1. Introduction and General Background

The Republic of Mali is located in the interior of West Africa, boarding seven independent nations. Despite being the eighth largest country in Africa, Mali’s population is relatively sparse, with a little under 17 million inhabitants, 90% of whom reside in the southern region.

This north and south divide can be seen in the geographical and cultural landscape of Mali. The north is composed of large arid land and desert with few large urban cities, and more semi-nomadic communities. The southern region is more sub-tropical in climate, and dense in population. It additionally is home to Mali’s capital, Bamako. Culturally, the south is predominantly composed of the Bambara ethnic group. The north is considered more ethnically diverse with the Songhaïs, Moors and Fula communities located around the Niger River regions, and Tuaregs—a cluster of semi-nomadic communities—straddling the Niger River and predominately extending northwards towards Algeria, Niger and Libya. Despite being composed of various ethnic groups, over 90% of Mali’s population in Muslim. Islam is deeply rooted in the history of Mali, with the ancient city of Timbuktu considered of the epicentres for Islamic scholarship in the 12-16th century.

Mali is among the 25 poorest countries in the world. Most of the economic activity is confined to regions irrigated by the Niger River, with both agriculture and mining making up 80% of Malian revenue and exports. Mali has a high dependency on imported goods, making it vulnerable to food price shocks and highly dependent on remittances and foreign aid.

2. Political Background

Mali gained independence from France in 1960, and became a one-party state under Bambaran President Modibo Keita. Under Keita’s authority, the central government implemented economic and social policies perceived as inimical to the Tuareg. In doing so, a small group of Tuareg nobles rebelled against the central government, resulting in a brutal repression by the state and exacted retribution on the general societies in the north. This led to ethnic and regional mistrust, division and resentment. By 1968, President Keita was overthrown in a coup d’état and followed by 23 years of military dictatorship. Throughout the dictatorship, the north suffered from successive droughts, and limited development and
economic policies. Combined with the harsh living conditions, many nomadic communities migrated, either to aid camps in the south, or abroad to Libya.

The turn of the century was considered a transitional period in Mali. In addition to the 1991 transition from dictatorship to democracy in the south, a series of northern led insurgencies took place in 1990, 1992, and 2006. While each insurgency differed in nature, the grievance and peace agreements that were put forth by northern groups reflected the desire for greater political autonomy, improved access to state services, decentralisation of the government, state supported economic development, and integration of armed forces into the national army. All three treaties made concessions to the demands of the north; however none of the treaties were ever fully implemented. The inability of the central government to fulfil their agreement further exacerbated the conflict in 2012.

i. 2012 Crisis
In 2012, Mali underwent a series of internal and external events that ultimately destabilised the government and plunged the country into a state of crisis. The conflict in Libya and subsequent fall of Qaddafi’s regime in 2011 had far reaching consequences on the Sahel region. Many Tuaregs left the service of the Libyan army, with fresh supplies, weapons and training, then forming the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). By uniting various rebellious factions that represented the main communities in the north, the MNLA sought to establish their perceived ethnic homeland – the Azawad.

The government’s perceived mismanagement of both the crisis in the north and the armed forces in general, prompted a faction of the military to stage a coup against the democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré. The coup crippled the capacity of the government and armed forces, subsequently creating a political vacuum upon which various insurgent groups capitalised on.

While the MNLA initially proclaimed the independence of Azawad, local and external Islamic insurgent groups -including Ansar Dine, Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MOJW)- side-lined the secular MNLA and went on to implement strict interpretations of Sharia law across regions in the north.\(^1\) Reports arose of serious human rights violations including cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, public flogging, amputations, sexual and gender-based violence, summary executions, and the use children in armed groups (IPI, 2013).

ii. Interim Government and International Engagement
The international community and Malian Civil Society Organizations (CSO) were quick to condemn the unfolding political and military events in Bamako. A number of targeted sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ultimately culminated in the resignation of the junta in April 2012. A civilian interim government was then created and led by President Dioncounda Traoré.

Soon thereafter, the interim government requested military assistance from the international community to help demobilisation Islamic insurgents in the north who had rapidly taken control of the northern region and who were moving south. A UN Security Council resolution authorised the engagement of African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). However, AFISMA lacked the necessary speed and capacity to effectively fight the insurgent forces. As a result, France led a military offensive against northern extremist groups. Within a month, French forces captured control of the northern region of Mali including three major
cities Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Insurgents fled to nearby countries and desert hideouts, from where they continued to launch attacks on civilian and military outposts.

