UK held an international summit on Somalia on 23 February 2012. Attended by over 40 heads of state, including from the TFG, the UK, the US and Somalia's newest donor, Turkey, it established a 'Somali consensus' template for global co-operation on Somalia up to and beyond the end of Somalia's internal political transition in August 2012. There was agreement on seven key issues: security, piracy, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, local stability, the political process and international

co-operation.<sup>7</sup> What was not said publicly, but has since become clear is that the London Conference was the start of a multilateral political process in Somalia. The process comes freighted with expectations from Somalis, who are key stakeholders and the drivers of the transformation of their country; it also carries the controversial baggage of nation-building attempts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia, and in Somalia itself from 1992–95. Many Somalis see international intervention as a last chance to stabilise the country; others fear that multilateral intervention is a euphemism for the *de facto* partition of Somalia by regional and global players. Even with varying views on intervention, the involvement of external actors continues to be a critical component of Somalia's stability. The Istanbul Conference on 31 May and 1 June 2012 was the next step in international efforts to support Somalia's political transition.

### The Consequences of Failure<sup>8</sup>

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and its failure to date are due to four principal factors, three internal and one external. The first is a vacuum of leadership: the presidents chosen since 1991 have proved unequal to the task. The second is the vacuum of military force. These leaders did not form a coalition of the clans to establish a military force capable of breaking the political stalemate. These two factors flowed from a lack of vision and policy, the third factor. The leaders could not see beyond the clan-based competition for power and resources that governed their *modus operandi*. The fourth factor is the response of world powers and the sub-regional states. Both withdrew from any meaningful involvement with Somalia in the 1990s following the 'Black Hawk Down' incident. But, overnight, 9/11 transformed interest in Somalia as the US became concerned by the evolving religious ideology in the country, represented by the formation of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Mogadishu.

#### The Influence of External Actors

The civil war between the two wings of the former ARS/UIC has destroyed the legitimacy and credibility

Meanwhile, there was no government in Mogadishu. Based in Baidoa, 250 km from the capital, the UIC was able to take charge. A clash for power was inevitable, which occurred when President Yusuf asked Ethiopia for 20,000 troops to seize Mogadishu with the tacit approval and support of the US.

The UIC lost Mogadishu and withdrew. Part of the movement converted itself into the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), whilst another developed into Al-Shabaab, unleashing an insurgency of the kind seen in Iraq. Ethiopia was forced to withdraw in 2008, with the ARS breaking into two wings. The first, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, signed the Djibouti Peace Agreement in December 2008; he was elected president of the new government in Mogadishu on 31 January 2009. The other wing, led by Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, opposed Sheikh Sharif and the Djibouti Agreement and began the new insurgency, which continues to date.

of religious groups in politics in the eyes of the Somali public and the world. Its persistence is now seen as a

personalised struggle for power between political factions and groups.

The length of the war, together with the presence of Ethiopian and AMISOM troops since 2006, represents an internal stalemate. In southern Somalia, no clan or militia has been able to win politically or militarily to overcome the others. Tragically, neither has the leadership of the transitional national government or its heir, the TFG, displayed the capacity to forge a coalition of clans and/or militias to force a political or military victory. This has given a disproportionate degree of political and military influence to external forces, especially Ethiopia and AMISOM.

Despite years of financial and political support from leading Western powers, the scorecard in the middle of the seventh year of operations is mixed. The political influence of the external forces, despite their military superiority, has achieved no more than an impasse:

### Avoiding More Missed Opportunities

Today we have the potential for a change of direction and policy. As an ordinary citizen, I share and fully understand the despair of the Somali people. Three opportunities to create a future have been lost in the last ten years. The first was the Union of Islamic Courts, which succeeded against all expectations; the second, the ARS that reclaimed national sentiment; and the third, the current TFG in which all hope was invested, both national and international.

It is tragic that Somalia once again faces an uncertain future, and in some respects, it is perhaps at its furthest from a solution. The country has just come out of the worst famine in living memory, with a war of attrition whose only sure result is yet more death and destruction in the camps and battlefields, especially of the young; and the state is subject to 30 separate claims by 'statelets' and 'regional' presidencies. There is an urgent need to define the post-August future and it has to be done on a blank page. Now is the time to commit to a political solution. Though the previous initiatives have failed, the Somali public will back a confident plan as they did the Djibouti Peace Process.

But a new process must not be pinned to the political longevity of the Somali participants – or it will find its partners overtaken by the exigencies of survival in the fast pace of national and local politics. Nor must it

Somalia remains at war, without a political solution for all the parties to the conflict. There has been a waste of human and financial resources that should have been used to address cyclical drought and famine in the Horn.

The elephant in the room remains the northern regions of Somaliland, which the transitional governments and the international community continue to consider as part of Somalia. Having achieved stability and democracy, Somaliland proves that doing things the Somali way can work and Somaliland has done so in a manner that many in Africa and other regions would envy. Had Somaliland strategically engaged in and perhaps even led on the larger Somali question, its weight and coherence would have provided a backbone around which a consensus could have formed for political progress. It would also have reduced or negated the role and influence of external actors.

continue to be wedded to the primacy of force and the military stick as the principal tools for a Somali solution. The enlargement of AMISOM and the re-hatting of Kenyan forces in Somalia seem to suggest that international policy has not moved on.

Given the success this year against Al-Shabaab, it is clear that the war against extremism can be won militarily. But given the failure of leadership and the destruction of institutions in Somalia over the past 30 years, there is an immediate danger of a military victory in a political vacuum. The impetus from the London conference must help establish new political and institutional structures that can convert the military successes against extremists into mechanisms for national reconstruction. Without a credible and competent replacement, supported locally and internationally, the vacuum will again only attract and be filled by armed gangs, warlords and the surrogate clients of neighbouring states. Nevertheless, a political way forward is still possible, feasible and is urgently desired by all. Its realisation, however, requires imagination and political will.

