Academia / Research

By Erwin van Veen & Maria Derks

This article argues for an integrated, political and pragmatic approach to justice and security development as one of the key objectives of effective international support to peace building and state building in conflict-affected and fragile states. Developments since the 1990s suggest that different actors and communities have started to work on the same issues from different angles and with – perceived– different mandates. As a result, important parts of the debate on how to deal with security system reform (SSR), justice reform and the rule of law seem somewhat stuck in conceptual arguments. This article suggests moving away from such debates and instead to focus on what such justice and security engagements are meant to achieve, for whom, and which general approaches are likely to provide most added value.

This is a pre-publication draft of an ongoing project. 

Begun in 2005-2006, the SSRI Project by ISDS seeks to develop an assessment tool regarding the performance of the Philippine security  sector which can serve as (1) a diagnostic instrument to determine what needs to be done to improve security sector governance (SSG) in the country; (2) a guide to the formulation of a reform program to achieve good/democratic security sector governance; and (3) a monitoring mechanism on the progress (or lack of it) of SSR for good/democratic SSG.

En juillet 2011, le programme de bonne gouvernance ‘Gutwara Neza’, sous le patronage du Ministère de la Justice, a réalisé une réflexion nationale sur la justice de proximité au Burundi. Consistant en une série de quatre ateliers de consultation régionaux suivis d’une journée de débat national, cette activité a permis de dégager des pistes de réforme prioritaires pour pérenniser le système de justice locale très riche dont dispose le pays.

A report commissioned by the EU on community justice in Burundi, including an analysis of traditional justice mechanisms.

The improper management of conventional ammunition and explosives poses significant safety and security risks. Frequent ammunition depot explosions and diversions from ammunition stocks of state actors testify to the relevance of the issue to Africa. Overcoming challenges to effective national ammunition management can be a formidable task in itself. This paper considers the challenges to and scope for action on ammunition management in Africa. It is argued that concerted efforts by African states and their international partners will be essential to effectively limiting risks of undesirable explosive events and ammunition diversions on the continent.

The fight against illegal arms transfers requires regulation and an effective monitoring of arms brokers. Their business primarily consists of facilitating and arranging transactions in exchange for compensation or material recompense. Indeed some of them manage to circumvent existing controls by exploiting different national regulations or conducting their activities from countries where controls are weak or non-existent.

In 2003 the EU member states took an important initiative by setting a harmonized system of control of arms brokers. With the adoption of a European Common Position they introduced controls on brokering activities taking place on their territories. Yet, six years later, all EU member states still have no legislation on arms brokering, while others need to adapt their national legislation to EU standards. Furthermore this European instrument reflects minimum standards which currently appear insufficient to effectively fight against ill disposed brokers.

This report reviews the extent to which EU member states implement the Common Position on arms brokering and suggests some improvements for a better control on brokering activities and an effective fight against illegal arms transfers. One section of the report also considers a major gap in the national regulations: extraterritorial controls on brokering activities. Finally, the report presents the case study of the Belgian legislation on arms brokering.

The problem of lacking or inconsistent regulations on arms brokering is painstakingly clear. Arms brokers are central in many illicit arms transfers, including transfers to conflict regions, embargoed actors, and serious human rights abusers. In the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW (UN PoA) of 2001, States specifically committed to develop adequate national legislation and common understandings on arms brokering. This report reviews progress made around the control of brokering.

It shows that a growing number of states have established legislation on arms brokering, or will do so. Comparing domestic norms and multilateral standards reveals that there is a large degree of convergence on key regulatory principles and measures, a good foundation for developing global minimal standards on brokering controls. The UNGA in October/November 2005 provides an opportunity for strengthening the international commitment to enhancing cooperation in combating illicit SALW brokering. Further efforts in this regard remain crucial, in particular in order to eliminate the loopholes and inconsistencies which allow brokering activities to take place with relative ease and impunity.

It is therefore urgent that the UN establish, at a minimum, a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Brokering, mandated to consider the feasibility of an international instrument and to identify the elements required for effective national brokering controls. The mandate should also consider controls on transportation and financial services related to arms brokering. Complementary standards on SALW control should also be developed in conformity with commitments undertaken with the UN PoA, including the development of minimal standards on end-user certificates and of adequate licensing to decide on arms exports and brokering activities.

This paper will proceed in four parts. The first part will examine the basic theoretical relationship between legal systems and market-oriented poverty reduction. The second part will examine various elements of legal and judicial reform and current activities. The third part will describe a strategy framework and methodology for designing and preparing legal and judicial activities. Lastly, the fourth part will examine the role of the World Bank and the organizational mechanisms available to the Bank to ensure that its
theoretical and policy approaches are constantly refined for new circumstances and in light of new interdisciplinary research.

For over a decade, the international community has been helping developing nations reform their judiciaries. The World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have extended over $800 million in loans for judicial reform. At the same time, the United Nations Development Program, the European Union and its member states, and the American, Australian, Canadian, and Japanese governments have provided significant grant aid to help developing nations improve the operation of the judicial branch of government. Why are international donors supporting reform? What kinds of projects are included within a reform program? How can a successful reform be achieved?

This annex can only provide a brief overview of transitional justice measures (§ I), and summarize an argument that clarifies the aims that these measures arguably are designed to seek (§ II). This is important, in turn, in order to clarify the contributions that transitional justice can make to security and development, particularly in the context of fragility. Contrary to misconceptions, particularly on the part of non-experts, transitional justice is neither past-oriented, nor of concern to victims alone; rather, to the extent that it achieves any of its goals, it does so in virtue of its potential to affirm general but basic norms—therein its potential contributions to both security and development. The argument thus is also meant to counter the perception that transitional justice measures hamper development and reconstruction, or that transitional justice is not urgent in the aftermath of the cessation of conflict (§ III). The next section clarifies the ‘mechanisms’ through which transitional justice can be thought to make their contributions to development, emphasizing their norm affirming function, and their (related) potential to disarticulate and articulate networks (§IV). Finally, I close by showing the relevance of the foregoing analysis to the WDR and offer four cautionary notes about the approach it adopts (§V).

Those who work in the legal reform business generally expected greater impact from this investment in new laws. Analysts, drafters, and project implementers often assumed that market forces would propel a greater level of implementation once the right laws were in place. Instead, a number of common problems repeatedly appear as counterparts in beneficiary countries have moved from legislation to implementation.

These problems have been independently identified by numerous legal reform professionals. They
can be summarized as follows:
• Lack of ownership: Laws are often translated or adopted wholesale from another system as “hasty transplants,” without the necessary careful, patient adaptation to the local legal and commercial culture and without substantial involvement by the stakeholders most directly affected, including the private sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), not simply government counterparts.
• Insufficient resources: Law reform projects are too short term and too lightly funded to create the needed mechanisms and processes that would permit sufficient absorption through broadbased discussion and sustained participation in the process of reform.
• Excessive segmentation: Overly narrow diagnoses and responses to legal shortcomings produce projects that ignore systemic problems and fail to add up to an integrated, effective whole.

When the law works for everyone, it defines and enforces the rights and obligations of all. This allows people to interact with one another in an atmosphere that is certain and predictable. Thus, the rule of law is not a mere adornment to development; it is a vital source of progress. It creates an environment in which the full spectrum of human creativity can flourish, and prosperity can be built. The Commission understands legal empowerment to be a process of systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance their rights and interests as citizens and economic actors.

The eighth edition in DCAF’s Yearly Book series examines theconceptual and operational dimensions of Security Sector Transformation inAfrica. African knowledge and experience has contributed much to theevolution of the security sector reform (SSR) concept while Africa continuesto be the main arena for SSR programmes. Consequently, over the years,DCAF has actively sought to expand its knowledge base, policy researchfocus and operational activities on African security sector reform andgovernance issues. For these reasons it is therefore particularly appropriatethat DCAF focuses on this subject in 2010 – the 10th anniversary of thecreation of the DCAF foundation.