On 1 July 2013, AFISMA handed over its authority to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Under the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013, the remaining insurgent parties to the conflict agreed to allow for elections to be held in Kidal, in exchange for an inclusive dialogue following the election. MINUSMA, after being granted access to northern regions, took on a robust peace enforcement role and facilitated the country’s political and electoral process in 2013. During this time, MINUSMA was free to initiate and conduct operations that concerned Malian defence and security. Furthermore, the mandate authorised the French forces stationed in Mali to come to the aid of MINUSMA if ever they were under imminent attack.

Mali held its Presidential and parliamentary elections on 28 July 2013. After two rounds, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was declared the winner. Election observers from the African Union, ECOWAS, Canada, and the UN declared both rounds of elections free and fair, while the EU also declared the final round of election “transparent” (BBC, 2013). One highlight of the election process is that the security forces didn’t declare or provide support for any candidate.

### iii. Peace Talks

As the conflict evolved the MNLA gradually began to splinter along ethnic and cultural lines, prompting armed clashes between different insurgent groups throughout the north. By June 2014, the fighting amongst the various groups and the state prompted UN Security Council Resolution 2164, expanding MINUSMA’s mandate.

The Algiers Peace Talks were initiated in April 2014. The talks consisted of two separate platforms of non-state armed groups: the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Platform of armed groups. The Peace Talks were highly complex and challenging due to the lack of a common agenda on matters regarding autonomy, federalism, and decentralisation. A peace agreement was signed on 20 June 2015, calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal insurgent groups in opposition regions. In February 2016, the signatory parties announced a timeline for the implementation of interim authorities, and cantonment.

As of the spring 2016, interim administrations in the region of Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Taoudenni and Timbuktu were established and governors in Ménaka and Taoudenni were sworn in. However, most provisions have not been fully implemented. For example, the slow progress activating and restructuring of defence and security provisions, has contributed to the significant deterioration of security over the past year (UNSG, 2016). As a result, terrorist and extremist groups have spread and enhanced their capacity to carry out attacks against public targets. As a result, the continued insecurity in the region has left northern populations restless, as can be seen in the April 2015 protest in which 500 demonstrators breached an airfield in a protest against international forces.

With most of the State and international efforts focused on the north, the central region has been largely neglected. This has resulted in an escalating rate of armed violence throughout the region by jihadist groups such as the Macina Liberation Front (FLM). The FLM, linked to terrorist group Ansar Dine, has attacked local authorities and claimed responsibility for deadly attacks across central Mali of security forces and peacekeepers. Given that the central region is home to a large abundance of Malian resources and more dense population,
addressing the violence in the central region is vital, as it could provide fertile ground for the spread of violent extremist groups (UNSG, 2016).

iv. Countering violent extremism, crime and intercommunal violence

The delay to restoring peace, security and the rule of law (RoL) has opened space for radical Islamic groups, intercommunal violence, armed banditry and crime to flourish. As a result, the north experienced high level of banditry and crimes (up to 30-40% of reported crimes as of May 2016), constituting the most major threats for civilians (UNSG, 2016). Central Mali is suffering from increasing violence originating from armed bandit groups, intercommunal violence and petty criminals, all of whom have been capitalising on the availability of modern weapons and lack of state security forces to repositions themselves within the hierarchies of urban elites and local aristocratic. In the absence of an accountable and trustworthy state actor, some authorities and local elites are supporting the establishment of community-based self-defence militias. Such militias are believed to have fuelled sporadic surges of inter and intra communal violence (ICG, 2016).

Radical and militant groups continue to be engaged in the area (UNSG, 2016). The number of deadly asymmetric attacks attributed to armed radical groups targeting national and international security and defence forces increased. Regional and international actors have responded by adopting sub-regional approaches to combating violent extremism. The Malian Government has responded by promoting partnerships with neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in hopes of combatting violent extremism.

3. Overview of SSR in Mali

In 2005, the Government of Mali launched a national debate on SSR and formulated a national security policy, redefining Mali’s security policy on the basis of human security, inclusiveness and prevention. Notable components to the policy were: capacity building for security forces; promoting neighbourhood policing; and implementation of shared governance of security. The Shared Governance of Security and Peace Programme (PGPSP) was established and launched in 2008 as the instrument for implementation of the National Security Policy. Notable achievements to the PGPSP include the adoption of a National Policy Framework Document on Internal Security and Protection by the Council of Ministers; capacity building efforts including round table discussions on human rights, conferences, training programmes; and programmes designed to encourage intercommunity dialogue in the north. While the PGPSP marginally improved civil-military relations, the slow adoption by the security services and a lack of ownership of the SSR process hindered the overall process.