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## The Challenges of Ending Somalia's Transition

There is good news out of Somalia. Al-Shabaab is in trouble, the famine is technically over, and local governance is gradually expanding. The bad news is that the TFG has had nothing to do with these positive developments.

Al-Shabaab's growing weaknesses are the result of self-inflicted wounds – political in-fighting and pathological policies that are deeply unpopular with most Somalis, as well as mounting military pressure imposed by African Union forces; neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia; and an array of anti-Shabaab clan militias. The expansion of modest municipal and regional governance systems is the result of local community initiatives, not the TFG. And though southern Somalia remains in a state of profound food insecurity, the end of famine conditions is attributed to a combination of good rains last autumn, robust remittance flows from the Somali diaspora, and international emergency relief operations that persisted despite one of the most non-permissive security environments in the world.

Somalia's recent, modest progress has occurred despite, not because of, the eight-year existence of the TFG. The TFG's security forces are unable to hold the liberated neighbourhoods of Mogadishu and occasionally clash with one another; TFG leaders have treated local governance systems as threats rather than as partners, and have actively sought to undermine them; and the corrupt TFG was more of an obstacle than a partner in the delivery of food aid to famine victims in its areas of control.

Despite this unacceptable performance, the TFG has for years remained the centrepiece of international peace-building and state-building efforts in Somalia. External actors sought to deter defections and encourage rejectionists to re-engage by insisting repeatedly that the TFG was 'the only game in town'. This produced seven years of foreign assistance to one of the most unresponsive and corrupt administrations in the history of transitional governments. The fact that the TFG was treated as a key part of the solution, when in fact it had become very much a part of the problem, was a paradox that was not lost on Somalis. Eventually a growing number of foreign donors came to this realisation as well.

Mounting international frustration with the TFG's corruption, its indifference to its responsibilities to

govern, and its failure to complete key transitional tasks led to the broad consensus in 2011 that Somalia's endless transition had to be forced to a close. The lengthy series of accords struck between Somali principals since mid-2011 – the Kampala Accord, the 'Roadmap' Agreement, the Garowe Principles, the Galkayo Principles, and the 23 May Addis Ababa Communiqué – are all attempts to create new procedures and mechanisms to accelerate completion of the transition, set deadlines for essential transitional tasks, expand participation in the transitional process, and assign responsibility for completion of those tasks. The London Conference on Somalia was mainly devoted to building an international consensus on the principles and procedures to expedite the end of the transition in 2012.

Most commentaries on Somalia's end-of-transition process have rightly focused on the enormous political challenges in the months ahead. There are concerns that elements within the TFG have a vested interest in perpetuating the transition and will seek to delay, block or manipulate the process in 2012. There are even deeper anxieties among Somalis that the complex selection process will be hijacked by a handful of TFG leaders of dubious legitimacy, that foreign governments are controlling and manipulating the process, and that selection of a new government will ultimately be driven by the purchasing of votes. The selection of members to the proposed Elders Committee and Constituent Assembly have already proven to be deeply contentious, prompting two important regional polities, Puntland and Galmadug, to withdraw from a planned meeting of the Elders Committee in Istanbul. As details about the selection process emerge, other Somali groups may defect entirely and become spoilers. Defections are likely to increase once the process culminates in a new government; political hopefuls left out of power may or may not respect the results. Fundamental issues relating to federalism and political constituencies in Somalia remain unresolved and are sources of deep division among Somalis. Many wonder if the shift to a post-transition government will in any way change the patterns of corruption that have plagued the TFG. And the time frame involved in the end-of-transition is extraordinarily short and likely to produce rushed proceedings, increasing the

likelihood of flawed decisions and insufficient consultation. All of this points to the risk that the process and outcome could have questionable legitimacy in the eyes of many Somalis.

But there are also significant security challenges linked to the end of the transition in Somalia. These have received less attention but could have enduring impact. First, much of southern Somalia still remains under the control of Al-Shabaab, and the group retains the capacity to launch terrorist attacks and assassinations in 'liberated' areas. Both the TFG and a post-transition government will be highly vulnerable to attacks and dependent on AMISOM forces for protection. The relocation of staff and offices of the UN and other international bodies from Nairobi to Mogadishu will impose significant additional burdens on AMISOM. Aid agencies and embassies are likely to gravitate toward a reliance on private security companies for protection, which carries its own set of complications. They will almost certainly have to adopt stringent security measures that will make Somali access to them arduous and limited. This is already the case inside the AMISOM-patrolled airport compound: security restrictions are so high that many TFG officials and others simply refuse to attend meetings there. The UN and other agencies will face a difficult balancing act between security and accessibility.

Second, most of the liberated areas in southern Somalia are now in the hands of third forces – clan militias allied with AMISOM, Kenyan or Ethiopian military forces – but with only tenuous links to the TFG. If the process to end the transition marginalises them, or if TFG leaders make moves to manipulate the outcome, we could see defections by these armed groups and armed clashes pitting them against the TFG or its successor body. This would be a worst-case scenario for AMISOM, and a windfall for Al-Shabaab. If mismanaged, the push for an accelerated end of the transition could inadvertently undermine gains made against Al-Shabaab. As has been true for years, state-building and counter-terrorism objectives in Somalia can sometimes work at cross-purposes. AMISOM is actively seeking to integrate these independent militia into a TFG command structure in the hopes of avoiding just such a scenario.

Third, the system of representation in the proposed constituent assembly and bi-cameral parliament rewards communities that form local or regional administrations.

