LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN SECURITY
CASE STUDIES OF PEACEBUILDING APPROACHES

Key Themes
Community Engagement
Dialogue & Consultation
Civil Society Oversight
Democratic State-Society Relations
Security Sector Reform
Peacebuilding Approaches to DDR
Gender Mainstreaming

Edited by Lisa Schirch with Deborah Mancini-Griffoli
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This publication is a product of people from forty countries and over one hundred organizations from coming together over a span of three years. Three roundtables conferences created opportunities for civil society and security sector leaders to share their case studies and identify patterns in their lessons.

The inspiration for this report comes from hearing their stories of creative collaboration and transformative relationships between civil society, police, and military. This report is dedicated to all the women and men – in civil society and the security sector – who reached out to each other to find new ways of pursuing human security together.

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Introduction

The relationship between civil society and the security sector is fundamental to human security. In many places, civilians view security forces with suspicion, perceiving them as predators rather than protectors. At the same time, many military and police also distrust civil society, questioning their intentions. Yet the security sector is a key stakeholder in the pursuit of peace. And civil society is a key stakeholder in the pursuit of security.

Improving relationships between civil society and security actors is a well-admired problem. The UN, World Bank and OECD note the need for "local ownership" in security sector reform. Local police departments from Baltimore to Kathmandu and Johannesburg consider how to engage with local communities to address urban violence. National military forces in India, Philippines, Kenya and beyond seek new ways to “win the hearts and minds” of local communities as they attempt to stabilize their countries. International policymakers increasingly recognize the need to include civil society organizations in responding to security challenges, particularly as they assess the challenges of the last two decades of violent conflicts and the trend toward violent extremism. New NATO guidance on the Human Aspects of the Operational Environment echoes US military publications such as The Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of War in their identification of missing skillsets in relating to local populations and adapting social science insights to security operations.

While governments and security actors attempt to find civil society partners, civil society is simultaneously attempting to reach out to them. Civil society is increasingly recognizing the importance of working together with the security sector to find new ways of improving human security. Concerned by the increasing violence against civilians perpetrated either by armed groups or sometimes even state security forces themselves, civil society organizations (CSOs) have stepped up their level of engagement. They have also been rapidly growing in numbers, especially those that are working to prevent violent conflict, build peace, and press for democratic freedoms. Yet there is a gap in the middle of those reaching “down” and those reaching “up.” All too often, civil society and the security sector lack capacity, human resources, policies, and mechanisms that will enable them to coordinate and collaborate effectively to achieve meaningful local ownership in security institutions, policies and operations.

Purpose

This report explores ways to achieve meaningful local ownership in the security sector. It provides nearly forty case studies of civil society and security actors using the principles of peacebuilding to work together towards human security. Each case study highlights the efforts that civil society and security actors have undertaken in order to reach out to each other, create collaborative processes and participatory mechanisms to solve problems related to human security in a particular local or national context. The report also tries to draw out lessons from these cases to help those who are seeking to engage with the civil society or security actors to improve human security to achieve better results. The overall purpose of gathering these case studies and identifying challenges and lessons learned is to inspire and enable others to replicate successes in peacebuilding to advance human security.

Target audience

The primary audience for this report are civil society representatives and members of the security sector or civilian government agencies overseeing the security sector. Entry-, mid-, and senior-level staff may all benefit from the examples and lessons it provides. Broadly speaking, any policy-maker or practitioner working to advance human security objectives through locally owned collaborative efforts might find relevant lessons, insights, and policy recommendations from this report.
How this report is organized
Chapter 1 provides a conceptual framework for the case studies. Chapters 2-6 then provide examples of civil society-military-police collaboration in five areas:

- Capacity Building
- Police-Community Platforms
- Peacebuilding Approaches to DDR
- Gender Mainstreaming
- National-level Platforms

Chapter 7 summarizes some of the practical challenges of local ownership and coordination. It pulls out key themes, lessons learned and patterns across the case studies.

Terminology
This report uses the following terminology:

**Security sector** is an umbrella term including the state's armed forces (military, police, intelligence services); justice and rule of law institutions; state oversight and management bodies such as national security advisory bodies, parliament; as well as non-state armed groups who in some cases, play certain roles in protecting some population groups. This report also uses the term **security actors** to refer to the security sector. **Security forces** include a limited number of groups that hold the responsibility to protect public order and security, and the power to arrest, detain, search, seize and use force and firearms.

**Civilians** are individuals who are not combatants. According to International Humanitarian Law, civilians are individuals who do not take direct part in ongoing hostilities. Due to their status as non-combatants civilians are entitled to protection against all types from violence and services such as food and shelter, medical aid, or family reunification. The term ‘civilians' is also used to designate government civilians that are not part of the security forces. **Society, local communities or local populations are interchangeable terms to refer to all the individuals and groups of people outside of government and the security sector.***

**Civil society and civil society organizations (CSOs)** are non-governmental, voluntary groups of people that organize themselves on behalf of interest groups or local communities. An active civil society fills two functions. Civil society can partner with government to provide public services. Civil society can also hold government to account, by pressing for transparent and fair governance. Civil society is by definition, unarmed. **Uncivil society** is a term sometimes used to refer to those individuals or groups that support violence by actively fuelling hate and distrust between groups.

There are diverse types of CSOs as well as other organizations representing the interests of local communities. **Traditional CSOs** includes religious, tribal, cultural, and informal organizations. **Modern CSOs** include universities, community-based organizations (CBOs), professional and trade associations, media, charities, artists, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) financed with national funds. **Locally-based NGOs**, also known as "LNGOs," are part of the local civil society within a country but in some cases have foreign donors. Most LNGOs refer to themselves as **local CSOs**. In this report, the term local CSO and local NGO are used interchangeably. **Internationally-based NGOs** or "INGOs" tend to have their headquarters outside of the country but they usually partner closely with local CSOs.
Case study methodology

The case studies in this report were collected over a span of five years, including four international roundtable meetings where civil society organizations presented, compared and contrasted their approaches to engaging with the security sector in diverse regions. The report brings together these case studies to call attention to the patterns of peacebuilding practice relating to the security sector.

The number of case studies in each chapter varies as do the level of detail and the depth of analysis of each example. Some case studies are short and illustrative and others more in-detail and critical. The report is less focused on rigorous in-depth evaluation of these examples and more interested in their comparative value of best practices and lessons learned as identified by organizations initiating these programs. The lessons and challenges are based upon civil society experiences shared at the research roundtables.

This publication is unique in its focus on case studies with these common attributes:

- Civil society met directly with security forces (military and police) with or without security policymakers from government.

- The goal of the meeting between civil society and security forces related to jointly identifying security threats, jointly designing security strategies, jointly implementing security programmes, and joint monitoring and evaluation of security programmes.

- Human security is the conceptual framework for civil society engagement with security forces. It is important for them to emphasize the goal of human security, because it has a population-centric and not enemy-centric perspective. Notably, while civil society would argue that human security efforts do reduce violence from non-state armed groups, most civil society groups do not call their work counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or countering violent extremism.
Chapter 1
Local Ownership in the Security Sector

This report is about local ownership. It illustrates how civil society groups in diverse geographical contexts from South Africa to Guatemala, from the Philippines to Israel/Palestine, use peacebuilding processes to build relationships between security forces and local communities with the goal of increasing human security. Even though “local ownership” has become a common buzzword, the meaning of the term is often vague, especially when applied to the security sector.

In this report, “local” is interpreted as a geographic term. It designates people affected by security threats – as well as security policies and strategies – because they live in the specific geographic area in which the threats occur. “Ownership” is used as a relative term that describes the varying ability to include local communities in security sector policies and programmes and set up effective oversight mechanisms.

Local ownership is not an end in itself. It is a means of reaching a larger common goal. The programmes described in this report all work towards the goal of improving human security. They aim to democratize and legitimize state-society relations, so that local people in every home and community feel safe. Human security is a population-centric idea; it is measured by the perceptions of whether local men and women, boys and girls feel safe. This distinguishes it from other enemy-centric concepts of security that focus on identifying and deflecting threats from certain groups. Due to the emphasis on popular perceptions of safety, local ownership is a key pre-requisite and intrinsic aspect of human security.

Local ownership engages local communities in a set of processes. This report documents the role of peacebuilding processes such as dialogue, negotiation, mediation and joint problem solving in enabling local ownership of security. These peacebuilding processes enable local people to participate in identifying security challenges, jointly developing and implementing security strategies, and monitoring and evaluating the security sector to ensure it works to improve the safety of every man, woman, girl and boy.

The term “local ownership” relates to other popular concepts. The security sector tends to speak about “community engagement” when they refer to their efforts to have local communities participate in their policies and programmes, e.g. in community policing projects. Civil society favours the term “civil society oversight” to describe their ability to monitor and contribute to security sector policies and programmes. “Civil-military-police coordination” and “multi-stakeholder coordination” relate to the same general concept. All of these terms refer to joint meetings between civil society and the security sector where local people have the ability to participate in security sector programmes and policies.

State-Society Relations
Local ownership of human security begins with an understanding of society’s role in legitimate, participatory and democratic state-society relations. Legitimacy stems from a state that uses its
powers and resources to protect and advance the interests of all people and groups in society. In democratic state-society relations, society participates in making decisions that affect their lives not only through an occasional election, but also through a variety of forums where society participates in solving public problems. State-society relations based on public legitimacy represent the ideal environment for ensuring conditions of human security.

Historically, the right to rule a state came by virtue of the rulers’ “monopoly of force” and military forces justified their sovereignty with their ability to control a population in military terms. Today, this model continues to exist. In some states, groups still compete for the monopoly of force and the group with most military power earns the right to govern. With the widespread availability of weapons to private individuals and non-state groups, today some governments actively take part in violent competitions against their own citizens and other states to earn their legitimacy to govern. Armed rebellion against the state is more frequent in “elite-captured” states that serve the interests of a small group of elite members in society and actively discriminate against other groups.

Excluded groups lack fair treatment or access to government services, such as protection, justice, or access to healthcare, education, housing, or jobs. Both armed insurgencies as well as nonviolent social movements often develop in response to elite-captured governments as local groups attempt to push for either a new or reformed government. Elite-captured governments may then direct security forces to pacify or repress society in an attempt to obstruct their public demands on government for accountability and equal access to public goods. In too many countries, local police or military forces use repressive violence against unarmed people and communities.

An alternative approach sees states earning legitimacy by serving the interests of all groups in society and through non-coercive public engagement via democratic processes such as public dialogue and accountability boards. In stable, peaceful states, citizens support their government and help leaders make decisions that benefit all groups without disadvantaging or persecuting parts of the population such as women, men or other minorities of gender, ethnicity, race, age or religion.

“Citizen-centred states" – which in most cases are democracies - serve the interests of a state’s entire population and enjoy a “monopoly of public legitimacy.” These governments win public support when they work to ensure human security of the whole population and not just the security of elite groups. A government’s public legitimacy is a reflection of public perception of government performance in providing public goods. In a citizen-oriented government, society both is able to hold government to account and to partner with government to provide public goods.

In a citizen-oriented state, the security sector serves the population. Peace and stability are relative to the degree that police, national military, international peacekeepers or military forces serve locally defined human security
goals and are accountable to local communities. Local ownership is not about enlisting an elite member of civil society to participate in elite-centred security strategies. Building local ownership requires listening to the perceptions of security threats from diverse segments of society. Government security policymakers consult with and listen to the interests of all local citizens who are affected by their security operations.

**Security Sector Reform and Development**

In countries such as South Africa, Guatemala, and the Philippines, large social movements pushed for the transformation from an elite-captured government to a citizen-oriented government. Civil society groups organized themselves to push for greater local ownership in security. In most democratic countries, society continues to push for security sector development (SSD) toward a human security model. Now these countries and many others are undergoing a process of developing democratic and legitimate state-society relations. A transformation of how society views and relates to the security sector is fundamental to this transformation, as illustrated in Figure 3.

With growing recognition of the links between development and security, donor countries began to see the importance of citizen-oriented states that provide public services and are accountable to citizens as critical to security and stability. The world has many tragic examples of how conflict can rapidly wipe out decades of hard-won development gains. Therefore, donors in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed programmes to assist in the democratization and legitimization of the security sector in “fragile” countries affected by violence. Reformed, citizen-oriented security sectors correlated with states being more able prevent and address violence and sustain a peace settlement to end war.³

Donors began urging states emerging from war to take on a formal process of security sector reform (SSR) or a less formal process of security sector development (SSD) to change state policies and practices from ones that protect the security, economic and political interests of an elite group in power to one that protects the interests of all citizens – male and female – including minority groups. Security sector reform and development (SSR/D) is seen as a way to strengthen and transform the state-society relationship toward a focus on human security, as illustrated in the figure here. The OECD defines SSR/D as a process of “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR/D includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing.”

SSR/D involves not only developing the military and police, but also addressing the wider security sector including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armed...
groups. Some refer to SSR, or SSD or JSSR, meaning justice and security sector reform. These efforts include three goals:

1. Improving democratic governance with an emphasis on civil oversight of security sector and multi-stakeholder processes that include civil society, especially women, minority groups, and youth in shaping security policy and strategy
2. Recognizing the relationship between security and development policy, and orienting security strategies toward human security for all people
3. Professionalizing the security sector, emphasizing an efficient and effective security sector that holds a monopoly of force over other armed groups in society

In practice, many Western donors under pressure to improve counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts invest primarily in the third area. They professionalize the security sector by training and equipping military and police in enemy-centric tactics, but put little emphasis on democratic governance or human security. This is more accurately called “security force assistance” and not SSR/D. Research on exclusive “train and equip” programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and elsewhere emphasizes that they can do more harm than good. Often, they may lead to situations where security forces simply use bigger weapons to repress local populations. They risk further undermining human security when they trap populations between increased violence of abusive security forces and the terror of non-state armed groups. The risk of security assistance to escalate violence is especially prevalent in nondemocratic states, where security forces lack public legitimacy and are thus less inhibited to engage in abuses.4

Most reviews of SSR/D programmes cite the lack of local ownership as the most pivotal element in success or failure. Donors attempting to foster local ownership and community engagement in security may not know where to begin. At the same time, civil society groups wanting to push for reforms toward a human security approach also do not know how to begin to reach out to the security sector. This report attempts to address that gap. The case studies provide abundant examples of collaborative processes between civil society and state security actors in police, military, justice, and other civil government institutions that are engaged in transitioning towards a human security framework. But first it is important to understand the history of why local ownership of security is so difficult.

Security Approaches to Society: From Pacification to Partnership

The case studies in this volume emerge from a long history of non-existing or adversarial relationships between security forces and local populations. It is important to understand this past to recognize the magnitude of shift represented by the new peacebuilding projects between civil society and security forces that this report displays.

There are at least five distinct approaches or stages in security sector relationships with society. Figure 5 illustrates these approaches with the goal of enabling an analysis of why civil society-military-police coordination and local ownership of security is possible in some contexts but not others.
Historically, states have taken an adversarial and exploitative approach to civilians. Colonial governments predominantly viewed civilians either as potential enemies or cheap labour and waged atrocious wars against them to keep them subdued. Such “pacification” campaigns induced fear and terror in local populations as a means of control. Some governments today continue to repress civil society, executing and torturing civil society leaders and using scorched earth policies, including mass atrocities, against local populations to ensure that they will not press governing authorities for any public services, freedoms, or rights. Journalists documenting such forms of violence by security forces have brought international pressure to expose and prevent violent pacification tactics – sometimes referred to as “state-based terrorism.”

However, the legacy of this approach continues to influence the security sector’s attitude towards civil society, including security forces’ distrust of NGOs and other civil society organizations, and civil society’s distrust of security forces.

Today, civil society widely views counterterrorism laws to restrict civil society as a continuation of the pacification mind-set. In this approach, counterterrorism legislation restricts civil society from contact with non-state armed groups identified as “terrorists” even if they have a legitimate set of political grievances and self-determination aims protected by international law. Counterterrorist “lawfare” (warfare by legal means) makes it impossible for civil society to offer humanitarian assistance, development assistance or engage in peacebuilding programmes that might have a moderating effect on non-state armed groups.

But over the last fifteen years, security forces have been adopting less repressive approaches towards civil society. Some aspects of the concept of pacification continue to be found in counterinsurgency literature, which takes a cautious approach towards civilians, viewing them as potential allies or potential enemies. Rather than intimidating civil society, counterinsurgency aims to pacify local populations by winning the hearts and minds through establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. Rather than attacking civilians, military forces provide civic assistance to local villages to gain acceptance and prevent local populations from supporting hostile non-state armed groups.

A fourth approach emphasizes a new era prioritizing civilian safety in security sector-civil society relations where states, regional organizations like the Africa Union, or the United Nations, mandate security forces with the task of “protection of civilians.” New military doctrine and training emphasizes military and police roles in protection of civilians as well as...
avoiding civilian casualties and mitigating harm against civilians during military or police operations. New frameworks for international action such as the *Responsibility to Protect* call governments to refrain from violent repression of civilians themselves, and to protect civilians from violence from non-state armed groups.

A fifth approach views civil society as service providers, contributing to peace and stability. States, regional organizations and international organizations view civil society organizations as contractors or “implementing partners.” They fund CSOs to provide healthcare, food, water and shelter to vulnerable populations such as the young, old, veterans and disabled members of society, to building the capacity of communities to govern effectively to maintain the rule of law, community safety, and economic development, to countering violent extremism. Many CSOs are wary of government funding, noting they lose their independence; their ability to respond to locally identified needs, and the trust and legitimacy they have with local communities when they are seen as for-profit contractors working on behalf of governments. Civil society specifically opposes the use of the term “implementing partners”, as it implies that CSOs do not have their own assessment or plans to address local needs.

This report illustrates a sixth approach where security forces and an empowered and independent civil society build understanding and coordinate with each other to address the root causes of insecurity and coordinate efforts to support human security. In a “coordination for human security” approach, conflict prevention and peacebuilding skills, values, and processes enable less antagonistic relationship capable of joint problem solving. It is important to recognize how this multi-stakeholder human security approach contrasts with other approaches. Unlike other approaches, a human security approach does not manipulate civil society as security assets. Instead it emphasizes the empowerment of civil society to participate in identifying security challenges, designing and implementing human security programmes and overseeing the security sector’s performance.

Senior military leaders have come to advocate for this approach. In his book *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions*, US Admiral Dennis Blair argues armed forces have a critical role to support society’s move toward democracy. “The military heroes that history remembers have acted not to oppress their people but to defend them.” Such views represent a major departure from past military attitudes that considered civilians as inferior or even hostile and mark a new era of prioritizing civilian lives and adding human security interests onto national security agendas.

In some contexts, different security actors may each be using a different approach simultaneously. Some national or international military and police units may focus on protection of civilians while others are actively using violent pacification. A government’s development agency may be funding programmes to support civil-military-police coordination on human security while other government agencies use legal frameworks to prevent CSOs from talking to armed groups, or keep CSOs busy with lucrative contracts to provide public services.

**Civil Society: From Protest to Proposal**

As security sector approaches to civil society have evolved, so have those of civil society to the security sector. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish three distinct civil society approaches to the security sector: support, protest, or proposal.

In some citizen-oriented states, civil society widely supports and accepts the security sector. They view military and police as legitimate representatives of society and may also decide to voluntarily sign up for service. In such countries, a growing number of civil society organizations are also working as implementing partners providing public services to contribute to the security agenda of governments, regional organizations and international organizations.
The security sectors in most elite-captured states do not enjoy this kind of support. In countries where there is forced recruitment, or recruitment by racial, ethnic or religious group, there may be wide public opposition to security forces. This is also true in countries where security forces repress or violate human rights. Given the prevalence of this problem in the security sector, in many countries, CSOs – especially human rights organizations – adopt an adversarial approach to the security sector. Some groups document human rights violations and publish reports to denounce and protest against abuses committed by security forces and seek accountability. Human rights organizations play an important role in holding governments to account for their duties to protect civilians. The “protest” approach relies mostly on “Naming, Blaming, and Shaming” state security forces and non-state armed groups for human rights abuses.

Figure 6 illustrates that some civil society organizations are shifting from protesting to making proposals to improve human security. While sharing the same human rights concerns that protesters denounce, these peacebuilding CSOs use a persuasive theory of change to build relationships with the security sector through direct dialogue, negotiation, and problem solving to address human rights abuses. As illustrated below, peacebuilding skills and processes help civil society to move from a sole reliance on “protest” to also include their ability to make “proposals.” While sharing concerns about human rights violations and firmly supporting human security, civil society leaders in diverse corners of the world have come to the conclusion that they must go beyond protesting security policies. Civil society’s interest in “coordination for human security” developed as civil society reached out to build relationships with the security sector, engaged in joint problem solving, and articulated security policy alternatives. Peacebuilding skills and processes such as conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue often inspired this coordination to support human security. This report documents case studies illustrating how peacebuilding CSOs have coordinated with the military and police to support human security.

Civil Society’s Operational Requirements

In contexts of political conflict, civil society must navigate between state and non-state armed groups to maintain their legitimacy among their constituents and their safety amidst these armed groups. This requires the adherence to operational requirements that guarantee its independence. The more empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free civil society organizations are, the better they can contribute to improve human security. Disempowered civil society organizations that are dependent on government funding, indistinguishable from security forces, and lacking operational freedom, will likely be rejected by local communities. The text box below describes the key operational requirements for civil society working in contexts of political conflict.
Coordination for Human Security: Working With, not Against

Civil society and the security sector can work with each other when they have a common goal to improve human security. “Human security” is also known as “multidimensional security” and “citizen security.” Human security is distinct from, but may overlap with national security.

“National security” prioritizes economic, geopolitical, or ideological interests of the state and, if necessary, the use of military force to protect them. In many countries, national security is tasked solely to the military. In recent years, some states have begun investing more in development and diplomacy as national security strategies.

“Human security” focuses on the individual and community perspectives on security. Human security prioritizes violence caused by both state and non-state armed groups, poverty, economic inequality, discrimination, environmental degradation and health and how they affect individuals and communities. Comprehensive human security includes three components: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. To address these problems, human security emphasizes the need for “whole of society” efforts including security forces but also government, civil society, business, academic, religious, media and other actors. Due to these differing outlooks, national security and human security responses can often be very different.
To contrast national security and human security, one can look at the different understanding of security challenges and the different theories of change underlying both approaches. The text box here explains the concept of “Theories of Change.”

**What are “Theories of Change”?**

Groups contributing to human security shape their programmes and strategies based on their understanding of security challenges. But they may not share the same understanding of the security challenge, even when acting in similar context. Organizations work according to their own set of ideas about the nature of the challenge they are addressing. Increasingly, civil society and governments are all using a conflict assessment research process to identify security challenges – including the root causes and drivers of violence. Yet even when using similar conflict assessment frameworks, groups still tend to understand security challenges differently.

A “theory of change” (ToC) is a statement – a strategic narrative - about how to address a particular challenge. Every organization has an implicit or explicit theory of change that articulates how some type of strategy or intervention will address the challenges they identify.

To illustrate the variety of theory of changes, each case study in this report contains a text box summarizing the locally identified understanding of the challenge and the theory of change guiding the human security programme described in the case study.

An example helps to illustrate the two approaches. An armed opposition movement is threatening to throw over a government, which is widely known to endanger civilian lives through violations of human rights. A national security strategy may understand the underlying security challenge as the state lacking a monopoly of force. As a consequence, the national security actor may ask the international community for more weapons and to provide training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to security forces. In contrast, a human security strategy will understand the challenge as the state lacking public legitimacy. A human security strategy might therefore focus on empowering civil society to hold their government to account for the grievances that drive support for insurgents.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Understanding of the Challenge</th>
<th>Theory of Change and Intervention Design</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Threats to state-defined economic, political or ideological interests, often emphasizing violence from non-state armed groups and other states as assessed by national security advisors • Emphasis on government security forces as primary actor in security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Threats to individuals and communities coming from violence from state and non-state armed groups, poverty, economic inequality, discrimination, environmental degradation and health concerns as assessed by conflict assessment research processes that include broad public consultations to define the drivers of violence and insecurity • Emphasis on whole of society or “multi-stakeholder” efforts to address the drivers of violence and insecurity including government, civil society, business, academic, religious, media and other actors</td>
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Despite their differences, national security and human security goals can also overlap. A state might come to understand that protecting civilians and prioritizing development or democratic governance is in its national security interests.\textsuperscript{12} The case studies in this report are examples of collaboration and dialogue between security forces and civil society who share interests at the intersection of national security and human security.

**The Logic of Local Ownership in the Security Sector**

Every government makes decisions about how much power local civil society will have to participate in the security sector. Elite-captured governments usually have little incentive to expand local ownership, as this would lead them to lose control and possibly their elite status. But citizen-oriented governments see increasing local ownership and community engagement as important aspects of their national security plans.

Although some donor governments recognize the necessity of local ownership and push for greater democratic governance, most foreign donors and interveners have a tendency to ignore it. Nearly every international assistance framework - at the UN, World Bank, OECD, and the recent *Busan Principles of International Assistance* and the *New Deal for Fragile States* - mandates the principle of “local ownership.” But in reality, the political and economic interests of donor countries easily hijack the concept of “local ownership.”

Critics of SSR/D argue that the term SSR/D itself has come to imply an unequal power relationship; a situation where those “reformed [are] reforming the unreformed”\textsuperscript{13} rather than local people reforming their own system. It is true that donor approaches to SSR/D are fragmented, lacking coordination and mechanisms for listening to local communities or communicating transparent goals or processes. Foreign governments donating money for other states to undergo an SSR/D process also have their own national security interests in mind. This leads some of them to push counterterrorism lenses onto their SSR/D programs. Local ownership then serves as a fig leaf, as a nice and uncontroversial idea, but certainly not a strategic necessity.

Often SSR/D processes involve a few token elite, male civil society leaders to “check the box” of local ownership. These elites are not actually invited to shape the analysis or design and implement the program. Rather they are asked to “comment” on plans already made. The International Network on Conflict and Fragility’s review of donor support to justice and security concluded that, “ownership’ is often conflated with ‘buy-in’. Structures are meant to enhance local buy-in to donor-conceived and -led activities, not to enable local actors to take the lead in programming decisions.”\textsuperscript{14} Often this approach to community engagement just causes further division within civil society.

Meaningful local ownership asks critical questions listed in the figure below and requires the participation of civil society in decision-making, control, implementation and evaluation of human security programmes.
Local ownership of security needs a makeover. Security sector reform and development (SSR/D) needs to move from externally guided processes toward internally generated analysis and solutions carried out by diverse local stakeholders. Local people in every community can and should play roles in monitoring and oversight of security programs. The effectiveness of SSR/D should be measured by local perceptions and definitions of human security. The case studies in this report illustrate that donors can create and support incentives or mandates for local ownership in an SSR/D process.

National governments and international donors need to recognize the clear strategic value of local ownership:

**Time and Speed Implications**
Donor governments who focus on train and equip programmes to meet the urgent security threats or to support fragile peace agreements often argue that that this is the fastest way to remedy security challenges. While it is true that local ownership takes time to construct, it is ultimately the faster route. Train and equip programmes will ultimately fail or cause even more violence, unless they are accompanied by programmes aimed at preventing human rights abuses by security forces. To build legitimate state-society relationships with local ownership in security, “you have to go slow to go fast.” There is no end-run around authentic local ownership.

**Security Implications**
Local ownership improves state-society relationships. A public that perceives the security sector protects human security is more likely to view their government as legitimate. Legitimate, citizen-oriented states face fewer threats from non-state armed groups. Local perceptions of security and justice may be very different than those of national elites or foreigners’. In countries where non-state groups fulfil up to 80% of the security and justice roles in society, tribal, traditional, religious and other citizen-based groups must be engaged in order to achieve human security for all. Local ownership puts local perceptions of security at the centre of all SSR/D efforts.

**Long-term Political Stability Implications**
If outsiders take down a government and attempt to rebuild it themselves, local groups may never have the incentive or the time to build coalitions among themselves. This can hamper the emergence of stable and functional governance in the long run. Without outside intervention, insiders have greater incentive to build broad coalitions between social groups to improve state-society relations. This coalition building among local groups that negotiate with each other to identify common ground proposals and platforms is essential to sustainable SSR/D.

**Sustainability Implications**
Without robust local ownership, any SSR/D efforts may simply fail. If insiders are not committed to changing the security sector, national elites or international donors may just be
wasting their time and effort attempting to force such changes. For example, a review of the Burundian SSR/D process questioned the impact of Dutch funding for the SSR/D process in Burundi. On the one hand, the funding mandated community engagement but may have encouraged national elites to withdraw financial support from SSR. Once the national elites were no longer financially invested in SSR/D, there is some concern they are less invested in making the reforms succeed. In Somaliland, the lack of international financial support for the peace process meant that the local business community had to step in. They were willing to do so and increase their influence, because they realized that reconciliation and stability would benefit the pastoral economy. More research could help to determine the conditions that warrant outside funding. Donors might be able to provide needed funding in ways that foster local accountability and do less to discourage local ownership.

**Gender Implications**

Local ownership is especially important to ensure that security threats to both women and men are taken into consideration in all efforts to improve security. SSR/D needs to be gender sensitive to ensure all men, women, girls and boys have equal access to justice and security, including their protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). SSR/D needs to be gender inclusive to involve all genders in planning and implementing security strategies. SSR/D also needs to be gender accountable so that all genders participate in overseeing the security sector.

**Broadening Local Ownership**

Local ownership should be broad, including as many stakeholders as possible. In order to broaden local ownership, diverse stakeholders must participate in policy-making and programming in the security sector. Involving just a handful of local elite men in a consultation cannot yield an accurate picture of the interests or needs of all social groups in society. True local ownership includes mechanisms to engage every individual in society, from children to elders, males and females, working in every sector of society, with different levels of education, religious beliefs, economic status, and with diverse gender, ethnic, racial and linguistic identities. Meaningful local ownership is not only about whom to engage but also about how to engage, i.e. which oversight or engagement mechanism to use to create meaningful and sustainable ties with local communities. Oversight and engagement mechanisms can be institutions or activities that provide citizens the ability to contribute, influence and control security sector policies and programming.

**Civilian Government Ownership**

The traditional mechanism to increase local ownership in the security sector is the civilian government. The government’s executive branch and representative bodies such as parliament or congress hold effective oversight functions. They administer and control the security sector’s authorities, mandates and budget to ensure that all security sector policies and programmes represent and satisfy the needs of citizens.

However, civilian government oversight is not always able to guarantee the human security of all citizens. If a parliament is made up mostly of men, it is not surprising that violence against women is not a priority for them. If a congress is made up primarily of one racial group, it is not surprising that the civilian government does not take action to ensure diversity within police departments or to stop police violence when the police belong to one racial group and the community belongs to another. Even in states with democratic electoral systems, an elite-captured government may make security decisions based exclusively on its own political and economic interests, such as making profits through weapons manufacturing.

All states should provide additional participatory mechanisms that offer opportunities for civil society and the wider public to have an input into security sector policies and programmes. These mechanisms enable the full participation of all sectors of society in security sector policies and programmes. They enable women, who represent half of every community and
nation, to be included and apply their distinct skillsets and perspectives on human security, but also other gender groups such as LGBTI individuals or men who can be marginalized due to their belonging to a particular ethnic, racial, religious, social, or age group.

Figure 8 illustrates the two types of local ownership in security sector policies and programmes: civilian government, consisting of the executive branch of the government and the parliament or congress in an elected representative system of government, and civil society, which also includes the media.

Civil Society Ownership
Local ownership must be expanded horizontally to include broader segments of civil society, as illustrated in Figure 9. This requires moving from international NGO (INGO) and elite local participation toward processes that involve large numbers of diverse segments of society. INGOS must map local capacity and recognize the principle of "Local First." They should provide entry to local civil society in order to widen public involvement in dialogue on security priorities and strategies. Women and men of different ages, regions, languages, religions, and ethnicities as a diverse set of representatives of distinct civil society groups should all participate in security sector policy-making and programming.

Sometimes, international NGOs (INGOs) act as intermediaries between the security sector and local civil society. They provide support structures such as forums and dialogues and capacity building to strengthen the ability of civil society to oversee security sector policies and programs. In some cases, INGOS engage and hand over functions to national "modern" civil society organizations, which in turn draw in "traditional" civil society organization such as tribal leaders. But this chain of engagement does not always proceed without tensions. INGOS may be effective in applying models and lessons they have learned elsewhere, as is evident in the work of international peacebuilding NGOs including Saferworld, International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Search for Common Ground, and Partners for Democratic Change. But some accuse other INGOS of holding onto neo-colonial attitudes toward local civil society, underestimating their capacities and tending to speak for local people. Local civil society sometimes critiques INGOS for taking over the role and funding for local civil society. International NGOs and elite local civil society representatives should not be gatekeepers, but instead step back and open doors to more diverse individuals and groups that truly represent aspects of society.
Deepening Local Ownership
While it is important to broaden local ownership by including more diverse segments of local civil society, it is also important to deepen local ownership, so that civil society engagement evolves from isolated, project-based efforts toward platforms for joint implementation and joint institutional oversight. There are a great variety of institutions and activities that enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programs. Not all of them are effective in creating sustainable relationships between civil society and security forces. To strengthen their ties, civil society and security forces need to build long-term relationships and trust. They need to come together, discuss their respective interests and find joint solutions that optimize their respective outcomes.

