



Remarks of Mr. Dmitry Titov
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Security Council Briefing
Maintenance of international peace and security: security sector reform

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as delivered

*Excellencies,
Members of the Security Council,
Ladies and gentlemen,*

On behalf of Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous, I am glad to take part in this important meeting. Thank you, Ambassador Ogwu, for this timely initiative – and for your special personal leadership – on this strategic issue over the years. We particularly appreciate the background paper circulated by Nigeria for this meeting; it articulates many important questions – especially those we are dealing with.

I would also like to pay special tribute to Slovakia and South Africa, the long-serving Co-chairs of the United Nations Group of Friends of SSR, for their many efforts in support of resolution 2151, including its implementation in the field.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Last year, while briefing this Council, the Secretary-General said – and I quote – “the purpose of security sector reform, simply put, is to make people’s lives safer.” Unquote.

We could not agree more. Well-trained, well-supported, accountable and service-oriented professionals are a country’s best defence against the violence and instability that threaten both lives and livelihoods. From DPKO’s perspective, the Council is right to do more to strengthen legitimate institutions and governance – not only to break cycles of violence, but also to provide citizen security, justice and economic growth. A quick scan of Foreign Policy’s 2015 Fragile States Index demonstrates a strong correlation between the performance of the security apparatus and overall fragility. The five most fragile countries in this index – South Sudan, Somalia, CAR, Sudan, and DRC – are all vivid reminders that a country’s security sector is closely linked with both the perception of State legitimacy and long-term socio-economic and political development.

For this reason, DPKO believes that, depending on specific circumstances, security sector management and professionalization should be the core of peace operations’ mandates and activities.

Understandably, some Member States express caution about the United Nations’ engagement in security sector management. However, the philosophy of the UN’s practice has been very simple – SSR can only be achieved if host-countries themselves agree to it. No one can impose

or import a security system. This simply does not work, at least in the long-term. The role of the United Nations is to support nationally-owned SSR efforts, when mandated and requested to do so. At the same time, it is our obligation to share the best international practices with recipient states.

Over the past 16 months, the Council has adopted 21 resolutions containing elements of security sector reform and management. And in 17 peace operations conducted globally, the United Nations is actively helping host-countries professionalize their security sector, so that they themselves can better support their nations in addressing national and regional security threats including in addressing terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime.

In the field, we are focusing on four central priorities, which are explicit in resolution 2151:

First, the United Nations views SSR as a political process, as much as a technical one. Train and equip is indispensable in post-conflict situations, but as demonstrated in a variety of Mission contexts, security sector management is most effective when it is also linked to broader reforms.

In **Mali**, for example, MINUSMA provided its technical expertise during the development of the recently signed Peace Agreement. The Mission is now helping Malian authorities preparing to integrate armed groups into the national security forces and revise the Presidential Decree on the *Conseil national de la RSS*. Together with the European Union and other partners, training is ongoing for the national army, police and gendarmerie, along with mentoring in the field. We are also engaging in building Malian anti-organized crime capacity and together with UNODC and Interpol, DPKO is actively doing the same in other western African countries.

In **CAR**, MINUSCA helped the Government develop its draft Constitution, which – as a result – now includes defence and security provisions. In addition, 2,000 members of the Central African armed forces have been preliminarily vetted, which has already led to the reinstatement of the First Territorial Infantry Battalion.

Second, the international community must focus on the need to integrate sector-wide delivery. The security sector does not do just defence, it includes justice and corrections, policing, border management and other areas. Building capacity of each of these services should preferably be balanced and mutually reinforcing.

In **Somalia**, UNSOM and the Government are implementing a Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, which will help develop sustainable security architecture for the country. The Mission is also helping integrate militia forces into the Somali National Army – and strengthen the capacity of 11 000 officers in the Somali National Army, so that they could engage along the lines with AMISOM. On policing, UNSOM also assisted the Government in developing a comprehensive plan which includes training, infrastructure development and equipment for police in Mogadishu and beyond.

The United Nations provides similar, multi-faceted support in **Guinea-Bissau**. I know that this Council received a briefing from on the political situation last Friday. UNIOGBIS has advised the Government to develop a new “Decree Law on the Establishment of the Special Pension Fund”. This legislation paves the way for the retirement of up to 1500 personnel in the armed forces and security sector.