This is the second of two volumes of the report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and consists mainly of the outcomes of fi ve working groups established to inform the Commission’s deliberations through substantive work in the thematic areas of Access to Justice and Rule of Law, Property Rights, Labour Rights,
Business Rights and with respect to overall implementation strategies. The working groups consisted of a core of between fi ve and seven experts and stakeholders in their
individual capacities from around the world, with leading edge expertise and experience in the theme to be studied.

For nearly two decades, international organisations and bilateral donors agencies have been involved in the promotion and implementation of legal and judicial reform projects in developing and transition countries. This paper refers to this process as the rule of law enterprise (RLE). It identifies the ambiguities and misconceptions of the RLE and asks why there has been so little interaction between those involved in the implementation of legal and judicial reform and academics with knowledge and experience on this topic. After identifying the theoretical and practical obstacles to a fruitful dialogue the paper concludes that such a dialogue could take place, provided that academics – political scientists and lawyers – and practitioners adjust their respective approaches.

Although the ‘rule of law’ is now widely recognised as indispensable to eff ective peace operations, its delineation remains elusive. Researchers contest its substance while those most responsible for its implementation ( e.g. the United Nations) promulgate only abstract notions needed to inform detailed decisions. At its worst, this means that competing reform activities undermine each other, making long term success less likely. The questions we address are about the deficiencies in how rule of law is conceived. Particular attention is paid to the little recognised assumption that the Weberian state ideal corresponds to the societies on the receiving end of international
interventions. After a review of extant academic and practitioner viewpoints, we set out a post-Weberian framework which expands the dominant imagination to include non-state rule of law ‘providers’. We argue that the optimum sources for immediate yet sustainable rule of law solutions may often be those which bear little resemblance to the conventional state-based providers that populate mainstream conceptions.

In this paper, I will analyze the connections between the multilateral debates and external agendas, on the one hand, and the implementation of rule of law strategies in the field, on the other. The first part of the paper will start with a brief historical overview of the emergence of international support for rule of law institutions and its progressive inclusion into conflict management strategies. I will then proceed with an analysis of the state of the multilateral debate and of the concept of ‘local ownership’, with a view to identify why rule of law programs still suffer from a lack of legitimacy at the multilateral and operational levels.

Postconflict societies are characterized by lack of the rule of law, past and present gross human rights violations, impunity, and economic devastation and decay. In response to past human rights violations, a variety of measures have been developed, including prosecutions at both international and domestic levels, truth commissions, and reparations for victims. All these options need strong institutions. In postconflict and post-authoritarian societies, this often requires reforming or rebuilding the judicial system and its supporting services. This paper draws connections between judicial reform, transitional justice, and development in transitional contexts.

The linkages between good governance, rule of law and economic growth, once more fully understood, have the potential to unshackle economies and decrease poverty throughout the developing world. Currently, however, most initiatives are heavy in rhetoric and light on directly addressing the legal structures and policies that affect the poor. Until developing countries can enable their vast populations of poor citizens to actively participate in their economies, their growth and the creation of egalitarian societies will be severely hampered. Analyzing and building on the final report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and other previous work, this article outlines a functional approach to addressing the most critical needs of the poor, including but not limited to issues that directly affect livelihoods and economic opportunity. It accordingly aims to help the poor gain a foothold in effecting their own development and making legal empowerment a reality. By introducing important lessons in ommunity-based justice from an access to justice program in Bolivia, the article provides tangible examples that might help shape legal empowerment initiatives to best address the needs of the poor.

This study provides groundbreaking analysis of the challenges faced in security and justice service delivery. More importantly, it proposes an innovative solution for development agencies engaging in supporting security and justice development. A multi-layered approach to security and justice programmes is a methodology that is highly context specific, targeting donor assistance to those providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points where actual day-to-day service delivery occurs. A multi-layered strategy recognises that unorthodox solutions and partnerships may be necessary to respond to the severe challenges of fragile states. The primary objective is to develop and strengthen the relationship between service providers (state and non-state) and the users of those services in the marketplaces where they work, in the neighbourhoods where they live and on the roads they travel, while fostering greater performance accountability.

Part I summarizes in broad strokes the scope of JRP’s work with Mongolia’s justice sector institutions. Part II summarizes “Lessons Learned” from the perspective of donors,
implementers, and recipients of USAID assistance. The final chapter, Part III, contains recommendations for the justice sector of Mongolia and for future donors. It is based on the experience of the Judicial Reform Program over the past eight years and draws on the recommendations coming out of JRP’s March 2009 closing conference “Next Steps in Justice Reform,” which brought together all of the key justice sector leaders and administrators. As its final contribution to its Mongolian partners, this Report seeks to synthesize the consensus outcomes of the conference which in turn were intended to serve as a road map for future reforms and improvements in the administration of justice.

This speech, delivered by Amartya Sen at the first World Bank conference on Comprehensive Legal and Judicial Development, discusses the importance of legal reform within a comprehensive development framework. Legal reform advances freedom-a crucial and constitutive quality of comprehensive development. Legal reform is thus important on its own; its cause need not be indirectly established through its contribution to economic development. Legal reform is, however, also causally interconnected with other constitutive elements of comprehensive development. By acting as a platform where the poor have equal voice and by creating the backbone of the capitalist system, a sound legal system is necessary to advance political and economic development.

Pakistan is one of the world best-kept tourist secrets, being endowed with a deep history, a rich and embracing culture and the majestic splendour of most the world’s highest mountains – features which are generally not well known abroad. Those of us that have had the privilege to live and work in Pakistan have had much to appreciate. What is generally better known is that Pakistan is a large poor country which ranks between Papua New Guinea and Nepal on the United Nation’s human development index, and faces a range of profound governance and economic challenges to its development.
This aim of this paper is to illuminate and reflects on one focused and substantial effort to improve this situation. It complements an earlier article outlining the purpose, goals and objectives of the project published at its outset.2 It will review the ongoing experience being gained in Pakistan’s Access to Justice reform program with a view to distil lessons learned for the emerging discourse on law and justice development programs. The paper approaches the subject in four parts: history, objectives, progress to date, and lessons learned.

Like other donors, SDC has dealt with rule of law issues for years. In several countries, SDC supports judicial reform and the improvement of the legal framework for economic and social development. This concept paper aims to provide information and guidance to SDC’s staff and partners at headquarters and in partner countries. The concept paper begins by identifying the essential elements of the rule of law. Although there is no internationally accepted definition of the rule of law, key elements generally include: non-discrimination and equality before the law, the hierarchy of norms, and the substantive coherence of the legal framework, the government is bound by law, the separation of powers, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and respect for human rights.
The rule of law is interlinked with other concepts used in international cooperation: the rule of law is a means to realize human rights and gender equality, a key element for good governance, decentralization, poverty reduction, economic development, and peace building. Depending on these different perspectives, the concept is multicoloured, and it results in different and sometimes even conflicting approaches to and priorities for legal and judicial reforms. SDC will use the rule of law concept as a means to realize human rights, and implement its principles with flexibility, taking into account the relevant context, and potential entry points for cooperation.
Part two of this concept paper looks at the growing trend to include the rule of law dimension in legal and judicial reform projects. The performance of judicial institutions depends not just on operational efficiency, but also on their accessibility to vulnerable groups and effectiveness in realizing human rights. Justice sector reforms are increasingly seen from a systemic perspective, as a series of interconnected institutions and procedures to be analysed and improved. Moreover, legal and judicial systems are not restricted to formal, “modern” laws and institutions: they include informal and traditional law and procedures.
Part three provides illustrative examples of SDC’s engagement and experience involving the rule of law dimension both in legal and judicial reform and in other areas of development cooperation. The examples show that the legal dimension of development can be addressed in a variety of contexts and manners with different partners and entry points.