Coordination Wheel for Human Security
This report documents various activities to coordinate civil society and the security sector in five areas, illustrated in Figure 10.

Joint capacity building: Joint training, coaching and support can build relationships and develop a common set of skills, concepts and processes for working together to support human security.

Jointly assess human security challenges: Joint conflict assessment can include jointly designing research questions and data collection methods and jointly analysing data.

Jointly plan human security strategies: Jointly determining appropriate programs and strategies to support human security, and determine relevant theories of change.

Jointly implement human security strategies: Jointly implement a project together, such as increasing the gender sensitivity of police, developing a civilian harm mitigation plan, or addressing trauma in local communities.

Jointly monitor and evaluate security sector performance in oversight mechanisms: Joint institutional oversight mechanism to identify the baselines, benchmarks and indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the security sector and discussing the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of security strategies.

The coordination wheel of activities produces a vision for what local ownership looks like at its most robust. But often, as illustrated in many of the case studies in this publication, civil society and the security sector may only be coordinating in one set of activities, and not in all. Case studies such as the Philippines illustrate joint work in all five activities in the coordination
wheel. Other case studies indicate only one or two joint activities, such as joint capacity building in Brazil, or jointly implementing a DDR programme in DRC.

Exact measurements of the vertical "degrees" of local ownership are difficult. However, some forms of coordination and local ownership seem to be more robust than others. Levels of local ownership relate to at least two factors: the number of joint activities that civil society and the security sector perform together, and the level of civil society empowerment within those activities. Local ownership is most robust where civil society and the security sector are coordinating with each other in all five elements. Second, local ownership is most robust where civil society is empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free, as discussed in the section on civil society's operational requirements.

For example, sharing information with civil society or setting up a dialogue to listen to civil society indicates less local ownership than setting up joint implementation of human security programming with civil society or institutionalizing a joint oversight mechanism. A community policing dialogue where the police just listen to citizen complaints is less robust than a community policing programme that involves local neighbourhood watch committees where citizens work with the police to manage community conflicts. And a permanent citizen-oversight committee where the community can assess threats to their human security, and report and take action to address incidents of civilian harm illustrates even greater local ownership. Institutionalized oversight forums that give civil society a seat at the table to monitor and evaluate the security sector indicate that the state-society relationship is seen as legitimate, democratic and citizen-oriented.

In order to deepen local ownership, it is important to increase and institutionalize the functions of civil society in relation to the security sector. Figure 11 illustrates a rough framework for deepening the levels of local ownership in the security sector. The darkest blue colour illustrates the most robust levels of local ownership, where civil society both is involved in multiple activities in the coordination wheel and where civil society holds institutionalized power to monitor and evaluate the security sector's performance with government. Capacity building is a necessary pre-requisite to achieve any level of local ownership, which is why it stands as a separate but permanent category.

Each of these levels of local ownership should build on the prior levels of engagement. However, Figure 11 is not necessary a linear path to local ownership. It is possible to innovate a programme in "joint implementation" before there are dialogue processes. But the case studies in this volume illustrate that often there is first dialogue to assess human security threats and/or an initial effort in capacity building. Joint implementation and institutional oversight mechanisms are more likely to grow out of these "lighter" forms of engagement. Figure 11 shows an approximate progression from the most superficial to the more meaningful types of engagement.
### Level of Local Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Training for civil society and the security sector to support human security</th>
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<th>Information Sharing</th>
<th>Governments identify human security threats to civilians. Civil society identifies human security threats to government.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogue and Consultation</td>
<td>Governments, security forces, and civilians identify human security threats and jointly design potential human security strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Implementation</td>
<td>Civil society and the security sector participate in joint problem-solving and programming to implement human security strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Institutional Oversight</td>
<td>Civil society representatives have institutional capacity, and legal authority at the local, regional, and national level to participate in assessing threats, designing and implementing security strategies and monitoring impact.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 11: Levels of Local Ownership**

**Information Sharing**

Information sharing is a one-way channel of communication, where one party simply receives information from the other. At a minimum, “local ownership” means governments should share basic security information with the public. It also means civil society groups share information with the government.

Governments may share information with the public or may encourage the public to share information with them. Some governments may decide to publish their policies on a specific security issue to increase transparency. Or they may encourage the public to provide information about security threats. Some governments may request information from civilians through hotline phone numbers, a complaints desk, or a web form that will allow individuals to report concerns related to security. These can be information sharing portals where citizens share information about security problems or they can be grievance mechanisms to report directly on the performance of a security officer. Some governments offer grievance mechanisms that simply register private complaints. Others are more transparent, enabling reporting to the public the pattern of complaints or grievances and how the government or security sector are attempting to be accountable to the public by responding to the complaints. But these one-way strategies prevent long-term relationship building and trust.

Civil society also uses information sharing channels when advocating for improvements to human security, such as submitting reports on security or policy recommendations. Civil society organizations play a “watchdog” role and serve as “an index of public contentment”²¹ with the security sector to ensure that it respects human rights and serves the public.
Until the last two decades, civil society relied mostly on one-way information-sharing approaches that often take an adversarial stance within a "protest" paradigm described earlier in this chapter. Independent human rights commissions; indigenous people's rights groups, women's rights advocates, refugee advocates, and anti-nuclear advocates are some examples of the types of civil society groups and movements that exist in most countries. These groups may denounce human rights abuses by security forces publicly, push for internal complaint mechanisms such as phone hotlines, or external oversight bodies such as or Ombudsman Offices, or work to strengthen legislation to protecting victims of abuses.

Watchdog mechanisms are important because they hold the security sector accountable. If they are successful, they force police or military to change their policies or to apply punitive measures to perpetrators of abuses, which certainly contributes to human security. But these mechanisms may entail the sacrifice of long-term relationships and trust. Due to their one-way direction and adversarial nature, advocacy efforts may make it more difficult for civil society to build the necessary relationships with security stakeholders to reorient the security sector toward human security.

This report focuses on civil society's move from relying almost entirely on one-way information sharing and the "protest" method of security oversight toward civil society's ability to work directly in relationship with the security sector on human security "proposals" that develop out of "two-way communication" settings where people meet together. This does not mean suggest neglecting accountability, but achieving accountability differently by creating meaningful and long-term institutional relationships and trust. Permanent, institutionalized civil society-security sector coordination mechanisms on as many levels and as many security issues as possible may provide the most effective guarantee for human security.

**Dialogue and Consultation**

The terms dialogue and consultation refer to a process during which civil society and the security sector jointly assess threats to human security and jointly plan how to improve human security. These forums are different from a mere information-exchange during which one party simply explains their point of view. This approach by definition includes at least a two-way exchange of information.

Successful dialogue and consultation forums – like all coordination mechanisms - require professional facilitation to foster effective cross-cultural communication. Stakeholders listen each other's interests and perspectives. Without skilful facilitation, coordination meetings often break down as participants engage in unproductive conflict or walk out of the meeting. Communication skills and knowledge of civic responsibilities also contribute to improved outcomes.

In practice, many country's security sectors are open to engaging in dialogue and consultations with civil society because they recognize that civil society has information and insights needed to achieve national security priorities. For example, many military forces receive training on humanitarian civil-military coordination, given the likelihood that they will need to communicate with humanitarian organizations, including civil society groups, operating in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Civil-military coordination or cooperation (CIMIC) centres and other mechanisms to support a "comprehensive approach" that includes civil society would also fall under this category. However, few military forces receive training on interacting with local civil society or other types of CSOs that are involved in long-term development, human rights or peacebuilding efforts. This limits their possibility to engage effectively, as many security forces are not even aware that other civil society groups exist and are working to support human security. Coordination is not possible where there is not first a mapping of this local capacity.

Where national security overlaps with civil society's human security priorities, these dialogue, consultation and coordination forums may be productive. The local ownership platforms
discussed in this volume are examples of such civil-military-police coordination to support human security.

**Civil Society-Led Dialogues on the Local Level**

CSO driven dialogues are forums that CSOs initiate and organize at the local level to foster exchange and understanding between security forces and civil society around a certain topic related to security. In Nepal, civil society conducted comprehensive joint security assessments on the district level including 80 focus groups with more than 800 individuals altogether to develop an approach to community policing. In Kenya, the University of San Diego’s Institute for Peace and Justice assembled youth leaders and policemen to talk about urban violence. In Tanzania, Search for Common Ground gathered security forces, civil society and representatives of private companies to discuss the security of mining operations. These dialogues usually happen *ad hoc*, i.e. only for a particular purpose and duration and rarely include national leadership.

**Consultations to Define Regional and National Security Policy**

National Consultations are mechanisms that enable civil society to take a permanent seat at the table to defining a country’s national security agenda. In Yemen and Guinea, for example, Partners for Democratic Change helped to facilitate a series of national dialogue forums that enabled joint analysis of human security challenges and strategies.

Dialogue and consultation has its limits unless it is institutionalized and accompanied by accountability mechanisms. Governments may seek to understand and review the community’s point of view on an *ad hoc* basis only when the political climate makes it necessary. They may credit and acknowledge civil society perspectives anytime without having to commit to actually include them in their strategies and programs.

**Joint Implementation**

A step beyond dialogue and consultation, ‘joint implementation’ involves civil society participating with the security sector in the development and/or the implementation of human security strategies. Civil society not only provides input but may also take on certain programmatic functions, such as participating in neighbourhood patrols Civil society and the security sector can carry out joint implementation in a wide range of efforts in diverse sectors, including community policing, restorative justice, criminal justice reform, transitional justice, security sector reform and development, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, demining, preventing sexual and gender-based violence, mitigating civilian harm, protecting civilians, and many more sectors. It can also mean civil society plays a role in mediating with non-state armed groups. The UK-based peacebuilding NGO Conciliation Resources documents how civil society uses mediation to end violence between state armed forces and non-state armed groups.23

There can be two kinds of joint implementation:

**Joint Programming at the Local Level**

This report provides examples of joint programming such as a community policing projects in Pakistan, in which local populations work with the police to report threats and hold perpetrators to account or DDR programmes in Mozambique, DRC, and Afghanistan, in which civil society innovated new models of joint implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The case study on private companies and community-based security in Tanzania also shows how, members of local communities, police and business representatives developed and implemented a security strategy at a mining site.

**National Peace Infrastructures**

National Peace Infrastructures are permanent institutionalized mechanisms that enable civil society and security sector on all levels to address the occurrence of violence. The National Peace Councils in Ghana provide the best example for such an infrastructure. They show how
local peace committees work to provide early warning and address local tensions. In the case of escalation, the infrastructure provides recourse mechanisms at the regional, national and also military level. The National Peace Council in Kenya is another example of a peace infrastructure that has also successfully stopped the escalation of election-related violence.

**Joint Institutional Oversight**

Joint institutional oversight provides institutional mechanisms for accountability, monitoring and evaluation of the security sector including official, institutional platforms for civil society involvement. They represent a new generation of oversight mechanisms that complement the watchdog and protest functions mentioned earlier by enabling civil society and security forces to build long-term institutional relationships and trust. In Guatemala for example, the UN-brokered peace plan enshrines accountability mechanisms for civil society to provide oversight to all areas of the security sector, including intelligence, military, police, criminal justice and national security policy formulation. In the Philippines, a new permanent civil society oversight platform allows civil society to meet monthly with security sector at the national and regional level to identify security challenges, formulate joint strategies and monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector. This permanent institutional engagement between civil society and security sectors is the ultimate guarantee of an accountable, democratic state response to violence and a “whole of society” approach to human security. In Burundi, two civil society representatives participated in the National Defence Review, serving as official representatives to help monitor and evaluate the reform process.

Most states are still reluctant to set up permanent institutional structures to enable civil society oversight. Dialogue and coordination and joint implementation are thus second-best options that enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programmes and complement civilian government oversight in order to ensure local ownership in the security sector and thus human security for all citizens.

**Capacity Building**

Capacity building for both the security sector and civil society is necessary to enable them to reach each of these levels of local ownership. A lack of capacity can often represent a major obstacle to building an effective working relationship. Traditional security sector training programmes do not include raising awareness of civic roles and responsibilities nor dialogue and consensus-building skills such as communication, negotiation, mediation and facilitation. Civil society also rarely has the opportunity to increase their knowledge about traditional national security approaches.

This report documents the efforts of peacebuilding CSOs to provide training to civil society groups and security forces, so that both sides have the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively coordinate human security programs. Joint trainings are particularly effective in preparing security forces and civil society for joint problem solving. When civil society representatives and security sectors are gathered in the same classroom, they may often experience the very first institutional opportunity to meet. Interactive training curricula that favour discussions and interactive exercises will enable the participants to already start building common ground and increase their understanding and appreciation for each other, before their formal joint problem-solving process starts. As of now, opportunities for joint training for both civil society and the security sector are still rare.

The “Handbook for Civil-Military-Police Coordination for Human Security,” which is a companion to this report tries to fill the gap in curriculums for joint training. Building on the insights of the case studies listed here as well as existing curriculums for separate trainings, it provides modules for joint training enabling civil society and security sector to learn shared terminology and appreciate their differences as well as their common ground.

Ideally, capacity building can support a planning cycle where governments, security forces, and civil society learn how to jointly identify human security threats, design and implement human
security strategies, and then monitor and evaluate the impact of these strategies together. Dialogue and consultation, joint implementation, and joint institutional oversight all contribute to this planning cycle. Together, these joint activities create opportunities for strengthening the state-society relationship and ensuring human security.

**A Peacebuilding Approach to Local Ownership**

Peacebuilding analytical tools, values, skills and processes help to support all the big ideas discussed in this chapter: legitimate state-society relations, human security, security sector reform and development (SSR/D), local ownership and civil society oversight of the security sector, and civil society-military-police coordination.

In a parallel way, this report illustrates how civil society uses peacebuilding processes to navigate a state-society relationship that can support human security.

Peacebuilding organizations work to advocate and support more robust levels of local ownership. The case studies in this report all illustrate inspiring efforts of how peacebuilding CSOs are playing a mediating role to engage in governments, police, military and local communities in order to achieve dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or joint institutional oversight to improve human security.

Peacebuilding includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national, and international levels to address the immediate impacts and root causes of conflict before, during, and after violent conflict occurs. Peacebuilding values, skills and processes such as dialogue, negotiation, and mediation support human security. Peacebuilding includes activities designed to prevent conflict through addressing structural and proximate causes of violence, promoting sustainable peace, delegitimization of violence as a dispute resolution strategy, building capacity within society to peacefully manage disputes, and reduce vulnerability to triggers of violence.24

From the various case studies in this report, some common principles of peacebuilding have emerged. They characterize the approach that pioneering CSOs have taken in order to strengthen local ownership in the security sector and thus advance human security. They include:

**Peacebuilding Analysis: Root Causes**

Peacebuilding stands apart from other approaches to armed conflict because it focuses on the lack of legitimate, democratic governance as a root cause of violence. Other approaches focus less on structures and more on individuals or groups as the cause of violence. Conflict assessment frameworks emerging out of the field of peacebuilding can help to improve shared understanding of security challenges. Such a shared analysis of violence between diverse stakeholders in the security sector as well as civil society is necessary to enable multi-stakeholder coordination for human security.

**Peacebuilding Values: Respect and Trust**

Security forces and civil society can jointly advance human security when both groups respect each other as human beings, even though they may distrust or disagree with each other on issues. Mutual respect is a fundamental peacebuilding value. Focusing on relationships does not mean to accept or accommodate adversarial interests. A peacebuilding approach does not back away from conflicts or tensions. It is "hard on the problems, but soft on the people." This means that it encourages individuals to distinguish between opinions and the persons who hold the opinion. It encourages them to criticize ideas or reject types of behaviour, while maintaining an appreciation for the person behind it. Such an attitude is the pre-requisite for building strong and sustainable relationships and trust.
Peacebuilding skills and processes enable women and men in civil society and the security sector to understand each other’s interests. Peacebuilding forums for dialogue and consultation, joint implementation and joint civil society oversight enable both groups to jointly solve problems. A lack of contact and communication between civil society and security forces increases tensions and decreases their ability to understand how to support human security.

Individuals and CSOs engaging in peacebuilding are often known for their ability to facilitate dialogue processes and build consensus. They are able to help diverse stakeholders to either come to an agreement or agree on a disagreement. They guide people through a dialogue process. They help participants to communicate with each other effectively and ensure that all stakeholder’s interests and perspectives are heard. They ensure that the results of joint meetings are constructive and that there are no communications break downs, for example when participants walk out of the meeting due to arising conflict. They help create a safe space by setting ground rules or guidelines to keep dialogue participants focused on listening to and working with each other. Peacebuilders are “process experts” rather than experts on a subject area. They keep a dialogue focused, help participants consider a variety of views, and summarize group discussions. They model active listening and respectful speaking. Facilitators and mediators help groups explore similarities and differences of opinion.

Peacebuilding Evaluation: Measuring changes in attitudes, behaviours, and knowledge
One last unique characteristic of a peacebuilding approach is its ability to measure changes in attitudes as well as behaviours and knowledge. CSOs usually measure human security, at least in large part, by the perceptions of safety held by civilians, including women who might experience different types of threats and violence. Do men and women feel safer? Are men and women able to work, travel, and live in their homes without fear of violence? If they do not feel safe, which parts of society do they see as a threat and why? A common peacebuilding indicator of human security is to measure whether the public perceives security forces as "protectors" and not "predators." Such indicators show how that dualistic stereotypes may have transformed, as adversarial attitudes have turned into cooperative ones and discriminating social norms into more egalitarian thinking.

To measure changes in beliefs and values, CSOs develop context-specific indicators that they develop based on their knowledge of the factors that caused mistrust between perpetrators and victims. For example, in the DRC where rape was often committed close to water sources, Search for Common Ground would ask civilian interviewees questions such as “Would you feel confident going to water sources if there are military vehicles in the area?” or they would ask soldiers questions such as “do you feel that to be a strong man you need to beat your own wife?” or "how would you interact with a civilian at a road block?"

Since these perceptions evolve constantly, especially in situations where conflict is still ongoing, assessment has to happen almost on a continuous basis. In DRC, Search for Common Ground monitored awareness and perceptions through pre- and post-project surveys, baseline and evaluations at the 12, 18, and 24-month stages.

The case studies in the following chapters will all reflect these principles to varying degrees. They will show how they can be put into practice in different areas of the security sector to enable civil society leaders and security sector to find joint solutions to problems of human security.

Creating Entry Points to Local Ownership
Local ownership in security cannot be built overnight. Changing attitudes and setting up adequate oversight mechanisms takes time and requires a strong commitment from both sides. Security sector reform and development requires “decade thinking” and looking beyond one-year programming. The political environment, historical legacies, or short-term oriented donor policies may all represent obstacles for achieving meaningful and long-term local ownership.
Nevertheless, the civil society organizations showcased in this report were able to set up initiatives for joint action even if the systemic conditions were not promising. They were able to create entry-points to local ownership that could extend into increased engagement in wider areas and strengthen institutionalized cooperative mechanisms. Joint activities that are particularly useful as entry points are:

**Community Policing Programmes**
Community policing programmes are a low-cost entry point to wider efforts to improve local ownership in the security sector. One key advantage of community-based policing initiatives is that they require relatively little resources. Since local staff rather than foreign experts run them, costs related to salary are relatively low and no sophisticated equipment is required. These initiatives provide a low-cost opportunity to change local attitudes and increase trust between the state and civil society. Peacebuilding groups can build on the cooperative networks that these projects establish in order to work on other reform areas such as issues related to reducing Small Arms and Light Weapons, implementing DDR programs, creating external oversight bodies or transforming existing legal frameworks.

**Capacity Building Programmes**
The case studies showed the need for capacity building in both civil society and in the security sector as a key prerequisite for local ownership. Learning about different stakeholder’s roles and responsibilities and acquiring skills for effectively engaging in coordination is a necessary first step for civil society and the security sector when they want to begin working together on human security. Many of the capacity building examples illustrate that training can prepare civil society and the security sector to work together by building shared understanding and interpersonal relationships. In the Burundi Leadership Training Program, for example, scenario-based training provided skills for listening and negotiating effectively, but also a forum that enabled key leaders to interact and build trust that increased their ability to then work together on security governance. This was also true in the Philippines, where an initial one-time training was the gateway to a sustained and institutionalized relationship between the security sector and civil society that included regular dialogue, joint problem solving and institutionalized civil society oversight of the security sector. Training can serve to create relationships and trust on a small scale.

**National Dialogues**
National dialogues such as those held in Guinea and Senegal provide the security sector and civil society a first opportunity to meet and exchange views. They enable both sides to learn about each other and jointly identify security challenges and responses. The case studies of Yemen and Libya also show how national dialogues can increase local ownership by providing civil society an opportunity to express their voice. They are a necessary step to achieve a national consensus on a vision for how security, justice and other key elements of governance will evolve.

**Need to Go Beyond Entry-Point Initiatives**
Although entry-points are helpful in building first contact and establishing trust, the case studies show how peacebuilding organizations work hard to go beyond the entry-level and increase the ability of the security sector to coordinate with civil society while increasing the commitments of national governments and donors to local ownership. The case studies in this report show how peacebuilding organizations use training to also engage in other areas of work, such as operational programmes aimed at setting up consultative processes, joint initiatives, or advocacy at different levels in order to create real and sustainable change.

Most donors only want to fund isolated trainings at the country level without putting the structures in place for on-going coaching and relationships that enable on-going learning. Moreover donors may fund initial training programs, but then move onto the next crisis. In
many contexts, training only represents the “lowest-hanging fruit.” But training is not a fix-all solution or an end in itself.

Capacity building can serve as a veneer to cover over systemic problems such as corrupt behaviour that enables individuals or corporations to profit from security threats and priorities or different security strategies. If motivated by political or economic interests, the security sector resists governance initiatives that entail civil society oversight, but they may be more willing to commit to short-sighted “train and equip” programmes that enable them to keep the existing power structures in place.

Peacebuilding organizations working on community-based policing initiatives make great efforts to embed their programmes into wider policies and practices on local, district and national level. They are advocating for institutional structures and guarantees on all levels of government so that these programmes can be adopted on a wider and more regular scale and be aligned with other security sector reforms, such as improvements of court procedures, prison reforms, DDR programs, or vetting mechanisms. The level of local ownership in the security sector will always depend on the ability to institutionalize isolated community policing projects that are isolated and limited in duration and make the accompanying structures of these projects more inclusive and accountable.

Peacebuilding organizations working on national dialogue also make a great effort in helping civil society to play a more permanent and institutional role in national security policy-making and programming. They provide civil society participants with civic education, set up mechanisms to deepen dialogue on issues that are difficult to resolve and provide other support structures mechanisms that increase the potential of the national dialogues to result in institutionalized joint action and a permanent oversight role for civil society.

The case studies in this report bring to light a peacebuilding approach to local ownership that encourages shared understanding of human security challenges and strategies, as well as joint implementation, monitoring and evaluation in order to achieve accountability. They show civil society working to encourage and increase direct and constructive two-way exchanges in individual or multiple phases of security sector policy-making and programming in order to find joint solutions to human security challenges.
Training has a number of functions related to local ownership in security. Training plays a role in capacity building for both civil society and security forces to enable basic understanding, shared terminology, and skills necessary to work together. While real reform and transformation of the security sector often takes 20 years, training is a shorter-term intervention with limited impact. Without sustained institutional support and change, and robust consultation and participation in designing human security-oriented strategies with civilians, training is unlikely to make an impact. In Burundi, training in conflict management and leadership for the security sector was pitched as a “slice of SSR” – it enables and supports broader SSR/D processes. But in practice, building capacity and trust through training first can set a foundation that led to institutional change.

Training also plays a role in building trust and relationships between civil society and security forces. Training often is a starting point, enabling dialogue, problem solving and more advanced levels of joint coordination for human security. Most of the case studies in this section of the report document how civil society is providing training to security forces to help them improve their community engagement strategies. However, in the section on Community Policing and DDR for example, civil society organizations provided training to community members to prepare them to dialogue and coordinate effectively with security forces.

For all the attention to the democratization of security forces, protection of civilians and civic assistance, there are relatively few training courses for the military and police to learn about civil society or for civil society to understand and relate to the security sector. All stakeholders need a shared set of terminology, concepts, skills and abilities for civil society-military-police coordination to support human security. While the UN provides training for humanitarian civil-military coordination, this is only for humanitarian assistance. Formal, institutionalized training to enable civil-military-police coordination to support a broader approach to human security is still rare.

**Training for Security Sector**

Security sector training programmes are requesting training on a range of topics that relate to civil society or what some countries refer to as “the human aspects of military operations” including civil-military coordination, protection of civilians, negotiation, governance, trauma, civic assistance, conflict assessment, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Some military training centres already offer training on some topics. But often there are no civilians involved in writing the materials, and the terms and definitions used often do not reflect the perspectives of civil society. Some police training centres have begun to include and expand training on community policing, problem-solving policing and restorative justice. But these approaches are not yet widely accepted.

Military and police community engagement strategies, where the security sector aims to build relationships with the community, requires capacity building to help the military and police understand civil society and their approaches to human security. Many military and police training programme focus mostly on the use of force against an “enemy” or “criminal” and their concept of who civilians are can often be negative or hostile. In some countries, security forces
have been taught in trainings that civilians are inferior to military personnel. Security forces have even been encouraged to take anything they need from civilians with statements such as “civilians are the field for the military to harvest.” Although training programmes may mention the necessity to protect civilians, they rarely teach the specific skills that are required to relate, communicate, and coordinate with civil society to support human security. So, any curriculum or training programme will need to provide these skills while also taking into account security sector views of civilians. If these latter are the source of mistrust, they must be transformed so that trust between the security sector and civilians can increase.

Training for Civil Society
In order for local people to participate in security-related analysis and problem solving, they must be able to understand the security sector’s roles and responsibilities. In some countries, civil society organizations attend educational conferences or workshops led by the military or police, to learn more about the security sector. Civil society educational programmes in universities and NGOs often teach peacebuilding and human security-related courses. But few have courses on understanding the military or police mandate and operational procedures, or learning how to use peacebuilding processes to improve communication and coordination between civil society and the security sector. Civil society requires more training and education to understand the mandate and capabilities of security forces, to understand how to leverage these capabilities where appropriate, and to communicate support requirements in a way that avoids unintended consequences such as increasing attacks against civilians. Training for civil society can also provide an idea of what “success” looks like in terms of democratic state-society relations and successful SSR/D.

Many civil society organizations are involved in providing training to security forces (see list of training topics here). While human security depends on fruitful civil-military-police understanding and coordination, a lack of opportunities for integrated, multi-stakeholder training and dialogue inhibits these goals. Integrated training between security policymakers, security forces, and civil society can help identify common ground in national security and human security perspectives and also help people recognize the areas where their approaches are different. This can allow cooperation in overlapping areas while appreciating the need for independence to protect the safety of civil society.

Joint Training for Civil Society and Security Sector
Currently, few opportunities for joint training for both civil society and the security sector exist. The military and police tend to think of security as their job alone. And civil society tends to distrust the military and police. The few that do exist tend to be run by civil society. Of the case studies documented in this report, joint training for the military, police and civil society is seen as an important tool for building confidence. Many of the case studies that include joint training

Training Topics

Conflict Assessment: Understand the causes and dynamics of conflict and violence

Democratic State-Society Relations: Understand the role of security forces and civil society

Civilian Harm Mitigation: Prevent, mitigate, count, & respond to civilian casualties

Protection of Civilians: Identify legal frameworks and civilian and military roles to protect civilians

Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination: Identify civilian and military obligations and guidelines

Civilian Assistance: Support development, governance, rule of law, etc.

Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Address drivers of conflict and support dialogue, negotiation, and mediation

Trauma and Stress: Build resilience to stress and trauma

Civilian Oversight: Build joint institutional mechanisms to monitor and evaluate security sector accountability and performance
report that including space for groups of security forces and civilians to identify and then challenge their stereotypes of each other builds trust between participants in the training.

The “Handbook for Civil-Military-Police Coordination for Human Security” is a companion to this report precisely because it fills a gap. It provides a joint training curriculum where civil society and security sector learn shared terminology, appreciate their differences as well as their common ground, and learn how to coordinate their assessments, planning, assistance, and protection activities related to human security. Many of the case studies in this section illustrate how a civil society organization created a safe space for training for both the community and security sector leaders. Often designed by universities, think tanks, or religious organizations, joint training programmes create unique opportunities for new ways of thinking about human security.

The Philippines: Civil Society-Military-Police Capacity Building

Written with Ariel Hernandez, Myla Leguro, Deng Gigiento, Chito Generoso and Jon Rudy

Following a long period of brutal colonial rule by first Spain and then the United States, Philippine government policies of martial law and authoritarianism correlated with increasing accusations of human rights abuses by military forces and a decline in civilian control of the military. Under these repressive and corrupt influences, internal insurgency movements grew, the main ones being The Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

An increasingly emboldened civil society opposition to authoritarianism led to a broad-based democratic movement of “people power” that ultimately toppled President Marcos in 1986. Ultimately, civil society-military cooperation contributed toward making the transition to a democratic political system. While foreign security assistance programmes for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) concentrated on train and equip programmes aimed to enable counterinsurgency, Filipino civil society organizations identified the military and police as critical stakeholders in the peace process and reached out to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to begin dialogue.

With a robust and highly skilled civil society, the Philippines became one of the first countries where civil society peacebuilding organizations began to reach out to the military and police to offer training and advice on building peace. A number of Filipino civil society groups have taken part in large-scale capacity building in peacebuilding values, skills, and processes for thousands of military officials, staff, and civilian reserve forces in the Philippines in conflict assessment, facilitation, mediation, negotiation, building a culture of peace and other conflict transformation strategies.

Like most other Filipino civil society groups, Balay Mindanaw had no intention to work with the military when they began their peacebuilding work in 1996. The director of Balay Mindanaw, Ariel (Ayi) Hernandez, first learned to know military officers in a leadership development program. “While all I heard about the military before was their abuses, here I was talking face to face with soldiers who are willing to change, willing to help improve our people’s lot,” Hernandez recalls. In particular, Hernandez built a relationship with then Colonel Raymundo B. Ferrer. Balay Mindanao reached out to the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute to begin discussion on training the military in peacebuilding.
Initial Civil Society Training for Military Officers

The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) was set up as a training ground for civil society in 2000. When military personnel applied to take courses, there was at first resistance. MPI faculty worried that admitting military personnel into their courses might affect the safety of other participants, or would change the dynamic of the learning environment, intimidating other students. There was also concern that the military wanted to spy on NGOs attending the training, to gather intelligence.

Trainers at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute had previous negative experiences with military forces. Lead trainer Deng Giguiento from Catholic Relief Services, had been on a fact-finding mission in North Catobato, Philippines when soldiers stopped her. The soldiers were drunk and had removed their nametags, so they could not be identified. Six pointed their guns at Giguiento, pushing the rifle barrels into her dress. Giguiento was subsequently hesitant about letting military personnel take her course on conflict transformation. However, other MPI faculty had more positive experiences with soldiers. Another MPI trainer Rudy Rodil (aka Ompong) had been part of a government panel that negotiated a truce with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and had seen, through that process, that soldiers could become respectful and skilled peacebuilders. One particular Filipino military leader was the first to seek training in peacebuilding. Balay Mindanao and another Filipino NGO Pakigdait, whose story is told later in this report, vouched for the good relationship they had developed with then Col Ferrer. As a result of civil society advocating on behalf of their military colleagues, Giguiento agreed to let Colonel Ferrer into her course on conflict transformation.

MPI staff set strict ground rules for military personnel attending MPI: "no guns, no uniforms, no bodyguards, no ranks, just the participants’ first and last names would be used, and no intelligence gathering." Military personnel learned side by side with civilians working for civil society organizations. The mixed workshops were opportunities for the military to engage with groups that they don't usually engage with such as Muslim peace advocates, grassroots peace leaders, and young peace activists. This allowed for breaking down stereotypes, and developing relationships between civil society and military personnel. Ferrer helped to ease civil society's anxiety by listening closely to other participants, not interrupting others, and demonstrating respect through all his interactions.