The 2012 coup had lasting impacts on the SSR process in Mali. Not only did the 2013 insurgency and clashes between the Malian Armed Forces and armed groups temporarily derail the PGOSP and SSR efforts, the conflict additionally illustrated the lack of capacity and efficiency of the armed forces, the persisting problem between civilian and military institutions and chronic corruption throughout the security sector. The crisis additionally highlighted the security services’ disregard for human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), as allegations of extrajudicial execution of civilians and torture surfaced.

A Multidisciplinary Focus Group on Security Sector Reform (GPRS), composed of civilian and military representatives and development partners, was created in November 2013. The GPRS contributed to defining the process of SSR and put forward a strategy for resource mobilisation to support national SSR efforts. Recommendations put forward by the GPRS led
to the creation of a National Council for Security Sector Reform (CNRSS), an advisory and decision-making body, placed under the office of the Prime Minister, responsible for guiding and leading the SSR process. As of June 2016, the composition of the CNRSS has been modified to integrate representatives from the North. The change has allowed for the creation of Security consultative committees, regionally and municipally implemented, to evaluate the local security situation on a monthly bases (National Decree, 2016). While the creation of the CNRSS is a positive step forward in establishing a holistic SSR process, concerns have been voiced over the lack of ownership and engagement (DCAF, 2016).

In 2014 the Malian Government, with support key partners, made progress in framing a national SSR vision, setting up a coordination mechanism and assessing fundraising opportunities through the Security Sector Reform Multidisciplinary Working Group established in early 2014 (UNSC, 2014). The Malian government additionally prioritised reform and governance of the security sector in its agenda, highlighting its commitment to promoting good governance, strengthening internal control of institutions and "accountability" in general. These factors, coupled with the Peace Agreements signed in 2015, allowed for the government to begin working towards further establishing strong democratic institutions and consolidating the RoL priorities already stipulated in the Government Action Programme (PAG 2013-2018). As of 2016, PAG continues to seek to reinforce human security, re-establish administrative structures in the North, reinforce national cohesion, and improve public trust and confidence in the armed forces.

4. Sector Specific Overview

i. Security Sector Management and Oversight Bodies

The Malian security sector is governed by various bodies and institutions. Control and oversight of the security sector is under the management of civilian authorities and is governed by a legal framework that seeks to prevent violations of and by the security sector actors. Furthermore, the 1992 Constitution established three branches of government - the legislative, executive and judicial branches - imbued with separate powers. Below is an overview of the key institutions and actors in Mali.

Legislative Branch- The National Assembly – the single chamber of the Malian Parliament – exercises powers of parliamentary oversight in which they review, supervise and oversee the operation of the security apparatus. Although the National Assembly does not directly manage the security sectors, they are responsible for voting laws and putting in place fundamental principles for the organisation of defence and security.

Executive Branch- The executive branch is the cornerstone of the governing apparatus of the armed forces. The executive exercises direct control at all levels and determines the budget, guidelines and priorities for the security sector. The President is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairs the National Defence Council (provides general guidance for national defence), the Committee for National Defence (provides military guidance for national defence) and the Council of Ministers.

Judicial Branch- The judicial branch has constitutional and legal prerogatives over the security sector. It has the capability to monitor and prosecute security sector actors through civil or criminal proceedings for criminal offenses. According to the Constitution, it is charged to apply in its domain all the laws, including those regarding security and
defence. It is additionally composed of specialised courts: political courts (which have jurisdiction over cases involving ministers and the President) and Constitutional Courts.

**Civil Society** - Mali has historically maintained a flourishing civil society which has served as a means of oversight for the security sector. These include women’s organisations, human rights organisations, individual citizens, the media, etc. CSOs have remained engaged in public affairs, regularly providing consultation on security strategies and policies of the state, as well as working in collaboration with security sector actors such as the police, to improve the security and well-being of society.