This was a well-intentioned attempt to expand participation in decision-making beyond the TFG, and to recognise and reward actual local governance inside Somalia. It is part of a wider strategy known as the 'dual track approach', in which external donors work with both the TFG and local political entities – in effect ending the notion that the TFG is the only game in town. But it is having the unintended effect of encouraging the proliferation of self-declared and destabilising regional polities. The unrecognised but stable and democratic secessionist state of Somaliland now faces multiple secessions of its own, as political entrepreneurs in several of its regions have declared themselves to be self-governing authorities with the intention of joining a federal Somalia. Some of these exist on paper only, but others have begun to assemble armed militia and have clashed with Somaliland authorities. An uncontrolled proliferation of regional polities will create more, not less, instability across Somalia.

One of the most clarifying questions to ask in the analysis of contemporary Somali politics is: 'Time is on whose side?' Somali political figures are astute players of the clock, and are adept at creating delays or waiting out a process that offers them no attractive options. The push to accelerate the end of the transition renders time an enemy, not a friend, of donor states and the UN. The fact that external actors want to complete the transition much more than do key Somali actors creates a poor bargaining position for the donor states, one that enterprising Somali political figures will seek to exploit.

There is a history to expedited efforts to revive the Somali state, and it is a cautionary tale. In 1994, after the disastrous war with General Aideed's militia in the summer and autumn of 1993, the UN Operation in Somalia jettisoned its laborious 'bottom-up' approach to state revival and instead tried to broker an expedient power-sharing deal among the most powerful militia leaders. That initiative, informed by the UN's wishful thinking that 'the warlords are now peacelords', never held, and Somalia fell back into state collapse. The UN was playing against the clock, and the clock won.

This is of particular importance for deliberations in the conferences that have followed the London Conference. On the one hand, the need for expediency usually results in hasty deals between small numbers of key players; broadly inclusive processes are by definition

slower, and hence unappealing when the clock is ticking. Yet conveners of the London Conference have committed themselves to ensuring that the process by which the TFG era ends and a new caretaker body is selected will be more representative and inclusive. The latter is a laudable goal, but will collide with the tyranny of the clock. Participatory processes in Somalia are, more than

in most places, slow and time-consuming affairs. They will co-exist poorly with the narrow and increasingly unrealistic deadlines set out in the roadmap to end the transition by August 2012.

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## Securing Somalia: AMISOM, Piracy and Security Sector Reform

On 6 August 2011, Al-Shabaab unexpectedly withdrew from Mogadishu after years of fierce urban warfare with troops from the national security forces and AMISOM, the AU peacekeeping force. A number of factors had conspired against it since the beginning of the year, including a stepped-up campaign by AMISOM within the capital and the locus of the famine in the insurgent heartland. It quickly became clear that fighting to maintain two areas of control had critically stretched Al-Shabaab, and its political leadership appeared to buckle under pressure, with rumours of a split. Al-Shabaab's media wing positioned the drawdown as a tactical withdrawal, presaging a 'shift in tactics', rather than defeat; within a few months, Al-Shabaab had adopted an almost exclusive focus on IED and suicide attacks, including eight suicide bomb attacks between August and November 2011.<sup>9</sup> Al-Shabaab's long-anticipated announcement of a formal merger with Al-Qa'ida in February 2012 seemed to confirm this trajectory.<sup>10</sup>

AMISOM has been careful to work through consultation with local Somali forces and civilians

The eviction of the insurgent group from the capital nevertheless caused a step-change in the broader security efforts in Somalia, with increased calls for an augmentation of AMISOM's mandate and troop numbers to take advantage of Al-Shabaab's change in fortune. Prompted by a number of kidnappings from Kenyan soil in quick succession,<sup>11</sup> Kenyan troops crossed the border in October 2011 in the country's

first such intervention since independence. In a co-ordinated campaign with Ethiopian troops on the western border, and AMISOM and TFG forces holding Mogadishu and its environs, the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF)'s Operation Linda Nchi was aimed at dismembering Al-Shabaab in the Lower Juba area near the border. This effort was bolstered when, on 22 February 2012, the UN Security Council authorised an increase in the AMISOM force size to 17,731 troops, with an increase in funding from US\$300 million per annum to around US\$500 million. The 4,000-strong KDF detachment in southern Somalia was also formally incorporated in the AU mission, making it the AU's largest single military intervention.

AMISOM is making the transition from being a group of national forces under a nominal AU umbrella to becoming a co-ordinated and semi-integrated African force. A great deal of progress has already been made regarding the development of an integrated command and control structure for AMISOM, and the inclusion of regional forces will enhance co-ordination and regional security, particularly in terms of the partnership between AMISOM and the EASBRIG regional security force, as well as having a broader impact on the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

But despite these advances, for many, memories of the disastrous 1990s' US-led operations in Somalia still linger. These missions were hamstrung by serious disputes over co-ordination, and command and control; and there was little local support. By contrast, AMISOM has been careful to work through consultation with local Somali forces and civilians, as well as by establishing an agreed multinational command and control structure. Under the leadership of

Major-General Fred Mugisha, AMISOM, in partnership with Somali forces, pushed Al-Shabaab out of most of Mogadishu. Under Mugisha's successor, Lieutenant-General Andrew Gutti, the expectation is that AMISOM will play a vital role in helping to build security across south and central Somalia, thus providing space for development in the country. AMISOM's mandate officially expires in October 2012 but there is little doubt that the mandate will be renewed for at least another year. There is no magic formula for a successful peace-building intervention, but AMISOM is hoping to learn from past failures in Somalia to demonstrate that security does anchor development and stability.