Balay Mindanao, the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute faculty, Catholic Relief Services and other Filipino civil society groups planned follow up after these initial trainings. Civil society invited trained military officials to become members of province-based networks of peacebuilders. Various groups established follow-up structures as support mechanisms for the trained military men and women. The support mostly comes informally through follow-up conversations, phone calls, and texts. Formal strategies included the conduct of regular meetings, inviting trained military personnel into local peace networks, and civil society visits to military camps. Local level initiatives between military commanders, local leaders, and communities included joint community-based
peacebuilding efforts such as local zones of peace, local dialogue between warring parties at the village levels, and community development projects. Key leaders in civil society began reframing their perspective of the military from an enemy to a partner in supporting the peace process.

**Expanding the “Soldiers for Peace” Approach**

Colonel Ferrer continued to reach out to Filipino civil society groups working in peace, development and human rights after he received training at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute. His promotion to Brigadier General came along with the title of “Peace General” because of his peace leadership and negotiation skills. Recognizing the history of bad relations and military abuses, Ferrer sought to involve soldiers in acts of atonement and reparation.

Referring to stories of human rights abuses, Ferrer recognized: “Admittedly, we had become part of the problem in the conflict in Mindanao.” The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had used brute force against armed opposition groups in deterring violence. But the more force
used, the more people joined armed opposition groups. Meanwhile, government services reached only main cities. In recognizing the roots of civilian distrust, Balay Mindanaw and General Ferrer began designing a joint project to provide peacebuilding and conflict management training workshops for the officers and soldiers of the 1st Infantry “Tabak” Division with the goal of deescalating the violence in Mindanao. Ferrer committed his entire division to Balay Mindanaw’s Operation Peace Course (also known as “OP KORs”). Balay Mindanao’s President Kaloy Manlupig supported the project, recognizing that peacebuilding requires involving the security sector, which was at the centre of peace and security issues in the Philippines. Manlupig quoted Albert Einstein, “No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.” Trained for war fighting, working for peace would at first glance appear to be contradictory. For transformation to happen in the security sector, security forces needed a new approach. Soldiers needed to learn communication skills so they could deescalate and defuse conflicts through active listening, dialogue, negotiation and mediation processes.

Balay Mindanaw began offering three levels of training in response to Brigadier General Ferrer’s interest in expand the training of soldiers for peace:

- A two-day course for senior officers, since they can only be absent from their command for a maximum of 3 days;
- A five-day course for junior officers, some of whom were trained as trainers so they could take the lessons to their respective battalions, companies and units;
- A five-day course for non-commissioned officers at the community level. This included training members of the volunteer Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs).

Balay Mindanaw also carried out policy advocacy. First, Balay Mindanaw attempted to institutionalize the peacebuilding and conflict management skills courses in all of the formal academic institutions in the Department of National Defence and the Armed Forces. Second, Balay Mindanaw aimed to change the doctrine of the basis of promotion for the soldiers, so that they would be rewarded for the peace leadership and not just for how many enemies were killed or captured, or how many weapons surrendered or captured.

Through the training and Ferrer’s leadership, soldiers in violence-prone Basilan province improved their relationships with local civilians and worked side by side with them to build houses and water supply systems. Ferrer questioned why his troops had been taught to scowl at people and “to put on a fierce face.” He encouraged soldiers to smile at people and to greet them with respect. Ferrer wanted paramilitary troops to be “peace multipliers” not “force multipliers.” And slowly his efforts yielded results. People began going to the security forces with their concerns rather than running away from them when they drove to their community. BMI’s colourful report called “Soldiers for Peace” includes photographs and stories of the impact of training for the military in peacebuilding. For example:
The Army’s 403rd Infantry “Peacemakers” Brigade arranged a ceremony for a return to the community for 22 members of the New People’s Army. Living a life of abject poverty in a remote village far from government services, the young men had been easy recruits to the NPA, who promised them a right to self-determination if they took up arms to topple the government. Recognizing the power of offering respect to each human being, regardless of their identity, the Army did not use the more common term of a “surrender” ceremony. They issued an apology to the 22 former NPA members, noting that the Army had committed human rights abuses against their people. Then Army officers helped the NPA to reintegrate, often by pushing civilian government officers to do their job in providing medical care.

Foot soldiers are now perceived as being more respectful in their dealings with people. Police and military officers have started to help mediate large and small conflicts in the communities; including defusing local disputes over land. When the public calls on security forces to respond, police or military soldiers trained in mediation use these skills rather than use force.

When a German national and his three Filipino companions were kidnapped in North Cotabato, Philippines, military officers who were in the midst of attending a peacebuilding course at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute pursued dialogue with the kidnappers by contacting the police, local government officials, peace negotiators and the MILF instead of sending troops after the kidnappers. The victims were freed within 6 hours.31

**Training for Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units**

While much of the civil society training for the military focused on the southern, Mindanao region of the Philippines and emphasized top-level military leaders, another group was focusing on training in the northern region. Like other Filipino leaders, the Interfaith Center for Conciliation and Nonviolence (ICCN) viewed a strong partnership between the military and key government service delivery units as main factor to reduce the level of dissatisfaction of the people. ICCN encouraged strong collaboration – especially in the operational level - between the civilian government and the military. This would help ‘capacitate’ civilian units to allow them to handle local peace and order problems without dependence on the military.

From 2010 to 2013, ICCN under the direction of Chito Generoso, partnered with the Office of the Presidential Adviser to the Peace Process (OPAPP), and the Philippine Army’s Civil-Military Operations Office (G3) on a project to train select CAFGUs (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units) and their commanders to support peace and human security in armed conflict affected areas. ICCN’s trainings for these paramilitary groups included conflict transformation, alternative dispute resolution, and mediation in ten CAFGU Battalion camps in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, with a focus on trainees from detachments from remote villages not easily accessible for government services.

In the Cordillera region in particular, local government units led an initiative to use mediation to address local conflicts that drive violence between state and non-state armed groups. In 2011 at Lagawe, Ifugao, the Provincial Governor, with UNDP support, formally organized and launched one hundred and six (106) mediators, consisting of local government officials, line-agency employees, civil society organization members, policemen, and security personnel as the “Ifugao Mediators Club.”
Israel and Palestine: Training Security Forces in Negotiation
Written with Noah Salameh

The Oslo Agreement of 1994 instigated a two-fold process. First, it launched Palestinian security sector reform (SSR) aimed to protect Palestinians and serve as pillar of statehood. Second, it mandated Israeli and Palestinian security forces to work together in border regions, jointly supervising various bridges and boundaries.

The Palestinian security forces were chosen for their loyalty to the Palestinian cause. Many were former prisoners. They were trained and equipped in the use of force, but not provided with skills for working with civil society. In spite of their loyalty to their people, and their passion to help, they lacked knowledge on how to engage effectively with civil society.

Like the Israeli and Palestinian populations at large, Israeli and Palestinian security forces have a history of antagonism and violence. They had little opportunity to meet each other and understand little about the other’s culture, experiences and perceptions. This caused tensions and problems with the civilians crossing these checkpoints between Gaza and Israel and between the West Bank and Jordan. Israeli and Palestinian security forces need communication skills and conflict resolution skills to deal with the public and with each other.

A number of local initiatives responded to these challenges. Between 1996 and 1999 several freelance conflict resolution trainers set up a programme to train Palestinian police, security forces, and government employees on how to better relate with the public. The programme was led by the Palestine Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR), an interfaith centre that provides peacebuilding education programmes to a variety of audiences, including the police, security forces, and government employees, in collaboration with PANORAMA, a Palestinian NGO focused on democracy and civil society, and the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights. Its purpose was to improve relationships between Palestinian security forces and Palestinian civil society.

In Hebron, Bethlehem, Abu Dis, Jericho, and Ramallah the trainers reached at least 200 Palestinian members of the security forces. The programme focused first on facilitating an internal dialogue between the different factions in the security forces, to help them learn to understand each other and coordinate with each other. The training included an introduction to conflict resolution skills and methods, a self-assessment to reflect on their...
own motivations and behaviours and how these impact the public, a discussion of the impact of internal conflicts within the Palestinian security forces on the public, and an exercise on improving relations with the public.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1998-1999, a separate programme brought together Israeli and Palestinian security forces mandated to manage a 24-hour a day border checkpoint at Allenby bridge at the Jordanian border and at Karmy bridge between Gaza and Israel. Given the history of conflict and animosity, this programme aimed to improve the relationships between Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The CCRR and the Israeli Centre for Negotiation and Mediation designed a model of training material course for 40 hours, co-facilitated and co-trained with one Palestinian and one Israeli facilitator. Senior officers on both sides also attended the course.

The officers had little information about each other’s habits, values and general culture other than the negative rumours and stereotypes each side held of the other. Given the lack of trust and understanding, it was difficult for them to work with each other. This course focused on ways to resolve daily conflicts between the two sides, including communication skills and cross-cultural understanding to change the image each side has of the other. The training began with basic trust building. Facilitators helped participants understand the experiences and perceptions that shaped each person’s understanding and behaviour emphasizing their shared humanity. Each participant was given the opportunity to introduce their culture and values to the others. These courses were the first opportunity for those officers to get to know each other and to learn how each side sees the other. All participants and their ranking officers reported a great interest in these courses, and a commitment to continue attending it. Participants indicated that their relationship with each other has changed after taking this course, and the way they were dealing with each other also changed and became better.\textsuperscript{33}

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\caption{Photo 6: Joint training for Palestinian and Israeli security forces. Photo credit: Noah Salameh}
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South Africa: Building Capacity for Human Security

South Africa is perhaps the most important case study of successful, locally owned peacebuilding and human security. Intensive training and coaching of South African leaders in negotiation, mediation and conflict analysis supported the intense transition from apartheid to political democracy. Local level peacebuilding efforts added up to national-level peacebuilding. As one of the most inspiring success stories of locally-led peacebuilding, South Africa’s independent and highly skilled civil society played important roles in both local and high-level negotiation and mediation processes. Growing out of this experience, South Africans are now in a position to assist in peaceful transitions to democracy in other countries through the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ACCORD takes a non-sectarian, independent stance to advance human security.

ACCORD’s Training for Peace (TfP) Programme began in 1995 to build the capacity of civil society and the security sector in peacebuilding, particularly in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and countries in the South African Development Community (SADC), but also further afield in Europe and elsewhere. ACCORD runs the TfP programme in collaboration with The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria; the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra; and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo.

Approximately 7000 civilians, police and military – many currently serving in UN and African peace operations – have been trained through the TfP Programme, and about 300 publications have been produced, encompassing research papers, books, reports, manuals, readers and handbooks.

The TfP Programme's primary purpose is to significantly improve the civilian capacity of African states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) / Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to prepare, plan, manage and monitor multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Africa. This is done through a combination of training, applied research and policy development, towards:

- Building civilian capacity for AU and UN peace operations;
- Contributing towards the development of a multi-dimensional and integrated approach to African peace operations;
- Assisting the AU and the RECs/RMs in the development of the civilian structures of their standby forces and PLANELMs; and
- Creating awareness on the civilian dimension of the ASF.

Training of civilian and police peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel take place in “classrooms, boardrooms, in halls of power and the African bush” with a focus on conflict analysis, negotiation and mediation, the role of civilians, particularly women, in peace and security. ACCORD works closely with the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (AFDEM), whose role is to provide the link between training and deployment. Graduates of the TfP are screened and placed on AFDEM's standby roster. AFDEM also facilitates deployment to UN or African peace operations, UN agencies or civil society organizations.

ACCORD also takes part in gender mainstreaming and integrating the women, peace and security agenda in peace operations, having over two decades of practical experience in peacekeeping and the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (See Fiji case study on women, peace and security in this report). ACCORD facilitates capacity building for women to understand the UN

The challenge:
Peacekeeping missions in Africa often lack capable people to support peacebuilding, especially women leaders.

Theory of change:
Build the capacity of leaders, especially women, at all levels and support civilian components of peacekeeping.
Secretary General’s Senior Women Talent Pipeline Project (SWTP) that aims to increase the number of senior level women in peacekeeping missions.

The first phase of the project led to the identification of 64 women for the Pipeline and deployment of 4 senior women to UN peace operations in the areas of Political Affairs, Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Civil Affairs, Public Information and Communication. The second phase rolled out in November 2014, with an emphasis on French and Arabic speakers, and led to an additional 27 women joining the Pipeline. As part of the third phase of the project begun in May 2015, ACCORD/TfP is working with the UN to identify and train more women to apply to top-level UN peacekeeping missions. ACCORD also plays roles in training UN and African Union staff in gender sensitivity to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and protection of men, women, boys and girls.

ACCORD’s Peacekeeping Unit focuses on improving the capability and professionalism of UN Civil Affairs; the development of a strategic framework on protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations; clarifying the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus; and enhancing civilian capacities. It has specifically focused on civil affairs, and has conducted research to understand the specific context and needs of Civil Affairs Officers. The Unit conducts specialized tailored in-mission conflict management training courses and supports the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) in the roll out of the Civil Affairs Skills Training Methodology. It has also developed a Civil Affairs Handbook (launched in April 2012) that serves as a reference guide for (Civil Affairs) Officers in the field.

Photo 7: South African service members with community members.
Photo Credit: SPC Taryn Hagerman, Wikimedia Commons
Brazil: Civil-Military-Police Joint Training

Written by Thiago Rodrigues

Civil-military relations and security sector reform in the Caribbean and Latin America face distinct challenges. During Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, the conqueror’s military forces used a strategy of pacification to put down rebellions and to control or even to destroy native peoples. Afterwards, this repressive attitude toward society continued, defining most of the history of military-civil society relations in Latin America. Yet in general, since the 1980s, there has been a transition away from military-led governments toward greater democracy and citizen participation in all aspects of public life. Latin American governments are increasingly working together on regional issues, particularly in response to regional challenges of trafficking in drugs, weapons and people.

Civil-military relations in the Caribbean and Latin America are distinct from Western countries in a variety of ways, due to a different historical evolution of the security forces and different governance arrangements. Since 2012, there has been an effort to build up a civil society network of university scholars and NGOs to work with military officers to improve civil-military relations in the Caribbean and Latin America. This “Military and Security in Latin America and the Caribbean” network aims to produce an overview on the recent experience of safety, different reports, and possibilities to create a human security/human rights oriented policy. It has been mostly a joint effort spread among military and scholars.

Brazilian efforts to use universities as an intermediary to provide a safe space for civil-military-police dialogue on issues of public safety and national security could eventually spread throughout the region. Formulas that connect civilian scholars, civilian graduate programs and military graduate courses – or even hybrid graduate programmes – have been part of this recent Brazilian experience. If analysed in its first outcomes, and adapted respecting local dynamics and expertise, this model could be translated more widely in Latin America, using this kind of cooperation established with military schools.

Photo 8: Rio Do Janeiro/Favéla. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Brazil itself has assisted in SSR/D efforts in other countries such as Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, and Timor-Leste, both bilaterally and through organizations such as the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). Yet as with other countries assisting with SSR, civil-military relations within Brazil and internal SSR/D efforts still need attention.

Within Brazil, the history of military interventions and military rule has created lasting mistrust between the military, police, and civil society. Historically, the military viewed political opposition as "the internal enemy" that must be "eliminated" rather than addressed through democratic processes. While democratization occurred within the government’s political sector, the military and police sector still run based on a model established during the authoritarian regime (1964-1985). This model gives to the military police a primary repressive task in ordinary law enforcement activities and a secondary competence as National Army’s auxiliary troops (exactly the same as during the dictatorship period). In Brazil, each state federal unity in Brazil has its own military police corps. These police corps are militarized in a gendarmerie-like corporation under state Governor’s authority.

On the other hand, the National Army has a contradictory history. Officially, the Army main prerogative is to protect national sovereignty, and as a second level of competence, to act in internal issues such as law enforcement. It means that training and weaponry is geared toward identifying and fighting enemies and not as much on protecting and serving the population.

Nevertheless, Brazil’s military has had a significant role in responding to internal humanitarian crises, such as floods or the recurrent support to minimize desertification effects on vulnerable populations. This degree of competence has increased since the beginning of the deployment of Brazilian troops to lead the security work in UN missions, especially in Haiti (2004 onwards). In preparation for this mission, Brazilian forces trained in urban combat simulations in order to act in Port-au-Prince slums. This experience exposed Brazilian forces to training on UN values and concepts on Protection of Civilians and related concepts.

The Brazilian military experience of policing operations in Haiti could lead to a shift in how the Brazilian military operates side by side in public safety issues within Brazil, particularly in favelas (slums). The Brazilian Ministry of Defence, answering to a formal request by Rio de Janeiro’s Governor, formed two “Pacification Forces” that occupied three sets of slums in two phases, the first one from December 2010 to July 2012, and the second between May 2014 and April 2015. Part of the Army’s troops operating in Rio’s slums included former UN troops in Haiti. Besides that, the operations were connected to a state Military Police programme called Police Pacification Units (UPP) aimed to occupy communities where drug trafficking takes place. There are many questions stemming from this kind of collaboration between the Armed Forces and the Military Police. The memory of the military participation in the so-called “dirty war” against political opposition during the 1960’s and 1970’s ignites a difficult debate among scholars, military staff, politicians, and civil society organizations.

If it is true that the move toward civilian governments in Brazil has opened the door to new conversations on security, Brazilian society has not had practice in participating in security discussions. Brazilian academics point out that in a democratic country, society must think about these issues and provide oversight to ensure that the military is accountable to civilian leadership and the civilian population. On June 20th, 2013, close to 1.5 million people marched in over eighty cities across Brazil in the largest public demonstrations since redemocratization.
in 1985. Then, state Military Police used extreme force on the protestors, indiscriminately using tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets. Political leaders and media portrayed the protests as illegal acts, while civil society perceived the protests as legitimate acts of political opposition. After the Military Police brutality even traditional political parties and the major media turned against the security forces.

In such a context, Brazilian academics and NGOs are trying to build bridges of communication between the military, police and civil society to offer forums for dialogue on the emphasis on public safety versus national security. However, there is an increasing consensus of the importance to discuss these issues more openly among Brazilian society, not only in silos of those directly involved. The educational field seems to be a respected intermediary to provide forums for civil-military-police dialogue. In Brazil, universities can provide a safe space for civil society and the military to interact, and therefore serve as an entry point, whilst overcoming stigma from talking to the military.

The Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) of the Fluminense Federal University, in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro is the first academic institute in Brazil devoted to civil-military relations. ISS opened its doors in 2012 after a ten-year process of consolidation within the Political Sciences Department. Scholars engaged in its creation had a historical involvement with civilian-military issues and had helped to establish organizations such as the Brazilian Association for Defence Studies (ABED), in 2008. ISS has cooperation agreements with high-level military schools in Brazil (Army, Navy, Air Force), with special attention to their graduate courses. Besides that, ISS offers an undergraduate course in International Relations and a postgraduate course devoted to civil-military relations. There are around 20 military officers in the institute, under civilian supervision, and among its professors there are forms military officers.

Following ISS experience, other Universities in Brazil started their own graduate programmes on Strategic Studies or Defence Studies, including the Army’s and Navy's high-level schools based in Rio de Janeiro. The Institute is establishing connections between these two separate worlds in Brazil – the world of the military and police’ and their perspectives on security and the world of civil society and their perspectives on public safety.

**Fiji: Training on Trauma and Conflict Transformation**

*Written with Koila Costello Olsson*

A series of military coups has left Fijians on all sides of the conflict with a sense of trauma and fear. The military and police have suffered in particular. Many of them perpetrated violence when taking part in repressing public protests against the coups. Those who are part of Fiji’s longstanding commitment to UN peacekeeping witnessed or experienced violence when serving in peacekeeping missions in Iraq, Lebanon, Sinai, Golan Heights, Sudan, or Timor Leste. Finally, some of the ex-military personal also committed or suffered from violence when participating as mercenaries/private contractors in other conflicts. Fijian security forces thus had ample exposure to trauma, although it was never addressed institutionally. As in many other cultures, state institutions do not address stress and trauma. This work is left to religious authorities or the individual’s private realm. For the most part, superiors simply taught the forces under their command “be tough” and encouraged them not to let stress or trauma affect them. But given the stressful nature of international military deployments and the tense situations with local communities, institutional leaders recognized they needed better understanding of trauma and stress.

**The challenge**

Trauma and stress impact the wellbeing of many people in society and in the security forces.

**Theory of change:**
Build the capacity of the security sector to understand the impact of trauma and stress on their society.
and ways of handling it.

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) first requested training from civil society organizations to broaden their understanding of conflict analysis, restorative justice and trauma awareness for the Officers Training School in 2003, following the coup in 2000. The Fijian civil society organization called ECREA (Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education, and Advocacy) was tasked with developing a course.

Then after the 2006 coup, they also commissioned training on community engagements. After the coup, a lot more military officers began taking up posts in government. The military was extending their role into policing and often conducting joint military-police operations within Fiji. But relationships between the military and civil society were hostile. NGOs had largely opposed the military coup. Some NGOs had affiliations with political parties. For these reasons, the military largely distrusted NGOs and questioned their funding and motivations. The experience of Fijian forces abroad, primarily in Iraq, and the experience in the coup contributed to a growing concern that on the military and police use of force on Fijian citizens at home. Despite these mixed feelings and perceptions about NGOs, the military again turned to civil society - this time the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding (PCP), a local peacebuilding NGO that works to transform, reduce and prevent conflict in the Pacific - to conduct debriefing sessions with the military, Fiji Police and Fiji Correction Services about their relationships with communities. Their work began in 2007.

Photo 9: Joint training in trauma. Photo Credit: Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding

Both organizations developed an interactive training approach that emphasized relationship building, peacebuilding skills and processes, and whole-of-community participation.

While trauma and stress are not often topics included in peacebuilding training for either civil society or security forces, understanding these concepts and how to develop resilience is necessary for all stakeholders in any context where violence is present. It is important for civil society and security sector personnel to recognize how trauma at work or in the public can translate into violence in the home as well. Trauma can contribute to gender-based violence. Training in trauma awareness can help people understand the cycles of violence and why traumatized people often go on to traumatize others. Training on how to manage stress and trauma can reduce the likelihood of violence, especially between security forces and civil society.
PCP held discussions with military leaders to assess the needs and types of participants who should be invited for a training on trauma awareness and to conduct a context analysis to ensure workshops took into account the needs and interests of all stakeholders. Together they decided to include all branches of security forces, as all groups needed to learn how to interact with civilians by using communication skills like dialogue and negotiation instead of using force. Workshops covered a range of topics, beginning with conflict analysis, to help security forces recognize that there are different ways of perceiving events and that people's behaviours are motivated by their diverse perceptions and experiences. Workshops also included lessons on stress and trauma, as well as conflict transformation skills in dialogue, negotiation and mediation.

Often military and police personnel were directed to come and had no choice in attending and/or had no idea what they were attending. They were very experienced officers who worked in both peacekeeping operations, and logistics. They were mostly Indigenous Fijians or “iTaukei” military personnel. The military's usual mode of instruction was 55-minute lectures, with very little time given for question and answer. Given PCP's recognition that lectures only make a limited impact, PCP's teaching style was elicitive and participatory using a combination of visual and interactive methods that reinforced key ideas.

Growing out of the relationships made in these initial trainings, other joint work with the police became possible. PCP staff works with the Fiji Police Force to teach secondary school students and leaders the value of restorative justice. Restorative justice is a process that holds offenders accountable by directly engaging with the victims or those they have harmed. A dialogue between victim and offender allows for both of them to make amends to each other. Unlike punishments that focus on the motives and sentences for perpetrators, restorative justice focuses on how to recompense victims for the suffering they have experienced. Since Fijian teachers can lose their jobs for improper uses of punishment, teachers and school administrators were eager to learn about restorative justice and come up with alternative options for correcting student behaviours.

When 45 Fijian peacekeepers were kidnapped and held in the Golan Heights by a Syrian rebel group in September 2014, there was concern that anti-Muslim feelings from the kidnapping would increase the possibility of violence toward Indo-Fijians, some of whom are Muslim, in the run up to the National Elections. PCP provided advice to assist the Fijian military on how to handle this situation with the affected families in Fiji until the Fijian peacekeepers were eventually freed.
**US: Training on Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR)**

Experiencing violence causes trauma for individuals, organizations, communities and whole societies, including the security sector. Both victims and perpetrators of violence experience trauma. Trauma affects the body, brain and behaviour, as well as the ability to make meaning or make sense of the world.

Security forces who participate in violence may experience “participation-induced trauma syndrome” and may suffer from “moral injuries” for participating in violence. Psychosocial healing and resilience help people to recover, and are important elements in assisting organizations and societies to function in the aftermath of violence.

In the US, trauma is widespread amongst both military and police personnel. Military personnel returning from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as those in other regions of the world are suffering from high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This affects the communities and families where they return to live as civilians.

Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR) is an educational program, based at Eastern Mennonite University’s Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of leaders and organizations to address trauma, break cycles of violence, and build resilience. The programme began for religious and community leaders in New York and Washington DC after the 11 September 2001 tragedy. The weeklong programme now runs for community leaders all over the world and includes work with the US military. A 2.5-day seminar called “Journey Home from War” was designed to help veterans, primarily from Iraq and Afghanistan, and veteran’s families and communities understand the impact of trauma and how to foster recovery, resilience, and reintegration for veterans returning to their community. Military chaplains also attend.

All trainings include information on the physical, emotional, cognitive, behavioural, and spiritual impact of trauma, awareness on different types of trauma, insights on the brain’s response to trauma, and strategies for coping with trauma and stress.

STAR wanted to help military veterans and their families and communities. But they also had reservations about helping to reduce PTSD symptoms that would allow soldiers to be redeployed, where they would both experience and participate in more trauma for themselves and others. STAR also felt it would be necessary to be as independent as possible, and not work directly under contract with the military. This independence was deemed as important for protecting the relationships STAR trainers have with communities in other parts of the world, who may oppose US military interventions in their countries.

**Mali: Training Military staff on IHL and Human Rights**

Written with Cynthia Petrigh

Historic patterns of distrust between the Malian army and the tribally diverse population following the ending of colonial rule in 1960 contribute to on-going cycles of violence between northern Mali’s Tuareg tribal group, Islamist groups, and the Malian military, which led a military coup in April 2012. International assistance to the Malian military focuses primarily on providing weapons and tactical training. Civilians are often caught in the middle of fighting.
When the European Union Training Mission in Mali’s (EUTM) requested a civilian trainer on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights, the Paris-based civil society organization Beyond Peace was tasked to carry out initial research on military patterns of abuse. Beyond Peace worked with local and international NGOs, human rights groups, and the Malian Ministry of Defence to identify patterns of military forces abuse. Documented accounts of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, use of torture, sexual violence, attacks on civilians, looting, and attacks on schools indicated a systemic lack of attention to protection of civilians and international law.

The Beyond Peace training on IHL and human rights faced a variety of challenges. Most of the Malian forces were illiterate. Soldiers receiving training did not share a common language, though many knew some French. The design of the military training that they were receiving in parallel to Beyond Peace’s course was cumulative, moving from simple to more difficult manoeuvres. The Beyond Peace training on IHL and human rights was on separate topics (such as distinction, proportionality, or treatment of prisoners) making it difficult to build on topics alongside the military training. And finally, there was only one IHL trainer, compared to 185 military trainers. The IHL trainer had to negotiate with military trainers for time allotment and inclusion of key themes into interactive scenario.

To address these challenges, Beyond Peace developed and delivered a 10 week course for 700 Malian military personnel, all men and mostly illiterate, who were preparing for immediate deployment to conduct policing, area control and counterinsurgency. The training focused on IHL and human rights to address these major incidents and prepare them with “right reflexes” when facing fear, hatred and violence, particularly with civilians. The training was not academic or highly technical. The main ideas of key international legal documents were translated into simpler and more accessible concepts that were then practiced in interactive scenarios. Training on IHL and human rights is about sharing values and changing mind-sets. It can only be achieved if the mission itself believes in these values and is ready to challenge its own mind-set.”

To evaluate this training program, Beyond Peace measured the acquisition of knowledge as well as changes to behaviour after deployment. A pre and post-training questionnaire was given on Week 1 and Week 10. Comparative results illustrated improvement on knowledge of IHL and human rights. In addition, trainers met weekly to reflect on group learning objectives and subjective progress in meeting these. Training exercises were adapted to reflect challenges in meeting learning objectives. In addition, the trainer gathered feedback from partners and observers about violations of IHL and human rights. No major violations were reported after the
training, in contrast to the frequent reports of violations before the training. During a refresher course for one of the battalions, soldiers’ anecdotal reports indicated that they had used the IHL and human rights training and that it did change their behaviour in military operations. They indicated their relationship with the local population had improved.

**Burundi Leadership Training Programme**
*Written with Elizabeth McClintock*

Burundi’s complex history and the challenges and flaws in the Arusha peace process motivated conflict management experts to challenge common assumptions about post-agreement peacebuilding processes. Could adversarial politics replace war and violence in a transition to democracy? Could building new institutions lead to stability? Would donor efforts to apply moral and political pressure, combined with legal sanctions, deter further violence or corruption? Local leaders’ attitudes and behaviours needed to shift, especially those leaders in charge of implementing the Arusha Accord. A rational or technical solution was unlikely to work in such a complex conflict where deeply traumatized people held onto deep antagonism toward each other. Capacity building created an opportunity for addressing these challenges in new ways.

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), a Washington think tank and a US-based consulting firm, Conflict Management Partners (CMPartners), collaborated to create the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP). The aim of the BLTP was to build a consensus on the new rules of the game, based on a understanding that the interests of all stakeholders are interdependent and thus, they must work together rather than compete with each other in adversarial politics based on a “winner take all” mentality. The BLTP’s skills-based training curriculum used interactive exercises, simulations, and role-plays, designed to strengthen communication, negotiation, and conflict management skills of Burundi’s leaders and to rebuild the trust necessary to solve problems together. The trainings included both mixed and homogenous groups: the security sector (both Army and Police); political party leaders and government officials; and community-based leaders, including youth.

Participating in a BLTP training was a first step toward building relationships and trust between former enemies. In the first trainings, the facilitators used negotiation case studies from other contexts, which created enough distance from the conflict to enable the participants to explore new ways of thinking and behaving. Over the course of the program, the role-plays began to more closely reflect the real life challenges faced by stakeholders. For example, a high level military official asked the trainers to use a role play related to a ceasefire when in real life he was having a difficult time getting key stakeholders to negotiate a ceasefire. The BLTP implemented a two-year programme with military officers and police. In all, the programme trained over 350 officers in the high command of the military and police; 15 police trainers and 30 army trainers. Three successive commanders of Burundi’s military academy participated in the training of trainers program.

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**The challenge**
Leaders need new relationships, ideas, and skills to navigate implementation of a peace accord.

**Theory of change:**
Rebuilding relationships and reinforcing capacities for new ways of communicating and negotiating among civilian and security sector leaders will improve joint problem solving.
US: Alliance for Peacebuilding Training

How does the US military work with NGOs and relate to civilians? How does it participate in or contribute to conflict prevention, governance, and humanitarian assistance? The US military's experience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as involvement in humanitarian assistance in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines and elsewhere prompt US military leaders to ask these questions and invite civil society to provide training on a range of topics related to these questions.

The Alliance for Peacebuilding is a network of peacebuilding organizations with the shared goal of improving human security. After 9/11, the US peacebuilding community began exploring how to impact US foreign policy, concerned about the reliance on military force rather than skills and processes from the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While first emphasizing outreach efforts to Congress, AfP learned that it was challenging to make an impact influencing Congress without speaking the language of security. Experimenting with translating conflict prevention and peacebuilding language into security discourse, AfP eventually emphasized the concept of human security.

AfP engaged directly with US military leaders to help shift US policy toward human security. Throughout this work, AfP learned to build a “narrative bridge” to explain how conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches could address some of the same security threats facing the US military. AfP stressed that civil society had an important role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and improving coordination between civil society, military and police – as well as policymakers – was essential to peace and security. AfP sought to both highlight common ground between the US military and civil society organizations working in conflict prevention and peacebuilding while also highlighting the differences in the approaches.

AfP highlights civil society’s contribution to peacebuilding and human security by enabling local civil society leaders from countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to share their perspectives on human security, the impact of current US policy, and alternative strategies to better support conflict prevention and peacebuilding leaders in these contexts. AfP publishes policy briefs and conducts research to improve US government and military support to peacebuilding and human security.

AfP provides training to a variety of US military training centres for military personnel at all levels. This includes teaching new cadets, such as at West Point Military Academy, in their course on “Winning the Peace”, training senior military leaders who are preparing for future deployments, such as Special Operation Command University or Quantico Marine Center, or training specific military units who are about to deploy, such as the 101st Airborne Division or the 12 PRT commanders and their teams preparing to go to Afghanistan. AfP also provided training at the US Foreign Service Institute several times a month for over 1,000 US Foreign Service officers and embedded military personnel who were preparing to work in the US Embassy in Afghanistan.