This paper cautions that unless there is an opening of political space and a participatory transition, the soon to be independent government risks recreating the kind of centralised, authoritarian and ultimately unstable state it finally managed to escape. The ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) cobbled together an important, though tentative, Southern consensus ahead of the January 2011 referendum. But its choke-hold on power and a “winner-takes-all” approach to the transition have since jeopardised those gains. Meanwhile, armed insurgencies, militia activity and army defections highlight internal fault lines and latent grievances within the security sector. 

More than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by violent conflict.
The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development examines the changing nature of violence in the 21st century, and underlines the negative impact of repeated cycles of violence on a country or region’s development prospects. Preventing violence and building peaceful states that respond to the aspirations of their citizens requires strong leadership and concerted national and international efforts. The Report is based on new research, case studies and extensive consultations with leaders and development practitioners throughout the world.

World Bank copyright Holder: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank: World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (2011)

It is now widely recognized that the advancement of the rule of law is essential to the maintenance of peace and security, the realization of sustainable development, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Rule of law assistance is a growing area of demand and significant experience has been accumulated in this field over the past 20 years. Yet, despite the centrality of the rule of law to our challenging global agenda, rule of law assistance is still too often executed in an ad hoc manner, designed without proper consultations with national stakeholders, and absent exacting standards of evaluation. A new perspective on rule of law assistance delivery is clearly needed.

The United Nations hosted a consultative process in New York resulting in this report, entitled New Voices: National Perspectives on Rule of Law Assistance. Sixteen national rule of law experts engaged in rule of law reform in 13 countries and regions, joined representatives from the United Nations system and partner countries to offer their respective views on how rule of law assistance can be better channeled to deliver results. The overall aim is to enhance dialogue between rule of law assistance providers and rule of law reformers in countries with a view to placing national perspectives at the centre of rule of law assistance.

This report outlines the following set of recommendations, corresponding to four major common conclusions which emerged from the consultative process. The national experts widely agreed that rule of law assistance is enhanced where: 1) national actors experience greater ownership over rule of law programmes; 2) local stakeholders are empowered; 3) assistance is coordinated and coherent; and 4) meaningful evaluations and assessment of impact are conducted. These common conclusions are based on the personal views and experiences of the national experts with rule of law assistance as articulated in the Voices section of this report.

It is hoped that the common conclusions and recommendations formulated by this informal forum of experts will serve as an important turning point towards a more effective approach to rule of law assistance. A clear call emerged for national rule of law policy-makers and experts and donor partners to come together to develop an internationally-recognized framework guiding rule of law assistance.

This report is based on a February 25, 2010 panel presentation and the views expressed on fighting corruption in SSR during a meeting of the Security Sector
Reform Working Group. The panel consisted of Raymond Gilpin, vice president of the Center for Sustainable Economies at USIP, Rachel Nield, legal adviser at the Open Society Justice Initiative, former Chief of Police Michael Berkow (retired), president of Altegrity Security Consulting, and Alex Berg, a USIP peace scholar.

This study is a comparative analysis of active, 2007 DDR programmes, whether they were in the early planning phase or implementing final social reintegration activities. The main goal of this year’s report is to provide an overall vision for the active DDR programmes and, as such, widen the general and current understanding of the process. Specifically, this report aims to address academics and practitioners.

Justice Beyond The Hague provides important insights into the strengths and limitations of current international justice mechanisms. It makes a clear case for increasing support to national legal systems and outlines a variety of ways that the U.S. government can improve and coordinate its aid with others. While there will always be a place for international courts in countries that cannot or will not prosecute perpetrators themselves, this Council Special Report successfully argues
that domestic systems can and should play a more meaningful role.

Justice Beyond The Hague: Supporting the Prosecution of International Crimes in National Courts by David A. Kaye, Copyright © 2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations Press. Posted with permission.

"A Common Approach for Building International Capacity to Support SJSR" is the title of ISSAT's second High Level Panel (HLP), organised on May 19th, 2011. ISSAT hosted its HLP discussion in Brussels, Belgium with the focus on the increasing need for establishing the right balance of technical, methodological and contextual expertise within SSR interventions.

The basis for the HLP topic was the recognition that the number of SSR mandates within Peace Support Operations (PSO) and crisis management operations has increased over the past years. In parallel, the demand for SSR and rule of law advisors who combine specialist knowledge with a solid understanding of the politics involved in reform processes has increased.

At present, many bilateral and multilateral donors face serious capacity gaps when it comes to having readily-available and deployable personnel with SSR experience and expertise. Security and justice reform requires a multi-disciplinary response: it requires personnel with an understanding of the political nature of SSR and the importance of accountability to a legitimate authority, coupled with those who have a technical understanding of how, for example, a police service, the military, the courts system and the various ministries function.

The panel who addressed these issues were:

• Mr. Richard Wright, Director Conflict Prevention & Security Policy, European External Action Service (EEAS)
• Mr. Cedric de Coning, Advisor to ACCORD and NUPI and Author of the Study on Civilian Capacities within the Non-governmental Civilian Roster Community
• Mr Mika-Markus Leinonen, Director, Civcom Chair, European External Action Service (EEAS) 
• General Juan Estaban (by video), Former Head of the EU SSR Mission in Guinea Bissau

This study analyses the issue of early recovery. In doing so it critically discusses, in a first step, the policy strategies and operational frameworks of selected bilateral donors, regional organizations as well as multilateral institutions to disentangle the main background concepts underlying the policy concepts and to inform the reader of the major challenges involved.The research investigate the following issues: the relations and trade-offs between the strategic objectives of peace-building as well as security and development; the analytical integration of socio-economic development and conflict; the methodological conceptualization of the 'transition' phase; the trade-offs between short and long-term development objectives; and the challenge of sequence and prioritization.

The study highlights policy recommendations and implications in fourteen priority areas: the reintegration of ex-combatants and special groups (IDPs, refugees), infrastructure, employment, agriculture, education, health, fiscal policy and public finance, monetary policy and exchange rate management, the financial sector, external finances (capital flight, debt relief, remittances, ODA), trade, private sector development and entrepreneurship, economic governance (land property rights and access to land, corruption, the management of natural resources, illegal economic activities, regional conflict factors) and horizontal inequality.

As part of a new series in a joint ISIS DCAF project, "Communicate, Coordinate and Cooperate: the A-Z of Cohering EU Crisis Management in the post-Lisbon Era", this first paper highlights some major operational challenges that hinder Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission planners and field personnel from effectively implementing security sector reform (SSR) missions. Member States have launched thirteen SSR missions without mustering the political will to supply sufficient adequately-trained personnel, money and equipment.

Member States must decide on whether or not they want the EU to become a viable international actor in the field of SSR. If so, they must clearly prioritise future CSDP missions in order not to waste scarce resources through mere flag raising exercises. Therefore, and in addition to addressing the operational needs mentioned above, the EU needs to agree on an SSR strategy in the EAS which would clarify the concrete criteria for intervention as well as objectives to be achieved in the framework of SSR-related CSDP missions.

The loss by many states of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force has contributed significantly to the proliferation of failed and failing states worldwide. In such states, a multitude of threats, including insurgencies, terrorist networks, transnational organized crime, and illicit shadow economies, flourish. These states often become trapped in cycles of violent conflict that threaten stability and security at home, in their neighborhoods, and throughout the world. States emerging from conflict are highly prone to return to conflict within the first few years of postconflict status. The widespread availability of lethal weapons exacerbates the tensions that already permeate conflict and postconflict environments.

