Uganda

Context

Security system reform issues have been integrated into national development frameworks in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Uganda. In Uganda, armed violence and insecurity — particularly in the north and northeast — were identified as primary contributors to structural poverty and inequality. The result was that the Ugandan Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (2004-08) highlighted existing commitments to regional agreements on security promotion, including small arms control. In Burundi, the government’s 2005 Strategic Framework to Combat Poverty (CSLP) was a deliberate effort to promote post-conflict recovery and was based on a multi-stakeholder and multi-sector dialogue of 145 community-based and non-governmental organisations. In Sierra Leone, the recently agreed PRSP (2005-07) shifted planning and programming from direct post-conflict concerns to a more development-oriented agenda designed to promote inclusive civil society participation.

Entry point

In all three cases, the real and perceived threat of escalating armed violence in the so-called postconflict period, and earlier positive experience with small arms control, catalysed a commitment to investing in accountable and responsible security sectors. In Uganda for example, the PEAP was purposefully designed to increase awareness of the costs of armed violence, but awareness also of the positive dividends of military and police reform in relation to the enhanced safety of communities. The Burundi CSLP addresses the need for a permanent ceasefi re with all remaining armed groups, the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, the professionalisation of the security forces, and civilian disarmament. The PRSP in Sierra Leone sought to build on previous successes in relation to DDR and small arms control, and to defi ne the appropriate size, shape and structure of a reformed security sector.

Lessons learned

Ensure a multi-stakeholder and multi-sector dialogue — The PRSP, PEAP and CSLP were forged after extensive and inclusive dialogue processes that emphasised the inclusion of SSR priorities in development frameworks. For example, the PEAP focuses specifically on enhancing the justice, law and order sector to improve the security of persons and property, law enforcement, and access to justice. Moreover, it emphasises disarmament and arms control as major contributors to security promotion
and development.

Use an international agency to co-ordinate a multi-stakeholder and multi-sector dialogue —International agencies had the necessary distance from local politics, legitimacy in the eyes of the governments and populations, and resources to foster successful outcomes of the dialogue processes.

Seek to include SSR in development frameworks to enhance commitment — The PRSP, PEAP and CSLP each include concrete commitments and strategies for managing public expenditures to meet poverty reduction and SSR-enhancing goals. This is valued by donors, who provide direct budgetary support.

Impact

The introduction of SSR as a priority issue in national development frameworks raised its profile among partner governments and donors. It also provided an opportunity to stimulate a more inclusive public debate on security issues. While progress has been made in some areas, there is still much to be done. Including security issues in development frameworks is an important step, but government and donors then need to ensure that commitments are financed and implemented.

Context

The government of Uganda carried out a defence review with UK assistance from 2002 to 2004. The comprehensive review was the fi rst in Uganda’s history and a politically sensitive and risky undertaking for both countries. The review sought to lay the groundwork for changes in how Uganda formulates and delivers defence and wider security policy, by attempting to anchor this process more firmly in wider governmental planning and budgeting processes. It was undertaken at a time when Uganda was facing a number of serious security problems, both in the north and along its border with the Congo.

This marked the first time that the United Kingdom had supported a review process of such scope and complexity. Like Uganda’s other development partners, the United Kingdom was particularly concerned about rising levels of defence spending. The methodology drew upon both the United Kingdom’s own experience with a strategic defence review in the 1990s and current SSR thinking in order to develop a more holistic and developmentally sensitive approach to analysing defence
requirements. Close collaboration was required at both political and technical levels in order to manage the immense expectations generated by the review process.

Entry point

Both the government and its development partners believed that the defence sector offered the most promising entry point for addressing the country’s security problems. Priority was placed on developing an understanding of the role of defence in relation to other security actors, a clear description of the defence forces needed to fulfil this role effectively, and a plan for defence transformation set within the context of competing needs and resource constraints across the public sector.

Lessons learned

Agree objectives at the outset — A clear and shared understanding of the rationale for and objectives of a defence review process should be developed by the government and its development partners before the actual review exercise is launched. Where views differ as to the objectives of a review or how it should be carried out, careful attention should be paid to managing the diverse expectations of stakeholders as to the concrete outcomes the process will deliver.

Ensure methodologies are appropriate to the local context — Experiences can be drawn on from other countries but should be carefully adapted to the local context before being applied, and adequate training for national staff should be provided.

Develop national ownership throughout the process — Where conditions for strong national ownership are not in place from the outset, a strong partnership between a government and its development partners is necessary. A successful partnership implies commitments and responsibilities on both sides, including the need for assistance to be provided in ways that enhance national leadership and political responsibility for the process.

Context

The defence sector has long been seen by many outside observers as an obstacle to economic and social development in Uganda. Despite a major DDR process in the early 1990s supported by the World Bank, defence has continued to swallow a large share of the resources available to the country. External actors thus informally tied their assistance to a cap on military expenditures of 2% of GDP. The Ugandan government argued that this cap was not sufficient to provide security to its citizens,
particularly in the North. A significant portion of military spending went off-budget and military budget data became increasingly unreliable, which — combined with other cost overruns — resulted in total spending effectively exceeding the cap every year. At the same time, donors were critical of the involvement of the Ugandan armed forces in the DRC.

Entry point

The defence review process was triggered by the recognition among a number of donors, including the World Bank and UK DFID, that the spending cap was not having the desired effects. They were willing to go along with the view of the Ugandan military and political leadership that higher expenditures were needed to improve security, but they also were concerned about the ways in which money was spent. A 1998 expert Defence Efficiency Study provided suggestions for improvements in transparency and management but could not solve the underlying issues of the appropriateness of Ugandan military spending. The logical next step in facilitating a rational debate between donors and the Ugandan government about the appropriate level and spending of defence funds was a detailed assessment of security threats to Ugandan citizens and defence needs. This was initiated
by the Ugandan government in the form of a thorough defence review process supported by UK DFID
during 2002/03.

Lessons learned

Broadening the process — The defence review process involved more than the military — it was a cross-governmental initiative and included some civil society organisations. It started out with an overall assessment of threats to the security of Ugandan citizens and territory, including an assessment of all potential policy responses available to the government, before focusing on options and issues for defence reform.

Professional approach — Sequencing of the various steps within the defence review process was well defined in advance. Implications for force planning and structure, as well as procurement and personnel, were logically derived from the threat and capability assessments.

Limited transparency — The military refused to provide transparency on all of its relevant activities; for example, some sections of the budget would remain classified. Outside observers, including external actors, thus were sceptical of the results of the review process, particularly of the proposals to greatly increase spending on equipment and to improve military capabilities.

Underestimating the fundamental nature of the problem — The main objective of the defence review, namely to improve the quality of dialogue on military spending, was undermined by a lack of common understanding about the main reforms necessary: those to improve military capabilities and governance reforms.

Impact

While the defence review process has not resulted in an agreement between donors and government about the appropriate level of military spending in Uganda, it has laid the groundwork for additional reforms in the Ugandan defence sector. Work has been done on a Defence Corporate Plan, and the Defence Reform Unit established as part of the Review has now become the Defence Reform Secretariat.