The challenge
The US military recognized that there were not military solutions to many security challenges.

Theory of change:
Training offered a broader perspective on conflict prevention and peacebuilding options for addressing security challenges.
US and Global: Training on Civilian Harm Mitigation

Written with Marla Keenan

The number of civilians killed in today’s armed conflicts continues to increase despite the Geneva Convention and the protections it affords to civilians in the midst of armed conflict. From Afghanistan to Yemen, Syria, the DRC, and South Sudan, civilians are caught between armed groups. While human rights groups have traditionally based their strategy on “naming, blaming and shaming” human rights violators, new approaches in civilian protection are focused on engaging directly with state and non-state armed groups who have the power to prevent civilian harm. While some groups intentionally target civilians, many armed groups do not try to harm civilians. The cause of civilian harm is often a lack of knowledge of what patterns of military action cause harm and failure to prepare and to take proactive steps to avoid harm.

The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) works directly with civilians, international organizations, governments and their militaries and other armed forces in conflict zones. CIVIC listens to and documents the stories of civilians including their harm, perceptions, wants, and needs. CIVIC then uses this research to develop specific recommendations for policy and practice on better civilian protection and advises parties to a conflict on ways to better protect civilians from their operations and to appropriately respond to harm when caused.

CIVIC believes all harm to civilians should be prevented to the greatest extent possible. Change should be rooted in the wants and needs of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC brings their voices to those making decisions about conduct in conflict. Like the other organizations featured in this report, CIVIC believes changes in the behaviour of parties to a conflict will result from working directly with decision-makers, helping them understand the effects of their actions and providing them with practical policy solutions to limit and address civilian harm. By adopting a pragmatic approach based on policy and practice rather than law, CIVIC is able to secure the cooperation of key actors and motivate them to adopt additional measures to ensure the safety of civilians. CIVIC believes working in partnership to protect civilians is more effective than working alone. The organization works with civilians themselves as well as civil society, governments, military actors, international organizations, thought leaders, and the media as passionate advocates and pragmatic advisors.

Like other human rights organizations, CIVIC presses militaries to do what's right and what's smart when it comes to civilians on the battlefield. Governments, militaries and other armed groups, and international organizations listen to CIVIC because their civilian harm mitigation recommendations are based on solid research and tested expertise. CIVIC develops concrete steps and recommendations that militaries can take to make smarter choices in their operations, by advising on prevention of civilian harm and response to harm caused. CIVIC’s approach has been proven effective. The US military, NATO and its national militaries, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, African Union forces, Afghan forces, and others have changed policies, training, doctrine, tactics, and mind-sets with the help of CIVIC’s unique work. CIVIC provides training to both troops on the ground and their leadership on how to take a modern, strategic, and ethical view of civilians in the battle space.

The challenge:
Military forces do not have adequate mechanisms for addressing harm to civilians

Theory of change:
Work with local communities to develop a method for mitigating civilian harm and then train military forces how they can make amends
As much as possible, training involves “showing” through scenarios and role plays more than “telling” the information through lectures. This includes advice, training, and guidance on keeping “the civilian” front and centre when planning operations, avoiding harm during operations, and responding to harm caused including by tracking casualties, learning lessons through analysis, and dignifying losses. CIVIC documents best practices and aims to institutionalize lessons learned on civilian protection, tracking and analysis, and making amends for civilian harm.

In Somalia, CIVIC advised on an African Union civilian protection policy and are supporting African Union forces to build a cell to track, analyse, and respond to civilian harm. In Afghanistan, CIVIC developed a seven-step process for responding to civilian harm for international and Afghan forces. With the US military, CIVIC helped draft the first civilian harm mitigation doctrine. CIVIC conducts training exercises that explore civilian harm prevention and response at US bases and for thousands of officers in the Afghan National Security Forces.

Like other civil society organizations, CIVIC will not take money from warring parties themselves, preferring to remain independent. CIVIC functions in a neutral advisory role, as advocates for civilians caught in armed conflict.

Armed groups have legal, strategic, and ethical reasons to ensure they reduce the potential for and mitigate civilian harm. Rather than simply advocating from a human rights point of view, it is important to also look at the interests of armed groups to figure out how best to communicate and motivate attention to civilian harm mitigation. Armed groups often recognize that harming civilians can result in further attacks on their soldiers and increased support for opposition groups. Making the case for prevention and appropriate responses to civilian harm from the point of view of armed groups makes it easier to build relationships, dialogue, and problem solve with armed groups to address the problem.

The decision to engage or not engage with an armed group is important. CIVIC has an internal guidelines document that aids in decision-making about whether to engage an armed group. One of these principles is the need for the armed group to have some type of responsible chain of command structure. Without this, there is no way to implement civilian harm mitigation policies and the organization risks the advice they have given being used as a ‘fig leaf’ by the armed actor.

Amplifying local civil society voices has been an important to validating CIVIC’s approach. Some of the work on the impact of drones on civilians, for example, is politically sensitive. Documenting local civilian voices in reports, and/or actually providing an opportunity for civilians to meet with military leaders to discuss the impact seems to have an impact on military leader's understanding of the importance of civilian harm mitigation.
Global: Training on “Do No Harm”
Written with Marshall Wallace

Any intervention into a conflict can cause harm, particularly if groups attempt to intervene without first understanding the local context. The “Do No Harm” approach includes two key ideas. First, analysing the local context to identify “connectors” and “dividers” will help any group – civil society, military, or police – understand more about how their intervention might help or hurt the local context. Connectors are institutions, values, people, or processes that help people connect with each other across the lines of conflict. Dividers are institutions, values, people or processes that increase divisions between groups. As with the medical profession, the concept of “do no harm” implies that the first responsibility of any intervener is not to make the conflict worse through their intervention. Second, the Do No Harm approach provides a set of tools for planners to ensure their planning is “conflict accountable.” Civil society peacebuilding efforts as well as police and military operations should all be “conflict accountable.” All groups should ensure that they anticipate potential impacts of the efforts, identifying how they might inadvertently increase divisions within a context and how they could maximize connections between groups so as to foster better relationships across the lines of conflict.

The Do No Harm approach is the product of a collaborative learning project involving thousands of people from 1993-2014, organized by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Because of the collaborative nature of the learning process, training is available from several organizations and individuals.

Many NGOs operating internationally have received training in the Do No Harm approach, recognizing that in the past NGO humanitarian and development efforts have inadvertently increased conflict and violence, fuelled corruption, disempowered local volunteerism or leadership, and led to a variety of other unintended impacts. As military forces engage in more humanitarian crisis, and become involved in a wider range of civilian tasks, there is a greater need for them to recognize the potential for causing harm when building a school, setting up a humanitarian camp for displaced peoples or delivering medical aid.

In Kosovo, in the early 2000s, a consultant trained the US military in the Do No Harm approach in a brief workshop. A checklist was developed out of the training to help the US military identify the connectors and dividers in the context so as to avoid potential unintended impacts and maximize opportunities for supporting local connectors.

In Afghanistan, the Australian government’s aid agency AUSAID moved into forward positions with the Australian military during the period 2010-2012. AUSAID developed a training module for deploying soldiers on relating to NGOs that included a section on Do No Harm to help explain what NGOs do, how they do it, and why it matters to the Australian military operating in Afghanistan. The positive feedback on the Do No Harm approach was so strong that while it was only given a one hour block in the first round of training, it was given an entire day in the second training course. One Australian major reported it was the most important part of the training. The operational reports were not as positive. Despite preparation to analyse the connectors and dividers in Afghanistan communities where the Australian military and AUSAID were serving, they ended up inadvertently supporting projects with a warlord that increased conflict between Australian forces and Afghan communities. However, a US-based NGO, the Center for Civilians in Conflict, found that the Australians were far ahead of other countries intervening in Afghanistan when it came to addressing civilian harm.
In the Philippines, local civil society initiatives to train the military and police (see other case studies in this report) emphasized the Do No Harm approach through short workshops for the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP). The Filipino military reported that the Do No Harm training has been very useful for helping them interact with civilians. Trainings that involve both police and community together are on-going as of 2015.

An organization working on security sector reform in Zimbabwe and Honduras, among other countries, has used the Do No Harm approach as part of the toolkit they teach to stakeholders. An evaluation of the now completed work in Zimbabwe said their contribution was “invaluable.” The work in Honduras is on-going (2015).
Relations between police and civil society can sometimes be hostile, grounded in deep suspicion and mistrust. A peacebuilding approach to policing emphasizes the rapport between police forces and the communities they serve. It aims to engage local citizens as much as possible in policing policies and operations. The idea behind this approach, that puts local ownership at the centre, is that human security will improve significantly when police engage directly with civil society. When local citizens are able to define their own protection needs and engage in planning, implementing and evaluating solutions to their problems, the resulting programmes and operations will be more appropriate and effective in contributing to human security. The organization Saferworld, an independent international organization working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives, uses the term "community security" to describe this approach. Community security reflects the idea that community representatives and police personnel work together to solve problems of violence, crime, disorder or safety and thus make their communities safer. Peacebuilding approaches to police and civil society relations usually have some common characteristics:

Adopting Collaborative Attitudes

In many contexts, community members and local police representatives view each other with an "us versus them" attitude. The lack of trust and even hostility can be due to political or social conflicts. But often there are also structural, organizational or personal factors that caused police and communities to look at each other with suspicion. Figure 10 below summarizes some of the reasons why relations between police and community can be challenging. In order to transform hostile attitudes into collaborative ones, it is important to bring the groups in direct contact with each other. This enables them to change the perceptions they have of each other and better understand each other's needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Deeply entrenched hostile attitudes among population at large</td>
<td>• Lack of policies, procedures, communication on how to engage with local communities or how to engage with police</td>
<td>• Inadequate conflict management and transformation skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption</td>
<td>• Lack of resources (insufficient staffing, inadequate facilities, equipment, or uniforms)</td>
<td>• Insufficient knowledge of local languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impunity</td>
<td>• Lack of incentives to motivate police staff to engage with civilians</td>
<td>• Illiteracy causing lack of professional capacities and leading other side to adopt a disrespectful attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discrimination of women and marginalized group</td>
<td>• Insensitivity to the needs of women or other marginalized groups due to gender or ethnic imbalances among police staff makeup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of oversight of the informal security sector (e.g. tribal courts)</td>
<td>• Lack of professionalism (inappropriate behaviour, disordered management, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of distinction between military and police roles and responsibilities leading to misconceptions among civil society</td>
<td>• Inadequate organizational attitude (overly bureaucratic – police, overly vindictive – civil society)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 14: Reasons for Uncooperative Attitudes Between Police and Civil Society
Conducting a Participatory Security Needs Assessment
This assessment is the basis for a context-specific and locally owned human security strategy for three main reasons: First, it provides a more accurate and authentic picture of human security needs. Second, it enables communities to better understand and articulate their own particular human security needs and to start thinking about solutions. Third, it often provides communities and local authorities an opportunity to make first contact and establish a working relationship. In order to conduct this assessment, peacebuilding groups usually assemble focus groups made up of an inclusive and diverse population of the community and facilitate a discussion around human security in which they help the communities identify a list of needs.

Setting Up Regular Communication Mechanisms
Due to the negative attitude mentioned above, community members are often actively avoiding contact with the police and police officers also show little effort to reach out to the community. Police and local communities can only establish good working relationships and jointly address human security problems if they are in regular contact. To achieve this, they need to set up and commit to a steady process of exchange. This may include various forms of in-person meetings such as focus group discussions, town hall meetings, public discussion forums, negotiation tables as well as written forms of exchange such as petitions, public announcements, websites, local media and public signage. Often, an advisory committee made up of police and civil society representatives helps to choose the right communication vehicles and orchestrate the exchange.

Improving Conflict Management and Transformation Skills
Training for police staff has usually been very technical, focusing on when and how to use weapons. This has usually been accompanied by training on how to avoid becoming subject to criminal procedures for the illegitimate use of force. Rather than learning how to enforce the law to protect others from violence and crime, police officers learned to work around the law to make sure they are not liable themselves. In many contexts, skills for effective relationship building such as communication, negotiation and mediation, have been entirely neglected and not integrated into training courses. Local communities, too, often had little exposure to these concepts. In many of the cases illustrated here, police staff and community members were able to improve their skills in these areas and thus engage more effectively with each other. In some situations, police and civil society members were encouraged to attend the trainings together. Participants and organizers of these joint workshops considered them as very useful, because they provided participants with the ability to improve their skills, and the opportunity to interact with participants from the other side with whom they have often had little or no previous contact.

Changing Organizational Structures and Incentives
Police departments that embrace community security approaches need to make significant changes to provide their staff with policies, resources and incentives for engaging with civil society. Departments may decide to re-write their mission statements to emphasize the need to build a culture of service orientation, protection of civilians, and accountability to the law. They may also revise their recruitment policies to include more gender and ethnic diversity, establish codes of conduct and provide reward schemes to change the individual behaviour of their police officers. Finally, they may increase their human resources and add facilities to enable regular meetings with local communities. Such organizational change can be slow and expensive, but they will significantly contribute to increasing local ownership and legitimacy of security sector, thus improving human security for communities at risk.

Police departments that have implemented some of the above changes recognize they can do their job better when civil society participates actively. When engaging with local communities, police can also provide a bridge for civil society to communicate and relate to the justice system. Police advocate for victim-centred restorative justice processes where offenders are held...
accountable to victims rather than the state. Finally, community security approaches can also create new opportunities for civil society to engage policymakers at the state level to articulate their definition and approach to human security, defining threats and strategies to improve safety.

**Reforming the Local, Regional and National State Policies**
Engaging with state actors at all levels is important in order to make achievements at the community level sustainable and address many of the structural problems affecting human security at the local level such as lack of effectiveness, inclusiveness or accountability of formal security mechanisms. Peacebuilding groups often engage in public or private dialogue with state officials in order to increase the attention given to human security needs at the local level, improve policies and practice, better define mandates, roles and responsibilities of different security sector groups to ensure their coordination, and allocate resources adequately.

**Strengthening Awareness and Capacity of Civil Society at Large**
Increasing awareness among the broad public is key in order to encourage local communities to work with the police for human security goals. Peacebuilding groups work to change the attitudes and expectations of the population at large and show what all citizens can do to make their communities safer. Peacebuilding groups may raise awareness on specific security issues such as gender-based violence or inform the public about local peacebuilding initiatives with the police encouraging them to replicate them in other communities.

Each of the following cases illustrates some of these various elements of an approach to policing that is based on local ownership.

**Afghanistan: “Democratic Policing”**
*Written with Aziz Rafiee*

In addition to the challenges of lack of training, policies, facilities and public trust, Afghanistan was a testing ground for multiple interventions to reform the police all happening at the same time. These included initiatives related to counterinsurgency policing, counter-narcotics policing, intelligence-led policing, arming local communities to act like police, and community or democratic policing. Each approach relied on a distinct analysis of the security problems and relied on different, if not competing, theories of how to improve policing. While many programmes assumed the problem with policing stemmed from a lack of weapons or training in how to use them, or a problem of discipline and corruption, or a lack of training in human rights, one police programme took a different approach based on the belief that public lack of trust in and community relationships with the police was the fundamental problem.

Recognizing the need to coordinate police reform and development with governance, justice reform, disarmament, and other government efforts, the Afghan Ministry of Interior asked the UN Development Programme to conduct research and write a strategy paper for police-community engagement in the Afghan context. Consultations with diverse stakeholders including parliamentarians, NGOs, media, academics, and police personnel, and community members, especially vulnerable groups such as women, ethnic minorities and economically deprived communities, provided. Unlike other police reform efforts, this programme was "people-oriented" and was almost completely Afghan-led, with Afghan civil society organizations playing a prominent role in designing the program.

The Afghan Civil Society Forum-organization (ACSFo) and other civil society groups helped to facilitate the

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**The challenge**
Communities lacked trust in police and police were unable to protect civilians.

**Theory of change:**
Creating forums to improve the relationship between the community and the police increased community trust and provided police with information needed to improve their performance.
research and design of the programme known as Police e Mardumi (in Dari language) or Da Toleni Police (in Pashto language). While similar to other community policing programmes in other countries, it was referred to as the “democratic policing” programme to distinguish it from the confusing use of the term “community policing” within the Afghan context to refer to a parallel programme also known as the Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) initiative, based on arming community fighters to protect their own region. The democratic policing programme had four main components: training of the community and police first separately and then together; developing neighbourhood watch committees made up of community members; facilitating community-police dialogue at the local, district and provincial levels; and problem-solving forums and mechanisms to invite public reporting on security concerns.

The programme began with three types of training. While other police training programmes focused more on the “hard security” skills of enemy identification, use of weapons and force, the democratic policing programme spent two weeks focusing primarily on the “soft skills” of Islamic-based human rights, communication skills, leadership skills and conflict resolution methods, psychosocial counselling, legal issues related to rights of vulnerable groups and police and state roles and responsibilities. Police received training in human rights and police procedures relating to detention. A separate training for the community provided skills in advocacy and encouragement to see police not as “big men” who could not be approached, but as public servants whose job requires them to listen to community members. A third set of training brought the police and community together to learn about the rule of law. Unlike other police training programmes that relied heavily on interpreters and lectures, this democratic policing programme used roleplays, pictures and group dialogue to foster practical learning and build relationships in the training. This was important given the high rates of illiteracy.

Relationship building and joint problem solving were central features of this democratic policing program. A neighbourhood watch committee formed in each community. It was made up of seven community members, including at least one or two women. In some communities,
religious leaders also participated in the neighbourhood watch program. Religious leaders have historically played important roles in overseeing the security sector, so could lend the project a sense of legitimacy.

ACSFo and other civil society groups facilitated bimonthly meetings between police and communities, including the neighbourhood watch committees. At these meetings, the community identified security challenges and designed local strategies to solve them. For example, the community could report on their concerns for children's safety walking to school and together with the police, they could develop a plan for protecting school children. In some cases, these community-police forums expanded beyond public safety concerns toward a broader human security agenda. In Samangan province, for example, the community identified water scarcity as a primary threat to their security. In some cases, police-community meetings at district level were very tense. The programme facilitators decided to focus on the provincial level instead. Community representatives brought their concerns about police bribery, corruption and laziness to the provincial chief of police. At the next month's meeting, the chief of police came with answers to the community and commitments to address the problems. These meetings increased police accountability to the public. Police realized they could be fired for reports from the community based on their performance.

In addition, the democratic policing project created two mechanisms for public to report information and grievances to or about the police. Police stations set up "information desks" and created call-in hotlines and/or complaint and suggestion boxes to receive information and complaints from the public. The complaint and suggestion boxes were distributed in front of schools, parks, and mosques. Every fifteen days, representatives from the police, community, local government and a religious leader would open these boxes and decide how to respond. For example, in one case a girl put in a complaint in front of her school naming the location of a man whom she had seen kill a woman. In another case, someone made a complaint against a specific government official who was corrupt and not doing his job. In the case of a group of girls that had run away from home to escape force child marriage, the community and police were able to negotiate with families and find ways of returning many girls to their homes and allowing them to continue their education. Most of the complaints were anonymous, making it difficult to investigate some accusations. But in some cases, the boxes provided needed information about how to protect the community.

In provinces with severe violence, such as Kunduz, the information desks and crisis response hotlines were the only feature of this programme in operation. There were no participatory dialogues where community members could discuss security threats and options for addressing them with the local police. It was assumed that the democratic policing concept to facilitate dialogue between police and community members would not work in these regions. However, Afghan media worked with civil society and the Ministry of the Interior to produce a large scale public awareness campaigns using mobile phones, social media, and TV and radio dramas to
provide the public with a positive vision of the police as well as citizen rights and information on how to use the 119 crisis response hotline.

The Afghan Civil Society Forum-organization and other civil society groups also monitored and reported on the progress of the program, building in a system of civil society oversight and accountability of the police to the public. Both police and community members believed that the problem-solving, participatory process to identify security threats and develop human security strategies between the police and the community improved their relationship.42

Bangladesh: “Community Security”  
Written with Bibhash Chakraborty

Increased levels of violence, lack of confidence to interact with security providers, and a state-centred approach to security that included time consuming response processes have led many local community members in Bangladesh to fear discrimination and violence. Since the contested 2014 elections, the deadlock between the ruling parties and the opposition has increased state-level violence in Bangladesh. Over 100 deaths and around 200 cases of severe injuries due to petrol bombing have been reported from January to May 2015.43 The opposition called permanent blockades and frequently countrywide strikes (hartals), which lead to additional attacks and disrupt travel and business. Extremist groups and criminal gangs have been thriving in such a volatile climate exposing local communities to increased risk of gender-based violence and abuses related to drugs, alcohol and gambling.

At the same time, communities feel less confident to approach police officials or representatives of the local administration and to ask for sincere, effective and trustful responses to the current problems. High levels of corruption, inadequate staffing and lack of communication have fuelled these suspicious attitudes that persist despite the government’s effort to set up local structures and bodies (Standing Committees for Law and Order and community policing forums called thana) to solve the security problems. The fact that Bangladeshi authorities have traditionally seen security as the sole prerogative of the state and prioritized exclusive and reactive responses to state security over more inclusive and proactive human security strategies have only added to communities’ feelings of vulnerability.

The challenge
There are increased levels of violence at the community level and weak relations between police and local communities.

Theory of change:
Build trust, cooperation and collaborative actions between community members and security providers at the local and national levels will improve access to and provision of human security, justice and development.
Saferworld, an independent international organization working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives, and the Bangladeshi NGO BRAC, a development organization dedicated to alleviating poverty by empowering the poor, implemented a four-year project in 16 sites across five districts of south-western Bangladesh. The programme brings communities together to identify their security needs and enables them to collaborate positively with state security actors in order to find solutions. Saferworld named this approach “community security” because it enables communities to articulate and their needs, participate in the response, and as a consequence feel valued and protected.

Two key elements for this community-centred approach to security are a large-scale participatory assessment of safety-security needs and the establishment of an inclusive consultation process.

**Large-scale Participatory Assessment of Security Needs**
To assess the context, cases, actors and dynamics behind violence in Bangladesh, Saferworld and BRAC held 80 focus group discussions with a total of 816 participants (cover 43% female) including minorities, women, youth and local authorities. Participants in each locality identified their specific security issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment, early marriage, child labour, theft, hijacking, drug abuse, gambling, political violence, water logging (flooding of agricultural land) or lack of fair judgment in criminal processes.

**Inclusive Consultation Processes**
Once the localities had come up with list of the most pressing issues, Saferworld and BRAC supported them to set up a consultation process driven by the “Community Action Committee” (CAC). The CACs are made up of community members with special attention to vulnerable or traditionally excluded members but could also include local government and security representatives. For example, one CAC included farmers, teachers, housewives, members of local women groups, local businessmen, local religious leaders, village police (chowkider, dafadar) and youth. The selection process is entirely owned by the community. In the beginning, CAC organized project orientation meetings with different level stakeholders to share information about their work and asking support for their activities following the action plan. The committees convene monthly with representatives of an Advisory Committee (made up of local government representatives, local opinion leaders and government frontline officials). At times delegates of the community’s Youth and Women’s Groups also join in to bring up pressing security issues and discuss possible joint solutions.

*Photo 18: Action planning workshop with selected community representatives in Gopalganj*
*Photo credit: Saferworld*
An Example: Addressing Sexual Harassment of Girls

If a girl in the community has become a victim of sexual harassment, her parents will either directly report the incident to the CAC or a neighbour of the victim will inform the CAC members. The CAC then decides an appropriate action to take. For example, it will approach the family of the boy who committed the abuse and propose and discuss remedial measures with the family. In case this is not effective, for example because the boy is not sensitive to the influence of his family due to his involvement with the local drug-trafficking mafia, the CAC can take up the issue with the locally elected members. If this failed, it can bring the issue to the attention of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee who represents the local government or it can approach the police. These authorities can then propose more formal punitive measures such as condemning the boy to community service or even imprisonment.

This example shows that the CACs have also been able to work as mediators between the community and police facilitating the reporting of incidents. This function is especially important when dealing with more serious crimes such as rape or murder. When victims or witnesses are hesitant to report either due to shame or fear of reprisals the CAC can communicate with the local government and police on their behalf.

The CAC consultations with local authorities, police and administration have led to stronger relations between civil society and the security sector. They have achieved a change of attitude and an increased level of collaboration among communities and local government representatives and police officers in the affected communities. Community members have become more confident and proactive about addressing security problems and local government and police officers are showing a greater sense of responsibility and willingness to respond. The project has not only contributed to improving human security but also to fostering social cohesion, strengthening state-society relationships, and increasing state legitimacy and responsiveness and thus advancing the broader human security agenda in Bangladesh.
Saferworld’s Operational Handbook on Community-Police Cooperation

The *Operational Handbook on Community Policy Cooperation* published by Saferworld and Centre for Security Studies in 2010 provides excellent step-by-step guidelines to community-based policing. The manual is part of the national community-based policing strategy that was designed by the Working Team for the implementation of the National Community-Based Policing Strategy and approved by the country’s Council of Ministers in 2007. It is primarily designed for police officers but will also be useful to community leaders, representatives of municipal authorities, and other non-police members of consultation processes around human security at the local level. The manual contains templates, checklists and other practical tools for all stages of a community-based policing programme including:

- Analysing the context
- Mobilizing the relevant people
- Identifying community problems
- Designing efficient responses
- Implementing the solutions
- Assessing the impact
- Reaching out to the public

The handbook was produced in close collaboration with police officers and is based on the principle of community ownership.
Saferworld’s Participatory Conflict and Security Assessment in Uganda

Saferworld uses participatory conflict and security assessment also in other contexts to identify the factors causing violence for local communities. For example, in the Karamoja region in Uganda, Saferworld collaborated with two local community organizations to:

- Design a questionnaire aimed at identifying the factors driving insecurity in this particular region. For example: Why are there incidents of violence? What are the underlying tensions between two groups, between a group and security actors, between a group and other government actors? What impact do these factors have on the community’s desire for security?
- Select participants for the assessment among the community with particular attention to elders (who have seen the evolution of the conflict), women (who are often the most vulnerable to attacks but not included in peacebuilding efforts), youth (who often instigate or participate in violence), children (who are innocent but may have knowledge of what is happening), adult men (who may be witnesses, perpetrators or victims) and witch doctors (who are often consulted by warriors to foretell whether and how to carry out raids). The organizations also selected participants representing government (ministries, police and army), local and national civil society organizations, and international actors (UN agencies, international NGOs).
- Interview over 300 participants in over 12 localities
- Summarize the results in form of a report
- Present the report to local security actors (government and police) and discuss the findings with them

The assessment helped to better understand the different layers of the conflict (intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, tribes vs. state actors) involve the local community in violence reduction strategies and change the perception of community security needs among the state actors.
The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) brought an end to a decade of civil war in Nepal, but the implementation of law and order still remains weak. Local businesses in particular suffer from interference by members of the political system. They are often subject to intimidation, forced donations and manipulated tender bidding imposed by political parties and their associated organizations. Youth organizations have joined in some of these practices, frequently asking shop owners for payments and, in case these are not granted, damaging or destroying their premises. Merchants are also affected by commercial disruptions due to frequent strikes, labour unrest, and traffic accidents. In absence of effective police control, some business owners resort to employing private security agents that use excessive violence, which in turn causes fears among the wider public.

The impact of instability and insecurity on businesses and their potential to contribute to this situation in Nepal makes them an important stakeholder for efforts to increase public security. For this reason International Alert, an organization that helps people find peaceful solutions to conflict, partnered with National Business Initiative (NBI), an NGO formed by 14 Nepali business associations and individual companies working to strengthen the role and capacity of the Nepali private sector, to contribute to peace. Their joint project was part of a larger initiative called “Enabling Civil Society to Contribute to More Effective, Inclusive and Accountable Public Security Policies and Programming.” The aim was to engage with district and national level police forces, related government agencies and local business owners in six districts in the country’s Terai region – a hub for manufacturing businesses – to find ways to improve public security.

Setting Up Working Groups for Joint Security Initiatives at the District-Level
In each of the target districts, International Alert first trained members of the local chamber of commerce on conflict-sensitive communication, human rights and conflict transformation and then supported them to set up a working group with senior representatives of the local police and local government representatives. The groups met regularly to discuss current security challenges and come up with practical solutions. International Alert then provided seed funding to implement the solutions. For example, in one of the districts the group was able to hire night watchmen and install CCTV monitors to better monitor activities in the market in the largest town. In other districts, they were able to provide fuel for police vehicles or other equipment such as metal detectors to police staff so that they could increase patrols and perform more effective searches of suspects.

Advocacy at the District and National level
International Alert supported the working groups in the six districts to come together on the sub-regional level and define common security priorities. A national workshop was also organized during which business representatives could discuss their security needs with police and government representatives, and a series of public slogans promoting improved public security were agreed for later dissemination. Business representatives also met high-level political decision-makers one to one, prepared press releases and appeared in TV and radio broadcasted interviews. As a result of these efforts, members of several major political parties

The challenge
Malpractices such as forced donations and gang violence affect the security of local businesses and the community as a whole.

Theory of change:
Enabling business owners and the police to jointly plan local public security initiatives broadens local ownership and enables more legitimate and effective security strategies.
made public commitments to address security issues affecting businesses. For example, they pledged to clamp down on party cadres demanding donations.

This project highlights the interconnectedness of private and public security needs and the need for the “whole of society” to participate in peacebuilding initiatives aimed at improving human security. Businesses and communities realized that malpractices such as forced donations or gang violence constituted a threat to everybody and needed to be addressed in collaboration with police and other government actors in order to establish a safe operating and living environment for the entire community.

Kenya: Preventing Youth Violence
Written with Zahra Ismail

Despite the relatively peaceful 2013 general elections, violence has been a regular feature in Kenyan politics, especially in times of voting. Elections bring out deep-seated, historical grievances on distribution of land, resources and political power between tribes echoing from a colonial past. Violence in Kenya peaked around the 2007/2008 elections that led to 1,200 deaths and 500,000 to flee their homes. Since then, national policy-makers have been giving more attention to the security sector focusing on new policies that aim to address and prevent human rights violations by security providers.

Violence is especially prevalent in urban areas that are increasingly densely populated but characterized by growing poverty and inequality and a high percentage of youths. Young people can be the most affected but also the most responsible for local forms of urban violence. In three particularly vulnerable communities in Nairobi - Mathare, Korogocho and Kibera – youth are often involved in crimes and associated with gangs but they also suffer from intimidation, forceful recruitment or rape committed by members of criminal gangs, and security actors. Run-ins with the police have also resulted in disappearances and extra-judicial killings by security forces. Because many of the youths who engaged in violence lack employment, the police and larger communities demonized them as lazy and criminal. In contrast, the youths saw the police as extremely threatening due to their reputation as brutal and corrupt.

To improve the tenuous relationship between youth and security actors in these communities, the University of San Diego's Institute for Peace and Justice (IPJ), an organization that works to improve practice, policy and scholarship in peacebuilding and human rights, collaborated with two local NGOs, Cissta Kenya and Chemchemi Ya Ukweli, both community-based peacebuilding organizations in Nairobi that work in communities that have been impacted by extreme violence following the post-election violence of 2007-8. The primary goal of this small-scale project was to increase security by changing attitudes. In order to reverse the hostile stereotypes youths and police had constructed of each other, IPJ launched some of the following activities:

- **The challenge**
  There are high levels of violence and hostile attitudes between youth and local police.

- **Theory of change:**
  If youths are able to take on positive roles within their community and have the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas with police officers, joint initiatives to prevent violence and improve human security at the local level will be possible.
Youth Ambassador Program

In Korogocho, IPJ and its partners initially supported 12 youths in mapping out security needs and solutions for their neighbourhoods. They trained them in non-violent conflict resolution using role-plays, during which the youths needed to de-escalate a conflict with the police, or flashpoint exercises during which the youths needed to draw scenarios of violence within the community and how to remedy them. IPJ and its partners helped them to prioritize security challenges and think of strategies and partners with which they could resolve them. These individuals then went back into their communities and trained 40 of their peers forming a pool of so-called "youth ambassadors." The ambassadors were made up of peace activists, former gang members or other community members. They came up with a series of innovative violence reduction projects in which they involved other youths from Korogocho. Projects included computer skill workshops, film clubs, job creation activities, or community development projects such as building homes for elderly people. A few months later, IPJ and its partners organized a follow-up workshop in which the ambassadors came together, updated each other on their projects and thought about ways to further improve security in Korogocho, including how to improve their relations with the police. This programme was useful in giving youth confidence that they can be agents of positive change and helped correct their image as hooligans.