The mechanism of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of successful peacekeeping, peace-building, postconflict management, and state-building. Security sector reform (SSR) has emerged as a promising though poorly understood tool for consolidating stability and establishing sovereignty after conflict. While DDR enables a state to recover the monopoly (or at least the preponderance) of force, SSR provides the opportunity for the state to establish the legitimacy of that monopoly.

The essays in this book reflect the diversity of experience in DDR and SSR in various contexts. Despite the considerable experience acquired by the international community, the critical interrelationship between DDR and SSR and the ability to use these mechanisms with consistent success remain less than optimally developed. DDR and SSR are essential tools of modern statecraft, but their successful use is contingent upon our understanding of both the affinities and the tensions between them. These essays aim to excite further thought on how these two processes—DDR and SSR—can be implemented effectively and complimentarily to better accomplish the shared goals of viable states and enduring peace.

Edited by Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic, with contributions from:

Gender analysis of actual SSR processes is sorely lacking in the SSR literature. In ‘Poster Boys No More: Gender and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste’ Henri Myrttinen breaks new ground in examining the gender dimensions of the DDR and SSR processes in Timor-Leste, with a focus on the establishment of the police and armed forces. The paper explores issues such as: how men’s roles relate to gang violence and relationships of patronage that undermine the security services, how women have been incorporated into the new security services and how the security services are addressing gender-based violence. It shows how a gender perspective can add to our understanding of many of the social processes at work in Timor-Leste and help to find solutions to some of the main security issues in the country, making recommendations for Timor-Leste’s ongoing SSR processes.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Background to the DDR/SSR Process

3. Gender Roles in Timor-Leste 
3.1 Women and girls
3.2 Men and boys

4. Violence, Insecurity and Gender 
4.1 Masculinities and the legitimacy of violence 
4.2 Patrons and clients 
4.3 Gender-based violence

5. FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) 
5.1 Structure 
5.2 Recruitment and training 
5.3 Internal tensions and external problems

6. Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) 
6.1 Structure 
6.2 Recruitment and training 
6.3 GBV and the Vulnerable Persons Units 
6.4 Internal and external problems of the PNTL

7. The 2006 Crisis 
7.1 Overview of events 
7.2 Aftermath of the crisis

8. Overview of Post-2006 SSR Developments 
8.1 The F-FDTL 
8.2 The PNTL 
8.3 The SSR process

9. Analysis and Policy Recommendations

Appendix 1. Timeline of key events from 1974-2009

Appendix 2. Overview of UN Missions in Timor-Leste 1999-2009

The importance of security sector reform (SSR) has increasingly been emphasizedin international engagement with post-conflict countries. Many governments and UN and donor agencies have emphasized women’s participation and efforts to achieve gender equality as crucial elements of post-conflict reconstruction. In 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, peace and security4, highlighting the interdependence of postconflict gender equality, peacebuilding and security. Women are acknowledged as playing important roles in peacebuilding and in sustaining security on a communal level. Gender inequality is understood to inhibit development and violence against women to be a pervasive form of insecurity with widespread ill-effects across society. There is also growing awareness of the need to address the particular experiences of men and boys, both as victims and as sources of insecurity.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Gender and security sector reform
2.1 Gender and security
2.2 Gender and (in)security in post-conflict settings
2.3 Principles for integrating gender in security sector reform

3. Gender mainstreaming and promoting women’s participation in post-conflict security sector reform
3.1 Gender mainstreaming in security sector reform
3.2 The challenge of women’s participation in security sectorreform
3.3 Women’s civil society groups in security sector reform
3.4 Women parliamentarians in security sector reform

4. Securing women’s full and equal participation in post-conflictsecurity situations
4.1 The challenge of women’s participation in security services
4.2 Women’s participation within post-confl ict security services

5. Gender and specifi c post-conflict security sector reform issues
5.1 Integrating gender in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
5.2 Integrating gender in transitional justice and justice reform

6. Conclusions

This publication summarizes the proceedings of the seminar entitled “Women, Peace, and Security:From Resolution to Action. Ten years of Security Council Resolution 1325”, held in Geneva on 15 September 2010. Convened jointly by the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the seminar is part of an ongoing series of joint events hosted by DCAF and UNOG since 2003, addressing various aspects of security governance.

For the purpose of this paper the term "child soldier" will be used for a personunder the age of 18 who is associated with armed groups or government forces, in any capacity other than a family member. The term "child combatant" will be used for a person under the age of 18 who is or has been actively participating in hostilities in such a manner that he or she adheres to the criteria set in international humanitarian law.

Currently scores of children are recruited and used for military purposes, and perpetrators are not held accountable. There is clearly a need to move from lawmaking, program development, and training, to law enforcement, implementation, monitoring and reporting. In the words of the UN Secretary-General: to move to an "era of application".

Table of Contents

Background

1. Child Soldiers, an Introduction

2. Child Soldiers and Recruitment

3. International Legal Instruments Relevant to Child Soldiers

4. Root Causes of Child Soldiering

5. Prevention

6. Advocacy

7. Negotiating the Release of Child Soldiers

8. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

9. Children with Special Needs

10. Reintegration

11. Criminal Justice and Child Soldiers

12. International Initiatives to Stop the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflicts

13. Conclusion
13.1. Recommendations for Action

Annex 1: World Map of the Use of Child Soldiers

Annex 2: Human Security Network Members

References

DCAF conducted a mapping study on Gender and Security Sector Reform Actors and Activities in Liberia from November 2010 to March 2011. The mapping study was undertaken by an independent consultant, Mr Cecil Griffiths from the Liberian National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA). This research was made possible thanks to the cooperation of most gender and SSR actors in Liberia including the Ministry of Gender and Development (MoGD), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Civil Society Organization Working Group on Security Sector Reform.

This project aimed to complement existing information on gender and SSR issues in Liberia and to reinforce information-sharing and coordination between actors.

On 31 March 2011, LINLEA and DCAF organised a workshop in Monrovia to complete and validate the findings of the study. In addition to validating the findings of the study, the participants made key recommendations related to gender and training, policy development, programmes and activities. The report was launched in Monrovia on 23 September 2011.

Rule of law–based criminal justice responses to terrorism are most effectively ensured when they are practiced within a criminal justice system capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the rights of the accused and when all are equally accountable under the law. Building the capacity of weak criminal justice systems to safeguard mutual rights and responsibilities of governments and their citizens is essential for the alleviation of a number of conditions conducive to violent extremism and the spread of terrorism. A new wave of multilateral counterterrorism initiatives has the opportunity to recalibrate how criminal justice and rule of law–oriented counterterrorism capacity-building assistance is delivered to developing states with weak institutions.

This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the Paris Principles and the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity-building assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically.

This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.

This MENA report joins the overall Index report, available at www.defenceindex.org, as an analytical summary of the detailed
results.

This is a brand new tool and is the result of a major two-year study. This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.

As a part of this Index, 82 countries across the globe were subject to expert, independent assessment. These countries accounted for 94 per cent of global military expenditure in 2011 (USD 1.6 trillion). 

They were selected according to the size of their arms trade, the absolute and per capita size of their militaries, and a proxy of the size of their security sector. Each country was assessed using a comprehensive questionnaire of 77 questions, clustered into five risk areas: political risk, finance risk, personnel risk, operations risk, and procurement risk. Each of these five areas in turn has specific risk areas, as shown in the diagram below.