### *Al-Shabaab*

Although Al-Shabaab still remains a military threat, over the past year it has suffered serious reverses, both operational and ideological. Multiple and co-ordinated military offensives against Al-Shabaab by Somali, AMISOM, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces from November 2011 to the present have forced the insurgents to cede territory in southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab's military problems have coincided with a leadership and ideological crisis. In 2011, at the height of the famine, there were serious internal divisions over what stance the group should take on food aid. The pro Al-Qa'ida wing under Moktar Ali Zubeyr ('Godane') refused to allow local or international food aid to those most in need; the faction loyal to Union of Islamic Courts co-founder Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys was more prepared to permit aid – for a fee. In February 2012 the divisions deep-

There is no magic formula for a successful peace-building intervention

ened; that month Godane announced the merger of Al-Shabaab with Al-Qa'ida under the leadership of Ayman Al-Zawahiri. But immediately following this announcement, other Al-Shabaab leaders meeting in Baidoa rejected the merger, insisting that Al-Shabaab is a national force under Somali command. In the months since, there have been dozens of defections to AMISOM and Somali National Army forces, from the rank-and-file and the leadership of Al-Shabaab.

Civilian support for Al-Shabaab has also dramatically declined. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab insists that it is in the midst of a strategic 're-organisation' that will see it re-emerge as the dominant stakeholder in Somalia.

### *Police and Justice*

Attention is now turning to Somalia's domestic security capability. Security is of fundamental importance to Somalia: without it, effective government cannot be rebuilt. The TFG's 2012 security objectives have been set out in its national security and stabilisation plan, which recognises the critical need for comprehensive security sector reform (SSR): professionalising the armed forces, strengthening the rule of law and resourcing the justice system. In Mogadishu, the TFG's efforts are more visible, and have included initiatives to enhance security in the capital's Bakhara market to prevent looting, and the

Security is of fundamental importance to Somalia

utilisation of mobile courts and police units to bring the rule of law into neighbourhoods.

Beyond the capital, however, there is little evidence of TFG-led rule of law or stabilisation; much of this is instead being undertaken by local authorities and militias. The TFG urgently needs to meld the different Somali militias together in order to avoid gaps, remembering the lesson of Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyya, which authorities claimed to have eliminated in the 1990s only to have the leaders return at the head of the Union of Islamic Courts.

As well as disarmament and integration challenges, the TFG is developing its national security forces and law enforcement mechanisms. There is general agreement that more attention must be paid to how to restore law and order in Somalia, with a special focus on the police, particularly as the emphasis to date has been on national security to the cost of a restored police force. Additionally, the justice system has been overlooked: Somalia cannot have a police force without a strong judiciary.

The improvement of policing and security in Somalia has been impeded by at least three logistical

and bureaucratic obstacles. First, a lack of resources for the armed forces, including food and healthcare, together with the non- or late-payment of salaries, has led to a high level of military desertion. Second, it is felt that foreign training methods (in the EU-led training programmes in Uganda) have not been attuned to Somali needs, and are seen as incongruent with Somali approaches. Third, instability of tenure within the senior echelons of the military is often cited as problematic. Multiple changes in the commander post have damaged efforts at reform and the potential for change within the military command structure and the wider organisation. Indeed, the promotion of senior military leaders who have not come up through the ranks, but who are often tribal

The effectiveness of the EU and NATO naval operations has yet to be decisively established

chiefs or former warlords, has impacted the effectiveness of the armed forces.

An overriding challenge for the TFG is developing the right exit strategy for the foreign troops now in-country, ensuring that there is a win-win situation for the TFG in which Al-Shabaab is eliminated, and that law and order is brought into the vacated areas. Crucial to this objective is securing the territory abandoned by Al-Shabaab and establishing administrations in those areas to fill the authority vacuum. The border regions are immensely important: having long been on the periphery of national policy-making based in Mogadishu, they may now hold the key to Somalia's stabilisation.

### *Countering Piracy*

In the midst of – and largely also because of – Somalia's recent insurgent war, piracy has mushroomed along the coastline, becoming sufficiently critical for the mobilisation of more than 20 nations in naval operations in and around the confluence of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. As a result, on any given day, there is an average of 17 naval ships on patrol in these areas of the high seas to provide a transit corridor for approximately 30,000 cargo ships every year.

It is now standard to proclaim that a land-based approach is essential to countering piracy, but there is as yet little international consensus on what such a strategy involves. The effectiveness of the EU and NATO naval operations has yet to be decisively established; whilst on land the donor focus on capacity-building of institutions capable of arrest, detention and trial in Puntland has not yet led to a significant deterrence effect. At the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012, international donors agreed to strengthen prosecution and detention capabilities for the Seychelles, Puntland and Somaliland, with prisoner transfer agreements between these administrations also completed that month. Another donor priority is to disrupt the financiers and logisticians of piracy wherever they may be based, by working through regional partners, the AU, the Arab League and other countries such as Turkey. In London, there was agreement to enhance co-ordination on illegal financial flows and to co-ordinate intelligence gathering and investigations. The recently established Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC) in the Seychelles was also welcomed.

However, more is required to put in place a coherent, comprehensive strategy that connects the maritime and littoral environments. In particular, it has been proposed that efforts should be made to change the narrative around piracy, such as through a public relations campaign that tackles the message that pirates are simply responding to toxic waste

More is required to put in place a coherent, comprehensive strategy that connects the maritime and littoral environments

and illegal fishing.<sup>12</sup> Whilst piracy may have in fact reduced the level of illegal fishing, the international community still needs to have a high-level interest in a complete ban on illegal fishing in Somali territorial waters.