A Joint Forum on Working Together to Prevent Violence

IPJ, Cissta Kenya and Chemchemi Ya Ukweli co-hosted and facilitated a two-day forum entitled Building Alliances: Working Together to Prevent Violence. It brought 100 youth and community participants together with high-level police and government as well as CSOs. Since the levels of apprehension and fear among the youths were so high, the purpose of this forum was simply to give each side a first opportunity to recognize the challenges the other side is facing. Police representatives presented their role and responsibilities and youths shared their violence reduction initiatives. This exchange helped both sides to get a better understanding of each other and reconsider their biases.

In the future, IPJ hopes to deepen dialogue between the youth and the police, beginning with independent dialogues among only youth and only police. This will allow them to identify the issues, face their own stereotypes, and decide how they, as a force, want to work with and engage communities together. The police are motivated in doing so because they desire a better reputation.

This project illustrates how peacebuilding approaches can build capacity, create spaces, and provide incentives for police actors and civil society to come together and jointly work towards improving human security.
Lebanon: Building Trust Between Police and Local communities

Written with Lena Slachmuijlder

Decades of civil war and regional conflict have resulted in few opportunities for the country to rally around a comprehensive security sector reform process. As a result, there is a trust deficit between civil society and the security sector, with the Internal Security Forces (ISF) often perceived as corrupt, biased or inefficient in their role of protecting local communities.

Recognizing this, the Lebanese government together with international partners decided to pilot a programme in one neighbourhood in central Beirut, Hbeish, with the aim of transforming the Ras Beirut Police Station into a ‘model Police Station’. By the time that SFCG began partnering with the station, they had already adopted a code of conduct based on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Standards and changed their recruitment and training policies in order to ensure their officers are properly trained. The ISF also set up new and easily accessible facilities and introduced regular patrols on foot, vehicle and bike as well as a digital database to collect and analyse security incidents. These organizational changes had built skills within the police to better be able to engage with the community. Yet there was little opportunity for police and community members to actually build direct human relationships with each and restore their mutual trust.

Search for Common Ground’s programme ‘Better Together’, in partnership with the Ras Beirut Police Station aimed thus to build healthy relationships with the local community and strengthen the effectiveness of the police officers in protecting the community.

Building Skills for Trust-building: Separately, then Together

The challenge
There were tensions between security forces and local communities.

Theory of change:
Build trust between groups through joint capacity building, dialogue, and joint programming.

The Ras Beirut community is situated nearby large universities, where perceptions towards the ISF were very negative. SFCG knew that bringing together people from the community with the ISF in a face to face meeting or town hall meeting would likely end with confrontation and deepening of mistrust.

SFCG thus started by reaching out to various student and young organisations, to explain the project and identify people who were interested in gradually growing their engagement with the ISF. At first, there was deep suspicion and rejection by many young people. But SFCG was...
gradually able to draw the young people into the project, starting by building skills for the young people in citizen engagement and Common Ground leadership and advocacy, with an emphasis on identifying areas of commonalities with 'the other'.

SFCG then trained nominated ISF members from Ras Beirut in skills around non-violent communication, mediation and conflict transformation. They also became familiar with methods of social media outreach, to improve their ability to communicate with the community.

**Trust-building through Open House and Joint Patrols**

SFCG recognized that many of the stereotypes held both by the youth and the ISF were due to past negative experiences, and misperceptions about the real role and responsibilities of the ISF. SFCG worked with the ISF to host open-house days where members of the community could come in and learn about the Ras Beirut station, and talk to police officers. Many community members had never before been in the police station, or had had negative experiences in the past. The ISF also invited a group of young people to shadow them on night patrols in the neighbourhood, which was an eye-opening experience for the youth, and a humanizing and trust-building success.

![Photo 21: Shadow patrols with youth from Beirut alongside police from the ISF Ras Beirut station. Photo Credit: Search For Common Ground](image)

**Roundtable Discussions and Joint Problem Solving Workshops**

After several months of working with the groups separately, SFCG facilitated a series of round table discussions. While recognizing that many of the participants still felt a need to express their anger, trauma or distrust of the other group, the facilitation gradually moved the group towards the identification of challenges within the community, which they could tackle together. Issues identified included how to tackle small café owners who put their tables and chairs on the street illegally, how to manage waste, and how to put in place a mobile application for citizens to be able to alert the Police Station when they see suspicious or criminal behaviour.
Through a series of five round tables, the relationship was developed to the point that in order to achieve progress on the above ideas, both the ISF and the community identified and contributed resources to move them forward. A WhatsApp group was created to enable ongoing dialogue and collaboration to reach these goals.

**Community Outreach**

Once the bridges of trust had been built between the ISF and the young people along with other community leaders, they jointly organised other public outreach activities. This included sports and cultural events, as well as setting up stands at large public Beirut street festivals (for example the Hamra Festival). The group also produced leaflets and posters to communicate the community security focus of the police station, and group representatives appeared on local media to talk about their initiatives.

Through the trainings, joint activities, round tables and public outreach, trust gradually began to overcome the mistrust and fear. In the end, the pilot project to demonstrate how the Ras Beirut Police station could become a ‘model police’ station showed signs of becoming reality, as both police officers and community members understood and acted on their joint sense of responsibility for bringing this idea to reality.

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**Tanzania: Safety Around Mining Sites**

*With Lena Slachmijlder and Patricia Loreskar*

Acacia Mining (then African Barrick Gold), one of the largest gold producers in the world, operates gold mines in Tanzania, including in the remote areas of Mara and Shinyanga Provinces. Although its operations were authorized since 2002 by the Tanzanian government, the company has been unable to protect the mine from intrusions by members of the local community.

The intruders were trying to steal gold or get access to ancestral territory. There was implicit support for the intruders by the local community; many felt the company was not investing enough in community development, was not hiring local staff, and had not properly compensated people years back. When the intrusions became more frequent, Acacia Mining hired Tanzanian police and private security companies to try and protect the mine from the intruders.

This further polarized relationships between the company and the community, who accused the police of…

*The challenge*

There were tensions between the communities surrounding a mining site and the security forces protecting the mine.

*Theory of change:*

Joint capacity building and joint assessment of the challenges built trust between groups.
corruption and extortion. The violence increased, and the police responded with excessive force. One day, thousands of intruders armed with machetes tried to invade the mine; the resulting clash led to many deaths and serious injuries.

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) partnered with Acacia Mining in 2011, using the framework of the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) to strengthen the company's efforts to improve relationships with local communities.

SFCG's initiative aimed to open channels for raising grievances, sharing accurate information, and enabling collaborative problem solving. SFCG also identified skills to build across the different stakeholders, including conflict transformation, common ground advocacy, rumour management and leadership. These trainings enabled the different stakeholder groups to be ready and prepared for the face-to-face meetings with each other.

SFCG organized and facilitated meetings with local village elders, religious leaders, sub-village and hamlet leaders, local police, Acacia Mining security and community relations staff, and local and district-level government representatives. Women, youth, and other marginalized groups were also engaged.

Through facilitated dialogue, the various parties were able to understand each other's concerns and identify joint strategies to act upon. Of particular concern was the violence around the incursions and the response by the police and the security companies. A solution to this was identified and agreed upon: the hiring of men from the local village as security guards. The selection process of the guards was managed by the village elders and it was agreed that the guards would re-invest ten per cent of their income back into village development. It was also agreed to train the local police on how to manage situations without resorting to violence as a first reaction. Through the project, SFCG trained 1,500 police officers, 300 key community decision-makers, 1,500 women and 1,500 youth.

The renewed sense of trust and collaboration was reinforced and highlighted through community outreach, including participatory theatre and sports tournaments reaching more than 13,000 women, men and youth. By 2015, Acacia Mining reported that there was a significant drop in violence around the mine.
Pakistan: Bridging Traditional Justice with Policing

Written with Ali Gohar

Since the inception of the state of Pakistan in 1947, formal criminal justice procedures were imposed upon local people without attempting to understand or integrate the long-standing traditional justice systems. But since the imposed state justice system is often weak and not able to provide redress to victims of abuse, non-state justice traditions continue to exist and often compete with state structures. As a consequence, the formal sector has little control over the informal sector and cannot correct for discriminatory attitudes among traditional judges nor impose formal punishment for serious crimes. In Pakistan, a local civil society organization working for justice and peace through conflict transformation methods called Just Peace Initiatives (JPI) uses peacebuilding skills and processes to build a bridge between the state justice and tribal justice systems.

The Pukhtoon tribe, uses a traditional justice system called jirga. The jirga is part of the cultural guidance known as Pukhtoonwali that dates back 5,000 years for the Pukhtoon tribes in Pakistan. Even a minor conflict in the Pukhtoon belt can lead to infliction of shame, loss of honour, taunting, or even violence. According to Pukhtoonwali, the jirga is a council of elders or “grey beard elders,” usually men, known locally for their impartiality, wisdom, and religious and traditional knowledge.

There are many types of jirga, for both minor and major conflicts from family disputes all the way to the loya jirga at the national level. When people in conflict approach jirga members or jirgamar individually, the jirgamar conduct shuttle diplomacy to bring the people together into

The challenge
There is a gap between tribal and state justice and security.

Theory of change:
Create opportunities with the police and tribal leaders to bridge tribal and state justice and security processes.

Photo 24: Jirga dialogue. Photo Credit: Just Peace Initiatives
JPI also supports the Muslahathi Committees to enable them to better address gender-based violence. Each reconciliation committee is mandated to include three women, which is an unprecedented step for a country like Pakistan. Where the traditions are strong, elderly women represent younger women or a *jirga* process may take place in the privacy of a home to resolve cases of gender-based violence within the community. Some elders prefer to resolve cases involving women in the community outside the police station as they see women’s participation and presence in a police station as culturally inappropriate. But traditions are changing. In 2013, a group of Pakistani women used the first all-woman’s *jirga* to advocate for their rights in Swat Valley, in a case where a husband and in-laws burned a woman with acid.

JPI is strengthening the Muslahathi Committees work on a variety of social issues. They encourage police and tribal leaders to work together on criminal cases or develop plans to help criminal juveniles reintegrate into their schools.

JPI also advances public knowledge on the complementarity of tribal and state justice systems. It produced TV and radio shows on the Muslahathi Committees as well as a dozen booklets on aspects of local indigenous system of *jirga*, the Pukhtoon code of life (Pakhtoonwali), or the Hujra (a community based indigenous community centre in which the *jirga* resides). Finally, JPI undertakes national level research on how the informal justice systems are working in Pakistan.
Chapter 4
Local Ownership in DDR

DDR complements SSR/D by disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating armed groups back into society. DDR contributes to human security by reducing the number of weapons and armed groups, reknitting social relationships and helping combatants transition to civilian livelihoods. The UN approach to DDR prioritizes a peace process that uses negotiation, mediation or facilitation of dialogue to address key issues driving armed opposition groups. The UN Integrated DDR Standards aims to support a war to peace transition so that combatants become stakeholders in the peace process.

The UN IDDRS Standards identify that DDR should do the following:

- Plan and coordinate DDR within the framework of the peace process
- Link DDR to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues
- Take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, and weapons control and management
- Link DDR to the broader processes of national capacity-building, reconstruction and development in order to achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants

Local ownership of DDR is often lacking. DDR requires coordination between many stakeholders including the national government, military authorities, local police, and local civil society. In some cases, international forces or peacekeepers, including UN funds, agencies and programs, may also be involved. In general, military forces direct disarmament and demobilization while civil society and civilian government agencies direct reintegration. But civil society has important roles in advising and overseeing disarmament and demobilization, especially in reporting on weapons caches, and advocating for the reduction of weapons availability in society. Likewise, peacekeeping forces, military forces and local police can play an important role in ensuring the safety of ex-combatants who are reinserted into or reintegrating with civil society. Often DDR lacks funding, especially for the reintegration phase. Including civil society in the design and implementation of DDR may have financial and strategic benefits. Civil society efforts seem to cost less and do a better job of addressing underlying grievances that might reignite conflict.
Using Peacebuilding Processes to Support DDR

DDR does not just contribute to peacebuilding at the national level. Often peacebuilding skills and processes can be used within DDR programmes to improve relationships between the security sector and civil society. A “peacebuilding” approach to DDR prioritizes dialogue, mediation and grievance resolution processes to address the fundamental relationship between armed opposition groups, community leaders and local and/or national government representatives that make them stakeholders in the peace process. Civil society peacebuilding organizations can play a significant role in designing and implementing peacebuilding approaches to DDR. They may play a large role in developing sustainable platforms and infrastructure for the social, economic and political reintegration of armed groups back into civilian communities. Reintegration processes focus on supporting the entire community that is participating in reintegration, and not just the individual ex-combatants. DDR does not just contribute to peacebuilding at the national level. Peacebuilding skills and processes can be used within DDR programs. This chapter describes four case studies where peacebuilding skills and processes support more effective DDR.

DRC: Peacebuilding-based DDR

Following the DRC's Lusaka peace agreement in 1999, the World Bank organized funding for a Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). Beginning in 2004, a programme to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate 150,000 ex-combatants, mainly militia members, continued to function alongside active warfare. In North Kivu in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a small local Congolese NGO with fifteen years of local peacebuilding experience began a DDR program.

Drawing on peacebuilding skills, a DDR programmes run by the Centre for Resolution of Conflicts (CRC) emphasized building an infrastructure of support for sustainable reintegration. CRC viewed reintegration as the cornerstone of successful DDR, and as such advocated calling the efforts RDD to emphasize the need to think about reintegration from the very beginning of any DDR program. From CRC’s point of view, the donor-supported DDR programmes neglected to consider how ex-combatants would cope with reintegration. Money was available for “sensitizing” armed groups on the need to disarm and demobilize, but money was not available for reintegration or for considering how to prepare communities where they were to be reintegrated. DDR programmes assumed ex-combatants would be integrated into the state’s armed forces, even though these units also were to be demobilized.

CRC designed a programme for reintegration where it became an opportunity for community development. Creating a preventive infrastructure to handle land conflicts was a key component of the CRC approach. Together, there was a coherent plan for livelihood creation through seeds and agriculture kit. This paired with the development of a community-based conflict resolution system that addressed issues of IDPs and combatants returning and settling on land.

Six task forces worked on the reintegration process, each with approximately 12 people made up of community and religious leaders, former child soldiers, and former militia commanders. CRC trained the task forces on human rights and conflict resolution. The task forces play a variety of roles through CRC partnerships with other agencies such as FAO, UNDP, UNHCR and Save the Children/UNICEF.

The challenge

DDR efforts focused on disarmament and demobilization, but neglected reintegration.

Theory of change:

Programs to prepare and support ex-combatants and the communities that will accept them by focusing on community development will enable sustainable human security.
First, CRC advertises their DDR programme in a variety of ways. Radio programmes encouraged combatants to leave armed groups individually. Negotiations with militia leaders encouraged demobilization and reintegration for entire militia groups. MONUSCO (and before that MONUC) dropped leaflets from helicopters inviting combatants to call the CRC director to discuss reintegration.

Photo 26: Community in DRC. Photo Credit: Flickr CC Mike Rosenberg

CRC staff would then travel without protection into the bush – sometimes waiting for several days - to negotiate with militia commanders, to return with all of their men or to release child soldiers. CRC provided accompaniment for 4,276 ex-combatants (3532 men, 270 women, and 474 children). This accompaniment ensured the safe passage of ex-combatants to MONUSCO or FARD camps where they are demobilized by removing their weapons, military-style clothing or other symbols of their combatant status and recording their names. CRC then accompanied them to the communities where they were reintegrated. This helped make sure that militia members made it all the way into CRC reintegration programs, which CRC viewed as pivotal to successful DDR.

Simultaneously with advertising the programme to militia members, CRC prepared communities for receiving militia members. CRC persuaded communities through incentives such as reparation programmes where militia members would do community service, such as building roads. CRC also provided a range of livelihood options, some available to non-combatant community members. For example, CRC began joint civilian and ex-combatant cooperatives for 1334 ex-combatants. Inclusion of civilians in the cooperatives ensured that ex-combatants alone did not receive the bulk of assistance, since this would create an unfortunate incentive for others to join militias. Cooperatives begin with 30 members and small grants of $2000 as start up. Cooperatives often grew quickly, some with 200 members, as they extend inclusion of others. Ex-combatants may provide community service by rehabilitating local infrastructure of roads and markets. This increases their acceptance by local communities and enables further community development.

CRC found that civilian communities provided a socializing model of civilian values and provided a new social network for militia members that affirmed acceptable civilian behaviours. In addition, CRC supported the creation of voluntary social networks to attend to reintegrated militia members and the community. This includes community conflict resolution task forces.
that help to ease social tensions. The CRC set up an early warning system and provided mediation for local disputes. The local conflict resolution task forces were created to warn of impending conflicts over land, for example, as IDPs return to an area. The task forces supported mediation to take place between key stakeholders so that an agreement can be made without resort to violence.

CRC supported 119 communities in the reintegration process by hosting call-in radio clubs for two-way dialogue on weekly CRC radio programs. Listeners could text or call into the radio show with their concerns or ideas. Some villages used these radio clubs as a way of fostering participatory planning and development on projects such as bicycle repair, hairdressing, hydroelectric power and propagating seedlings for reforestation. There is also a synergy between these programs. The radio clubs foster trust with local communities, that then makes the other stages of reintegration work more smoothly.

PeaceDirect, the London-based funder of CRC, is carrying out on-going monitoring and evaluation of CRC’s DDR effort. Ex-combatants who went to communities with CRC’s intervention are compared both with ex-combatants who went through other, non-CRC DDR programs, and with ex-combatants who did not receive CRC or other DDR support. Researchers also interviewed CRC-assisted communities and non-CRC assisted communities to evaluate their view of the program. Researchers found that 81% of ex-combatants who did not receive assistance would consider re-recruiting to an armed group compared to 58% of those receiving non-CRC assistance and only 10% of those ex-combatants that CRC did assist. An evaluation of CRC’s work found that its identity as a local organization with a long history of working with local communities enables it to be credible and trustworthy for armed groups, many of whom have become wary of FARDC, UN and MONUSCO. "CRC's long term commitment, visibility, local knowledge, first hand awareness of the impacts of conflict at a personal and community level, networks of contacts and strong staff commitment and work ethic have given CRC great credibility with armed groups, with communities and with partners."46

Peace Direct also compares the cost for CRC’s DDR program, a small fraction of the costs of large scale, government or contractor-run programs. For example, the cost for these task forces was $1500 to start up each Task Force with $500 per year for travel funds. Task Force members volunteered 44000 hours of time per year. In contrast, some DDR programmes easily cost $1500 per armed individual.
Mozambique: Civil Society Roles in DDR

From 1977-1992, a civil war traumatized the country, as both sides, FRELIMO and RENAMO, relied on child soldiers and committed atrocities against civilians. Religious leaders from the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), the Anglican Church and the Roman Catholic Church and its affiliates at the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio based in Rome encouraged RENAMO and FRELIMO to bring an end to the war through dialogue in a 1992 peace agreement. The UN oversaw demobilisation of 100,000 troops and collected over 200,000 weapons between 1992-1994. At the end of this process, the country still suffered from violent crime and a widespread sense of trauma. Millions of weapons and caches of ammunition, landmines and explosives still littered the country, obstructing agriculture, and economic development. These local stashes were a source of instability, as it remained unclear whether the peace agreement would hold or whether groups would return to fighting.

Religious organizations and NGOs in Mozambique led a nation-wide DDR programme following the end of the UN’s program. The Christian Council of Mozambique’s (CCM) pivotal role in the peace process gave it trust and respect to also play roles in disarmament. CCM noted in its 2002-2204 report that “Mozambique is the first Country in the world with a government who accepted in 1995 to give the civil society, (Christian Council of Mozambique) completely the responsibility for collection, massive destruction of small arms and light weapons as well as all security process of these complex and political very sensible issue.”

In addition, over a dozen Mozambican youths, some of whom were former child soldiers from both the RENAMO and FRELIMO forces, came together in 1995 to discuss effective ways for community participation in peacekeeping and security processes. Initially named the Community Intelligence Force (Força de Inteligência Comunitária, or FIC) the group eventually changed their name to FOMICRES (Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Insertion). FIC joined together with the CCM in a “transformation of swords into ploughshares” or “TAE” disarmament project. Early efforts included helping community members build trust with one another, establishing a culture of peace, and fostering understanding of the need for reconciliation and weapons collection. FIC trained community members on techniques to gain intelligence for public collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons that were still in illicit hands. The six elements of the project included:

- Weapons collection
- Exchange of weapons for tools
- Destruction of weapons
- Civic education in the community
- Transformation of the destroyed weapons into art pieces
- Post-exchange follow-up with beneficiaries

FIC staff worked with communities, former combatants and leaders on both sides to gather information on the location of weapons stashes. Individuals and communities would share information about weapons based on promises that they would receive tools such as bicycles, sewing machines, zinc roof sheeting or agricultural tools in exchange. General criteria for the exchange allowed for standardizing negotiations depending on the type and condition of the weapons.
For example, for 1 operational weapon, 12 non-operational weapons, or 520 units of ammunition, an informant could expect to receive 10 zinc sheets (often used for roofing) or 1 bicycle. Technical staff from the capital Maputo would then travel to these areas to verify the information and arrange a process with the communities to collect and destroy the weapons.

In the capital city Maputo, artists transformed some of the weapons and ordinance into objects of art for sale such as the chair pictured here. The artists helped to attract attention to the project, reinforcing public values in a culture of peace. The art also attracted donor's attention and sponsorship of FOMICRES other work.

FOMICRES also worked with Mozambican government authorities and the South African police in a project called “Operation Rachel;” a cross-border weapons collection and destruction initiative. This partnership brought together government-scale logistics and technical support, together with FOMICRES' trust with communities, needed in order to enter communities and then locate and collect weapons.

FOMICRES expanded its programming to begin work on other security issues, such as the shortage of police. In Mozambique, more policemen die of AIDS than can be trained to replace them. According to FOMICRES reports, nearly a million community volunteers now assist the police. With new funding from the German Government via Peace Direct, FOMICRES is now refining the selection of policing volunteers and offering training course for community volunteers, hoping that this can bring down rates of violent crime.

Evaluations of the work of the TAE project indicate a variety of outcomes. First, the project collected thousands of weapons and hundreds of thousands of pieces of ordinance. While this is a small amount compared with the UN missions’ DDR efforts, it is a considerable contribution for a CSO without the scale of resources and logistics as government. Evaluators note that “collecting and destroying illegal weapons is not very meaningful unless it is part of a wider effort to improve security and maintain peace. In the case of TAE, it is an attempt to promote a culture of peace, advocate a life without guns, help ex-combatants to gain a peaceful livelihood and reduce the suspicion between former enemies. Much of this costs money, which is why a programme like TAE cannot be as cheap as a straightforward gun buy-back program.” TAE asserts that the real value of its work is to foster public awareness of a culture of peace.
Afghanistan: Mediation-based DDR

International priorities on counterterrorism delayed and contorted Afghanistan's DDR program. The 2001 Bonn Agreement after the Taliban fell did not include DDR. DDR began in Afghanistan in 2003 to address anti-Taliban militias. The first DDR programme offered individual former militia commanders political appointments as an incentive to go through DDR. This had the negative side effect of setting into place political appointees who the public accused of human rights abuses and corruption. Rewarding these militia leaders with political appointment created a sense that counterterrorism was more important than human rights or the rule of law. It entrenched public distrust in the Afghan government and in turn also contributed to Taliban recruitment.

Without setting up DDR encampments to entice whole militia units to go through DDR together, donor governments channelled lower level former militia went through an individual DDR process. Beginning with soldiers giving up their weapons in a parade and attending a demobilization workshop in which they promised not to take arms again, the programmes offered demobilized individuals a package of food and clothing. However, without a peace agreement in place, DDR did not stick. Some demobilized combatants turned back to militia groups and some went to the drug trade. At best DDR was a waste of time and money. At worse, the contentious political appointments resulting from these efforts entrenched public distrust of the Afghan government and increased Taliban recruitment.

A new generation of DDR programmes imagined that local Taliban commanders and their groups could disarm together through a mediated process that would address local grievances. A story from Helmand Province inspired this new model. An armed opposition group had agreed to stop fighting the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), reject out of area fighters, remove or show the location of planted IEDs (improvised explosive devices), allow freedom of movement to patrols, and accept Afghan National Security Force checkpoints. In return, the Afghan government agreed to increase Afghan security forces to ensure that there are Afghans partnered in all home search and patrols with international forces to address widespread complaints of international forces searching Afghan homes. The Afghan government also promised to begin short-term cash for work and long-term economic development opportunities for ex-combatants.

Afghan civil society was the only stakeholder in Afghanistan with the capacity to design and carry out a mediation-based DDR model. Afghan civil society organizations (CSOs) have been carrying out peacebuilding programmes in Afghanistan since the early 1990s to mediate water and land disputes, domestic violence and family issues as well as conflicts within community development councils over setting development priorities. One Afghan CSO designed a programme to harness Afghan peacebuilding capacity to this new generation of DDR. The Afghan CSO facilitated a pilot DDR programme based on mediation and grievance resolution from October 2010 through January 2011 in 3 provinces and 16 communities including the following components.

**Rapid Response Team:** The Afghan government identified emerging reintegration opportunities. Government staff provided permission letters to the Afghan CSO’s field staff to conduct an independent assessment of economic, ideological, political and security grievances
among the reintegrees and the communities to which they would return. This step provided information about the core grievances driving the insurgency. Those interviewed included commanders, reintegrees and members of communities ranging from households to elders and religious leaders, labourers, traders, and district level political leadership. This assessment helped identify potential "internally-generated" incentives for DDR including face-saving mechanisms for reintegrating, local security guarantees, and promoting local coexistence so as to foster successful reintegration rather than relying on "externally-generated" incentives such as financial payments.

**Provincial and Local Community Mediation and Grievance Resolution:**
Government authorities identified a mix of diverse provincial leaders to join Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees. The Afghan CSO trained provincial and local mediation and grievance resolution teams composed of two representatives from each group: government representatives, members of non-state armed opposition groups, and community representatives including local village elders, local mullahs, and community members.

In some communities, local peace committees already existed as part of the nation-wide network of existing Community Development Councils. Where there were no peace committees, the Afghan CSO helped to set them up.

The mediation process included three phases. First, the process identified each stakeholder’s key issues or grievances necessary to reach a DDR agreement. Second, the mediation explored options for resolving each of the issues. Third, the mediation developed a signed agreement that met all stakeholders’ interests. By the end of January 2011, the Afghan CSO had trained 400 people in three provinces to help the reintegrees and communities cope with reintegration, leveraging both formal and informal justice systems. The programme also improved local capacity for addressing longer term conflicts directly related to the reintegrees as well as other issues such as local disputes over land, water, debts, domestic violence and other community issues.

**Monitoring and Assessment Team:** Afghan CSO research teams of four to six members monitored the roll out of the DDR programme in three provinces. The research teams also conducted focus groups to identify the effects of reintegration on the community, and track overall human security at the village and district level. To do this, the CSO developed a research tool based on locally identified human security indicators measuring people’s ability to move around, provide for their families and access governance systems and service. The human
security indicator tool measured the accuracy of perceptions by counting actual events, such as the number of visits made to specific districts by local, provincial and national government representatives and the number of police interaction with the community. The research monitored trends and changes of both the former combatants and the communities into which they were reintegrating in terms of physical security, freedom of movement, economic well-being and access to governance and justice. The methodology provided direct comparison across provinces, including both qualitative and quantitative information delivered on a monthly and quarterly basis. The Afghan CSO then wrote policy recommendations for security policymakers based on the human security research.

Future DDR in Afghanistan: Political opposition to this approach eventually made it impossible for this programme to continue. Some of the former militia leaders cum provincial leaders who had benefited from political appointments during the first round of DDR may have obstructed a mediation-based DDR effort that would bring a new set of political rivals from the battleground. However, a negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan will create an unprecedented urgency for DDR. The lessons from this peacebuilding approach to DDR will be essential to avoid the failures of past DDR processes such as technical fixes and short-sighted political appointments that undermine human security. DDR must address underlying grievances and needs, and reknit social relationships.

Burundi

Two separate Burundian civil society organizations took part in DDR activities. Réseau d’Actions Paisibles des Anciens Combattants pour le Développement Intégré de Tous au Burundi (RAPACODIBU) is an organization founded by a group of ex-combatants to emphasize the need for small arms control and DDR. The Training Centre for the Development of Ex-Combatants (CEDAC) is an organization that assists and advocates for veterans and victims of conflict. CEDAC undertook public campaigning to encourage the population to voluntarily handover firearms. CEDAC also monitored ex-combatants’ own initiatives and provided training in conflict prevention and management. Finally, they organized peacebuilding activities for female ex-combatants, including psychosocial support to address trauma. According to its records, CEDAC supported the socioeconomic reintegration of 25,000 ex-combatants and with financial support from the UNDP and UNIFEM.
Chapter 5
Gender Mainstreaming in Security

Local ownership of security requires that all women, men, girls, boys, as well as lesbians, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex people (LGBTI) contribute to defining security threats and strategies. People affected by sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) may have different security needs depending on their gender identity. SGBV includes psychological or emotional violence such as sexual harassment, rape and sexual abuse, child sexual abuse, child marriage, female genital cutting, marital rape, dowry-related violence, female infanticide, killing of females because they are females, forced prostitution, sex trafficking, and sexual violence used during war. SGBV is directed against a person on the basis of their biological sex or their social gender roles. Males commit most SGBV violence. Females experience high levels of SGBV. Males can also experience SGBV. People with same sex sexuality, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer or other sexual identities also experience high degrees of SGBV. Gender mainstreaming includes the use of a gender sensitive analysis of threats, gender inclusion in the security sector, and gender accountability on security issues.

**Gender Sensitivity**

Gender-sensitive programming began in the 1990s to provide targeted protection services for women and girls suffering from gender-based violence. The security sector should be sensitive to sexual and gender-based violence. Security research should disaggregate data according to gender and sexual identity.

Observers of the first wave of gender sensitive programming questioned the agenda's exclusive focus on women and girls, pointing out that men and boys who share households with female victims may also suffer from the consequences of gender-based violence against women. Men, boys and LGBTI individuals may be victims of violence themselves and require assistance. There may also be a need to recreate non-violent social identities for male perpetrators of violence that harmonize with the new responsibilities that women have taken on. Organizations such as International Alert and Saferworld have been a pioneers of this so-called “gender-relational” approach that looks at gender as a dynamic concept shaped by individuals’ relations to opposite genders as well as other factors such as age, social class, ethnic or religious background, geography, disability or marital status. A critical pre-requisite for gender mainstreaming of security is the transformation of those cultural attitudes that endorse and promote SGBV. Many peacebuilding organizations focus their work in this area. They encourage security actors, victims, perpetrators and society at large to question gender stereotypes that promote targeted abuses against women and men and re-invent alternative...
role models. For example, some societies may glorify physical aggression as a means to achieving manhood or submissive silence as an ideal of womanhood, and such values make the unreported occurrence of male violence against women more likely. Peacebuilding organizations encourage all stakeholders to abandon ideals that increase the likelihood of abuses and adopt and propagate new forms of behaviour that are equally respectful to all genders.

**Gender Inclusion**

It became clear that it was not enough for the mostly male security institutions to be sensitive to SGBV. Security institutions also needed to be more gender inclusive. With the advent of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in UN Security Resolution 1325 in 2000, the equitable inclusion of women into peace processes and post-conflict institution building became a second priority for gender mainstreaming in security. And observers again noted the need to broaden the understanding of gender.

Security forces should include women and people of diverse gender identities at every level. Members of police, army, courts and correctional facilities can all play an important role in preventing, addressing and ending the occurrence of sexual and gender-based violence. Male and female security actors can contribute to improving monitoring and reporting of gender-based violence, providing support services for victims, facilitating access to justice for victims, ensuring appropriate penal procedures for perpetrators, and raising awareness of gender-based violence among the population at large. Since justice and security sector actors have been seen to be perpetrating gender-based violence themselves, they have an even greater responsibility to set an example and work towards stopping abuses.

Women have a fundamental human right to participate in justice and security institutions. But there is also a more pragmatic argument for female participation. Female security actors may bring different skills and perceptions. Because of their gender socialization, female security personnel may have more practice in listening and respecting victims. When working as police women, judges or prison guards, women are seen to be more likely to encourage victims who are hesitant to report abuses and less likely to let perpetrators off the hook.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, many countries have committed to National Action Plans (NAPs) to ensure the more equitable representation of women in justice and security institutions. These institutions have been recruiting and positioning women on all levels of the police, army, and penal system and providing them with more career opportunities and professional development. Inclusion has also happened at the program-level. DDR programmes for example have been giving increasing attention to women, offering them vocational alternatives or financial plans and involving them in the planning and execution of weapons collection and reintegration programs. These efforts are seen to broaden local ownership and establish more legitimacy for on-going justice and security reforms.