The analysis was subjected to multiple levels of peer review to minimise the risk of bias and inaccuracies in the responses. Governments were given opportunities to comment on the draft and to provide additional commentary if they desired. Each government has received a comprehensive report outlining our findings for each question, with references to all the sources we used. These assessments are made public on our website.

A second index has also been developed that addresses defence companies, analysing the anti-corruption systems of 129 major global companies. This index, the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (www.companies.defenceindex.org), was published by Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme, on 4th October, 2012.

The report, co-drafted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (formerly known as the Centre for Civil-Military Relations) and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence with the support of DCAF, presents the findings of the needs assessment on gender and SSR in Serbia.

It:
• Generates a detailed baseline for the current state of gender mainstreaming in security sector institutions at the central, provincial and municipal level;
• Identifies local needs, gaps and shortcomings of current SSR processes, and prioritizes needs which should be addressed by national authorities and civil society, with the support of the international donor community, including DCAF’s gender and SSR project.

The needs assessment is built on desk research, interviews, and a series of local stakeholder consultations conducted in Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Novi Pazar, Bujanovac and Belgrade in the course of March and April 2010. It forms the building block of DCAFs dedicated and long term gender and SSR project in Serbia.

These Principles were developed in order to provide guidance to those engaged in drafting, revising, or implementing laws or provisions relating to the state’s authority to withhold information on national security grounds or to punish the disclosure of such information.

They are based on international (including regional) and national law, standards, good practices, and the writings of experts.
They address national security—rather than all grounds for withholding information. All other public grounds for restricting access should at least meet these standards.

These Principles were drafted by 22 organizations and academic centres (listed in the Annex) in consultation with more than 500 experts from more than 70 countries at 14 meetings held around the world, facilitated by the Open Society Justice Initiative, and in consultation with the four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and/or media freedom and the special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights:

 the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
 the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights,
 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
 the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and
 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media.

A U.S. report by Colin Gray from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) based at the U.S. Army War College discussing the future of hard and soft power in military operations.

In most security sector institutions, women constitute a small minority of the personnel. Unwelcoming working environments discourage recruitment and retention of women, and thus create a vicious circle that perpetuates their minority status. At the same time, female security sector staff associations have multiplied, promoting networking and offering mutual support among members. Many of these associations have expanded their mandate to activities reaching beyond their members’ welfare.

This occasional paper examines the structures, mandates and activities of a sampling of female staff associations and networks in the security sector, analyses whether and how they meet members’ needs, and gauges the effect or influence they have had on changing policies and practices in their institutions and in the communities they serve. Research for this paper focused on 67 international, national, regional, and local female security sector associations and networks in the military, police, corrections, justice system, fire and emergency services, immigration services, and in national security bodies and private security companies from around the world. An annex to the paper provides more information on the associations studied.

Local ownership is widely considered to be one of the core principles of successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes. Nonetheless, there remains a gap between policy and practice. This article examines reasons for this gap, including concerns regarding limited capacity and lack of expertise, time and cost constraints, the allure of quantifiable results and quick wins, and the need to ensure that other principles inherent to SSR are not disregarded. In analysing what is meant by local ownership, this article will also argue that, in practice, the concept is narrowly interpreted both in terms of how SSR programmes are controlled and the extent to which those at the level of the community are actively engaged. This is despite policy guidance underscoring the importance of SSR programmes being inclusive and local ownership being meaningful. It will be argued that without ensuring meaningful and inclusive local ownership of SSR programmes, state security and justice sector institutions will not be accountable or responsive to the needs of the people and will, therefore, lack public trust and confidence. The relationship between the state and its people will be weak and people will feel divorced from the decisions that affect their security and their futures. All this will leave the state prone to further outbreaks of conflict. This article will suggest that the requisite public confidence and trust in state security and justice sector institutions, and ultimately, the state itself, could be promoted by SSR programmes incorporating community safety structures.

Recent events in Mali, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate that building professional indigenous forces is imperative to regional stability, yet few success stories exist. Liberia is a qualified “success,” and this study explores how it was achieved by the program’s chief architect. Liberia suffered a 14-year civil war replete with human rights atrocities that killed 250,000 people and displaced a third of its population. Following President Charles Taylor’s exile in 2003, the U.S. contracted DynCorp International to demobilize and rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia and Ministry of Defense; the first time in 150 years that one sovereign nation hired a private company to raise another sovereign nation’s military. This monograph explores the theory and practice behind the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the legacy military and security sector reform (SSR) that built the new one. It also considers some of the benefits and difficulties of contracting out the making of militaries. This is significant since the private sector will probably participate increasingly in security sector reform. The monograph concludes with 28 concrete recommendations for practitioners and 6 recommendations for the U.S. Army on how to expand this capability. Finally, this monograph is written by a practitioner for practitioners.

Little more than five years ago, Liberia was emerging from fourteen years of brutal war and pillage that had left it in ruins. today, it has a democratically elected president, and the security sector is experiencing reforms that are unprecedented not only in the country, but in the world. Under cover of a 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force, it drew both its army and defence ministry to zero, in order to recruit, vet and train the personnel for these institutions from the ground up. Such "root and branch" security sector reform (SSR) was bold. But, given the many abuses perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) both before and during the civil war, the vast majority of Liberians supported it.

• In 2006, a day of deadly riot in Kabul dramatized the need for an Afghan constabulary force capable of controlling outbreaks of urban violence. In response, the U.S. military and Afghan authorities created a elite gendarmerie, the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
• Although ANCOP was conceived of as a riot control force, it was assigned to the Focused District Development Program to replace district-level Afghan Uniformed Police who were away for training. The high demand and constant transfers required by this duty resulted in rates of attrition among ANCOP unit of 75 to 80 percent.
• In 2010, ANCOP's superior training, firepower, and mobility were recognized in its assignments, along with a "surge" of U.S. military forces, to reverse the Taliban's hold on key areas in Southern Afghanistan.
• In heavy fighting in Marja, Helmand province, ANCOP was demonstrably unprepared to serve as a counterinsurgency force, particularly in areas that had not been cleared by coalition and Afghan military forces.
• Subsequent improvements in training and partnering with U.S. forces improved ANCOPS's performance in kandahar, where ANCOP was used to hold areas that had been cleared by the military.
• By 2011, ANCOP had firmly established its place as an elite rapid reaction and counter-insurgency force with a positive reputation among coalition troops and afghan citizens.

Between 2011 and 2014 the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)’s Kenya Transition Initiative implemented what was essentially a pilot program of the new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept. Aiming to counter the drivers of ‘violent extremism’ (VE), this operated through a system of small grants funding activities such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates on sensitive topics, counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder, and so on. This paper delivers lessons from the program, generated via an independent evaluation, offering insights of relevance to the broader CVE community of practitioners. A first overarching conclusion is that programming decisions would have benefitted from a more comprehensive understanding of VE in the local context. For instance, subsets of the population more narrowly ‘at-risk’ of being attracted to VE should have been identified and targeted (e.g. potentially teenagers, ex-convicts, members of specific clans, and so on), and a greater focus should have been placed upon comprehending the relevance of material incentives, fear, status-seeking, adventure-seeking, and other such individual-level drivers. A second conclusion is that the KTI team would have profited from additional top-level guidance from their donors, for instance, providing direction on the extent to which efforts should have been targeted at those supportive of violence versus those directly involved in its creation, the risks associated with donor branding, and contexts in which the pejorative term ‘extremism’ should have been pragmatically replaced by neutral terminology. As a priority donors and the wider community should also provide suitable definitions of the CVE concept, rather than leaving practitioners to construe (undoubtedly inconsistently) it’s meaning from the available definitions of VE.