Third, in the spirit of national ownership, we support Governments in their efforts to develop state security plans and convene international partners around those plans. In **Liberia**, UNMIL has responded to the requests of the Council – by working with the Government to produce

Transition Plan, which is largely focused on the security sector. UNMIL has also trained almost 3000 police officers and supported the review of the National Security Strategy, while the bilateral partner assisted with the national army and specialized police.

Meanwhile, in **Haiti**, MINUSTAH's support to the vetting of national police resulted in an additional 1,200 certified national police officers – thus making progress towards the goals in the National Police Development Plan. This effort complements the training that the United Nations, together again with donors, have provided to 14,000 Haitian National Police officers and over 200 Corrections officers over the years. All of this training is done based on UN standards, human rights laws and due diligence policy.

Fourth, building strong and democratic security sectors helps the United Nations deliver on key mandated activities, including the Protection of Civilians, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence and others. In the **DRC**, for example, UN Police deployed recently along with the Congolese National Police to mentor, advise and help protect civilians in the troubled town Beni, where armed groups were launching deadly attacks on the population. MONUSCO colleagues also manage the Prosecution Support Cells Programme, which has helped the military justice system reduce impunity and address conflict-related sexual violence. This is an integral United Nations activity in many operations.

All of these are only examples, which demonstrate the concrete action of UN colleagues and my colleagues from DPKO in the field on a daily basis. Yet I must acknowledge that the whole system could do better. In **South Sudan**, for example, the United Nations did not manage properly and effectively security dialogue, which contributed to the unravelling of peace. Lack of success in this context demonstrates the political imperative for sustained – and well-resourced – efforts towards SSR in peace operations.

Within the framework of the Inter-agency SSR Task Force, DPKO's special unit dedicated to security sector management has also carried out a number of system-wide initiatives, including for example, again, it's only an example, support to DPA-led efforts in **Iraq** and earlier in **Libya**. With colleagues from UNDP (who will speak also this morning), we hope to increase our engagement with other partners, such as PBSO and World Bank.

Meanwhile, DPKO has also undertaken mapping initiatives with regional partners, including the EU and AU. Over the past five years, the Department has built a serious, strategic partnership with the AU Commission. This resulted in the adoption of the first and unique **AU policy framework on SSR**. As stressed in resolution 2151, we need to enhance cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, including Regional Economic Communities, in order to ensure compatibility of approaches and closer coordination.

Through all the initiatives we have mentioned this morning, DPKO is also trying to address a number of persistent challenges. Therefore, we would like to propose a few recommendations for your Council, for future considerations.

First, SSR is sometimes viewed as a technical process, while it could – and should – provide critical solutions to some of the political engagements. Moreover, there are instances when United Nations support to SSR comes too late and too little. Security sector management should obviously concentrate on post-conflict situations; but it could also be used for preventative purposes in some contexts. Furthermore, our SRSGs should be empowered and indeed encouraged to take initiative and ownership on security sector management issues – and I would

like to stress this should be done from the earliest days of the Mission onwards. This should not be seen as a second- or third-tier activity. And progress towards security sector benchmarks should also be embedded into a Mission's entry and exit strategy.

Second, commitments to strengthening the security sector, whether by international partners or host-States, are often difficult to formalize, especially when it comes at the later stages of UN intervention. The Council could consider requesting host-States and the United Nations agree on specific compacts, which the Council already discussed informally. And those compacts should include security sector and wider governance and this should be done when operations are being established. This could help to implement specific reforms and allocating national resources in a sustained manner and based on national commitments.

Third, I believe that we in DPKO could better serve the Security Council by increasing our engagement with you on SSR. Already, having two briefings in two years, dedicated to this strategic topic, is a step in the right direction. And the Council should perhaps encourage us, through Secretary-General's reports, to provide more detailed information on the national and international efforts in this vital area, as well as on the whole issue of peace sustainment.

Before I conclude ladies and gentlemen, I would like to reiterate that any peace operations should ideally leave behind at least a basically functioning security and rule of law system. From our perspective, this should be considered as a strategic priority goal for most of our operations, so that the Council will not be seized over and over with relapsing conflicts, human suffering, impunity and instability.

Thank you very much madam president