**Gender accountability**: Mechanisms for oversight of the security sector should include people of diverse gender identities. Oversight boards and complaint hotlines also need to be able to hold the security sector to account for providing security as a public good to all people, regardless of their gender identity. Trained staff of representative of different genders should staff these mechanisms so they can process complaints effectively and hold offenders of SGBV accountable. People of diverse genders should participate in security reviews of national and local security sector performance and be able to influence security policymaking.

The following case studies show how peacebuilding organizations approach SGBV and the inclusion of women in different contexts.
Fiji: Women, Peace And Security in Security and Defence Policy
With Sharon Bhagwan-Rolls

On 19 May 2000, following the civilian led overthrow of the Labour Party led government the first step for a core group of women was to convene on May 21 what became known as the Blue Ribbon Peace Vigil. Because of the recurring role military in addressing instability in Fiji, women began to negotiate and communicate directly with the security forces. The National Council of Women Fiji made contact with the military, and as a result, the commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces brought together the members of the military council and other senior officers to meet with the representatives of the Peace Vigil.

The women’s delegation presented what has become known as “The Women’s Letter” to outline various suggestions, particularly the need for Fiji to return to parliamentary democracy, respect human rights, and uphold the 1997 Constitution as the supreme law of the country. The Fijian military received the “women’s letter” respectfully and favourably. Fijian women’s groups learned the importance of using the language of the military and security sector for future dialogue and peace initiatives.

Awareness of the impact of violence on women and women’s roles in peace and security had been increasing at the global level with the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 2122 reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

Following the return to parliamentary democracy in 2001 local women's rights groups in Fiji such as FEMLINKPacific promoted UNSCR 1325 as a way to engage with the Fiji security sector to advance the growing global “women, peace, and security” agenda. Beginning in 2003, the Women, Peace and Security Fiji Coordinating Committee on 1325 (WPS Fiji) was established, following consultation with the Ministry of Women and a range of women's groups and NGOs including FEMLINKPacific. This built on the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Peace Vigil and focusing on increasing their own capacity to understand national security processes and also to begin raising issues about the transparency and accountability of the process - who was consulted, and what security threats were identified and prioritized.

Fijian women continued to send communication to the Fiji Ministry of Defence outlining that national security must include a sense of safety for women in their homes and communities. Fijian women saw the need to talk about human security as something that not only the military could deliver, but rather it was a societal commitment involving many government agencies, religious leaders, media and civil society groups. The National Security and Defence Review was an opportunity for women’s civil society groups to participate in shaping a human security agenda together with the Ministry of Defence. Fijian women began to jointly explore options for women’s representation on national security councils and other local or district/provincial level committees and delegations addressing security issues. Together, they documented factors that

The challenge:
The security sector was not gender sensitive to women's security concerns and did not include women in security sector roles.

Theory of change:
Women’s advocacy and relationship building with the security sector created opportunities for greater dialogue and opportunities for oversight.
impede women from participating in security decisions. Fijian women’s organizations worked with the state security sector to do the following:

- Provide policy advice on improving transparency, accountability and responsiveness.
- Monitor the implementation of international and regional agreements, as well as national and institutional policies.
- Provide capacity building for oversight bodies on gender issues.
- Identify early warning indicators or security threats and issues facing individuals and communities.
- Facilitate dialogue between local communities and security sector oversight bodies.
- Raise public awareness of how to hold security sector institutions accountable.

The Fiji Women, Peace and Security Coordinating Committee, together with the National Council of Women, also made formal submissions to the National Security and Defence Review. Recommendations reaffirmed that defence and security is the business of men and women, therefore the organizational mechanism that deals with it should ensure that issues of men and women are given the same level of attention.” The National Security and Defence review provides an opportunity to take corrective measures of existing structures and processes that are out-dated. The women included these recommendations:

- The Minister of Women should be included as a member of the National Security Council;
- The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Women should be included as a permanent member of the National Security Advisory Committee;
- Women should be effectively and equitably represented on Provincial and District Security Committees;
- Women should be included in the National Security Assessment Unit;
- Gender balance in the decision-making levels of the security forces should be ensured and efforts made to recruit women into the Republic of Fiji Military Forces.

Fijian women also noted the importance of environmental security issues such as addressing the negative impact of extractive industries, preparing for natural disasters and the impact of
climate change on food and nutrition security. Following the submission of the position paper, the Fijian Ministry of Defence invited the Women, Peace, and Security Coordinating Committee to make a presentation in front of the National Security and Defence Review.

The Ministry of Defence also indicated that they have committed the full implementation and mainstreaming of the fulfilment of state obligations under the UNSCR 1325 into their policies, plans and an integrated approach with Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This gained traction at the regional level and subsequently the UNDP Pacific Centre, in collaboration with PIFS, the University of the South Pacific and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) FEMLINKPacific - as the convenor of a regional network on the 1325 and the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum held a series of three regional consultations on human security in 2008, beginning to outline roles and responsibilities of existing institutions to fulfil a human security agenda. The series of regional meetings and documentation contributed to the adoption of the Pacific Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2012 - 2015).

While the WPS CC in Fiji was disbanded, women-led NGOS such as FEMLINKPacific have persisted in engaging on national security policy advocating at national and regional level. Since 2014 the Women's Human Security First campaign and reports has been a basis of advocacy and engagement including a submission to the Hague 2015 National Security Policy review and it should be noted that the Ministry of Defence in Fiji has included a human security approach and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in its Strategic Plan.

Photo 30: Women conducting policy analysis. Photo Credit: FEMLINKPacific
In response to violent extremist group’s attacks on religious places, military and police installations, markets, funeral gatherings and even schools, Pakistani police departments diverted training and resources away from crime prevention toward counterterrorism. The police engaged mainly male officers with negligible if any role of female police. Building public trust in police and improving public-police relations was not a priority. Close collaboration between police and army and the militarization of the police had further widened the gap between public and police leading to incidents where people took the matters in their own hands. With male officers involved in counterterrorism activities, women police could have been utilized in regular police work to improve public security.

The National Police Bureau acts as a Secretariat of the Ministry of Interior Pakistan and has the mandate to give advisory support to all police organizations on policy formulation and monitors implementation. In response to these challenges, GIZ and the National Police Bureau launched a Gender Responsive Policing Project in July 2009 with a vision to bring a positive change within the institutional landscape. The project worked nationwide through close collaboration with the bureau. The project aimed to provide gender responsive policing services to the community by support equitable participation of both men and women police officers. The main rationale of the programme was to improve the delivery of police services for women, girls, elderly people, children and minorities. It was observed that wherever women were engaged in active policing there was no report of corruption and very few complaints of delayed response. In the presence of female officers, women also no longer abstained from seeking police assistance due to fear or shame.

The program’s key activities were the following:

**Conducting a Gender Audit**
A Gender Audit established a baseline understanding of current levels of gender awareness and sensitivity in the policing practices including recruitment and promotion, training and curricula, procedures and protocols, policies and services etc. Police officers in the mid-management level conducted the audit to ensure that the credibility of results was not questioned. The audit revealed striking gender gaps at all levels. Women police were segregated in women police stations and played an insignificant role in active policing. In response to the gender audit, the project adopted a multipronged approach for improving gender mainstreaming and sensitivity to gender-based violence in policing.

**Introducing Gender-sensitive Operating Procedures**
With input from police officers across Pakistan, the project developed Standard Operating Procedures for police to deal with women victims of violence. This led to the establishment of Ladies Complaint Units and dedicated women desks inside regular male-dominated police stations to assist women with complainants. For example, more than 60 women’s desks were set up in the province of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa. Setting up women desks and ladies complaint units encouraged women to approach police for help, increased reporting of cases of violence against women, and resulted in improved responses to women’s complaints.
**Conducting Training Programs**
The project brought together police training heads from all parts of the country to formulate gender guidelines for training. This enabled the establishment of a uniform countrywide standard of learning for each rank within the police form. Police trainers from police training institutes were trained as gender trainers to sensitize male and female police trainees to provide gender sensitive services to women seeking police assistance. Police received information and training on implementation of laws supporting women’s safety from violence, which helps to motivate police officers to offer timely assistance to female victims and to fight crimes against women. The project included modules on gender responsive policing in mandatory police trainings and improved general understanding of gender issues. In addition, the gender trainers modelled new interactive training methodologies to improve the overall training environment.

**Improving National Policies and Laws**
The National Police Bureau with the technical assistance of the Gender Responsive Policing Project began to develop a Gender Strategy of Police. The project negotiated and mediated spaces for women in police. Despite initial resistance, the 2012 approval of the Gender Strategy of Policy provided national guidance on gender sensitive policing practices and provided a new rational for gender mainstreaming. The Government of Pakistan had previously announced but had not implemented a 10% quota for women in all public jobs. Through the Gender Strategy of police the project ensured this quota in policing throughout Pakistan. Senior management was convinced to create proper positions for women police in mainstream policing. Police organizations now have to increase vacancies for women since more and more are applying for policing positions.

The Gender Strategy also highlighted that enhancing the role and position of women in active policing was not only a constitutional right of women, it was also an operational necessity to address violence against women. The philosophy behind gender responsive policing was to prevent and control violence at its roots. Gender roles often encourage women to practice using social skills such as empathy, communication and problem solving. The Gender Responsive Policing Project focused on women’s strengths in these skill sets to address social problems. Violence against women was seen as a precursor of intolerance in society. Children exposed to domestic violence are more likely to run away from home, use violence, seek refuge in drugs, and indulge in criminal activities or other activities that reflect societal intolerance and violence. Safety at home results in safe and tolerant societies.

**Preparing Women for their New Role**
Parallel activities supported the Gender Strategy. Specialized trainings were organized for women police to enhance their policing skills before negotiating for their enhanced positioning within their departments. A Women Police Network was established providing a platform for women police to table their issues and demand an active role in policing. Motivational workshops were held for women police to help them take pride in their work and stand by each other against all odds. The Women Police Network was linked with international and national organizations for technical assistance and advisory support.

**Raising Public Awareness**
The project worked with religious scholars, media, civil society, and philanthropists to promote the idea of gender responsiveness in policing practices and improve the acceptance of the role of women in police. National and International conferences were held on gender responsive policing advocating for the enhanced role of women in police for ensuring peaceful societies.

**Placing women as role-models into the police forces**
The women officers trained in the project were deputed in male police stations. For example, in Punjab Province a few women officers trained by the project were posted to male police
stations to work shoulder to shoulder with their male colleagues. In Sindh Province, four women were made head of male police stations (Station House Officers) and one senior woman was made head of a police district for the first time in the history of Pakistan. Media headlines on their achievements further motivated the women and their colleagues, as well as prospective women who see these female police officers as role models. Nationwide motivational campaigns were organized in girls’ colleges and universities to inform them on women protection laws, violation of women rights, and motivating them to join police service to help the helpless in their communities.

Several international and national organizations are now working on gender responsive policing adopting the approach of the Gender Responsive Policing project and building on its successes. Other countries such as Sudan and India are using Pakistan’s Gender Strategy of Police as a model for their own work to gender mainstream in policing.
Pakistan: Training Women to Participate in Security Sector Policy-Making

Written with Allison Peters

Lack of training and support is a major obstacle to women's participation in security sector policy-making and programming. Security processes often exclude women in their development and implementation and women may need enhanced advocacy capabilities to address this exclusion. Often women in the security sector have no mentors or support networks and are provided little access to the forums that discuss national or local security priorities. Male policy makers may also often lack knowledge about how to craft inclusive security sector policies and programmes.

The Institute for Inclusive Security works through research, training, and advocacy to advance women's inclusion in peace and security processes. The central focus of their policy work and programming is to recruit, retain, and professionalize women in the security sector not just to train women to collaborate with the security sectors. Inclusive Security organizes joint workshops and consultations during which women peacebuilders and security actors discuss how to better account for women's needs in security sector reform.

In Pakistan, Inclusive Security and partner organization PAIMAN Alumni Trust held a series of multi-sectoral capacity building workshops to advance the inclusion of women in the country's policy-making on countering violent extremism (CVE). Inclusive Security and PAIMAN brought together female delegates of civil society from every province with women working in provincial and federal police forces and parliaments in Islamabad.

Based on a training curriculum developed with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (see box below for more detail), the initial workshops focussed on the role women can and should play in addressing CVE. These discussions were important to build trust and a common consensus around these issues among the women. Since it was their first opportunity to meet representatives from the other sectors, they needed to increase their understanding of each other's roles and responsibilities and think about how they could jointly contribute to CVE. The second workshop then focused on how they could address or work around the current shortcomings of the security sector in Pakistan. The women were able to formulate specific recommendations to ensure that the national action plan on CVE will give more attention to gender-specific needs and increase the recruitment, retention and professionalization of women in the police force.

The partners equip select Pakistani women leaders in civil society, parliament, and the police to impact processes and dialogues related to countering violent extremism in Pakistan by:

1. Deepening participants understanding of women’s roles in countering violent extremism, the existing institutions that develop policies related to security issues, and the impact that they can have on national security processes and dialogues.

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**The challenge:**
While research indicates policewomen are critical in fighting violent extremism and terrorism, women represent a little over one percent of Pakistan's police forces and remain largely excluded from decision-making processes around these issues.

**Theory of change:**
Ensuring women's priorities and perspectives are represented in national and provincial security policies and processes will enhance the effectiveness of efforts to counter violent extremism.
2. Connecting participants to other leaders and policymakers in Pakistan, the US, and the region so that they can share information about the role of women in countering violent extremism and build a broader network.

3. Increasing the participants’ advocacy skills so that they can effectively advance women’s inclusion in security-setting policy processes and institutions, including Pakistan’s law enforcement sector.

4. Building cross-sectoral collaborative approaches to increase women’s inclusion in countering violent extremism and increase trust and information sharing between sectors.

“A Woman’s Guide to SSR”

In collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Inclusive Security has produced a textbook with an accompanying curriculum – “A Woman’s Guide to SSR” – which provides women in civil society with knowledge, skills, tools and examples to participate proactively in ongoing SSR processes. The guide explains the main SSR concepts and provides women with options on how to get involved. For example, it explains how to find out about security sector issues, how to approach policymakers in different institutions, how to build coalitions or how to engage in advocacy. It also provides practical tools such as a list of relevant regional and international legal instruments, glossaries of jargon terms, as well as ample stakeholder maps or meetings agendas.
Nepal: Improving Access to Justice
Written with Joe Whitaker

Although security has improved overall since the peace agreement in 2006, violence against women and girls is perceived to be on the increase in Nepal. Domestic violence is widespread including beatings, intimidations and food rationing by family members or neighbours. But discriminatory socio-cultural practices such as polygamy, child marriage, dowry disputes, limited access to property or citizenship rights or witchcraft accusations are also rampant on the local level.

These grievances are countered by a very weak response from official security and justice actors. Although policy-makers have ratified progressive legislation, discriminatory attitudes or interference by political parties in formal justice institutions prevent many women and girls, in particular those belonging to ethnic minorities, to report their cases. Victims of SGBV may often not read nor speak the language of the court and may feel generally intimidated or discouraged by the formal procedures. Instead, they increasingly turn to informal justice institutions such as traditional village courts or mediation committees. But these informal mechanisms are just as prone to discrimination or interference. Since the state has little oversight over the informal justice sector, they leave the needs of women and girls largely unaddressed and allow perpetrators of serious crimes to evade formal punishment.

In order to improve the state oversight of informal mechanisms and improve access to justice for women and girls in Nepal, International Alert has worked in three main areas:

Training Informal Justice Providers
In collaboration with the Supreme Court of Nepal and the National Judicial Academy International Alert worked with two local civil society organizations, the Legal Aid and Consultancy Center (LACC), a legal resource organization that promotes women's access to justice, and the Forum for Women, Law and Development (FWLD), an NGO that works for the protection, promotion and enjoyment of human rights. Together they trained almost 500 informal justice providers on the basic principles of Nepal’s law and its justice system including international gender and human rights norms. Through the trainings, informal justice providers increased their knowledge and understanding of the formal justice system and the principles on which it operates. They understood their own role within the larger system, their mandate to handle civil disputes, and how they could complement the work of the courts in order to provide more equitable and fair justice, especially to women and girls.

Pushing for Institutional Progress
As part of on-going judicial reform in Nepal, the judiciary created a provision for Continuous Hearing to ensure speedier justice delivery by the courts and reduce large case backlogs. However, for some time this provision had not been implemented at the district level because district judges and court officials lacked a clear understanding of the procedures required to implement it and because of a lack of coordination among the different justice sector actors.

Recognising that justice seekers turned to informal justice providers even for criminal cases because of the speed of their judgements, International Alert collaborated with the Supreme
Court to organize briefings for judges in the courts in six districts to discuss how to implement Continuous Hearing. The briefings resulted in the adoption of the practice of Continuous Hearing by these six courts, demonstrating that justice could be delivered more swiftly in the courts, and eventually official guidance for Nepal's other district courts to replicate this practice.

**Raising Public Awareness**

International Alert has also been engaging in a broad public outreach campaign in Nepal. The aim is to make female justice seekers aware of their rights and increase their understanding of the justice system. The campaign included discussion programmes on problems of access to justice that were broadcast on radio stations in six districts and a video documentary about access to justice problems related to addressing SGBV that was broadcast on national TV and Facebook. In three districts, International Alert provided public information on women’s rights, the law relating to SGBV and justice procedures through a mobile documentary show that reached approximately 500 members of the public in schools and other public meeting places.

One hundred and twenty non-state justice providers took part in exposure visits to courts, police stations, public attorney offices, Women and Children’s Development Offices and other parts of the state justice system to demystify state procedures. Participants met with officials, including judges, and in at least one district (Banke), received presentations on how the state providers worked. The visits were also an opportunity for the state providers to request that criminal cases be referred to them and not be handled in the community.

Working with the Women and Children’s Development Offices in six districts, International Alert and its partners held twelve public information sessions on the Government’s GBV Reduction Fund. This Fund existed but was largely not being used because the local government structures were not sure of how or when to use it. The information session served a dual purpose of helping local government officials and WCDO officers understand how they could use the fund to assist victims of GBV, and gave victims and communities members at large an induction to the Fund and what women could request from local government representatives.

Photo 32: Traditional justice providers in Banke. Photo Credit: Saferworld
DRC: Transforming the Congolese Armed Forces
Written with Lena Slachmuijlder

The Democratic Republic of Congo has seen the deadliest conflict since World War II. Following the overthrow of former President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, the country was plunged into several civil and regional wars, involving dozens of non-state armed groups battling with remnants of the Congolese army. The result was a death toll reaching 6 million, the destruction of rule of law, and a complete breakdown in the role of the Congolese Armed Forces in their obligation to protect Congolese civilians. The conflict led to the DRC being labelled the “rape capital of the world” due to the frequency and intensity of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) inflicted by soldiers, non-state armed actors, bandits, criminals and even community members against women and men.

International civil society organisations responded to these extreme abuses largely through condemnation or seeking to use the UN or other international channels to pressure the government to discipline its soldiers. However, this had little effect on the abusive behaviour of the soldiers, and resulted rather in polarizing relationships between the civil society organisations and the Congolese Armed Forces, who felt attacked and not supported by these groups.

In 2006, faced with this situation, Search for Common Ground took another approach, building buy-in from the Congolese Armed Forces themselves for a programme that would use the military’s own in-house capacity to sensitize their own units and build bridges of cooperation with the communities they were meant to protect.

“We began another type of conversation with them. One about enabling them to become protectors, not perpetrators,” explained Lena Slachmuijlder, SFCG’s Country Director at the time. “We listened, and heard that deep down, they also wanted to change. They knew that if the communities didn’t trust them, but feared them, that their own security was in danger. And they weren’t proud of their record of abuses. We created educational tools to resonate with the soldiers’ sense of self-esteem.”

SFCG also recognized that part of the obstacle was deep trauma and resulting prejudice and stereotypes by the communities, particularly in eastern DRC. These attitudes prevented the type of information sharing and collaboration that the soldiers depended upon to be able to effectively combat the armed groups and protect the communities under attack. The programme was thus designed to seek to change the perceptions by these communities, and have them participate in the overall reform.

The challenge:
Security actors are perpetrators of violence and local communities fear them.

Theory of change:
When the security forces have the in-house capacity and appropriate tools to sensitize their troops and build bridges of collaboration with civilians, then relationships will improve and protection will improve.

Photo 33: Soldiers from the South Kivu 10th Region running a joint marathon with women’s organisations in Bukavu.
Photo Credit: Search for Common Ground
process of the security sector in the DRC.

The first iteration of the program, entitled “Tomorrow is a New Day: Transforming Security Forces from Perpetrators to Protectors” began in 2006 with a pilot in the South Kivu province. Since 2006, SFCG has expanded the programme nationwide, reaching more than 40,000 Congolese soldiers of all ranks across the country in a programme that is “about them” and “not against them.”

The project aimed to shift perceptions and attitudes around civil-military relations. It aimed to raise general awareness about the Congolese Armed Forces’ responsibility to respect human and protect civilians and build bridges of trust and collaboration among soldiers and civilians, particularly in the war-affected communities.

A key factor of success was the internal support the project was able to secure. The ‘Armed Forces Pastors’ ("Aumoniers", in French), which occupied hierarchical ranks within the Congolese Armed Forces, and the Programme of Civic and Patriotic Education, a unit which had been legally mandated by the Congolese Armed Forces Headquarters to train soldiers and that was headed by an experienced and respected General, were in favour of the project. The collaboration with the Education Unit permitted the pilot project to scale to a national level and maintain official buy-in at all stages of the project over the last 10 years.

Some of the program’s key elements were:

**Interactive Training Materials for Soldiers**

SFCG designed innovative training materials, which the soldiers themselves were able to understand and then deliver to their peers. This included translating human rights, civilian protection, SGBV and conflict transformation training into accessible ‘image boxes’ with simple training manuals, supported by pre-recorded audio sketches in local languages and comic books. The soldiers were trained in how to shift from one-directional communication to participatory methods in their trainings. The soldiers were even trained in how to build improvised participatory theatre sketches to translate the human rights and protection principles into accessible real-life examples in front of their units. SFCG worked with a documentary filmmaking team to produce a curriculum-driven educational film with a focus on sexual violence and masculinity, with a discussion guide, for outreach to the units. SFCG trained soldiers to be able to use this film and facilitate discussions, which included discussions about their role as soldiers, their own trauma, comic book, featuring Captain Janvier. Photo credit: Search for Common Ground
**Community Outreach**

After the project had gained traction by training thousands of soldiers within the various brigades and battalions, the Armed Forces committees then were coached as to how to design solidarity activities to build bridges of trust with the communities they were meant to protect. The criteria for these events relied on the soldiers and the local civil society organisations' joint assessment of the most damaged relationships. This meant that, for example, the Congolese Navy initiated actions with the local fishermen; the Military Police initiated collaboration with University Students, and Units in Bukavu worked closely with local women's organisations. These activities included soccer matches, clean-up activities, town hall meetings, marathons, and longer-term collaborations including joint farming projects.

**Changing Social Norms**

SFCG also used its expertise in communication for conflict transformation to reach a mass audience through radio and television programmes and comic books. A radio drama series in Lingala and Swahili was broadcast nationwide, featuring a dynamic cast of military and civilian characters whose daily lives reflected the drama, crises and collaborative solutions that were gradually coming to be a reality through the project. The programmes clarified key issues around the Security Sector Reform process, including how civilians and the army could best collaborate to ensure civilian protection. Other magazine format radio programmes reported on efforts to combat impunity by the mobile courts ("audiences foraines"), which were moving around communities to sentence military perpetrators of serious crimes. Hundreds of thousands of comic books were distributed around the country, portraying the negative and positive roles of soldiers and civilians, reinforcing and popularizing the social acceptability of the changes that were underway. Billboards were put up in specific communities, as well as murals painted on the regional military headquarters with powerful imagery demonstrating the protective role of the Congolese Armed Forces working hand in hand with civilians.

These various forms of media also reinforced each other. The main character in the comic book and radio drama was a certain 'Captain Janvier'; his name became so popular amongst military and civilians as the 'bad guy' that it became a frequent reference in every day conversations and discussions within the military units and amongst the general public. SFCG also launched complementary media initiatives, including one called 'the Real Man' ("Vrai Djo"), which highlighted examples of men, including soldiers, doing the 'right thing' faced with a temptation to abuse or harass a woman. This was also used in outreach and discussions with soldiers and the communities.

**Measuring Impact**

Within the highly fragile context of DRC, traditional monitoring was often challenging. A major measure of change however was the shift in perception of protection by the civilians before and after the project worked with soldiers deployed in their community. For example, in one evaluation, 54% of the populations of the areas of intervention reported relationships with the military as being good to very good, compared to only 32% in control areas. There were also powerful qualitative measures of change, such as the ability of a military unit that had participated in the programme to undertake an important, high-risk military operation in Katanga, without committing any human rights abuses. And the relationship building between communities and the soldiers led to numerous examples of collaborative problem solving and a de-stigmatization of the relationships.

Overall this programme has inspired multiple projects within Search for Common Ground in Tanzania, Nigeria and Nepal. These experiences continue to reinforce the value of the Common Ground approach to the security sector, grounded in strengthening relationships of collaboration and enabling people to drive forward their own transformation.
Earlier chapters in this volume illustrate the creative and inspiring work to improve local ownership of security through capacity building, community-police dialogues, gender mainstreaming in security, and peacebuilding approaches to DDR. This chapter explores national-level case studies of efforts to improve local ownership and human security. The case studies generally fit into three categories, with some efforts indicating more robust levels of local ownership than others.

**National Security Dialogues**
Similar to police-community dialogues, national dialogues on security provide an opportunity for civil society and the security sector to listen and learn from each other. Together, they identify threats to human security and strategies for response. In Guinea, Yemen and Libya, for example, such national dialogues provided a platform for improving understanding of security challenges and building a vision for possible responses. National security dialogues may be transitory and not integrated into the national SSR/D process. Yet they begin the process of viewing security as a public good; an issue that requires multi-stakeholder dialogue including civil society. National security dialogues do increase local ownership because they provide civil society an opportunity to express their voice.

**National Peace Councils**
National peace councils offer a more robust model for national level local ownership. They are permanent institutional platforms for joint assessment and early warning of conflict and joint planning and implementation for responding to conflict. For example, the National Peace Councils in Ghana, also known as a ‘National Infrastructures for Peace,’ provide joint training for civil society and security sector at the local, regional and national level. They also provide an early warning mechanism, in which civil society and the security sector jointly analyse early warning signs and then mobilize others for preventive action. In the peace councils, civil society and security actors decide together which joint set of local, regional and national efforts is needed to reconcile between groups in conflict. The National Peace Council in Kenya is another example of a peace infrastructure that has also successfully stopped the escalation of election-related violence.

**Joint Institutional Oversight**
When security actors and civil society engage in joint oversight, they jointly monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector. In Burundi, civil society representatives have a permanent seat on the national defence review that oversees the SSR/D process. In Guatemala for example, the UN brokered peace plan enshrines accountability mechanisms for civil society to provide oversight to all areas of the security sector, including intelligence, military, police, criminal justice and national security policy formulation. In the Philippines, a civil society oversight platform allows civil society to meet monthly with security sector at the national and regional level to participate in the national security review process. In these cases, civil society actors identify security challenges, formulate joint strategies and monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector. This permanent institutional engagement between civil
society and security sectors is the ultimate guarantee of local ownership and an accountable, democratic state response to improving human security.

**Burundi: Civil Society Consultation and Oversight in SSR/D**

Written with Perpetue Kanyange and Jocelyne Nahimana

The Burundian SSR/D process is unique for several reasons. The Arusha Accord’s attention to the ethnic balance of the Burundi security forces in the years following the civil war may have displaced needed attention to security governance, as evidenced by renewed fighting and frequent accusations against the police of human rights abuses. As part of the SSR/D process, the Burundian Defence Review included three pillars to assess the military, police, and the crosscutting theme of security sector governance. Unlike most train and equip-type SSR/D efforts, this programme gave more attention to local governance and the process of how local institutions earned public legitimacy through open, transparent, and inclusive processes. The military pillar, for example, included a UN Peacebuilding Fund project in strengthening military ethics and discipline through a “moralization” training for the military to improve the morality and behaviour of security personnel that could then improve the civil-military relationship. The overall purpose of the Defence Review was to identify diverse stakeholder’s security needs and perceptions through a participatory security assessment process. The process emphasized the diverse roles and the “matrix of responsibilities” of different stakeholders.

The “security governance pillar” focused on national ownership of the Defence Review process. The review assessed parliamentary roles and responsibilities for overseeing the security sector, to ensure it represented citizen’s interests. It also provided space and funding for civil society consultation, participation and oversight in security governance.

When the Defence Review began, tensions were high between civil society, the government, and the security sector, especially the police. In 2009, a civil society leader fighting government corruption was assassinated. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Intelligence denounced and threatened civil society, requiring all CSOs to obtain permission to hold public meetings and de-registering the main Burundian CSO network, the Forum for Strengthening the Civil Society (FORSC), until pressured to reverse the decision. Early in the program, military leaders and some Parliamentarians objected to having civilians involved in discussing security and strongly opposed civil society oversight or monitoring of the security sector. Through the Defence Review process, multi-stakeholder security dialogue led by skilled facilitators, built trust and appreciation that diverse civil society stakeholders held legitimate roles and responsibilities in security sector governance.

The Defence Review set up a Governance Advisory Group and chose two Burundian civil society organizations with experience on peace and security issues Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (CENAP) and the Centre des Femmes pour la Paix/Women’s Centre for Peace (CFP/WPC) to participate. The Governance Advisory Group played a variety of roles, from guidance and advice on programme activities, to evaluating the impact of activities, coordinating and overseeing the security governance in the entire SSD program.
As part of its role in the Defence Review, CENAP structured wide public consultation to support the SSR/D process. With experience in conflict assessment and early warning, CENAP already had a positive track record on security issues. CENAP collected views of what was needed to create long-term peace from a representative sample of the Burundian population through focus groups, interviews, audio-visual sessions, and national forums. CENAP facilitated consultations with diverse local civil society organizations, women, youth, refugees, religious leaders, students, media, political parties and demobilized soldiers, CENAP organized dialogue groups in both rural and urban areas as well as national task forces on four identified challenges: illegal circulation of weapons; poverty and unemployment; attitudes during elections; and transitional justice and reconciliation. The consultations with diverse segments of Burundi society documented that people of different regions, classes and ethnic identities had different security challenges.

Research documented that most security threats did not have a military solution, highlighting the roles and responsibilities of other stakeholders. The CFP/WPC supported consultation with women and girls, include female ex-combatants to ensure the public consultation was gender sensitive and included advocacy for women's rights and the involvement of Burundian women in the peace and reconciliation process, particularly in light of UN resolution 1325's mandate for women's involvement in peace processes. CFP and CENAP also contributed in mobilization of civil society, including those of women and youth, to get understand security sector reform and on their role in supporting peace consolidation.

An example illustrates how civil society participated in SSR. Military and police units began hosting "open days" where the public could visit non-sensitive sites to dialogue with and improve relationships and understanding. On one military open day, civil society representatives from human rights and women's organizations worked together with military officers to evaluate different military units as they demonstrated how they would protect a village from a rebel attack in an "ethics competition." The participating military units with the highest rating won a prize and public recognition. This exercise marked a new milestone in Burundian civil society oversight of the security sector.
The Guatemalan Peace Accords signed in 1996 brought an end to 36 years of internal armed conflict between a repressive and authoritarian state and leftist guerrillas with more than 250,000 victims, 63 massacres and other crimes against humanity. As part of the peace process, Government and insurgency representatives reached an official Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Military on a Democratic Society that detailed the need to transform the security sector institutions adapting it to the new roles required in a democratic era. But implementation of the agreement faltered: a resistant military, a distracted government, a polarized atmosphere and an uninformed public combined to allow the continuation of the conceptual and operational frameworks of counterinsurgency that represented a latent threat to peace and democratization.

The Peace Accords dealt not only with the end of the armed confrontation and its effects in society, but addressed a wide range of social and economic issues – from women's rights to socio-economic policy - effectively becoming an agenda for social reform. The Part Agreement on the Strengthening of Civil Society and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (AFPC, for its Spanish acronym) went beyond the usual disarmament, demobilization and reintegration agenda to deal with issues of military reform and de-militarization of society. It was not so much about the end of armed struggle as about the advent of democracy in Guatemalan society. It dealt not so much with the necessary redefinition of military functions as a result of the end of armed conflict and the disappearance of the subversive military threat to the state, as with the need to ensure the development of a military institution that responds to the security needs of a democratic political community. In this regard, it built upon the Central American Democratic Security Framework Treaty that had been signed by the Presidents of the Central American countries in 1995 with the explicit intention to eradicate the authoritarian regional security structures and concepts inherited from the Cold War.