**Ombudsman** - Mali ombudsman institution, or Mediator of the Republic, is an independent authority, appointed for a seven year, non-renewable term by decree of the President. They are empowered to investigate cases, summon the agents involved in the matter, require the disclosure of any record or document relating to the case, use specialized inspections to carry out necessary checks and propose recommendations. The Mediator does not have jurisdiction over the armed forces, however discussions to establish a special representative appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to facilitate communication between the Mediator and the armed forces, is currently underway. (DCAF, 2016)

Despite having the infrastructure and constitutional backing, Mali has historically struggled with persistent corruption at all levels of the government as well as a culture of secrecy and lack of transparency. Moreover, the parliament suffers from a lack of adequate resources and expertise and has not been very assertive in the governance of the security sector in relation to the executive (DCAF, 2010). As of 2015 women remain underrepresented in many of the decision making bodies. Despite the adoption of a national strategy to increase female participation by 30%, it is estimated that women represent 9.5% of the National Assembly, 7.6% of municipal councils, 9% of the Ministers who form the government.

### ii. Internal Security in Mali

Internal security and public order is maintained by a multitude of forces including the gendarmerie, National Guard and most notably, the National Police. Below is a brief description of some of the sub-sectors of internal security and RoL.

**The National Police** falls under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection (MoI). It is estimated to employ over 6,000 individuals, 700 of whom are women. The National Police’s mandate focuses primarily on the protection of people and property; the ability to identify and record criminal offenses, gather evidence, find and arrest perpetrators; as well as the capacity to seek and gather intelligence to inform government decision-making.

**The Judicial Police**, an integral part of the National Police, is tasked specifically with reporting violations of criminal law, gathering evidence, tracking down suspects and supporting investigating authorities once a case is opened. While the judicial police are directed by the public prosecutor in support of specific cases, they fall hierarchically under the MoI. The judicial police can be thought of either as a status for certain officials⁸, with an associated bundle of rights and duties, or as an organisation in itself.
The National Gendarmerie is entrusted with maintaining internal security and order. It shares a number of security related responsibilities with the National Police and the National Guard, including maintaining public order, collecting intelligence and protecting private property. However, because of its military status, it is entrusted with territorial defence operations, particularly during times of crisis. For this reason, the National Gendarmerie falls under of the authority of the MoI as well as the Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants (MoAF). As of 2015, it is estimated that the gendarmerie counts 4,000 individuals, 100 of whom are women.

The National Guard is a military-type force responsible for providing security to political and administrative institutions, as well as contributing to the maintenance of public order and the territorial defence of Mali. The National Guard falls under the MoAF for administrative affairs and the MoI for deployment. The National Guard does not carry out criminal investigations, instead only participating in policing functions such as the maintenance of law and order, and the patrol of sensitive areas. It is additionally considered one of the most widespread of all the security forces. As of 2015, it is estimated that the National Guard contains 3,000 individuals, 100 of whom are women.

Mali’s internal security apparatus has historically struggled with a lack of resources, low pay and inadequate training. Security services in the north are insufficiently established, with a low concentration of infrastructure and staff. Cross-border crime is difficult to monitor due to porous borders. Because of this, the influx of illegal transfers of small arms, human trafficking and the trade of illicit drugs has been difficult to address. Since the outbreak of conflict, the absence of internal security structures has provoked the support for community based auto-defence groups amongst some tribal chief and politicians, who perceive these groups to be useful intermediaries and security actors. However, auto-defence group are perceived as fragmented and less structured, as well as lacking in a unifying point or common leadership. As a result, some fear that auto-defence groups could provoke further inter-communal violence (ICG, 2016).

Moreover, police officers and gendarmes have been accused of extortion and bribery at checkpoints. The judicial police, in particular, has been criticised for the poor quality of its services, and its abuse of power. As a result, a 2009 survey showed that only 10% of the population contacted the police in the case of the crime and 65% stated that they were dissatisfied/ highly dissatisfied with the management of the police and gendarmerie (CLU, 2015).

Domestic violence and rape have been cited as an additional cause for concern. Despite the development of a National Gender Policy and the creation of hotlines for victims, data on the number of investigated and prosecuted attacks remain unavailable and police have been reluctant to intervene in cases of domestic abuse. Furthermore, although efforts have been made to increase representation of women in the national police force, as of 2014, women make up an average of 12.4% of the personnel, and 9.2% of the senior level personnel.