Political will and competent leadership are the keys to clamping down on piracy. This is not only required in Puntland, but also crucially in the

Galmudug administration since piracy has now become more active around Hobyo. There is a risk for these regional governments and local administrations in taking on the pirates who now constitute powerful economic organisations with a significant interest in the status quo. Puntland, in particular, needs to be encouraged to commit to counter-piracy but also compensated for taking on this risk, particularly in order to build a system of sustainable law and order that buffers against the pirates' resurgence. Job creation and employment schemes, such as in the fishing

and road-building industries, are one element of this approach which must not only focus on shoreline communities, since pirates do not necessarily come from the coast.

It will take a long time to dismantle the system in place, but it is essential in order to prevent Puntland becoming a narco-state based on piracy like some areas of West Africa; and to prevent any link-up between pirates and other destabilising actors in Somalia.

### AMISOM and Counter-Insurgency in Somalia

In a 2006 article, General David Petraeus, the former commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, penned 14 lessons learnt over years of commanding counter-insurgency operations in that country. One observation he made was that success required more than just military operations. He wrote: 'Counterinsurgency strategies must also include, above all, efforts to establish a political environment that helps reduce support for the insurgents and undermines the attraction of whatever ideology they may espouse'.<sup>13</sup>

In this, General Petraeus acknowledged he was stating the obvious. But it bears repeating given the military success that the AU Mission in Somalia has achieved in the capital, Mogadishu, over the last 18 months. Ultimately, however, its work will be judged by its facilitation of the peace process across the whole of southern Somalia over the long term. This is not to diminish the significance of AMISOM's efforts in and of themselves; for the long-suffering people of Mogadishu, any respite, however temporary, from the years of war is welcome. While much more work remains to be done if Somalia is to be placed firmly on the path to stability, it is undeniable that without security in the capital much of the political progress that has been made in the last eight months would not have been possible.

AMISOM is now embarking on Phase II of its original concept of operations. The aim is to create stable conditions throughout the country in which the political roadmap can be implemented. The roadmap calls for the establishment of regional administrations that progressively extend the writ of the transitional government

and enable the long-term process of reconciliation. As in the capital, this will necessarily require confronting the terrorist insurgency of the Al Qa'ida group, Al-Shabaab, across south-central Somalia.

The British military strategist, Sir Robert Thompson, likened counter-insurgency to fishing. 'If the [insurgents] can be isolated from the population, i.e., the "little fishes" removed from "the water", then their eventual destruction becomes automatic', he wrote in his 1966 book, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. Thompson's approach is known as the ink spot strategy. Areas that security forces effectively control are viewed as inkblots on a map. Any area falling under the spreading inkblots must be cleared of insurgents and subsequently policed. This has been the bedrock of AMISOM's success in Mogadishu.

The strategy requires the availability of troops in sufficient numbers to take and hold key towns in south and central Somalia, as well as a substantial investment in force enablers and multipliers. The strategy has received the approval of the UN Security Council, which, via Resolution 2036, has expanded the mandated force strength to 17,731, for the first time giving AMISOM aerial and marine components, as well as guaranteed predictable funding for its operations and equipment. As a result of this, AMISOM is now in the process of adding new contingents into its fold, including the Kenyan forces in southern Somalia as well as a fresh battalion from Sierra Leone. With the deployment of Djiboutian troops – eventually destined for Beletweyne – already underway and Uganda and Burundi deploying additional

forces to Baidoa, the mission now has a significant and expanding presence outside the Somali capital for the first time.

The expansion of the AMISOM force will also require revamping the command and control architecture. Over the last four years, the Burundian and Ugandan contingents have forged an effective partnership, but the integration of the Kenyan and Djibouti contingents over such a wide area will undoubtedly come with new challenges as forces learn to work together. An expanded and balanced Force Headquarters able to guide and co-ordinate the actions of all AMISOM forces, and liaise with both allied forces and with Somali national forces, is indispensable. These arrangements have now been elaborated in a new concept of operations.

In his article, General Petraeus further warns against 'trying to do too much with your own hands', citing the counsel of T E Lawrence from 1917. To paraphrase: 'Better the Somalis do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them.' In practice this means empowering Somalis to do the job themselves.

With the help of our partners in the international community, AMISOM has been training and mentoring the core of a rejuvenated Somali National Army and currently our forces are woven tightly together on Mogadishu's perimeter facilitating the transfer of discipline, knowledge and experience. However, the Somali forces face significant hurdles in terms of equipment, weaponry, communications infrastructure and resources.

AMISOM has also prioritised the training and mentoring of the Somalia Police Force (SPF) via the AMISOM Police Component. With its help, the SPF, whose officers today number approximately 5,000, has established police posts in all 16 of Mogadishu's districts. Working together with the National Security Agency and with the

co-operation of city residents, they are disrupting up to 70 per cent of Al-Shabaab terror plots. The deployment of Formed Up Police Units, also authorised by Resolution 2036, will help improve the situation even further.

General Petraeus noted in another of his observations that money can be better than ammunition. Repair of police stations, purchase of uniforms and equipment, construction of training and operating bases will all require funds, as will international support for overall reconstruction, economic revival, and the restoration of basic services in liberated areas.

On the whole, the policing and civil-affairs operations will be just as important as the military operations inside the newly liberated inkblot areas. This is not to say that the capital or other liberated towns will be perfectly safe and free of violence. Across the world, no city or town in a country dealing with an insurgency can hope to be immune from random attacks. Kabul and Baghdad, for example, are still targeted by terrorists, but to a large extent security forces there have enabled political and economic activity to proceed.