The POLSEDE (Toward a Security Policy for Democracy) initiative was launched in 1999 by two local civil society organizations, the local chapter of an academic network of research centres called the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), and the Guatemalan Institute for Development and Peace (IGEDEP), with the support of the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP International) – currently known as Interpeace and UNDP. The research-and-dialogue process brought all the concerned parties in state and society around a collective effort to further the goal of military conversion and promoting democratization in the spirit of the peace accords. The programme gathered relevant government agencies including the military, civil society organizations and academic institutions in a process that lasted over 3 years, holding more than 200 meetings in 6 technical working groups and a high-level Plenary, and organizing ad-hoc events such as public conferences and workshops.

The War-Torn Societies Project had developed a method of participatory action research to enable a diverse and polarized community of actors in state and society to engage in an inclusive
evidence-based analysis and decision-making process. The research and dialogue process provided a neutral space making it safe for people to participate across socio-political divides, working upon the principle of consensus. The combined dialogue and research methods ensured the development of policy recommendations that were both technically sound and politically legitimate. The intention was to facilitate the adoption of collaborative attitudes by undertaking the dialogue as an academic exercise instead of relying on adversarial 'negotiation' formats. The 'evidence based' nature of the process would prevent actors from engaging on discussions based upon pre-defined, often ideologically anchored notions of what the problems and the solutions were, allowing time for the establishment of sound, evidence-based parameters for the discussion. The consensus rule would reduce concerns that the exercise could be politically manipulated in favour of one side or other and eased resistance to participation from hardliners by guaranteeing they would not be 'ambushed' by numbers.

A critical issue was the identification of the motivational factors that would enable such a varied group of actors, often polarized about the issues, to converge around a common effort. Government authorities expressed their support for the initiative, clearly identifying the value of consensus-based policies in such a polarized subject, and specifically, the potential contribution to the implementation of lagging AFPC commitments. Civil society organizations expressed their interest in a space that would allow them to interact with civilian and military actors in government, on a topic hitherto monopolized by security institutions and key for democratization. Although some recalcitrant military elements expressed reservations about the opening of military conversion and other SSR/D issues to civil society organizations, as an institution the Military –interested in legitimizing itself in a new political context- expressed its willingness to join a research-based effort that stood apart from the adversarial dynamics that had characterized civil-military relations. Clarity about their own and others’ motivations and transparency about the process rules and procedures enabled participants to progressively develop the trust and the shared knowledge necessary for the development of far-reaching consensus-based recommendations.

The project issued twelve documents with a range of specific recommendations that were integrated into a conceptual framework document on civil military relations, and four concrete legal and institutional reform proposals: of the national security system, of the intelligence services, and of the military functions. Beyond these concrete results, the project instilled in participant's attitudes and skills that have enabled them to pursue cooperative engagement between state and society and strengthened civil society capacities for engagement still in evidence, long after the project ended.

A number of dialogues processes grew out of the project. The Project in Support of a Citizen Security Policy (POLSEC), was set up under the initiative of the participants in POLSEDE in response to an explicit request by the Government to transfer the analytical framework and dialogue mechanisms that were used in the project to the wider debate about public security such as initiatives in civil intelligence, criminal investigation and community-level security; The Guatemala Network for Democratic Security brought together military officers and civilians in a “security community” anchored in the new paradigm of democratic security that continued dialogue across the state-society divide. An Advisory Council on Security, created in the AFPC as a space for civil society participation in policy formulation, was finally established after Government and civil society reached agreement on the terms under which it would function. Over a dozen universities, think tanks and NGOs participated in a follow up projected called FOSS (Strengthening of Civil Society Organizations Specialized

The challenge: The security sector protected elite interests and undermined human security.

Theory of change: As part of a peace process and wider effort at democratization, civil society worked with the security sector to reorient it toward "democratic security."
in Security) that carried out research on different aspects of the new security agenda, from civil society engagement in community security strategies to the development of democratic controls over the state’s security apparatus, that continues to function to this day. The National Congress signed an agreement with FOSS that turned its participant organizations into technical advisors of congressional committees working on security sector legislation. The result has been an empowered civil society, which has been playing important roles in the security sector policy making through technical advice, advocacy and lobbying.

This project did contribute toward progress and acted as a confidence building mechanism. It strengthened understanding on the technical issues at stake and improved research and policy capacities across the state-society divide; and a network of civilian and military actors with the skills and self-confidence necessary to continue in constructive interaction. Guatemala still has many security challenges linked to emerging security threats and forms of violence, and the process of democratizing the security legal and institutional frameworks continues. But it now has an empowered civil society that is living up to the challenge and engaging the state in constructive interaction around these issues.

The Philippines: The “Bantay Bayanihan” Forum
Written with Myla Leguro and Musa Sanguila

Building on a decade of capacity building training programmes and joint programming for the military and civil society in the Philippines, a new initiative creates a permanent forum for civil society-military-police coordination and civil society oversight of the security sector. Launched in 2011, the Bantay Bayanihan forum institutionalized the goodwill that began with the 2010 formulation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) that included strong participation from civil society groups.

Bantay Bayanihan, known as the “BB,” engages the security sector in critical and constructive collaboration towards peace and security sector reform. The network serves as an independent oversight body in the implementation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Internal Peace and Security Plan. It provides dialogue spaces for various stakeholders to come together and work towards addressing peace and security issues at the local and national levels.

The BB is a “Whole of Nation Approach” involving many diverse stakeholders. But the BB is also localized, enabling the general public at the local level to communicate directly with local security forces and local government. The map here highlights the locations of BB platforms across the Philippines. The network has grown to 15 clusters with a nationwide reach. It includes 150 civil society organizations – including human rights, religious, environmental, academic, and labour groups - together with civilian government units, leaders from the Department of National Defence, Department of Interior and Local Government, Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, National Security Council, and the Cabinet Cluster on Justice, Peace, and Security also participate in BB events and meetings. The BB's National Secretariat is the Security Reform Initiative (SRI).

According to the BB's website, "The universal message of Bantay Bayanihan is about working together towards winning the peace. By sharing the gains and duties of laying the groundwork for conflict resolution and community development, it creates a
space for conflict survivors to be empowered in creating their future. At the same time, it brings government closer to its constituents, offering a human perspective of security issues rather than its traditional institutional stance.” BB aims for dialogue partners to jointly implement the IPSP to ensure and advance human rights, international humanitarian law, rule of law, accountability, civilian engagement and democratization of the armed forces. Specifically, BB includes the following tasks:

- Serving as a venue or direct channel to raise issues regarding the IPSP-Bayanihan, including peace and security concerns of local communities
- Conducting and validating periodic evaluations of IPSP-Bayanihan
- Providing recommendations to the Chief of Staff (national level) and Commanding General (unified command/ division/ brigade level) on IPSP-Bayanihan
- Generating concise policy recommendations on security reforms together with peace and conflict dynamics, to be submitted and presented to respective peace and order councils (local executive) and sanggunian (local legislative), all the way to national-level Cabinet security cluster (executive) and Congress (legislative)
- Promoting Bantay Bayanihan to other potential partner stakeholders
- Institutionalizing the active partnership of government and civil society

In addition to smaller meetings where civil society representatives meet with security sector leaders, the BB also holds public forums to broaden discussion about Peace and Order Councils, Normalization, and CAFGUs (Citizen Auxiliary Force Geographical Units). Bantay Bayanihan also produces policy reform papers to reflect the views of both civil society and relevant government agencies.

The BB emerges from decades of tense relationships between communities and security forces. At first, civil society suggested that they call the BB a “multisectoral advisory committee.” Then the name shifted to the “Bayanihan Partners Forum” but some parts of civil society objecting, noting it was too early to call each other “partners.” Some military officers were unsure about allowing civil society representatives to hear intelligence reports, such as the details of operations, from casualties to how many shells were fired. A civil society member shared that with the IPSP approach guiding the military’s activities, there was a significant change in dealing with such cases: “Military now plays a vital role as protector of the civilians. This lessened human rights violations because the military has learned that they have to connect with the community. Before, they were hard to get or they were very sensitive and defensive especially when we brought cases of rape [against soldiers] to the [meeting] sessions.” Trust
continues to grow, as security forces recognize the value of hearing civil society’s different perspectives and analysis on security threats.

In the region of Lanao del Norte, the BB’s work building civil society collaboration outreach from a small, interfaith NGO known as Pakigdait with the Filipino military. Pakigdait conducts interfaith dialogue between Muslim and Christian leaders and aims to help communities address conflict and bring needed changes without violence. Like most of his community, Musa Sanguila of Pakigdait had experienced abuse from military personnel. Growing up as an ethnic Moro, he had been rounded up by the military police and from that experience of repression and humiliation he became a Moro activist. In August 2008 the army blocked all food supplies to the local municipality. Pakigait requested for passage to bring in relief goods. The army refused for fear that they are also providing for the insurgents. But now, because of the BB dialogue, trust between civil society and the military is increasing because of the BB engagement.

His colleague Abel Jose Moya was captured and tortured in the 1980s for his role in the New People’s Army. Sanguila and Moya had a change of heart. With a desire to promote a “culture of peace,” Sanguila and his colleagues began regularly visiting military camps to teach soldiers how to speak the local Maranao language and to relate better to local communities. The AFP twice awarded Pakigdait as an “outstanding NGO” for its bridge building work between civil society and the military. Now Musa Sanguila sits on the BB oversight committee. Sanguila observed that “Everyone is wounded” in both civil society and in security forces. Speaking as a representative of civil society, Sanguila states “It is important we talk to each other. We always tell them that we are here not to criticise but to be constructive on how we can push for peace and development together. We are here to help.”
Ghana: A National Infrastructure for Peace

Like other states, a modern state system coexists with tribal chiefs without formal political authority. Neither the state nor traditional leaders were able to stop violent conflicts in northern Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s. Riots broke out after the 2002 slaying of one region’s traditional King of Dagbon and many of his elders. The regional government established the Northern Region Peace Advocacy Council (NRPAC) as a mediation mechanism to deal with the issues of trust among traditional factions.

With the success of the NRPAC, the government decided to explore the possibility of extending the peace council concept to the rest of the country. NGOs such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) have worked with local communities to train tribal and village leaders in mediation and conflict transformation skills since the mid-1990s. These local peace committees have prevented violence when tensions began over stolen property, inter-tribal conflicts or disputes over land.

With support from the UN Development Programme, as well as regional organizations of the African Union and ECOWAS, Ghanaians convened a range of consultations with the military, police, Parliament, and civil society at local, regional and national level. The Ghanaian Ministry of Interior launched the National Architecture for Peace in May 2006. The goal of this programme was to design an early warning and response system at national, regional, and district levels that could facilitate coordination among government, military, police and civil society. The National Architecture for Peace mandated joint dialogue, problem solving, and promotion of reconciliation initiatives.

The National Peace Council Act of 2011 established a national infrastructure for peace that consisted of a National Peace Committee, regional and district peace councils and as an innovative element, Government-affiliated Executive Secretaries and Peace Promotion Officers on the regional and district level.

National Peace Council (NPC) is a platform for consultation and cooperation between the government, security forces, traditional chiefs, business leaders, religious leaders and other representatives from civil society with the aim of “promoting reconciliation, tolerance, trust and confidence building, mediation and dialogue.” The NPC coordinates early warning and response including the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. It provides mediation and mediation support and emphasizes indigenous solutions to conflicts. It build capacities of the society to peacefully manage and transform conflict and promotes understanding about the values of reconciliation, tolerance, confidence building, mediation and dialogue as responses to conflict.

The NPC is independent. It has a Board, consisting of thirteen eminent persons appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State. Eight members are representatives from religious bodies. The NPC’s independence from government strengthens its public legitimacy and acceptance by traditional leaders.

The national platform connected Regional and District Peace Councils. In some regions, already existing Regional Peace Advisory Councils merged with regional security structures. Each Regional Peace Council has their own staff of professional Peace Promotion Officers, trained by WANEP, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, to do public education, monitor conflict, and facilitate dialogue and mediation. Peace Promotion Officers nominated by regional
governments, act as coordinators to facilitate early warning and response. Executive Secretaries of the National Peace Council with experience in conflict resolution and peace building operate in each region and district. The Ministry of Interior has a Peacebuilding Support Unit to coordinate the collaboration of government agencies with the infrastructure for peace components and provides technical and administrative support.

Together, the national, regional and district peace councils form an early warning network to alert to the potential for violent conflict as well as an early response network to prevent conflict from escalating. The National Peace Council hosts a website that monitors conflict in different regions of the country and provides a ‘conflict map’ of key divisive issues. Ghana's local peace committees are the first resort if conflicts break out at the local level. If tensions escalate, regional peace teams are sent in to mediate and facilitate communication to address underlying grievances. If these efforts cannot stop the threat of violence, regional teams call upon national level diplomats and parliamentarians to get involved. The Ghanaian military intervenes only as a last resort, when they then have the legitimacy and support from other leaders who consent to military action. The international community touted this as an example of atrocity prevention, illustrating the type of infrastructure needed for the prevention element in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

In 2007, when community groups in the suburbs of Tamale, the capital of the Northern Region of Ghana, had clashed over the construction of a water pipeline, the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council successfully intervened to stop the violence and mediate a settlement. Local Peace Councils use mediation to address conflicts over land, religion, social and political issues.

The NPC sponsors peace education activities. For example, on one occasion one hundred youth from all the regions in the country were trained to become Peace Advocates within their communities. The NPC also sponsors capacity building programmes for the three main political parties to strengthen their capacities to manage diversity and conflicting political, religious, economic, tribal and land interests.

Even though Ghana is West Africa’s most stable democracy, chieftaincy-related conflicts and the discovery of oil led sparked political tensions leading up to the 2008 elections. The National Peace Council (NPC) played a major role in ensuring peaceful elections in 2008 by enabling interparty dialogue, helping to establish a code of conduct for political parties and their candidates, promoting voter education and public value in peaceful elections. When tension broke out in the streets after the media announced initial election results that only 50,000 votes separated the winner and the loser, the NPC helped to arrange for both candidates to go on television to ask their supporters to go home, to reject the use of violence, and to support a smooth transfer of power through discreet meetings with stakeholders that defused considerable tension.

**Kenya: A National Peace Council**

The roots of Kenya’s electoral violence are deep. Following colonialism, the British favoured some tribes with political positions and ownership of large tracts of land. Other tribal groups, punished by the British for their rebellion and insurgency against British authority, continue to perceive a system of injustice. Every election is an opportunity to either affirm or challenge post-colonial tribal dominance.

Kenya has a robust civil society highly trained in conflict prevention. Teams of civil society Kenyan peacebuilding experts have been mediating conflicts in other African countries since the 1980s. With several dozen Kenyans with higher degrees in conflict transformation and peacebuilding, multiple institutions and initiatives are always underway to prevent violence and foster a just peace.
For example, since the mid-1990s, the Kenyan National Council of Churches mobilizes clergy from across the country at every election to preach against the use of violence and put up public billboards condemning electoral violence. Other Kenyan NGOs, in partnership with UNDP, have trained Peace Teams as immediate responders to deescalate public violence. Still other Kenyan NGOs use mobile phone networks and social media to enable the public to quickly report outbreaks of violence to security authorities and civilian peace team responders.

In 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, developed by Somali women’s groups, became a model for imagining a whole of society approach to human security in Kenya. This Wajir District Peace Committee had brought peace to one Kenyan district near the border with Somalia by mediating between elders of different clans while working with representatives of formal authority. The Kenyan government’s District Commissioner who was chairperson led the Peace and Development Committee. The Committee also included Members of Parliament, the heads of all government departments, military and police, representatives of the various peace groups, religious leaders, and Kenyan NGO. The Committee representatives planned and designed the Committee’s activities. The Peace and Development Committee held broad consultations in twelve regional “Stakeholders Validation Workshops” between the government and non-state actors, involving all relevant ministries, including the military and police, academia, development partners, regional organizations, CSOs, women, youth groups, communities, private sector and local authorities.

To build on Wajir District Peace Committee’s successes in reducing violence, in 2001 the Kenyan government established a National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. The Office of the President, through the NSC, embarked on a process towards the development of a national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management in 2004.

Kenya’s 2007 electoral violence was a test for these prevention efforts. Once violence began, some warned of the potential for mass atrocities, mirroring those that had taken place in Rwanda. As pockets of severe violence between tribes supporting competing political candidates mounted, the Kenyan infrastructure of local peace committees, mobile phone reporting, trained local peace teams, religious leadership, and responses from the Kenyan military and police complemented by UN and African Union diplomacy created a “whole of society” response that was able to quell the violence. Yet still 1,500 people were killed and an additional 300,000 displaced during the elections. Kenyans determined that more needed to be done to prevent violence.

The challenge:
National elections lead to potential violence.

Theory of change:
Create local, regional and national capacity for early warning and immediate response from skilled mediators and peace teams.

Photo 40: Women peace forum in Kenya.
Photo Credit: CC/Flikr Institute for Inclusive Security
Reconciliation Act, the government decided to create District Peace Committees in all of Kenya's districts given the wide consensus among researchers and observers that the peace committees have successful reduced violence and enabled dialogue to address conflicts, especially in the pastoralist areas. The Kenyan government also set up four commissions to address the causes and consequences of electoral violence. The Office of the President published the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, including the lessons learned from the Post-Election Violence of 2008, at the end of 2011. However, the efforts to address the root causes of Kenyan's grievances had not been addressed by 2013.

In preparation for another round of potential electoral violence in 2013, a variety of Kenyan organizations mobilized to prevent violence again. The Uwiano platform brought together the government's National Cohesion and Integration Commission with the National Steering Committing on Conflict Management, the UN Development Programme and Peace-Net, a civil society network of more than 500 Kenyan NGOs. Uwiano set up an extensive campaign via media and mobile phone texting to provide citizens with a way of providing early warning signs or reporting violence and to match requests for help with appropriate response mechanisms including civilian rapid response teams as a first resort and to the military and police as a last resort. The Uwiano Platform prevented over a hundred incidents of potential violence in the volatile Rift Valley region alone.

The underlying tensions between tribal groups in Kenya still exist and may even be increasing over time. While prevention efforts successfully convinced people to reject violence as a method for obtaining justice in the short term, the broader grievances regarding land distribution and political power still fuel anger. The international community, actively waging a counterterrorism campaign in east Africa with the help of the current Kenyan government, has shied away from pressing for deeper political and land reforms needed to address the drivers of conflict. The International Criminal Court trials, while attempting to provide a sense of justice, may actually become the trigger for future violence if the ICC trials favour one tribe or another.

**West Africa: Early Warning and Early Response**

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANE) is a civil society-based peacebuilding network operating across West Africa. WANE collaborates on peace and security programme with the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) and the African Union. Its multi-stakeholder approach recognizes the need to focus at the policy level as well as community peacebuilding. WANE is the civil society partner of ECOWAS in the operationalization of the ECOWAS Early Response Network (ECOWARN). WANE has trained ECOWAS staff in early warning and conflict assessment, negotiation, mediation and dialogue skills as well as community engagement and civil-military coordination.

WANE founded and now runs the West African Early Warning and Early Response Network (WARN) as one of its conflict prevention mechanisms. It aims to improve human security in West Africa by monitoring and reporting socio-political situations that could degenerate into violent and destructive conflicts. WARN informs policy makers on options for response on one hand and WANE's response strategies on the other hand. The WARN programme of WANE is the forerunner of the ECOWARN.

ECOWARN's regional focus has led to a complementary National Early Warning System (NEWS). NEWS is setting up community-based conflict monitoring systems with local monitors to produce conflict and peace assessment reports, early warning reports, and policy briefs which are widely disseminated to CSOs, governments, intergovernmental bodies, partners, and...
UN agencies. WANEP’s 15 national country-based networks developed and validated their indicators to ensure effective culturally sensitive conflict monitoring. Building on the success of Ghana’s National Peace Council which established a civilian first resort to preventing and responding to violent conflict, WANEP is working to building a national architecture for peace that builds a coordination system between security forces, governments and civil society to prevent and respond to conflict.\(^\text{74}\)

The WANEP partnership with the Kofi Anan Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana and WANEP’s West African Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI) offer opportunities for WANEP staff to provide training to West African security forces from ECOWAS and the African Union, in addition to its training for civil society organizations and state institutions. WANEP trains new security officers to “know” human security, and what their role in achieving this is. WAPI offers a specific training for the security sector, where people in the army and police may attend WAPI through scholarships. The courses aim to discuss what conflict is and what causes it; security sector participants come to see how civilians view conflict and the role of security services.

**Senegal: The Armée-Nation as Indigenous Model for Peace**
*Written with Teresa Crawford, Hugh O’Donnell and Partners West Africa*

In 2009, Partners West Africa (PartnersGlobal Affiliate based in Dakar, Senegal), made an innovative move in its work on human security when it hired Colonel Birame Diop, a colonel in the Senegalese Air Force and scholar and practitioner in the field of security in West Africa. Seconded by the Ministry of Armed Forces to Partners, Colonel Diop first served as the Director for Partners Africa Institute for Security Sector Transformation. During his three years with Partners Colonel Diop served as a bridge across the civil–military divide by hosting seminars on the role of military in society, as well as how the military and civilian populations in West Africa can cooperate.

As Director of the African Institute for Security Sector Transformation (AISST) Colonel Diop addressed the lack of integration of security sector actors (military, police, border patrol and intelligence services) into civilian authority structures and systems (legislative, executive and judiciary) in West Africa. AISST began with an initiative to capture the best practices and strategies for strong civil-military relations in West Africa.

**The challenge:**
The army had a history of violent relations with the public.

**Theory of change:**
Bring the security sector together with civil society to jointly develop a new model for civil–military relations.

Working in collaboration with AISST, the results of the initiative produced the report *Senegal’s Armée-Nation: Lessons Learned from an Indigenous Model for Building Peace, Stability and Effective Civil-Military Relations in West Africa.*\(^\text{75}\) Recognizing the profound challenges of development, and its relationship to security, Senegal’s armed forces play key roles in supporting the development of the country – from health to education to vital infrastructure development. Senegal’s top military leadership credits the military’s good relationships with the population and its roles in development as responsible for Senegal’s relative peace and stability compared to its neighbours. AISST
convenes civil-military dialogues across Africa to highlight the potential positive models of security forces contributing to human security.

AISST facilitates local ownership of security through joint programmes between civil society and the security sector to improve human security. For example, following an order from then President Wade in 2010, senior leadership in the military issued a directive to increase women’s leadership within security forces. Although they had made modest progress, women remained largely in “desk” functions and did not hold frontline leadership positions. The Minister for the Armed Forces asked Colonel Diop to design a programme to aid the successful integration of women. Building upon his unique connections with civil society and working from the Partners platform he recommended drawing on the resources of civil society.

Partners West Africa worked with the Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development (AMLD), and the Senegalese Ministry for Women, Family, Social Development and Women’s Entrepreneurship on gender mainstreaming in the Senegalese armed forces. Building upon the deep research already conducted with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) Partners convened a multi-sector platform to study the challenge. They convened focus groups of current and past service members to generate deeper understanding. The interviews and research were followed by a 5-day workshop on gender mainstreaming in October 2010. The workshop convened members of the armed forces with a responsibility and interest in mainstreaming gender with Senegalese experts in gender and security reform. A select group of regional and international experts discussed and outlined the opportunities and challenges facing the armed forces in developing policies, allocating resources and creating structures that support gender mainstreaming.

This workshop was followed by a presentation of over 60 recommendations to the Ministry of Armed Forces to harmonize current policies with international instruments and existing Senegalese legislation. These recommendations formed the foundation of a series of reforms the Ministry undertook. In 2011, representatives gathered from each of the branches of the Senegalese security sector to share lessons learned and best practices in human security.
Guinea’s Defence and Security Forces (DSF) are respected for their role in the independence movement. However, beginning in the early 1980s, the DSF rooted itself deeply within Guinea’s authoritarian political structures. With growing political power came a cycle of military coups, widespread corruption, impunity, violence, and human rights abuses, including the massacre of 150 pro-democracy protestors in a soccer stadium in the country’s capital in 2009. This prompted domestic and international demands that Guinea’s security sector be reformed.76 While the 2010 election provided an opportunity for reform and comprehensive SSR/D efforts were launched, civilians outside of government were largely left out of the process.

In Guinea, Partners for Democratic Change and Partners West Africa, began work with the Committee Civilo Militaire (CCM) to conduct workshops to help Guinea undertake a national SSR/D process that considers the interests of civilian leadership and civil society. The Guinea Citizen Security Project (GCSP) began in 2011 and is endorsed by the Guinean Minister of Defence.77 Since its inception, the initiative has successfully brought civil society into the SSR/D process through education, engagement with Guinean security forces, articulation of issues at the local level, and identification of opportunities for civil and security sector collaboration. In parallel with the essential civilian engagement Partners, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), held a joint conference on the theme “Developing a Guinean National Security Policy.” The conference brought together members of Guinea’s ACSS community, as well as official representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the National Transition Council, and Guinean civil society organizations.

Since 2011, GCSP has been implemented in each of Guinea’s main regions. In the first year, it included Lower Guinea, Upper Guinea, and the Forest Region. The second year included the more contentious Medium Guinea. In 2014, GCSP replicated the dialogue in Boké and Kindia—cities within the strategically significant stretch along the coast of Lower Guinea. Community security forums provided a space for civil society and security forces to discuss what they considered their main security threats and what they perceived as the gaps in the SSR/D process. The outcomes of these forums were fed into the national dialogue to share security concerns with the national leadership and to identify where more emphasis and attention was needed in the reform process.

A number of outcomes emerged. The programme provided an “on-ramp” for citizen engagement and created new “software” - spaces for engagement to improve the quality of relationships between civil society and the armed forces. It brought together champions of change and provided them with both intellectual and moral support. Political will, the right
people, and concrete actions accompanied by funds created an atmosphere where change was acceptable. The programme in Guinea was small-scale and took place at the local level, but it resulted in increased transparency because citizens gained a better understanding of what SSR/D was and what national level actions were being undertaken. The current National Security Strategy better reflects the threats the population is facing, and the state is slowly moving back into ungoverned and un-serviced spaces.

As a complement to the formal SSR/D process, Partners is also leading a programme on policing reform with Partners West Africa, COGINTA and CECIDE. “Partners for Security in Guinea: Reforming the Police to Better Serve Citizens” aims to improve overall citizen security by strengthening the community-oriented services of the Guinea National Police (GNP) through institutionalized trainings and policies. Given a history of security forces using violent repression, victims rarely report crimes to the police. Underperforming security institutions negatively affect social trust, resilience and economic activity in the country. Partners is training a cadre of trainers at the National Police Training Academy on community policing, human rights, gender and sexual based violence and youth engagement. Partners is also supporting the establishment of Community Safety and Crime Prevention Councils (CSCPC) led by mayors in two communities in Conakry to bring together local leaders and community based organizations. These councils will act as fora to voice concerns, as platforms for civic education regarding the police roles and responsibilities and in the long-term.

Photo 44: Partners Guinea Training. Photo Credit: CC Flikr/Partners West Africa
In Yemen, state and non-state armed groups play roles in security and justice. Non-state armed groups known as "Popular Committees" are an indigenous movement whose mandate and function are rooted in and inspired by the tribal tradition of collective responsibility in which local men volunteer to maintain security in their communities. These groups have been instrumental in peace talks with both the Saudi-backed President and Ansar Allah (Houthi) opposition in control of large parts of northern Yemen. In contested states like Yemen, a multi-stakeholder dialogue including civil society, security forces, and security policymakers from the state, tribal and religious leadership is daunting. Yet there are examples of both regional and national multi-stakeholder dialogues in Yemen that offer potential lessons.

In the two restive governorates of Marib and Abyan, the Yemen office of Partners for Democratic Change (Partners Yemen) built on past work on governance and community reconciliation to support a "Justice and Security Dialogue" series in the two regions of Yemen beginning in 2013. The "Justice and Security Dialogue model" is a US Institute of Peace programme to improve trust between security actors and the communities they serve. Partners Yemen launched the dialogue series in the capital Sana’a with forty participants, including local and national government officials and members of the security forces, tribal and community leaders, members of civil society, and members of the judiciary. A conflict assessment process clarified that many participants shared the same analysis of the factors driving violence: a lack of education and employment for youth, underdevelopment and resource shortages, and an overall failure on the government’s part to protect human rights particularly in Marib where local people often oppose state law and favour tribal rule.

The dialogue participants asserted that security challenges were not amenable to military or police solutions. Rather, there was a need for greater education, job opportunities and development. Participants identified recommendations for addressing justice and security issues including the following:

- Develop a unified security action plan that engages security forces, local police and law enforcement, justice actors, Popular Committees, and citizens.
- Develop a strategy for reintegrating, dismissing, or otherwise engaging Popular Committees to lead to a state-led security provision.
- Develop cooperation strategies between communities (including Popular Committees) and security officials and between governorate officials and neighbouring governorates to respond to threats and causes of conflict.
- Protect electricity towers and oil pipelines by expanding electricity provision.
- Engage local tribes in protection responsibilities, ranging from protecting electricity towers and pipelines in their areas to protecting government institutions.
- Conduct a dialogue between security officials and citizens and find other mechanisms to build public trust and decrease tensions between citizens and security figures.
- Increase military and security checkpoints on main roads used by traffickers and criminals, and increase public awareness to reduce potential citizen-security force tensions or standoffs at these checkpoints.

While the original project design planned a series of large-scale dialogue conferences in each
governorate, Partners Yemen recognized that smaller, local dialogues emphasizing joint problem solving and programming would be more effective. Partners Yemen helped local officials from Marib and Abyan take the recommendations emerging from the dialogue to national counterparts in government to seek resources and support for implementing these strategies. In Abyan, local officials took over the role of convening these justice and security dialogues, having been convinced of the benefits of joint analysis and problem solving. But in Marib, where there was less support for the state and also fewer state services and presence, the government was not able to help local officials. The justice and security dialogue in Marib came to be a place where local stakeholders negotiated over the very concept of the state and its relationship to tribal structures. In January 2014, Partners Yemen presented the security and justice recommendations from the dialogue to the security director and local military commander, who agreed to take on some of the recommendations. While there was less local ownership of the dialogue process in Marib than in Abyan, the relationship building in Marib was measurable. Evaluations of the dialogue process in both governorates were positive, indicating participants felt it was a worthwhile process.

At the national level, the UN Resolution had mandated a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) including the state government, tribal authorities, non-state armed groups, and civil society, including representatives from women and youth groups. The National Dialogue process was a core component of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-sponsored agreement— which paved the way for former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down in exchange for immunity in November 2011—and was designed to be an inclusive process addressing the myriad of challenges facing the country. After multiple, hand-wringing delays, the 565-member body completed more than ten months of painstaking work and agreed upon more than 1400 articles laying out recommendations on the conflict in Saada, demands from Southern secessionists, economic development, transitional justice, and expanding rights and freedoms. The Dialogue broke down important cultural barriers—allowing youth to engage on equal footing with tribal elders and introducing unprecedented acceptance of women’s participation in all facets of government and public life. Dialogue participants were divided into nine themes in the conference’s agenda, including southern interests in secession, the capital Sa’ada, national reconciliation, transitional justice, state building, good governance, rebuilding the army and security forces, the status of special entities, rights and freedoms, and comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable development.
As part of the Partner’s Yemen flagship project called LEAD – Local Engagement for Advocacy and Dialogue - Partner’s Yemen was very active in the NDC to help ensure that the working group meetings were done in an inclusive and participatory manner. In fact, one of the programme’s hallmarks of success was the respect and encouragement that Yemen’s policymakers and National Dialogue members showed the LEAD team members and Partners Yemen staff. Such credibility gave the LEAD programme a unique opportunity to meet with and train certain members of each of the National Dialogue’s nine working groups and collectively determine a strategy for raising awareness of the Dialogue’s outcomes in rural regions. For instance, the head of the Rights and Freedoms Working Group, Ms. Arwa Othman, who would go on to become Yemen’s Minister of Culture, worked closely with the LEAD team to help community members better understand the output of her working group and the National Dialogue agreements, particularly as it pertains to constitutional rights and freedoms.

The National Dialogue Conference concluded in 2014. The National Dialogue Conference achieved many positive changes. It strengthened women’s political participation and took steps to combat violence against women. The Conference also strengthened the role of political parties and civil society, allowing them more equal representation with tribal representatives. While there was consensus on many issues, the interest in southern secession was a point of contention. During the NDC, there was political violence in many regions, mass protests in the south, and calls for violent rebellion by southern leaders. While the NDC was ultimately successful in terms of its process of inclusion and building relationships capable of joint problem solving, but unsuccessful in preventing war.