Since the 2012 crisis, 2,026 gendarmes and police officers were deployed in the north, compared with 469 before the coup. Malian authorities also proceeded to transferring law and order responsibilities from the armed forces to law enforcement institutions. Additionally, the Malian Government, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established a joint initiative – the Governance, Peace and Security Programme-
aimed at establishing community policing in northern Mali. Some provisions include “organising traditional chiefs into associations capable of securing the movement of populations and creating local neighbourhood watch brigades in charge of retrieving weapons” (IDP, 2012).

iii. Defence Transformation

The Malian Armed Forces consist of the National Defence, composed of the Air Force, the Army and the National Guard, alongside the National Gendarmerie, all of whom fall under the authority of the Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants (MoAF). Below is an overview of the National Defence forces.

**National Defence Forces:** The President is the supreme commander of the armed forces and the Prime Minister is responsible for the implementation of the national defence policy. The Armed Forces fall under the General Staff of the Armed Forces, within the MoAF. The Malian Armed Forces consist of 13,800 personnel and are responsible for the defence of the country, the protection of democratic practices, and the promotion of the best interests of the country. During periods of peace, the armed forces are used as an auxiliary force to maintain public order. As of 2014, 7% of the army and 6% of the air force were composed of women.

There has always been tension between the civilian population and military forces because of Mali’s history of authoritarian rule. This relationship has been further damaged by the recent coup and continued influence of the ex-Junta leaders on the interim government. Furthermore, Mali’s military remains deeply divided, underpaid and lacking in the capacity to effectively defend the territorial integrity of the country from insurgent groups. Security forces have also been accused of attacking individuals who belong to specific ethnic groups thought to be in collusion with the insurgents and violating basic human rights.

In response to such challenges, in 2014, the government of Mali presented the draft defence and national security policy and the draft framework law and military programming (LOPM) 2015-2019. By March 2015, Mali adopted the LOPM, which will mobilise 1.5 billion Euros in funding over the course of five years. The LOPM seeks to develop the operational capacity of combat units and mobile teams, to increase logistic support for means of transport and counter-mobility, and to improve the quality of life for army personnel (NFdU, 2015). Additionally, as of March 2016, steps have been taken towards the implementation of DDR and SSR processes – as detailed in the peace agreements- in the north. This process has however been plagued with delays (UNSC, 2016).

iv. Justice and Prison Reform

Mali’s judicial system is based on French civil law and international customary law. It is guaranteed independence under the Constitution. Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and religion are protected under the constitution. In 1994, Mali established a Constitutional Court which provides for juridical review of the legislative branch as well as a High Court of Justice which is responsible for trying government officials. The Supreme Court possesses administrative and judicial powers and deals with appeals and rulings.

Although the judicial system is independent, the executive branch has substantial influence over the judiciary as the President heads the Superior Judicial Council (the body that supervises judicial activity) and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (responsible for
appointing judges and providing court oversight). This can be problematic and has allegedly resulted in unfair trials. Moreover, judges face case backlogs, contributing to long detentions and remand periods. There is a variety of interconnected problems such as chronic corruption, quantitative and qualitative shortage of staff and material resources, linguistic barriers, lack of knowledge on procedures and laws, and insufficient connections with ‘customary justice’ providers (CLU, 2015). Since the crisis, most of the basic state services and infrastructure in the north have been destroyed, leaving access to justice services limited.

The combination of such factors helps explains why the justice system plays a modest role in comparison to traditional forms of justice. Customary justice- which includes family elders, religious leaders, traditional communicators, and local government actors- is considered the predominant justice provider for 80% of the population. Customary justice is considered more accessible, comprehensive, affordable and familiar. However, this too can be problematic as customary justice providers are also subject to corruption albeit less than the state and aren’t always compliant with the Malian Constitution. Additionally, they often blur the line between civil and criminal issues, maintain highly conservative values that can supersede human rights, and give low status to women. There is also a lack of representation of women within these structures.

Regarding the penitentiary system, the Directorate for National Penitentiary Administration is meant to investigate and monitor prison and detention centre conditions; however, it is unclear whether it is effective or even active. Prisons in Mali are overcrowded with poor access to healthcare and food. There is also a lack of qualitative judicial police, a lack of staff resources, sizeable backlog, and at times a notably harsh punitive approach to criminal justice that makes little use of alternative sentencing for non-violent offenders. Administratively, prison systems struggle with poor recordkeeping, no specific ombudsman for prisoners complaints, and mismanagement of prison funds (CLU, 2015). Finally, although Malian law states that separate detention must be established by gender and age (adult/minor), the Centre on Women and Children and the Ministry of Women, Children and the Family showed that 41 out of 54 prisons had no special section for minors.