Similarly, though it is likely that Mogadishu and other Somali towns will continue to be hit by terrorist attacks, the goal will be to ensure that violence is kept to a minimum and that the insurgents are relegated to the periphery of society. The central challenge therefore will be the continued degradation of the capacity of the Al-Shabaab terror group while investing in the Somali peace process, its people and its institutions. AMISOM has applied the lessons of others and is firmly on the right path to achieving this.

*Major General Fred Mugisha is a senior member of the Uganda People's Defence Force and served as the AMISOM Force Commander from August 2011 to April 2012.*

## Humanitarian Relief and Recovery

According to a recent UN World Development Report, it takes on average 25 years to escape conflict.<sup>14</sup> Somalia faces enormous and sustained humanitarian challenges emerging from persistent violence, poverty, environmental degradation and drought-induced food insecurity. In the summer of 2011, the humanitarian crisis in the south and

central regions of Somalia had put 750,000 people at the risk of starvation, with an estimated 4 million people needing aid. By November, the UN considered food security to be stabilising, but in the spring of 2012, the effects of the drought and its associated impact on displacement and the agricultural economy were still acutely felt.

The UN is very extensively involved in Somalia. Since the 2010/11 droughts, the UN has been working to stabilise access to food through food vouchers and cash-for-work schemes, and to address the high mortality through water and sanitation programmes and controlling communicable diseases. The UN has been focused on providing shelter and public health within IDP camps but also giving support during the migratory movements, for instance in cross-border operations at Gedo. The KDF incursion affected people's willingness to plant during the Dehr rains, thus impacting the forthcoming harvest, and important mill production since the area of the Kenyan operation is the main fodder-producing region of Somalia. The UN has also focused its work on Mogadishu where at least 300 displaced communities are living

There is much to do in the long-term to rebuild livelihoods and social resilience

in squatter conditions in areas controlled by 'gate-keepers' who control assistance. The UN is concerned about the level of sexual and gender-based violence in these IDP camps; as well as the severe long-term problem of loss of livelihoods and assets, including increasing impoverishment and an enlarged external refugee population. There is much to do in the long-term to rebuild livelihoods and social resilience.

The humanitarian crisis has brought new donors and actors into Somalia, which has challenged UN co-ordination and also raised questions about the

accountability of assistance going through the TFG. There are concerns that the practices of agencies new to Somalia may challenge current ways of operating, for instance by working through Al-Shabaab, which will need to be considered moving forward.

### *The Role of the Diaspora*

The diaspora plays a dual role as an agent for change and as a link between international and Somali communities; an estimated 80 per cent of the start-up capital for small and medium companies in Somalia comes from the diaspora, which also contributes skills and technical expertise. As is well known, remittances constitute a significant proportion of Somali incomes, receipts that add up to more than the international aid budget every year (approximately \$3 billion).

In the UK, it has been suggested that the rise of a successful Somali-speaking TV channel, together with multiple websites and news articles, has led to increased awareness and debate amongst the diaspora community. Important issues under discussion include the reduction of MPs and the possibility of national elections. In some circles, this active engagement has led to accusations that the diaspora has been pushing forward clan politics and the federal agenda. Other accounts are more positive: the UK diaspora, for instance, has sought partnerships with the UK government, the UN and other agencies in order to strengthen the organisational capacity of Somali communities.

There is nothing notional about the role that is, and can be, played by the Somali diaspora, and its members are an indispensable ally in the stabilisation and rebuilding of Somalia.

## Marginalisation and Gender-Based Violence in South-Central Somalia

In the tumultuous social landscape of Somalia, the vacuum of political power has left the power base of patriarchy largely unchallenged. Somali women have experienced – or rather endured – untold hardships during the past 20 years of civil conflict and humanitarian disaster.<sup>15</sup> In one respect, they are second-class citizens with limited rights, yet they also play an important and

unheralded role in sustaining livelihoods and running small businesses in this fragile state.<sup>16</sup>

The United Nations' Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Ms Rashida Manjoo, has said: 'violence against women is a manifestation of inequality and discrimination which cannot be addressed in isolation of the historical and current context'.<sup>17</sup> In south-central

Somalia, sexual assault, female genital mutilation,<sup>18</sup> domestic violence, forced marriage and abduction are brutal manifestations of the very fragile situation in which the state is weak and there is widespread impunity. Women have been particularly vulnerable during the upheaval and violence of the recent conflict. Sexual violence is prevalent in IDP camps, and there is little redress for Somali women in the enduring culture of patriarchy and sexism in which customary and social norms do not provide adequate protection. Intimate partner violence, for instance, is not a legal offence: it is seen as a private issue and families prefer not to intervene.<sup>19</sup> As a result women find it difficult to report abuse. The idiom, *'Walaashaa iskuma hubtid seedigaa ha isku ceebayn'* ['you are not sure the position of your sister, therefore don't lose your brother-in-law'] reflects dominant power dynamics within the family and the broader community.

Women are also grossly underrepresented in the political institutions of south-central Somalia. Despite a 12 per cent quota, women occupy less than 5 per cent of the national legislature's seats. In the customary system, women may not serve as sultans, legislators or judges (*Xeerbeegti*), and they are excluded from the traditional clan forum of the *shir* in which important clan decisions are made, such as compensation payments. This systematic exclusion of women from traditional politics and the justice system perpetuates women's subordination and their current limited political representation.