The recent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is a significant accomplishment for the European Union. Still, the agreement marks the beginning, rather than the end, of a long-term process of normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The maintenance of the EU’s “constructive ambiguity” approach to the question of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state is important for continued normalizing relations between the countries. The EU’s continuous and active involvement and interest in the region is of paramount importance for the full implementation of the agreement.

Devant les événements politiques qui secouent actuellement le monde arave, les Pays-Bas s'interrogent sur la façon de soutenir les forces démocratiques dans la région. Par le biais de la motion de MM. Pechtold et Timmermans déposée le 23 mars 2011, la Chambre des représentants a prié le gouvernement de solliciter un avis de l'AIV sur la capacité, notamment financière, des politiques néerlandaise et européenne à appuyer la démocratie de l'état de droit dans les pays arabes et perses. La demande en ce sens adressée à l'AIV le 18 avril 2011 se décline en deux questions.

• Les instruments dont dispose actuellement l'Union européenne (dialogue dans le cadre des accords d'association, aide, préférences commerciales, prêts de la BEI, PESC, etc.) lui permettent-ils d'appuyer adéquatement la transition du monde arabe vers la démocratie et l'état de droit?
• Comment les Pays-Bas peuvent-ils utiliser efficacement leurs dispositifs bilatéraux actuels pour soutenir ce processus?

Burundi is back at the brink. Less than a decade after the end of its civil war, a political conflict over the president’s attempt to stay in office for a disputed third term risks escalating into wider violence, policy specialists say. The international community has begun to respond, but should do more, and quickly. In this article, recent USIP research on how to prevent election violence identifies four strategies as being most effective. Peacebuilders can press the security sector to remain politically neutral, can continue monitoring and mapping by those organizations that remain on the ground, and can help the national election commission operate effectively. Additionally, diplomatic efforts to raise awareness about the impending crisis could bring more resources to the peace effort.

The report, produced by Isabel Vogel and commissioned by the DFID evaluation division,considers the current uses and definitions of Theory of Change (ToC). A methodology which maps the assumptions which inform planned interventions within all stages of an initiative, ToC is increasingly regarded as an essential tool in designing and appreciating the complex network of factors which influence project outcomes.The review considers the practical aspects of ToC implementation and to develop a more consistent approach which is gaining in reputation and use within the international development community.

Vogel acknowledges that lack of consensus exists around the specific definition of ToC. The review highlights the necessity for flexibility in developing a successful ToC. Through consideration of different approaches, outlining examples of ToC in practice within the appendix, Vogel identifies and draws together a short list of the core elements, generally agreed upon as essential requirements for any discussion centred on theory of change. The review further examines the most effective means of establishing a logical pathway to desired outcomes using the ToC model. Vogel highlights the need to establish ToC as an ongoing process developed alongside all phases of a programme from inception to impact evaluation and emphasises that assumptions should be made explicit within the organising framework of a project.

ToC, as the review makes clear, has the potential to provide an invaluable framework for discussion and critical thinking surrounding project implementation and evaluation. It allows for subjective analysis to be discussed and represented, through diagrams and visuals, which can in turn support more dynamic exchange between policy actors, grantees and donors.

For full report, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf

The relationship between transitional justice and security system – or sector – reform (SSR) is understudied, yet both contribute to state-building, democratisation and peacebuilding in countries with a legacy of massive human rights abuse. The security system is fundamental in any democracy for protecting the citizens’ rights. Yet in postconflict environments it usually comprises members of the police, military, secret police, intelligence agencies, armed rebel groups and militia – the groups which are often the most responsible for serious and systemic human rights violations during conflict. Reforming the system to ensure security agents become protectors of the population and the rule of law is therefore of the utmost urgency, but the political and security context may pose serious challenges to reform.
This paper draws on research in four very different environments: Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Timor-Leste. Although effective SSR is highly context-specific, this paper argues that the EU could improve the substance of its SSR programming and implementation by drawing on lessons from these four case studies.

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Advancing the rule of law around the world is the central goal of the World Justice Project (WJP).

Establishing the rule of law is fundamental to achieving communities of opportunity and equity—communities that offer sustainable economic development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights. Without the rule of law, medicines do not reach health facilities due to corruption; women in rural areas remain unaware of their rights; people are killed in criminal violence; and firms’ costs increase because of expropriation risk. The rule of law is the cornerstone to improving public health, safeguarding participation, ensuring security, and fighting poverty.

The WJP Rule of Law Index™ is an innovative quantitative assessment tool designed to offer a comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law, not in theory, but in practice.

This report is the second in an annual series.  Indices and indicators are very useful tools. The systematic tracking of infant mortality rates, for instance, has greatly contributed to improving health outcomes around the globe. In a similar fashion, the WJP Rule of Law Index™ monitors the health of a country’s institutional environment—such as whether government officials are accountable under the law, and whether legal institutions protect fundamental rights and allow ordinary people access to justice.

This policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia andin what context these possible activities should be viewed. The main focus will be on direct engagement on security topics such as the EU Border Management project BOMCA.
However, indirect activities such as education programmes that might be beneficial to security and stability in Central Asia will not be ignored. After an exposé on EU security interests in Central Asia, in the second paragraph attention is devoted to national and regional threats to the security of Central Asian republics and engagement of the EU. The paper concludes with a few recommendations for EU institutions and member states that could help to strengthen EU–Central Asia security cooperation including aspects of Security Sector Reform.

This volume hopes to initiate a debate within the SSR community of policy and practice on the future of the concept, developing new ideas on the form and content of a second-generation model. If nothing else, it hopes to give shape to a new research agenda that can harness the many lessons learned from a decade of implementation to foster a more informed debate on the future of SSR.

This book is a witness of historical events and facts in the first fiveyears of Nepal’s peace process between 2005 and 2010. Some ofthe documents in this book are legal documents such as theComprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), being an annex to the InterimConstitution of Nepal 2007. Some can be interpreted as politicaldocuments. However, one thing in common for all the documentscollected in this volume is that they are manifestation of Nepalesepeople’s aspirations and struggles towards peace, justice and equality.Each document carries its own ‘spirit’ within it.

Decades of political instability, state fragility, mismanagement, and a series of armed conflicts have led the Central African Republic (CAR) to a state of widespread violence and poverty. This study provides a better understanding of the scope and magnitude of violence in CAR and its consequences, as well as a snapshot of what the citizens of CAR believe is the best way to restore peace. It also examines the issue of justice and accountability for the serious crimes that were committed.

This report provides the findings from a survey of 1,879 adults, residents of CAR, randomly selected in the capital city of Bangui, and the prefectures of Lobaye, Ombella M’Poko, Ouham, and Ouham Pende. These prefectures encompass a large geographic area representing 52 percent of the total population of CAR and have experienced varying levels of exposure to the conflicts. Locally trained teams conducted the interviews between November and December 2009.

This report provides a detailed analysis of results on a wide range of topics related to the population’s priorities and needs, exposure to violence, security, community cohesion and engagement, access to information, conflict resolution, reintegration of former combatants, transitional justice, and reparations for victims. Interviewers used an open-ended format and respondents could provide more than one answer to most questions.

The purpose of this paper is to propose an analysis which discloses the various interdependencies that may exist between modes of objectifying the nation and the legitimacy of discursive strategies of nation-building in the context of a grave social conflict. The paper advances two interrelated arguments. Firstly, it argues that the order of conflict in the Congo is contingent on the strictly symbolic efficacy of myths of identity. Secondly it argues that the “charisma” of some of the country’s “Big Men” is a related to what I call the democratization of sovereignty, and neither to their supposedly exceptional individual qualities nor to a specifically African “Big Man”-syndrome. I propose that while one must be critical of the Weberian notion of “charisma” as a sociological theory of prophecy, one can nonetheless use the notion of “charisma” as a tool to analyse symbolic properties that accrue to a specific individual and his followers, to the extent that they embody a subjectivity which is held as absolute by his, or their, proper discourse.

