Policy and Research Papers
Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, the premise of the study is simple: before discussing at Brussels-level what defence strategy the EU should adopt, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Follow the link to the publication: http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1150#sthash.UcKoF3Ib.dpuf
With the possible exception of the UK, it is quite difficult to grasp what member states really want from CSDP, so any debate over a possible European grand strategy would appear to be premature.
This study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the European strategic debate. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strict national interests. Five researchers thus took the opportunity to immerse themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses – away from potentially distorting influence of the ‘Brussels-mentality’ or rhetoric.
In brief, this book does not set out to analyse European defence policy as an end in itself or as a collective project, but rather as a vector of individual – indeed self-interested – visions for the member states studied. By following this rather more pragmatic path, the survey aims to identify the common denominators, misunderstandings and rigid deadlocks on the strategic debate around CSDP, with a view to enriching it.
This report presents the results of an independent review of the progress that the GFP initiative has made since January 2012, conducted at the request of the GFP managers, by a joint research team from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), the Stimson Center and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.
Security is experienced at the personal level, but it is often determined at the political level. The present report substantiates why needs analysis alone is inadequate for generating a good understanding of security in a particular community. It proposes a complementary approach to analysing community security that is more power-oriented.
For full access to the report From Entitlements to Power Structures, kindly follow the link.
As Security Sector Reform (SSR) faces pressure to address new issues and threats, the moment is right to assess unresolved issues concerning both the concept and the practice of SSR. Four points stand out as essential to improving SSR initiatives.
First, SSR efforts require a more nuanced balance of support for state actors and their informal counterparts, to reflect more accurately the realities of security provision in different political contexts. Second, while continuing to strengthen security actors’ capacity, SSR’s original focus on governance and political analysis of the security sector needs to be more central to such efforts. Third, SSR programs must be longer in duration, more iterative in approach and less prescriptive in terms of expected outcomes. Lastly, as modern security threats come into sharper focus on the international community’s agenda, particularly threats posed by transnational organized crime and violent extremism, SSR must not fall into the trap of ‘solving security problems’ or becoming a quick-fix solution. Rather, it needs to be more carefully applied, in line with its original core tenets.