General Juan Esteban
Mr. Juan Esteban is Army general at Ministry of Defense in Spain. He is currently in reserve for the SP Army, and his expertise includes Former Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau.
Mr. Esteban joined the Military Academy in 1969 and served as Artillery officer and Army Helicopter Pilot. He graduated in the Spanish Army War College. His last command was the Spanish Army Aviation (2004-2008). His experience in PKO include: Bosnia (1992), Guatemala (1995-96), DR Congo (2003-04) and SSR: Guinea-Bissau (2008-10) as Head of Mission. After more than two years as Head of Mission in the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, Mr. Esteban gained a lot of expertise in the SSR field and also in the management of the crisis by the EU institutions.
Mr. Esteban was posted twice at NATO HQ in Brunssum (NL) as Liaison Officer and Retamares (SP) as Chief of Operations.
Richard Wright is currently the Director of Conflict Prevention and Security Policy in the European External Action Service. Mr Wright joined the European Commission in 1988 and during the past 23 years has worked extensively in the DG External Relations where he has served as Head of Unit - Relations with Japan and Korea, Director for relations with North America, East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and more recently as the Commission Representative to PSC and Head of the crisis platform and Policy Coordination in CFSP.
Mika-Markus Leinonen is currently the Director, Civcom Chair, in the European External Action Service. Mika-Markus first entered the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990, and after postings to the Finnish Embassies in Chile and Belgium, and as the Finnish Representation to NATO amongst others, he came to Brussels in 2000 where he served as the Principal Administrator for the Crisis Management Units (DGE VII, VIII and IX) in the General Secretariat of the Council. He has extensive experience in Civilian Crisis Management, having served as the Finnish representative to CIVCOM, the Director of the Unit for Civilian Crisis Management in the Finnish MFA, and as the Director of DGE IX – Civilian Crisis Management in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU.
Cedric de Coning
Cedric de Coning is an Advisor with ACCORD and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). He was a South African diplomat in Washington D.C. and Addis Ababa (1988-1997). He served with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999-2000 and 2001-2002) and worked with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Training and Evaluation Service (2002).
Cedric is working on the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force and civil-military and peacebuilding coordination for ACCORD, and the Comprehensive Approach with NUPI. His research focus is on the coherence and coordination of complex peacebuilding systems.
Cedric holds a M.A. (Cum Laude) from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and is a D.Phil candidate at the University of Stellenbosch. His recent publications include: Conflict Management for Peacekeepers and Peacebuilders, (ACCORD 2008) with Ian Henderson, Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations, (ACCORD 2007) and the Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping, (UNU Press 2007), which he co-edited with Prof Chiyuki Aoi and Prof Ramesh Thakur.
Policy and Research Papers
The fight against illegal arms transfers requires regulation and an effective monitoring of arms brokers. Their business primarily consists of facilitating and arranging transactions in exchange for compensation or material recompense. Indeed some of them manage to circumvent existing controls by exploiting different national regulations or conducting their activities from countries where controls are weak or non-existent.
In 2003 the EU member states took an important initiative by setting a harmonized system of control of arms brokers. With the adoption of a European Common Position they introduced controls on brokering activities taking place on their territories. Yet, six years later, all EU member states still have no legislation on arms brokering, while others need to adapt their national legislation to EU standards. Furthermore this European instrument reflects minimum standards which currently appear insufficient to effectively fight against ill disposed brokers.
This report reviews the extent to which EU member states implement the Common Position on arms brokering and suggests some improvements for a better control on brokering activities and an effective fight against illegal arms transfers. One section of the report also considers a major gap in the national regulations: extraterritorial controls on brokering activities. Finally, the report presents the case study of the Belgian legislation on arms brokering.
Improving the Understanding and Use of Participatory Approaches in EU Security-Building Programmes (2010).pdf
Over the past decade or so, the EU has gradually adopted the concept of ‘human security’ in its support for security and justice programming. A commitment to human security implies that security and justice strategies and programmes should proactively seek to take into account and address citizens’ needs and concerns, as primary recipients of security and justice provision. One way to ensure these requirements are met is to promote public participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of security and justice mechanisms.
The EU has a number of policies, tools and frameworks which commit its institutions to taking a ‘participatory approach’ to programming, including in the areas of security and justice. These commitments are gradually, if unevenly, being translated into practice. However, research by the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) Security Cluster has identified a number of institutional, cultural and operational challenges which hinder the understanding and use of participatory approaches by EU institutions. This paper gives an overview of the challenges faced by EU actors in understanding and using participatory approaches and suggests steps that EU institutions can take to overcome them.