The aim of this issue paper is to provide some ideas regarding how best to create suitable conditions for security sector reform (SSR) in DRC. Throughout the last decade, SSR has become a key component of the international agenda in states affected by conflict. There is a growing consensus amongst donors regarding the necessity of implementing SSR for effective stabilization and reconstruction. Since 2003, this has resulted in DRC in several donor-supported initiatives to strengthen the police, military, and justice sectors. Although some of these efforts may have initially shown must promise, progress on SSR in DRC remains very limited.

The Security Sector Governance (SSG) Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducted baseline studies of the security sector in six Southern African countries, namely Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as the Southern African Development Community’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC Organ). The results of this research are reflected in this monograph.

The purpose of this paper is, however, not to add to the extensive literature speculating on various outcomes and their consequences. Serious efforts are currently
being made by the parties themselves, the African Union, other regional partners, the UN and other international stakeholders to address the immediate challenges so as to secure a peaceful transition after the expiry of the interim period. This paper, rather, focuses on the one variable that remains constant in both scenarios, which is long-term and strategic in nature: The ability of the South – where ‘everything’, in the words of its President, ‘is at zero’ – to develop and improve the lives of its ten million people.

This background report explains the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. It is the first in a series of reports which will focus on the national and international policies
needed to take the country out of its incessant cycle of political crises and become a point of stability in the region.

After many years of political instability and three failed attempts of DDR, there is a renewed effort in Guinea-Bissau to get DDR and SSR right. With a national strategy and action plan on SSR in place, Guinea-Bissau has attracted a lot of attention from the international community. Many donors, the European Union (EU) among others, are sending experts to assist in the SSR process in Guinea-Bissau. While there are favourable circumstances for SSR in Guinea-Bissau such as a willingness and
commitment displayed by the national authorities, a number of difficulties and challenges were highlighted during the briefing. The Army, which is by far the most powerful actor in Guinea-Bissau, has to be brought into the reform process. In addition, the large numbers of donors and experts have to be absorbed, organized and most off all coordinated.

This monograph examines the relationship between organized crime, internal violence, and institutional failure in Guatemala. It aims to increase awareness of this growing threat to regional security and to provide a granular, textured case study of a phenomenon that, while most striking in Guatemala, is present throughout Latin America as a whole. Organizationally, the monograph comprises three substantive sections. The first, offers an overview of the emerging security environment in Latin America, examining
organized crime as a form of irregular warfare. The second, zooms in on Guatemala, exploring the origins, nature, and effects of the current crisis in that country. The third, considers the implications for Guatemalan and U.S. policy.

This chapter provides background information on the Haiti judicial system. It is based on the Introduction to the Caribbean Community contained in this report; the Report on Judicial Systems in the Americas 2004-2005; the report “Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti and the International Community” (2006), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005, published by the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; the World Bank report “Doing Business” (2006); and data gathered via Internet.

The dysfunctional state of Haiti’s justice system has impeded implementation of democratic reforms since the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. In spite of robust international efforts for six years following Aristide’s 1994 restoration, little lasting progress has been made, and there has even been regression in some areas. The lack of political will of successive Haitian governments has been the major factor but donor approaches have also suffered from flawed methodology.

Strengthening the rule of law in Haiti poses a major challenge to both the Haitian Government and several donors. For the Government the challenge is to ensure that the opportunity presented by the return to constitutional order in 1994 is used to construct new and reformed rule-of-law institutions against a background of decades of repression and systematic human rights violations. For donors, the challenge since 1994 has been how to advance a reform process in a political environment not conducive to change and characterized by protracted political crisis and paralysis.

This issue of the CIGI Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti analyses the programming shift undertaken by MINUSTAH and some donors from a traditional DDR to
a violence reduction approach, underlining the problems of coordination and knowledge sharing that emerged.

This edition of the Security Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti, written before the January 12, 2010 earthquake, examines issues surrounding the renewal of the UN mission, the
recommendations on the security apparatus put forth by the two presidential commissions and existing security threats. While some priorities of the SSR process will
change dramatically in the wake of the earthquake—with a significant portion of the security infrastructure devastated and the police thrust into the role of relief facilitators—
many of the existing challenges will remain the same, only amplified.

This paper sets out five recommendations for change of United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti’s (MINUSTAH) mandate on 15 August 2006. In addition it sets out
recommendations for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), and police, judicial and correctional reform that can be realised under the current mandate. These recommendations reflect the current situation in Haiti and are based on an analysis of what is feasible and can be realistically implemented given the existing circumstances. The paper highlights changes that are necessary in the immediate future to enhance DDR, police, judicial and correctional reform so as to ensure human security, local ownership, security and stability in Haiti. DDR and rule of law are critical to ensure sustainable peace, therefore these must receive a strengthened and renewed focus from MINUSTAH and the new Haitian government. The international community and the Haitian government should take advantage of the current window of opportunity to promote sustainable reform and reduction of violence in the Haitian context.

The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to the under-theorised field of Security Sector Reform (SSR) studies (Egnell and Halden, 2009) and to support better design, implementation and review of SSR programmes. We borrow, from economics and strategic management, some perspectives on institutional change and we consider the implications of these insights for approaches to SSR.

The aim of this study, besides giving an overview on the most important stages on the way to an independent Kosovo, is to provide an analysis of the political and economic situation in Kosovo since the independence declaration and to put under the microscope the priorities and expected problems of the EU mission, which, in coming years, will cost European tax payers millions of euros. The present investigation is based on a book published in 2005 and revised in 2006 and on interviews and research in Kosovo since 2002.

‘The rule of law’ draws extraordinarily diverse supporters. Theorists from the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson to the conservative economist Friedrich Hayek have embraced it; in September 2005 the entire membership of the United Nations committed themselves to it. Such widespread endorsement is possible only because of relative vagueness as to what the term might actually mean.
This poses particular problems in states where rule of any sort is uncertain. The facilitation or imposition of the rule of law in fragile or conflict-affected countries has been something of a growth area since the rediscovery of the rule of law — long discredited after the failed ‘law and development’ efforts of the 1960s and 1970s — in the post-Cold War era.
Yet the enthusiasm and resources devoted to programming in this area have not been matched by much success. Rule of law is invoked as a kind of mantra, but efforts to support or promote it tend to be technical quick-fixes or rhetorical abstractions. In part this is due to the absence of agreement on a definition.
The author’s presentation (from which these brief notes are drawn) will examine the fall and rise of the rule of law, some of the lingering definitional questions, and the use and abuse of the term ‘ownership’ in particular.

The focus of this paper is the “demand-side” model of administration of justice/rule of law (AOJ/ROL) reform as developed by USAID and increasingly adopted by other donors. It explores the basic arguments as they have been presented in USAID documents, compares them with actual experience of Latin American projects, and suggests some lessons to be incorporated in a revised theory of “demand-side” reform.

The rule of law is increasingly regarded as a precondition for sustainable peacebuilding and development, and has become a central element in international approaches to crisis management and conflict resolution. This guide explores the challenges of transferring responsibility for public order and the rule of law after conflict to local ownership. It does so by taking a closer look at the principle of local ownership—a participatory framework through which the needs and views of all stakeholders can be articulated and addressed—and how it can be implemented.

The report seeks to assist field personnel—from the police officer on the street to the head of mission—with the difficult task of implementing the principle of local ownership in justice and security sector reform during peacebuilding operations. It is intended to assist with the process of deciding how, where and when local ownership should be promoted, where it may not be an option, whether different circumstances call for different types of strategies for transition and what factors should be taken into consideration. It identifies potential stumbling blocks and encourages practitioners to ask critical questions that can guide the transitional process.