Libya: Multi-stakeholder National Dialogue Preparatory Commission

Written with Najla Elmangoush

Former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi maintained control over security and justice institutions such as the police, army, and courts and limited their capacities. Gadhafi kept his hold over Libya by promoting tribal identities and promoting a culture of bedouinization that included the use of traditional justice and informal security institutions. As Libya’s new post-revolution National Transitional Council (NTC) attempts to create new security and justice institutions, the country needs local and national peacebuilding processes to foster dialogue between diverse Libyan groups and to build a bridge between traditional and state-based approaches to security and justice.

Civil society is playing a number of roles to help facilitate dialogue between civilians and armed groups. In some cases, traditional civil society leaders mediate between different political factions and armed groups. For example, tribal leadership facilitated reconciliation between the post-revolutionary government of Libya and a militia that had seized four oil ports on the eastern coast. The government was not able to protect the oil ports, so a guard recruited his own militia, demanding local governance over the port’s security. Government representatives were not able to resolve the situation, as the militia refused to meet with them. At the government’s request, tribal leaders mediated between the government and the militia, and the militia eventually returned security control of the ports back to the government.81

At the national level, modern civil society is also playing a role to convene a national dialogue about security, justice and related issues. The Libya National Dialogue Preparatory Commission82 set up a forum for diverse stakeholders to explore their perspectives on security and justice issues. Funded by the Libyan government and assisted by the UN Technical Assistance Team, the Commission affirmed its independence from government control and its desire to be inclusive so that all ethnic and tribal groups, armed groups, and men, women, youth and elders in communities could participate in the dialogue.
A commission of thirteen prominent civil society leaders without political affiliation or ties to any of the armed groups acted as unpaid volunteers to facilitate the National Dialogue between 2013 and 2014. An Advisory Team made up of seventy-five Libyans who represent the broadest possible cross-section of society provided a consultative body for the National Dialogue to identify opportunities for dialogue with diverse groups.

The Advisory Team also developed the criteria for selecting delegates to attend the government-run National Conference, where civil society had representation from the civil society-run National Dialogue. The dialogue had only a handful of rules. No one suspected or charged with serious crimes could participate. All participants had to agree in principle with some general form of a united Libya. No weapons were allowed into the dialogue space.

In Phase I of the National Dialogue, the preparatory commission created a series of participation and engagement events across the country to gather suggestions, comments and proposals to build consensus on broad themes of national unity, identity, values and vision. In Phase II, the National Dialogue discussed specific challenges: security, development and transitional justice. The National Dialogue aims to provide a place where diverse stakeholders can improve their relationships and understanding of each other. This is a necessary step to achieve a national consensus on a vision for how security, justice and other key elements of governance will evolve in Libya. The National Dialogue currently is on hold in 2015 as it supports high-level UN mediation to achieve a peace process.

**The challenge:**
Significant social divisions and non-state armed groups overwhelm the state’s weak institutions.

**Theory of change:**
Create multi-stakeholder dialogue spaces where non-state armed groups, and representatives of different segments in society can discuss the future the country.

Photo 7: Libya civil society meeting. Photo Credit: UN Photo / Jean-Marc Ferré
Chapter 7
Common Challenges and Lessons Learned

The case studies in this volume show how civil society and security actors in diverse contexts work together towards human security. They show that local ownership in the security sector can be achieved, when civil society and security actors change discriminatory or hostile attitudes, set up regular consultation mechanisms, develop and implement joint programs, and work to institutionalize their joint efforts to prevent and address violence. Some common patterns and themes emerge from the case studies providing insights into how peacebuilding organizations address the challenges they encounter on the ground. Returning to the key concepts outlined in Chapter 1, this chapter draws out the challenges and lessons learned identified in the case studies.

Tools for Changing Attitudes
All case studies show that attitudes matter when it comes to improving relations between civil society and security actors. The peacebuilding organizations cited in this report work to transform existing adversarial stereotypes into new attitudes based on mutual understanding and trust. This requires changing mind-sets on the individual level but also among the larger public. Some of the tools that the organizations cited in this report use in order to change perceptions on these diverse levels are the following:

Humanizing Across the Civil-Military-Police Divide
On the individual level, trainers and facilitators reinforce the need for civil society to recognize the necessity of including military and police personnel as key stakeholders for human security, and for security forces to be respectful of civil society. Many organizations cited in this report note the importance of civil society affirming human rights standards, but also their need to model respectful listening even when security personnel shared difficult stories of what they have experienced and what they have done. They provide active listening techniques, communication and negotiation skills to enable their participants to build a human rapport and constructively engage with individuals from the other group.

Translating Language and Terminology
Security forces and civil society are not speaking the same language, both between and among sectors and organizations. Peacebuilding organizations are very attentive to the difference in terminology, the words and terms civil society and security sector individuals use to talk about security problems. They provide definitions and translations to clarify the meaning of terms and expressions to either group. In order to effectively translate between the two sectors, many civil society organizations first had to take the time to learn and understand security terminology for themselves. For example, Alliance for Peacebuilding staff attended military conferences and read military publications in order to learn about military interests and terminology. This enabled the development of training materials to compare and contrast peacebuilding with counterinsurgency and stabilization. This time investment on learning military terminology, military structures and military strategy was difficult to fund, as there was not an immediate "outcome" or "output" to report to donors. Donors interested in fostering local ownership of security should invest more in capacity building for civil society on security issues.
Making Information Accessible
Changing attitudes and challenging stereotypes requires engaging people with simple, but compelling forms of communication. Peacebuilding organizations use art, radio, comic books or interactive training methods. Organizations such as Search for Common Ground are pioneers in producing innovative media such as illustrated flip-books in local languages and interactive participatory theatre shows that make difficult subjects accessible to local and low-literacy audiences. Peacebuilding organizations also make a conscious effort to avoid the overly technical language and the focus on international processes and legal treaties that is common in traditional civil society advocacy.

Working with “Champions of Change”
In most of the case studies, innovative security sector-civil society projects began because there were a few “champions of change” both in the security sector and in civil society that built a trusting relationship and began to work together. Local ownership of security is initiated and legitimized by individual “champions” within civil society and the security sector – individuals who believe in the validity and usefulness of joint training or programmes and who have the capacity to foster broader changes.

For example, in the Philippines, when Brigadier General Raymundo Ferrer was still a Colonel, he participated in a training course at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute and then made a decision to help organize training courses for other military officers and personnel. Key civil society leaders built a trusting relationship with Ferrer and began working with civil society groups to change their hostile attitudes toward the military. The Philippines case studies presented in both the Chapter 2 on Capacity Building as well as Chapter 5 on National Level Local Ownership illustrate the significant contributions these “champions” on all sides make to improving the state-society relationship and human security.

Partners for Democratic Change and Search for Common Ground also found that the work of “champions” was more effective than their own, because these champions were able to draw in other local “champions” from civil society, government ministries, and uniformed security services to engage in regional forums to discuss obstacles and opportunities for improving human security.

“Champions” are risk-takers and face potential isolation from their peers, which may put their peacebuilding initiatives at risk. Since champions are ready to reach out across long-lasting divides between civil society and the security sector, they may face scepticism and even hostility from those on their own side. “Champions” may be questioned or rejected by others in their organization, while also not fully accepted by people on the other side of the divide. A military representative or police officer who meets with a civil society leader from a university or NGO may be accused of meeting with the enemy; and vice versa. A civil society leader who chooses to engage with the security sector may face resistance and opposition from his constituencies because he is seen as taking sides with those who engage in civilian abuses. If attitudes towards “champions” become too polarized and divided, their initiatives will lack credibility and legitimacy among the wider population they represent. It is important to monitor how others in a similar role perceive “champions” and provide champions with adequate support so that they can build consensus within their own camps.

Tapping into Local Capacities
Donors and governments often underestimate local capacities to contribute to security. After several decades of training and higher education in the field of peacebuilding, civil society peacebuilding capacities are often more robust than those found in government, regional or international organizations. While donors lament the lack of local ownership, civil society equally laments that governments, security forces, and donors overlook or underestimate their
abilities. The case studies in this report showcase the significant potential of local CSOs to act as effective intermediaries between the security sector and the populations they represent. Donors and governments need to tap into this potential to better coordinate and root their work at the local level. For example, in Kenya and Ghana, extensive collaboration and coordination are possible precisely because there is full awareness of existing local capacities for supporting early warning and early intervention to stop violence. Identifying, mapping and connecting with local capacities are the most effective ways to achieve local ownership in the security sector and design human security responses that address local needs.

**Protecting Civil Society’s Legitimacy**

Many of the case studies show that civil society actors can be effective partners for security due to their legitimacy among local communities. The DDR projects are good examples of how civil society organizations can use their unique position to provide incentives to former combatants and communities to participate in DDR programs. Given their strong local networks and thorough understanding of the local context, local CSOs are able to draw in excluded groups and increase the legitimacy of official security efforts among the population at large. In Mozambique, CMC and FOMICRES were able to support Operation Rachel, as well as carry on the UN’s role in DDR, while still maintaining a relatively impartial role. This allowed the TAE to gain access to local communities and maintain trust. They were also able to reach out to groups such as women or youths who have been traditionally neglected in DDR programs. Former child soldiers, female combatants or soldier’s wives have seen as much disruptions in their lives as the “men with guns” who are the traditional key target group of DDR programs. Local youth and women’s organization are able to engage with such groups, who suffer from particular stigmatization after the war, and help transform their lives. No other stakeholder would have been able to gain access to all of these groups.

The legitimacy of civil society organizations among society at large depends on the public perception of their independence from government and their political impartiality. Since civil society organizations usually work in autonomy of political factions and cater to the needs of multiple groups, they are able to access and gain trust among large parts of the local population.

But this broad trust is difficult to maintain when engaging in partnerships with the security sector. In Palestine, the Philippines and Fiji, other civil society leaders criticized and mistrusted civil society groups that launched peacebuilding initiatives because they perceived their work with the police and military as a betrayal to the values of human rights. Sometimes, they also accused the civil society groups as spies working for the government. Given the history of human rights abuses in some countries, some civil society groups doubted the sincerity of military and/or police units adopting human security strategies. Further dialogue was necessary among civil society to discuss the ethics and purpose of building relationships with the military and police to address security challenges.

Donors and governments may also undermine the legitimacy of local CSOs when they engage in activities or adopt behaviour that put CSO’s independence at risk. For example, security forces should consult with their CSO partners before publishing information about a dialogue or joint programme or when making unannounced visits to programming sites.

Formulating and adhering to an “engagement policy” can be a good way of protecting the legitimacy of civil society organizations. The “engagement policy” serves to define conditions and principles under which a CSO is willing to work with security actors. In Fiji, the Pacific Center for Peacebuilding’s engagement policy prescribed to never meet one-by-one with the security sector. They always took along another member of their organization to witness any meetings with security forces. This ensured some transparency and accountability within civil society and helped to build trust and understanding of the intentions of the programs. CIVIC and CDA, two US-based NGOs, also have developed a policy for their work with any armed groups. CSOs may often decide to publish their “engagement policy” to maintain acceptance among their
constituencies. In the Philippines, for example, trainers publicized their engagement policy to help the public understand the principles of their engagement with the police and military.

In order to maintain their legitimacy, CSOs need to be transparent about their motives and principles when working with security actors and security actors must commit to respecting CSOs’ engagement policies.

**Including New Stakeholders**

A common pattern among all of the case studies is the need to broaden the number and type of stakeholders involved in an effort to improve human security. The community policing case studies illustrate the inclusion of youth, women, and diverse representatives from civil society as well as security providers such as police, private security forces, representatives of local and central government, and donors to build a common vision of human security at the community level.

Likewise, many peacebuilding organizations adopt all-encompassing approaches to promote gender-sensitive approaches to security. They simultaneously build alliances with diverse stakeholders from government, business, civil society and local communities, work at the international, national, and local level and push change in political, institutional and cultural domains. Projects such as the Gender-Responsive Policing Project in Pakistan or the Improving Access to Justice for Women in Nepal have shown that working at multiple levels at the same time can reinforce the new ideas that gender projects introduce.

**The Dilemmas of Gender-Inclusion**

In all of the community policing case studies, women and girls have been identified as key participants of community-based policing initiative. This is because women and girls are especially vulnerable to experiencing violence, but also because they have a well-documented ability as connectors (or dividers) on the local level. Including them gives voice to victims and enables them to become agents of change.

However, there can be two unintended side effects when focusing exclusively on drawing in women. First, participation in community-based policing projects might expose women and girls to acts of retaliation, if other community members contest the role they aspire to play in the community. The women’s ethnic or religious background might exacerbate this risk depending on the stage and the intensity of the conflict. Second, while including women is important, the continuous participation of men and boys is necessary as well. Especially in contexts where gender-based violence against women is prevalent, male community members, who may often be the perpetrators, can play a key role in preventing attacks. The case study “Preventing Youth Violence in Kenya” shows how peacebuilding approaches could support boys to develop meaningful non-violent social identities and to contribute to larger human security goals. But men may also be victims of sexual violence and in need of assistance and they may also need support in order to adapt to a new society where women play a more outspoken role. According to some NGOs, the identity crisis of Congolese men has, at times, been exacerbated by aid agencies’ almost exclusive focus on women. In each context, it is important to evaluate the risks and benefits of a specific programme on local women and men and adapt the programme to meet the need of all gender groups.

**Reach Out to Religious Leaders**

In some contexts, religious leaders can increase the legitimacy of a community-based program. In Afghanistan for example, stakeholders believed the democratic policing programme was acceptable because, unlike other police reforms, it kept with Islamic traditions and included a religious teacher in all training programs. The presence of the religious leaders emphasized that the purpose of the programme - learning to listen and respond to local people’s needs - was politically neutral and culturally acceptable. Religious leaders also know the security needs of
their religious communities well and can give important insights into how to better protect them.

**Join Forces with the Private Sector**
Some of these cases show that businesses, be they local or international, play an important role in improving human security in communities. They may often be stakeholders in local conflicts such as shown in the case studies on Tanzania or Nepal. Private companies that are willing to advance the human security agenda can use their clout to effectively engage with police and government actors. Peacebuilders increasingly work with businesses as partners for change.

**Avoid Biases and Hardening Lines**
Some of the case studies illustrate that men, women and youth who are already very outspoken and engaged in other community or peace initiatives may be the first to be willing to meet with security forces. In contrast, those community members who feel more critical of or even hostile to such projects or who may also sense existing prejudices against their involvement may be reluctant to participate. This can lead to biases within the mechanisms that are set up to administer the exchange between the community and the police. In some cases, the working group or committee can appear as pro-police and siding with a particular side of the conflict. More radical constituents might be contesting their work from the outside. Peacebuilding organizations make an effort to reach out as much as possible to those who are still afraid or reluctant to make their voices heard in order to avoid the hardening of conflict lines and increase the legitimacy of common initiatives for human security goals.

**Dealing with Spoilers**
Broadening ownership also means dealing effectively with individuals or groups that may want to obstruct projects that change existing security approaches. In some countries, key leaders of justice and security sector institutions perpetuate and silently tolerate exclusion of or violence against particular gender communities. For example, in Nepal, International Alert worked with government representatives who were almost exclusively men of a certain age and member of the Brahmin cast. Lobbying for gender-sensitive reforms among these elites is challenging and requires political finesse and diplomatic skill.

One way to circumvent spoilers is to focus on the younger generation who tends to be more open to notions of gender equality, although less institutionally powerful. In Pakistan for example, GIZ started to involve more mid-level members of the police since they were more open to change than the senior management they had been dealing with. SFSC in the DRC moved in the opposite direction. They realized that trying to teach soldiers to behave respectfully against civilians while their own unit commanders were openly involved in abuses was not as effective. They decided to reach higher levels of leadership in the military rather than working as broadly as possible. To increase pressure on spoilers, peacebuilding actors move around in institutions building links where most useful.

**Identifying Security Sector Interests**
In many of the case studies, the authors and programme designers highlighted the need for civil society to better understand the interests of the security sector. This enables building common ground, which will facilitate effective collaboration. For example, in the Philippines, the Armed Forces expressed an interest in finding new ways of thinking about preventing violence. Their interest in peacebuilding made it possible for civil society to provide them with an overview of peacebuilding skills such as negotiation and mediation, which could be used by AFP forces to address local conflicts and prevent violence. The military and police involved in the training did not consider these skills as degrading their level of combat preparedness. On the contrary, they viewed them as enhancing the capabilities of the military, police, and paramilitary forces for peacebuilding.85
In their effort to mitigate harm to civilians, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) recognized the need to understand security forces’ strategic interests. They often recognize that harming civilians results in further attacks on them and more support for opposition groups. Security forces may have their own legal, strategic and ethical reasons for wanting to mitigate civilian harm. Once CIVIC had recognized this interest, it no longer had to simply advocate for ending violence from a human rights point of view, but could make a case for preventing and mitigating of civilian harm that corresponded to the security forces’ strategic interests. This made CIVIC’s work more convincing and enabled the organization to build relationships, dialogue and jointly solve problems with security forces.

Identifying and recognizing the interests of security actors requires CSOs to question their underlying presumptions and listen carefully. Successful programming depends on the ability of CSOs and security actors to build common ground.

Training Delivery

“Engaged Learning”
Trainers universally found the need to develop interactive, scenario-based training that could be delivered in the short blocks of time available. In some of the case studies, civil society trainers were given only 1-2 hours with 300 soldiers in the room to provide an introduction to a peacebuilding topic, which makes it challenging to find the right approach. Training also needs to be culturally appropriate and sensitive to education levels, including widespread illiteracy in some countries.

Role-playing and active games, contests, and competitions between groups seemed to work especially well to motivate lively participation. Real life scenarios based on the context where participants worked were uncomfortable. Scenarios based on an imaginary context that was distinct enough from the local context to provide a degree of distance, while similar enough in the challenges to allow participants to engage with the exercise in a context that felt more “safe.” Visual aids such as hand outs and PowerPoint presentation should contain mostly visual representations of the ideas and not just words. Audio-visual materials such as short film clips were also useful to help all of the trainees have a common experience upon which they could jointly reflect on the concepts of peacebuilding.

For example, Search for Common Ground’s training programme to address sexual and gender-based violence learned the importance of disseminating curriculum tools such as comic books in local languages to soldiers to make the lessons immediately accessible. When developing a curriculum, it is important to identify not only the “what” of the curriculum but also the “how” – the practicalities of how soldiers will talk with and engage civilians.

Mixed Ranks
Training military personnel of the same rank was easier than mixing senior and lower level officers and enlisted personnel. Trainings that included both enlisted personnel and officers created difficult dynamics. Enlisted personnel did not feel free to participate. They simply agreed with what their officers told them or said in the trainings. Lower-ranking enlisted personnel fear contradicting higher-ranking officers because of potential penalties for sharing secret information or saying something wrong. They expressed frustration at discrimination because of their education level. It may be easier for senior officers to learn the material if the trainer is reporting what has been taught to field level rather than teaching the same material to senior officers. This can both protect the dignity of senior officers as well as allow them to review and refresh their memory on the topics that they may or may not have been exposed to earlier in their careers.

Location of Training
For joint trainings between civil society, military and/or police, a non-military or non-police environment, where security personnel could wear civilian clothes, seemed to be beneficial. It
was easier to create a non-hierarchical exchange of opinions and learning in trainings that took place, especially if there were either senior and low-ranking officers or enlisted personnel. Trainers should help trainees feel safe by creating a safe place in the training room through ground rules and confidentiality that creates a sense of confidence and trust allowing trainees to share with each other. The co-training environment - with both civilians (mostly from universities and NGOS) and military and police personnel - at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) was a good venue for dialogue, exchange, networking and training between military and civil society. This co-training environment allowed people to get to know one another, exchange contact information, build trust, and to have a common language and set of concepts in peacebuilding that allowed them to solve security problems together. In some of the case studies, university settings provided a more neutral setting, as they are seen as less hostile to the military and police. Religious organization may also provide a setting where civil society and the security sector can meet together.

Scale and Institutionalization
Inadequate resources to address the scale of security challenges are a common pattern across the case studies. Many of the programmes described in these case studies never reached a critical mass of people to create conditions for addressing the security challenges. When gender-sensitive training happens in one unit or branch of the military, but not others, it is not likely to make a systemic impact. When a community-based policing approach happens in one community, but not in neighbouring ones, the programme may illustrate decreased levels of violence at the local but not national level. Institutional change requires decades, not months or years. Projects that last only six months to a year are unlikely to make lasting changes. A common challenge across some of the case studies was the lack of donor funding available for “decade thinking” or country or region-wide programs.

National dialogues and platforms to enable local ownership build trust and confidence between the civil society and security sector. They identify security threats and generate innovative ideas for improving human security. But they are not a panacea to fix all security problems. Almost every case study in this volume faces daunting, on-going security challenges despite the good work to foster local ownership of security. In some cases, such as Yemen, Burundi, and Libya, the contributions of multi-stakeholder security dialogues are pale in comparison to the magnitude of the problems. The drivers of violence in these countries outpace the levels of resilience generated by improving civil society-military-police relations. Some of the case studies reflect on the challenge of meeting the scale of the problem, and the steps that can be taken to institutional new ways of thinking about security.

Institutionalization of Training
There are multiple levels of institutionalization required. First, there is a need to institutionalize any training curriculum in military and police schoolhouses that do professional military education. Second, the key concepts and ideas need to be included in military and security doctrine. Third, operational “just in time” training for security forces is needed before they are deployed. And finally there is the need to integrate any curriculum into “steady-state” training exercises that occur without the same urgency.

In the DRC, for example, the scale of the need for training and intervention was vast. SFCG realized early on that rather than working broadly with as many officers as possible they needed to employ a strategy to reach higher levels of leadership in the military. So, they started to train more senior-level army members who were then able to train their own staff. This increased organizational buy-in.

Institutionalizing Reward Structures
Current reward structures within many military and police units do not reward soldiers or police officers for demonstrating skills in preventing violence, building peace, and fostering human security. For example, when Colonel Ferrer was promoted to Brigadier General in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, some within the security forces noted that working for peace
could help with their own promotions. There is a need to formalize the incentives for security actors to engage with civil society in order make local ownership more sustainable.

**Consortium Planning**

Training can be a gateway to enable diverse groups to build more synergy and foster linkages between different programmes and at different levels. To make the most of this possibility, a group of civil society and security sector institutions can approach donors as a consortium with a menu of mutually reinforcing training, coaching and programs. This will improve the potential of institutionalizing human security priorities to leverage the move from training as “technical” capacity toward pragmatic coordination in conflict assessment, protection of civilians, mediation, and collaborative decision-making.

**Working with the System**

In Pakistan’s Gender-Responsive Policing project, a number of important elements helped to build support for gender reform in policing. First, the project constituted a Steering Committee to get support for steering the entire process of planning and implementation. The project then conducted a Gender Audit to gather relevant data on gender and policing, and studied in detail all relevant laws and policies. At every step, the project sought formal approval for their activity plans, and coordinated with the main government institutions relevant to the project. Programme achievements, problems or changes in planning were shared with these government institutions and parliamentarians.

**Identifying Indicators for Local Ownership**

Local ownership of security requires changing attitudes, skills, and knowledge as well as improving the performance of institutions. Monitoring and evaluation of local ownership is critical. *We value what we measure.*

While skills and knowledge are relatively easy to assess, attitudes are more difficult to measure. One can easily test a perpetrator’s knowledge about legislation on gender-based violence. For example, one could survey how many soldiers in the DRC knew that rape was a crime and what punishment for rape conviction entailed. But the fact that the soldiers have knowledge of the legal definition and consequences of rape does not yet prove that their attitude towards women has become more respectful. How can you tell that people now think differently about gender-based violence than before? Or whether ex-combatants are reintegrated into their communities? Or whether the threat of violent extremism is lower than before?

Measuring changes in attitudes requires context-specific indicators developed in collaboration with local communities. Context-specific indicators measure specific factors that local people identify as causing mistrust between perpetrators and victims. Organizations such as SFCG have been extensively using these indicators to evaluate their programs. So, in the DRC where rape was often committed close to water sources, SFCG would ask civilian interviewees questions such as “Would you feel confident going to water sources if there are military vehicles in the area?” or they would ask soldiers questions such as “do you feel that to be a strong man you need to beat your own wife?” or “how would you interact with a civilian at a road block?” Since these perceptions evolve constantly, especially in situations where conflict is still on going, assessment has to happen almost on a continuous basis. Search for Common Ground monitored awareness and perceptions in the DRC through pre- and post-project surveys, baseline and evaluations at the 12, 18, and 24-month stages.

Here are some initial ideas of how to measure the changes that are necessary to achieve effective local ownership in the security sector and have civil society and security work together for human security. The indicators are grouped into attitudes, skills and knowledge, and institutional changes, although there may be some overlap.
Attitudes
- Stakeholders in both civil society and the security sector identify the value and need for coordination
- Security forces and communities perceive each other as partners not opponents
- Individuals and communities say they feel safer and are able to work, travel and live without fear of violence
- Security forces respond when approached by community members who express security concerns
- Communities credit police and local government for improvements
- Women and minority groups participate and say they feel represented
- People recognize that discriminatory attitudes may put particular gender groups at risk for gender-based violence
- Individuals at risk for gender-based violence have confidence that security sector institutions will treat them fairly
- Communities increasingly invest more of their own resources (time and money) into security projects

Skills and Knowledge
- Civil society and the security sector use communication, dialogue, negotiation, mediation and other conflict management and transformation skills
- All stakeholders can translate, compare and contrast different civil society and security sector terminology so as to bridge the different approaches
- All stakeholders identify gaps in their capacity. They are aware of their need to gain more knowledge of other stakeholder’s and their interests.
- Civil society groups, especially women’s and youth groups, have the capacity to help develop, implement and monitor security-related programs

Processes
- Mechanisms exist that enable the security sector and communities to have direct contact and engage in dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or joint institutional oversight when working to address challenges and find solutions to improve human security
- Mechanisms are inclusive, granting participation to all stakeholders
- Mechanisms exist at as many levels and in as many areas of security sector policy-making and programming as possible
- Mechanisms are integrated horizontally enabling participants to feed local security needs into the broader national security agenda and enabling local communities to participate in the implementation of national security goals

Institutional Changes
- Stakeholder institutions commit to long-term training on civil society and security sector engagement for all relevant stakeholders as part of broader institutional efforts to foster joint approaches to human security
- Security sector introduce code of conducts and reward-schemes to encourage community-oriented behaviour
- Security sector increases recruitment, retention and professionalization of women - including in leadership roles
- Security sector puts in place anti-corruption and gender-sensitive policies and practices (e.g. female patrolling units, dedicated women's desks, counselling services for victims)
- Civil society develops engagement policies to encourage non-adversarial attitudes towards security actors among their staff

Concluding Remarks
The idea of "security" usually conjures up images of government, military and police heads meeting in secure locations to plan counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and policing in enemy-
centric operations. The case studies in this volume provide a new vision of security where men and women of all ages, ethnicities and religions build problem-solving relationships with police and military forces.

**Innovative Paths to Legitimate State-Society Relations**

Improving the state-society relationship is at the heart of all of the case studies described here. Local ownership of security, the most fundamental public good, is a prerequisite to democratizing and legitimizing the state-society relationship. The security sector and society find common ground when they work together toward sustainable human security. While some of the case studies took place in a formal security sector reform process, most of the case studies illustrate parallel pilot efforts of military, police and communities to train and work together to improve human security.

**The Utility of Peacebuilding Skills and Processes**

Local peacebuilding organizations use facilitation, negotiation and mediation skills and processes to bring the security sector into direct relationship with society in order to improve human security. The intellectual vision for each of the case studies here comes from groups trained to think creatively about conflict. Peacebuilding organizations recognize the potential for conflict between the security sector and civil society and try to bring the groups together in order to decrease it. They set up processes that enable the security sector to engage in dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or joint institutional oversight in order to create safe spaces for diverse stakeholders to meet each other, build relationships, and address security challenges together. This direct contact is especially important because civil society and security forces often have so little opportunity to meet each other and discuss their respective security interests. Improving human security requires increasing the contact between the stakeholders so that they can develop joint solutions. The case studies in this report illustrate stories of how local peacebuilding efforts turn lip service into real commitments to human security. They show that bringing people together is both possible and productive.

**The Road to Local Ownership**

Those who use words like “local ownership,” “capacity building,” and “civil society,” may certainly have good intentions, yet the meaning is often unclear. There is often an implementation gap between intent and impact. The conceptual framework and case studies in this volume illustrate ways to deepen and broaden local ownership by enabling the security sector to engage directly with local civil society.

Each of the case studies provides examples of how peacebuilding approaches can broaden the ownership of security programmes by including formerly excluded social groups. In many of the initiatives, local communities had no previous contact with security forces and engaged in communication and exchange for the first time. There seems to be a growing commitment among security and government actors to broaden local ownership and accept not only more but also more diverse inputs from the community into their local policing strategies.

However, in many contexts, direct contact and joint initiatives of civil society and security actors are still at the entry-level stages. The groups are often more willing to engage in joint training and ad hoc dialogues than jointly implementing security sector programmes or sharing institutional oversight of security sector policies and programmes. In many countries, there is a still a trust deficit between the security sector and society, which prevents meaningful local ownership. The road ahead is long and challenging. The stories in this volume offer inspiration and hope that multi-stakeholder coordinated approaches to human security will become more frequent and more institutionalized.
Most of the case studies involved interviews with the local leaders initiating the projects described. These people are the intellectual authors of the ideas in the case studies and are named as authors of the case studies. The editors based the case studies on written documents, correspondence, information on websites and direct interviews. These authors then were sent a draft of their case study for review and final approval.

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Bernardo Arévalo de León, InterPeace, Guatemala  
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Chito Generoso, Interfaith Center for Conciliation & Nonviolence (ICCN), Philippines  
Deng Giguiento, Catholic Relief Services, Philippines  
Ali Gohar, Just Peace Initiatives, Pakistan  
Ariel Hernandez, Balay Mindanaw, Philippines  
Khola Iram, Independent Consultant, Pakistan  
Zahra Ismail, University of San Diego’s Institute for Peace and Justice  
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Allison Peters, Institute for Inclusive Security  
Cynthia Petrigh, Beyond Peace  
Aziz Rafiee, Afghan Civil Society Forum Organization (ACSFo)  
Thiago Rodrigues, Fluminense Federal University, Brazil  
Jon Rudy, Peacemaker in Residence, Elizabethtown College  
Noah Salameh, Independent Consultant, Palestine  
Musa Sanguila, Pakigdait  
Lena Slachmijlder, Search for Common Ground  
Ana Glenda Táger, InterPeace  
Marshall Wallace, Brevity  
Joe Whitaker, International Alert
Two-day roundtable meetings were held in Geneva, The Hague, and Washington DC. Over 80 civil society organizations and 15 UN, governmental, military, and police attended these roundtables. In addition, a week-long Training of Trainers for the Handbook on Human Security that accompanies this report also was an opportunity for 29 people from 26 different countries to compare and contrast their experiences in building relationships and problem solving with the security sector.

See the Global Terrorism Index 2014 for a complete set of correlates of attacks by non-state armed groups.

http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf


See the Global Terrorism Index 2014 for a complete set of correlates of attacks by non-state armed groups.

http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf


The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org


Donais, 2008.


See the “Local First” website which outlines the principles of local ownership of development and peacebuilding. http://artlocalfirst.org (Accessed 15 October 2015).


Several exceptions are notable. Civil society research projects on security issues may create an opportunity for individual civil society members to build relationships with people in the security sector. Civil society has become adept at facilitating public dialogue on security issues, but often these are solely for communities themselves and have not until recently included the security sector in dialogue with civil society and communities. See Duncan Hiscock, in Public Oversight of the Security Sector, p. 49.

For a comparison of different types of conflict assessment frameworks used by peacebuilding organizations, see Lisa Schirch. Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning. 2013.


Ibid p. 6.


Participants gave a written and oral evaluation every day of training.


Organizations conducting Do No Harm training include: Brevity, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Local Capacities for Peace International, RedR, Swedepace.


See Afghan Civil Society Forum-organization. “Baseline Study for Pilot Democratic Policing Across 8 Districts of Northern Kabul Province.” Published in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the UN Development Program. March 2010.


46 See http://www.unddr.org/iddrs.aspx


50 Ibid.


52 Faltas and Paes, p. 28.

53 Faltas and Paes, p. 31.


56 The name of the Afghan CSO is withheld intentionally given the security risks to civil society in Afghanistan.


58 See also http://www.cedacburundi.blogspot.com


ICCN, p. 7.

Ariffin-Cabo, p. 8.

Interview with Cynthia Petrigh. April 2015.

Ariffin-Cabo, p. 8.