Published in the run up to the September 2010 UN Summit on the MDGs, this policy paper addresses the status as well as challenges to their implementation questioning their objectives and the apparent statu quo.
As part of a new series in a joint ISIS DCAF project, "Communicate, Coordinate and Cooperate: the A-Z of Cohering EU Crisis Management in the post-Lisbon Era", this first paper highlights some major operational challenges that hinder Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission planners and field personnel from effectively implementing security sector reform (SSR) missions. Member States have launched thirteen SSR missions without mustering the political will to supply sufficient adequately-trained personnel, money and equipment.
Member States must decide on whether or not they want the EU to become a viable international actor in the field of SSR. If so, they must clearly prioritise future CSDP missions in order not to waste scarce resources through mere flag raising exercises. Therefore, and in addition to addressing the operational needs mentioned above, the EU needs to agree on an SSR strategy in the EAS which would clarify the concrete criteria for intervention as well as objectives to be achieved in the framework of SSR-related CSDP missions.
This study evaluates the oversight of national security and intelligence agencies by parliaments and specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies, with a view to identifying good practices that can inform the European Parliament’s approach to strengthening the oversight of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and, to a lesser extent, Sitcen. The study puts forward a series of detailed recommendations (including in the field of access to classified information) that are formulated on the basis of indepth assessments of: (1) the current functions and powers of these four bodies; (2) existing arrangements for the oversight of these bodies by the European Parliament, the Joint Supervisory Bodies and national parliaments; and (3) the legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary and specialised oversight of security and intelligence agencies in EU Member States and other major democracies.
Willing and Able? Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States – Insights from the Central African Republic
Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral part of the international community’s efforts to build peace and enhance security in weak post-war states. It has, however, proven difficult to undertake SSR in such contexts. A number of factors constitute a challenge to create security forces that are able to provide security to the population.
Based on previous research, this report highlights some of the challenges to SSR in weak post-war states. Through an analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic, this study shows that informal power structures, a volatile security situation and failure to understand how SSR is influenced by other political processes, negatively impact on the prospect for successful implementation of reforms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that weak capacity and lack of political will on behalf of the national government, is a challenge to local ownership and sustainable reforms. Despite a holistic approach to reforms aiming to improve both the capacity of the security forces and to increase democratic control of the security institutions, insufficient international engagement, scarce resources, lack of strategic direction and inadequate donor coordination have limited the prospect for implementation of reforms.
This study focuses on EU support to SSR in the form of CSDP missions, analysing recent developments in the EU's internal set-up, capacities and training arrangements for mission personnel. It is based on interviews with mission personnel, Brussels-based officials and secondary sources.
Civilian crisis management has long been considered the EU’s forte. Recent research however has questioned the EU’s claim to this specialization. I will interrogate how the EU has fared in building civilian capabilities for CSDP through a case study of the impact of the Europeanization of CCM norms in one of the newer EU member states - Poland. I investigate the domestic reverberations of an EU-level CCM governance – conceptualized as a vertical diffusion of norms - and a horizontal diffusion in the realms of policy setting, institutional adaptation, as well as in recruitment and training. I hypothesize that the European cognitive constructions and policy designs are the more likely to impact upon Polish security policy the more they resonate with the ideas embedded in the national security identity.
Another intervening variable affecting the ‘translation’ of EU policy into the domestic context is state capacity. Due to weaknesses
in the supply side of CCM and the refracting impact of national security identity and state capacity, I find that Europeanization has had a limited impact on the civilian response capability-building in Poland. Europeanization has been shallow, featuring adjustments
on the margins rather than the core of the security policy.