In 2000, a Ten Year Justice Reform Programme (PRODEJ) was created as a means to improve the efficiency and credibility of the justice sector. PRODEJ was launch in hopes of addressing some of the challenges previously stated. However it has been widely criticised for its mismanagement of funds, its inability to incorporate customary justice effectively and its top-down approach. It has been described by some as “slow and non-impactful” (CLU, 2015). A study conducted in 2013-2014 by the Centre for International Legal Cooperation and the Netherlands Helsinki Committee found that entrenched resistance by political and judicial elites, both prior and after the crisis, have persistently hindered reform.

Efforts have continued to improve the justice sector. President Keita considered changing the composition of the CSM to make judicial discipline more transparent and allow for better oversight by civil society. Judges are increasingly being investigated on chargers with forgery, fraud and extortion. As of April 2016, the MoJ is working alongside MINUSMA, establish monthly working sessions in which all reported violations are reviewed, in hopes of addressing issues of impunity against human rights abuses and violations.

5. Donor Support and Coordination
Currently, the Malian government’s capacity to ensure effective governance of its security sector is limited. As a result, and as outlined below, Mali has received widespread support and funds from the international community. In addition to those listed below, notable contributors include the US, France, AU, Japan, and ECOWAS.

i. United Nations Support
The MINUSMA peacekeeping force was established under UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) thereby subsuming AFISMA and the UNOM responsibilities. These responsibilities included stabilisation of the region; coordination assistance to the interim authority on SSR; and support to the implementation of a roadmap, protection of civilians and the promotion and protection of human rights. Under UNSCR 2164 (2014) and UNSCR 2227 (2015), MINUSMA’s mandate was expanded to include further provisions on national political dialogue and reconciliation; assistance in the reestablishment of State authority; the rebuilding of the security sector; and the promotion and protection of human rights. As of March 2016, MINUSMA stands at 11,240 personnel, 95% of whom are authorized military personnel (1.7% of whom are women) and 1,440 police component individuals (11% of whom are women). Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, and Chad make up the largest numbers of the troop contributing countries.

The MINUSMA SSR team’s mandate is to provide strategic and technical advice and support to rebuild the Malian security sector and to support the overall international coordination of SSR. Since its deployment, MINUSMA has supported a variety of security sector activities including: coordination with Malian and French forces on joint patrols in the north; technical assistance and capacity building for specialised Malian police units; supporting a workshop to the National Assembly on strengthening democratic oversight of the security sector; supporting the implementation of the military programming law; supporting to the formulation of defence and security policies; supporting the revisions of the national strategy on border management; coordinating national and international efforts at border strengthening; and disseminating military documents pertaining to military training, internal control, and management/personnel management. As of May 2016, MINUSMA will support in the establishment of local advisory committees and territorial police as well as continue to support DDR and cantonment.

Additionally, MINUSMA’s SSR team has been engaged in a series of quick impact projects in the areas of rehabilitation and equipping of government facilities in the northern regions; operationalisation of courts in the north through training and advisory support. Despite its efforts, the SSR process appears to be fragmented, in part because of the slow implementation of the peace agreement, hindering significant progress on SSR initiatives.

ii. European Union
In response to the growing challenges in the Sahel, the EU adopted a Comprehensive Strategy for Security and Development (2011), a Comprehensive Regional Approach (2013) and Action Plan (2015) for the Sahel region. The Comprehensive Strategy was framed along the interlinkages between security, development and governance and was complemented by the Comprehensive Regional Approach. The Approach developed a more operational perspective framed around four lines of action: development, good governance and internal conflict resolution; political and diplomatic action; security and the rule of law; and countering violent extremism and radicalisation. The aim of both the Strategy and Approach was to establish the foundation for good coordination, and to develop a joint
understanding amongst the various EU bodies, so as to more efficiently manage the multi-dimensional challenges facing the region.

The Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 constitutes a framework for implementation of the EU Comprehensive Strategy. Within its four priorities include provisions on preventing and countering radicalisation; border management, the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime. The action plan also focuses on support to the CDSP EU-Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and CSDP EUCAP Sahel Mali missions, both of which seek to improve the capacity and security services.