But changes are afoot in Somalia. The Garowe Principles include a commitment to gender representation in political institutions through a mandatory 30 per cent quota of women in parliament and cabinet. The quota programme has the potential to significantly elevate the status of women in Somalia, as it has done in Uganda and Rwanda. However, increased political

representation alone cannot bring change in women's lives unless followed by political commitment and initiatives to end gender inequality. Legislation to protect women and promote gender equality would be an important milestone in Somalia's current political transition.<sup>20</sup>

But women in Somalia are not only victims of conflict: they are important actors with agency, and as such they merit a key role in reconciliation and peace-building processes. A growing number of women in Somalia and in the diaspora are already playing important roles in the process of recovery and reconstruction. They are leading various initiatives to rebuild the country such as the construction of roads, rehabilitation of hospitals and schools, and rebuilding wells and boreholes. Their involvement could be a harbinger of wider change, with more women joining the political arena, demanding greater equality.

This is particularly notable in the economy. The collapse of the state in 1991 decimated the country's public sector whilst the civil war required the participation of large numbers of men – both factors that led Somali women to run businesses and small enterprises for survival. Women's roles in the market – and outside the home – is increasingly seen as normal. Through greater participation in the marketplace, women's productive roles in the nation's economy has become apparent.<sup>21</sup>

These developments are not new: women played an important role during the civil war, and women's social organisations have been active in peace and advocacy work since the early 1990s.<sup>22</sup> But there is now a sense that women can have a better place in the new Somalia we all yearn for.

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## Recommendations

Somalia requires a comprehensive approach that emphasises political and economic capacity building, as well as security. A military solution alone will not work, and Somalia will not be able to capitalise on security gains without political gains: Somalia needs to move beyond the status quo.

To do so, Somalia needs a motivated, accountable government capable of gaining trust and legitimacy. The years of violence and the inability to bring together Somalia's different groups have resulted in the breakdown of Somalia's social contract between the state and the people. Imposing internationally 'approved' leaders may be a short-term fix, but

is never a long-term solution, as has been demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Local ownership' is now a well-worn truism, but it remains true nevertheless. As the clock ticks towards the end of the TFG mandate in August 2012, pressure will mount for the establishment of a government – any government – to avoid a post-TFG power vacuum. At the same time, this would return Somalia to the

Planning for a comprehensive approach in Somalia needs to begin sooner rather than later

classic short-termism that has hobbled the country for two decades. The long-term strategy must be to build institutions and encourage accountable and representative leadership. Institutions such as the proposed National Constituent Assembly could play a key role in fusing traditional representation with parliamentary democracy. A credible civil service also needs to be established. None of this can be achieved overnight and it is, inevitably, a messy process. But there is no substitute for genuine representation.

### *Making Aid Work for Somalia*

The size and duration of the multilateral footprint in Somalia is being downplayed in public, with an insistence that it is the Somali people who must take pole position in rebuilding the country. But the lesson of previous interventions suggests that the global community is likely to be in Somalia for the better part of this decade. This is a long-term commitment and it needs a comprehensive strategy to meld together aid, development, politics and security. In Iraq and Afghanistan, jurisdictional disputes and mutual mistrust between development and security stakeholders cost time and lives. Planning for a comprehensive approach in Somalia needs to begin sooner rather than later, and avoid being bogged down in political correctness. The UN has opened an office in Mogadishu and the expectation is that other development organisations will also make the move from Nairobi, but international organisations must also work with local organisations to build long-term capacity in the country.

The comprehensive approach must also be complemented by co-ordinated humanitarian assistance. Somalia's aid architecture has been in place for two decades but the dynamics are changing: there are more than 1 million IDPs in Somalia, tens of thousands still being displaced by AMISOM operations in Bay and Bakool, and three quarters of a million Somalis remain in camps in Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. With the return of the UN and other organisations to Somalia it is crucial that the humanitarian strategy is fully funded and prioritises Somali perspectives. The donor effort must also contribute to virtuous circles that can take Somalia progressively out of conflict. A clear agenda for achieving this has been recommended by the UN World Development Report, built around the three pillars of legitimate institutions, justice and jobs, and this is where aid should be focused.<sup>23</sup>

In particular, there needs to be a proper funding strategy. This requires clarity and consensus on how funding is given, who it is given to, and who is accountable for the finance. In the fog that followed the removal of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, tens of millions of dollars in cash were distributed by the international community to warlords, self-styled political leaders and criminals. The monies were never accounted for. Without due diligence, funding for Somalia will disappear into the black market economy and could end up financing corruption and factionalism instead, making aid a curse not an asset. There needs to be clarity on how long and to what extent the global community can fund Somalia, given the financial crises facing traditional donors, as well as the development of alternative funding structures.

Co-ordination on a grand scale is never easy. But some of the most basic questions have not yet been answered: Who is in charge overall? Who is in charge of what? How best can the Somali people be at the centre, not the periphery, of international efforts? What is the draft timeline and possible exit strategy for the multilateral effort? There are of course no simple answers, but the international community must use the impetus from London and Istanbul to move towards agreement on these key issues.

## Eight Points for Consideration

- Develop better co-ordination between new aid agencies working on the ground and the UN, and also between agencies in Mogadishu where there are overlapping interests.
- Prioritise the capacity-building of local Somali NGOs, with clear arrangements for eventual handover to domestic agencies.
- Support initiatives to promote gender equality and stop gender-based violence in Somalia.
- Focus on jobs. Employment creation is very important both for bolstering livelihoods after the famine and also for providing credible alternatives to piracy. Sufficient well-paid jobs are also crucial to undermining Al-Shabaab, which has been able to pay their personnel on time whilst the government has not.
- Bolster the Somali police force to provide a law enforcement capability in Somalia, and strengthen the justice system as the corollary of security and law enforcement capabilities.
- Review tenure arrangements for senior positions in the military to build resilience and accountability into the organisation, and ensure the payment of Somali Army salaries on time, with specific attention paid to food and healthcare provisions, in order to stem desertion and improve conditions of service.
- Focus on local accountability to ensure that the AU force is not seen as yet another militia, and ensure that misdeeds and acts of impunity by all military forces within Somalia are investigated.
- Ensure better co-ordination between land and maritime operations.