The report builds on the experiences of recent peace-building efforts, including those in Kosovo and East Timor, where the international community has taken the lead in bearing responsibility for law and order. It also builds on peace-building efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where primacy has rested with local authorities.

Over the past two decades, in response to the underwhelming results of international development efforts across the Third World, arguments concerning the importance of local ownership have been gaining currency within the international development community. At its core, the discourse around ownership revolves around fundamental questions of agency: who decides, who controls, who implements, and who evaluates. The growing emphasis on local ownership, then, emerged as a critique of mainstream development practice and the broader cult of Western expertise which underpins it. As Joseph Stiglitz argued a decade ago, a vision of development in which all the answers and all the agency are seen to lie in the hands of foreigners is inherently problematic and ultimately self-defeating: ‘We have seen again and again that [local] ownership is essential for successful transformation: policies that are imposed from outside may be grudgingly accepted on a superficial basis, but will rarely be implemented as intended’. Since then, the principle of local ownership has been viewed increasingly as a precondition for effective development assistance, even if
the translation of the principle into actual practice remains an ongoing challenge.

The report is intended to serve both as a general knowledge resource and as a practitioner’s guide for national bodies seeking to employ traditional justice mechanisms as well as external agencies aiming to support such processes. It suggests that in some circumstances traditional mechanisms can effectively complement conventional judicial systems and represent a real potential for promoting justice, reconciliation and a culture of democracy.
In addition, even in situations where communities are more inclined to demand straightforward retribution against the perpetrators, traditional justice mechanisms may
still offer a way both of restoring a sense of accountability and of linking justice to democratic development.

Within the last 15 years, peacekeeping has undergone a rapid and remarkable transformation. Today, peacekeeping enjoys a much more expansive definition, which acknowledges the complexity and difficulty of truly winning the peace. The absence of the rule of law is a common cause and byproduct of conflicts, and in recognition of this fact, the United Nations (UN) has begun to regularly incorporate rule of law programming into complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (hereinafter, peacekeeping operations).

This study reviews the recent experience with judicial and legal reform programming in UN peacekeeping operations and proposes measures to strengthen and integrate this programming within the mission to maximize its contribution to lasting peace and security. Though this relatively new aspect of peacekeeping has grown consistently in recent years, this study represents one of the first introspective examinations of its status and integration within the UN system.

While significant progress has been made in integrating judicial and legal reform programming into peacekeeping, this study concludes that the effort is still in its early stages, and a number of additional steps are needed to prepare the UN to address judicial and legal system issues in a post-conflict environment. Some of these measures may require additional resources, but more importantly, some demand changes in the way the UN plans and administers the rule of law dimension of peacekeeping operations.

Since the 1990s, internationally-supported peacebuilding interventions have become increasingly prominent. Activities focusing on rule of law and security institutions are a key component of this agenda. Despite increasing calls for more rigorous analysis of the impact of peacebuilding interventions, conceptual advances have been limited. There is little clarity on what is working, what is not, and why. This SSR Paper seeks to address this gap by mapping relevant approaches and methodologies to measuring impact. It examines how international actors have approached these questions in relation to support to rule of law and security institutions in complex peacebuilding environments. Most significantly, the paper demonstrates that measuring impact is not only feasible but necessary in order to maximise the effectiveness of major international investments in this field.

Available for download at: 

https://www.dcaf.ch/measuring-impact-peacebuilding-interventions-rule-law-and-security-institutions

Security sector reform has been a central component of post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes, and the restoration of state authority since the 1990s. However, these reforms have rarely been successful in the long run. In the DRC, police reform has been a staple of statebuilding and governance strengthening efforts. Despite some reform successes, however, the Congolese National Police largely remains a reflection of the state. It is mostly unaccountable to those it is meant to serve, and used as a tool by some to extract resources and protect elite interests.

As a key state institution, sustainable reform of the police is impossible without a considerable overhaul of the larger governance framework of which it is part. While acknowledging this major systemic challenge, this briefing suggests that there may nevertheless be some more modest, yet impactful, gains to be made through police reform. By focusing on the everyday work and life of police personnel, future reforms could contribute to changing police behaviour on the streets and in police stations, at the interface between the police and the population where it may arguably matter most.

Based on seven months of qualitative research on the PNC conducted in Bukavu between 2016 and 2017, this briefing argues that targeted police reforms, informed and driven by local actors, can affect change, and often in a more sustainable—and financially viable—fashion than past large-scale donor-driven reform support programmes.

USIP has been working with lawmakers and other reform constituencies in Haiti as they strive to reform Haiti’s criminal laws that date back to the early 19th century. In March
2009, USIP commissioned two reports that were written by Louis Aucoin, a professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and Hans Joerg Albrecht, the director of the Max Planck Institute of Foreign and International Criminal Law. At the request of Haitian lawmakers, USIP has also provided copies of the Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, a law reform tool developed by USIP’s Rule of Law Program to assist in the drafting of new laws.

While there has been a growing interest in customary justice systems among rule of law practitioners, it has remained very much at the margins of justice reform strategies. This session will challenge us to view customary justice and other forms of legal pluralism not as a side issue, but as a fundamental part of the justice landscapes in which we work. It will take a critical stance in reviewing the current range of overall policy approaches to legal pluralism and the preconceptions and assumptions that underlie those approaches. It will seek to identify and critically review how different approaches (rights-based, developmental, expanding access to justice, peace-building, state-building etc.,) tend to “frame the problem” when it comes to engagement with legal pluralism and will reflect specifically on how these approaches affect a range of key post conflict objectives. Finally it will consider the building blocks needed to define strategic objectives for engagement with legal pluralism.

This report reflects views expressed during a March 5, 2010, conference held at the National Defense University entitled “Monopoly of Force: The Link between DDR and SSR,” cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Center for Complex Operations. The conference sought to dispel the notion that there is no connection between disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). The conference determined that, in reality, DDR and SSR are interrelated and mutually reinforcing and should occur simultaneously in a holistic manner.

This publication questions the relevance of considering capacity development synonymous with training as knowledge transfer. It argues that, whilst capacity development can mean or include training, it should move beyond training as the default and include other activities such as building institutional capacities and engage with substantive and relational skills.

The lessons identified here are based on ideas that have been developing across Government and on our deepening understanding of what works and what doesn’t
work on the ground. They will hopefully be of use to policymakers, practitioners and programme managers working in and on conflict-affected environments.

The complexity of the challenges in stabilisation environments require integrated solutions at multiple levels. Rather than re-inventing our responses to each new
crisis, we need to identify relevant lessons from past experience, learn from these, and adapt them to the specific requirements of each new environment.

The identification of lessons remains just the first step. We need to ensure that the lessons are actually ‘learned’. This requires a genuine commitment at all levels to learning from the past, the dedication of resources (human and financial) to support the learning process, and the development of systems to feed lessons back into policy, planning and practice. The lessons learning process should be a continuous cycle.

Human rights are key to stabilisation - both as a means and as an end in themselves. Although we need to promote universal adherence to human rights, we need to recognise that there can be different cultural and political approaches to dealing with human rights violations, especially during a fragile peace process. Human rights need to be embedded in planning and assessment for stabilisation; the selection of specific tools will depend on needs, opportunities and constraints in any particular context.

This Issues Note gives readers a basic understanding of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), so that they are in a position to consider whether DDR is an appropriate stabilisation intervention. It clarifies questions, issues and articulates the decisions that the practitioner may face with when considering a DDR programme. This note should be read in conjunction with Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A UK View, and with other Stabilisation Issues Notes, particularly those on Security and rule of Law and Economic Recovery.