The EUTM was created in February 2013 under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Framework. It was mandated to support the Malian Armed Forces through advisory support to the MoAF and training of the Malian Armed Forces. The objective is to sustainably enable the security forces to maintain security and stability within their country and to support in the structural reform of the sector. EUTM’s training activities include technical capacity development trainings as well as modules on IHL, human rights and protection of civilians. Additionally, the EUTM has provided support to the structuring of Malian Defence Ministry units from the ground up. As of August 2015, there was an estimated 23 EU and 4 non-EU contributing countries, making a force of 578 individuals. The mission was expanded in May 2016 for an additional 24 months.

Additionally, at the request of the host nation, the EU launched the CSDP EUCAP Sahel Mission in Mali on 15 January, 2015. EUCAP Mali is mandated to provide SSR support to the internal security forces. This includes the police, gendarmerie, National Guard and well as support in border management, migration and combating criminal activity. Its stated objects are to improve operational effectiveness; re-establish respective hierarchical chains, reinforce the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regards to management and supervision; facilitate redeployment to northern regions. The target for 2015 was to train 600 commissioned and non-commissioned officers within the first year, and train one third of all officers in the gendarmerie, National Guard and police. The trainings are estimated to take 100 hours over the course of 4 weeks and consist of thematic issues such as criminal policing, community policing, technical and forensic police methods, human rights and gender issues, and command structures. Additionally, Malian authorities are also training experts in policing techniques, the fight against organised crime and terrorism, oversight and auditing of the different departments, human resources and logistics support, etc.

iii. Danish Support
In addition to contributing to MINUSMA and EUCAP Mali, Denmark established a variety of projects aimed at supporting peace and development in Mali and the broader Sahel region. In a policy report drafted February 2016, Denmark expressed its commitment to supporting the establishment of sustainable peace, development, and human rights, underpinned by an inclusive and legitimate state. Danish support to Mali falls under a set of strategic objectives, which include peaceful coexistence, stability and security, as well as democratic and inclusive governance. One of the overall themes underlying Danish support is the importance of civil society in building peace and stability. Denmark’s vision and strategy are aligned with key Malian and EU key policy documents, such as the national policy framework.

In 2013, Denmark had established the Peace and Stabilisation Programme for the Sahel. The programme sought to address underlying causes of insecurity within the region through a
regional approach. The programme supported dialogue and reconciliation, focusing on conflict resolution on a local level with formal and informal actors. It additionally sought to promote improved security by targeting the democratic control of military and police and through efforts to counter violent extremism (DANIDA, 2013). In 2015, Denmark developed the Democracy, Peace and Reconciliation Programme (2015–2016), aimed at promoting an environment conducive to democracy, peace and reconciliation in Mali. The programme seeks to consolidate the results from the previous good governance programme by reinforcing the capacities of the Malian Parliament, strengthening access to justice through paralegals, and supporting the peace and reconciliation processes (DANIDA, 2016). In addition, Denmark launched a reconciliation and dialogue programme which in which key stakeholders, including the government, the army, the armed groups in the north and CSOs participated in the peace process through 123 dialogue sessions and 183 radio debates.

iv. Dutch Support
In addition to increasing its contribution to MINUSMA as well as supporting the EU missions, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Bamako restructured their development programme in response to the changing political and security climate in Mali. Because the Netherlands has already engaged in and is perceived as a primary partner in the justice sector, the Dutch Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014-2017 for Mali outlines the strategic focus and framework on security and RoL. The Security and Rule of Law Strategy’s primary objective is to help restore RoL, with a specific aim of reinforcing the legitimacy, and capacity of the government. The Strategy hopes to align with nationally defined outcomes, and adopts a comprehensive and decentralised approach. It is founded on a 3 pillar strategy focusing on reinforcing a functioning justice sector, a politically inclusive process and principles of human security. Below are some of the action points for Dutch engagement.

- **Functioning Justice Sector**: increase strategic guidance at a national level; improve operational capacities of courts and prosecution; promote human rights; support CSO lead anti-corruption efforts; ensure human rights violations, particularly against women, are brought to justice; strengthen the penal chain at a decentralised level.
- **Inclusive Political Process**: encourage local level engagement; promote inclusive intercommunal dialogues; strengthen the capacity and visibility of moderate Islamic associations; improve Malians understanding of the local government responsibilities.
- **Human Security**: support improvement of the penal chain in the intervention zones; piloting community policing programmes in two municipalities; support the formulation of a government owned framework for internal security sector reform (MASP, 2014).