## Concluding Remarks

The RUSI–Brenthurst Foundation roundtable on Somalia was in many ways a precursor to the large-scale international conferences on Somalia that would dominate 2012. The meeting was arranged through consultation and partnership with the UK Somali diaspora and policy-makers in Somalia. That it attracted good attendance and media attention is a testament to the fact that the consultative process was just as important as the event itself. The consultations in the UK prior to the London Conference in February 2012, and the national and regional consultative conferences in 2012, also show that for the Somali people, the consultative framework is a key element of engaging on Somalia.

Although the roundtable was held in late 2011, the issues raised during the event and in the subsequent articles, remain central to Somalia's future. There is less Somali hostility towards AMISOM now than there was at the time of the meeting six months ago, and the AMISOM expansion into southern and central Somalia has further dislocated an increasingly fragmented Al-Shabaab – but AMISOM still has its critics amongst the Somali people.

The roundtable also highlighted a deep desire amongst Somalis to build a Somali nation that fuses

federal autonomy within a wider national partnership in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The cautious optimism expressed by roundtable delegates regarding the transition is being borne out by events. In May 2012 Puntland adopted a constitution that provides for an autonomous Puntland within a federal Somalia. Meanwhile, in Mogadishu at a conference in May 2012, agreement was reached that clan elders will play a pivotal role in selecting a constituent assembly, which in turn will pave the way for a new constitution and parliament. Increasing the levels of female political and social representation in Somalia was a recurring theme at the RUSI–Brenthurst Foundation meeting and subsequent Somalia conferences, and is a major consideration for post-TFG Somalia. Although there can be no illusions about the challenges, the heightened, local, regional and global engagement with and on Somalia has raised hopes for greater success this time around. The consultative process cannot deliver a 'quick fix': Somalia's ongoing initiative in participatory democracy is a long-term endeavour.

The RUSI–Brenthurst Foundation roundtable, and other conferences elsewhere on Somalia, has demonstrated the small but useful role think tanks

can play in providing a neutral space for leading policy-makers and the general public to discuss key issues and work towards constructive outcomes. As

the Somali people continue to build their future, this report is a reminder of the hopes and fears of Somalis at a pivotal time in their history.

## Endnotes

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- 4 See Article 71, 'The Transition Period', Somali Transitional Charter: Transitional Federal Charter for the Somali Republic, February 2004, <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4795c2d22.html>>, accessed 13 May 2012.
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- 6 Track I is focused on national legitimacy; track II understands that stability is rooted in local and regional political units.
- 7 'Full text of the Communique from the London Conference on Somalia at Lancaster House on 23 February', <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?id=727627582&view=PressS>>, accessed 24 February 2012.
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- 9 See Anna Rader, 'Time to Secure Somalia', RUSI.org, 5 October 2011.
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- 11 Al-Shabaab denied involvement in the kidnapping of two European tourists, Judith Tebbutt and Marie Dedieu, from the Kenyan coast, and two Médecins Sans Frontières aid-workers from the Dadaab refugee camp; and indeed, it did not bear the organisation's hallmarks.
- 12 See Jay Bahadur, *Deadly Waters: Inside the Hidden World of Somalia's Pirates* (London: Profile Books, 2011) for more on the illegal fishing myth.
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- 16 See the report of the National Civic Forum's meeting on Saturday 16 April 2011 at the Pride Inn Hotel, Nairobi, 'The burden of the two decades Somali conflicts on women and children', <<http://ncfsomali.net/index.php/forums/81-the-burden-of-the-two-decades-somali-conflicts-on-women-and-children>>, accessed 24 April 2012.
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- 18 UNICEF puts the prevalence rate of female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) among older women at 96 per cent, and 46 per cent among young women. UNICEF, 'Somalia Statistics', <[http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/somalia_statistics.html)>, accessed 25 April 2012.
- 19 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *op. cit.*
- 20 The Puntland State of Somalia has made strides in promoting gender equality, with initiatives such as the FGM/C inter-ministerial decree. Set out by Puntland's President, Abdirahman Farole, this calls for the practice to be made illegal in Puntland and perpetrators punished – although the fierce opposition of religious groups will make enforcement very difficult.

- 21 See Judith Glover and Gill Kirton, *Women, Employment and Organizations* (Routledge, 2006).
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- 23 See Chapter 3: 'From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions', *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (World Bank, 2011).

## Annex

### *Somalia and Somaliland Roundtable*

Roundtable at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), London, UK, 7 November 2011

Hosted jointly by the Brenthurst Foundation and RUSI

### *List of Panellists*

(in alphabetical order)

**Ms Sally Axworthy**, Head, Africa Desk and Somalia Unit, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Mr Mark Bowden**, UN Resident Humanitarian Co-ordinator and UNDP Resident Representative for Somalia

**Dr Knox Chitiyo**, Associate Fellow, Chatham House [Former Africa Fellow, RUSI]

**Dr Admore Kambudzi**, Secretary, African Union Peace and Security Commission, Addis Ababa

**Ms Rachel Meyers**, First Secretary, Political Section, US Embassy in London

**Mr Roger Middleton**, Former Senior Researcher, Africa Programme, Chatham House

**Hon Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar**, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Transitional Federal Government, Somalia

**Mr Abdirahman Omar Osman (Eng. Yarisow)**, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister of Somalia and Spokesperson of the Government, Transitional Federal Government, Somalia

**General Osman Omar (Falco)**, Former Somali Police Official, Somalia

**Ms Samia Shire**, Stockwell Partnership, Lambeth; Member of UK Somalia Diaspora

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