6. Upcoming Considerations
The multiple dimensions encompassed in the Malian crisis are complex, with the heart of the problem historically linked to regional tensions and mistrust between the various communities. Therefore, genuine attempts as developing inclusive dialogue and reconciliation need to be prioritised at local, sub-national, and national levels. It is essential that progress on implementing peace agreements, including commitments made to northern communities such as DDR and cantonment, progress more rapidly. In doing so, this will help to build trust between the government and regional actors. However, measures additionally need to be extended beyond the Algier Accords, which has overlooked actors in the Central region. With a larger population and important economic activity occurring in the centre of
Mali, overlooking the security challenges has and will continue to further entrench and expand the reach of violent extremists, terrorists and criminal groups.

Provided that most communities outside the capital rely more heavily on customary system, inclusion of customary actors will likely facilitate the SSR process. Identifying and mapping the distinctions between state and customary systems on a locality-by-locality basis, with a focus on understanding why and how several justice systems exist concurrently and how they can best be supported to work together would be a fruitful exercise for the Malian government and international donors.

Due to the various insecurities facing Mali – including violent extremism, organised crime, banditry, illicit trafficking of arms and drugs, and an absence of state services- it is essential for the international community to maintain a human security perspective that takes into account the various dimensions of insecurity. This means that funds and efforts need to be balanced and appropriately allocated so as to address all dimensions of insecurity. Thus, it is crucial to for the international community to maintain a comprehensive, coordinated and coherent approach towards supporting Mali’s SSR- and broader peace- efforts. Strategies such as the EU Comprehensive Approach demonstrate a positive step forward; however the momentum for cooperation needs to be sustained. Additionally, as international support and funds continue to pour into Mali, donors should remain prudent regarding sustainability and financial management of reform processes.

7. List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFISMA</th>
<th>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</th>
<th>IHL</th>
<th>International Humanitarian Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Lands of the Islamic Maghreb</td>
<td>MAA</td>
<td>Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMFPR-II</td>
<td>Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance II</td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad</td>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
<td>MoAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
<td>MOJW</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU-Training Mission in Mali</td>
<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATIA</td>
<td>Groupe d’autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRS</td>
<td>Multidisciplinary Focus Group on Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>PRODEJ</td>
<td>Ten Year Justice Reform Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCUA</td>
<td>Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8. Further Reading


“Report to the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali.” UNSC S/2016/281 (March 2016).


1 Many of the Islamic based groups were considered to have fluid alliances, often working together to consolidate and capture regions in the North (CRS, 2013).

2 As the crisis evolved, the divisions became increasingly more pronounced and fragmented. Splinter groups such as: the MNLA, HCUA, MAA, CMFPR-II, and a faction of the CPA, a faction of MAA, and the GATIA, were formed. For more information, please refer to: Chapter 2 of CRU, 2015. Full list of names see Annex I.

3 For more information, please refer to the Section 5, I, Donor Support and Coordination.

4 The CMA is comprised of the MNLA, HCUA, MAA, a faction of the CPA and the CMFPR–II. The Platform is comprised of the CMFPR–I, GATIA, and splinter groups of the CPA and the MAA.

5 The CMA consistently pursued claims for self-determination, while the Platform sought resolution of grievances within the unitary state of Mali, and the central state opposed any form of federalism.

6 See section 5 for more information.

7 Since May 2016, MINUSMA has received a total of 96 human rights violations and abuses committed by security forces from the government, CMA and the Platform.

8 Mayors, senior officers of the national police and gendarmerie as well as officials not directly part of the police force but who have been granted the status of ‘judicial police’ for the purposes of supervision and enforcement of specific tasks.

9 As of 2003, some were detained for over 10 years before seeing a judge.

10 According to a 2014 Ministry of Justice report, there were 335 lawyers in Mali at that time most of which are located in Bamako. In Mopti, which has a population of 2 million, has less than 10 lawyers. In 2008 Mali had 630 judges for a population of about 13 million.

11 Despite the fact that 1/5 of the country speaks French, and there are over 14 dialects spoken throughout Mali, the penal system is predominantly in French.

12 There were 59 prisons prior to the crisis with an official capacity of about 3,000 inmates. However, Mali had over 6,000 people actually incarcerated in 2010. Since the crisis, 14- 24%, were destroyed (CRU, 2015)

13 It was later extended to 2014 and Titled PRODEJ II.

14 The Netherlands increased personnel from 380 military, police and civilian personnel in 2013 to 461 in 2016.