SSR activities are key for stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states through their emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance. The EU has engaged in aspects of SSR for the past decade through its CFSP/CSDP as well as development and enlargement policies. The recently launched CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa take place in a new institutional context, and address European security concerns in a fragile but geopolitically important region. The EU’s engagement with SSR in general and the Horn of Africa in particular shows the difficulties in simultaneously pursuing dual objectives of stability and institution-building and in adopting and coordinating long-and short-term approaches to the problems facing the region. To do justice to the holistic conception of SSR and its emphasis on accountability and democratic oversight, the training of security forces and capacity building needs to be framed in a long-term approach that aims for sustainable structural change. The creation of the EEAS has given the EU the right tools – but a continued emphasis on policy coordination is necessary to address old and new, institutional and operational, challenges so as to attain a comprehensive approach to SSR. The input and continued commitment of member states to CSDP also remains vital
This evaluation was commissioned by the Joint Evaluation Unit in DG DEVCO on behalf of the European Commission. It provides an independent assessment of the Commission’s past support to Justice and Security System Reform (JSSR), and makes recommendations with a view to improving current and future Commission strategies and programmes. The evaluation covers the period 2001-2009 and all regions where the Commission provides JSSR assistance, with the exception of those countries that
fall under the mandate of DG Enlargement. Only those aspects of justice reform which mostly directly fall under Security System Reform, such as strengthening of criminal justice systems and the legal institutions involved in the oversight of security institutions, are considered. The evaluation covers all funds provided by the Commission geographical programmes (EDF, ENPI, DCI) and the thematic budget lines (such as the IfS, EIDHR, NSA), with the exception of humanitarian funds managed by ECHO. This represents a total of €1bn of funds contracted over the evaluation period. An inventory and typology of these funds is presented in Annex 9 of this report.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform in partner countries. The EU has a broad range of civilian and military instruments which are able to support SSR activities. A case-by-case analysis will always need to be undertaken to assess whether any proposed activities are most appropriately carried out through CFSP/ESDP or Community action or indeed a combination of both. This concept is deliberately broad in order not to constrain future CFSP/ESDP or Community activities but in any situation, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission will need to work in close co-operation both to ensure a clear, functional division of responsibilities and to ensure maximum coherence and effectiveness of overall EU effort.
The relationship between transitional justice and security system – or sector – reform (SSR) is understudied, yet both contribute to state-building, democratisation and peacebuilding in countries with a legacy of massive human rights abuse. The security system is fundamental in any democracy for protecting the citizens’ rights. Yet in postconflict environments it usually comprises members of the police, military, secret police, intelligence agencies, armed rebel groups and militia – the groups which are often the most responsible for serious and systemic human rights violations during conflict. Reforming the system to ensure security agents become protectors of the population and the rule of law is therefore of the utmost urgency, but the political and security context may pose serious challenges to reform.
This paper draws on research in four very different environments: Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Timor-Leste. Although effective SSR is highly context-specific, this paper argues that the EU could improve the substance of its SSR programming and implementation by drawing on lessons from these four case studies.
The paper sets out principles and norms for the European Community’s engagement in SSR, based on current support in different countries and regional settings, the relevant policy frameworks under which the EC supports SSR, and the rationale for SSR as an important part of Community support.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform in a partner state. This concept should focus on principles, key elements, and modalities; it should be flexible enough to be drawn on and adapted for the needs of each specific action in this field on a case-by-case basis. This paper aims to spell out the contribution of ESDP in supporting SSR.
Over the past decade or so, the EU has gradually adopted the concept of ‘human security’ in its support for security andjustice programming. A commitment to human security implies that security and justice strategies and programmesshould proactively seek to take into account and address citizens’ needs and concerns, as primary recipients ofsecurity and justice provision. One way to ensure these requirements are met is to promote public participation in thedesign, implementation and monitoring of security and justice mechanisms.The EU has a number of policies, tools and frameworks which commit its institutions to taking a ‘participatoryapproach’ to programming, including in the areas of security and justice. These commitments are gradually, ifunevenly, being translated into practice. However, research by the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) Security Clusterhas identified a number of institutional, cultural and operational challenges which hinder the understanding anduse of participatory approaches by EU institutions. This paper gives an overview of the challenges faced by EUactors in understanding and using participatory approaches and suggests steps that EU institutions can take to overcome them.
Security system reform is an essential factor in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It plays a direct role in establishing democratic governance that respects human rights.
Insecurity obstructs development and poverty upsets security: SSR contributes to creating a development and reconstruction-friendly environment. Further upstream, it helps
prevent crisis and conflict.
This paper presents the findings of a case-study carried out in Kosovo in January 2010, which investigated the challenges and opportunities that the EU faces supporting the reform of the rule of law in that country. It also identified a number of tensions and challenges at both the design/planning stage and the implementation stage of SSR support, and pointed to a number of avenues for improvement.
The aim of this study, besides giving an overview on the most important stages on the way to an independent Kosovo, is to provide an analysis of the political and economic situation in Kosovo since the independence declaration and to put under the microscope the priorities and expected problems of the EU mission, which, in coming years, will cost European tax payers millions of euros. The present investigation is based on a book published in 2005 and revised in 2006 and on interviews and research in Kosovo since 2002.
This report briefly describes the relations between Kosovo1 and the Union; analyses the political situation in Kosovo in terms of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities, and regional issues; analyses the economic situation in Kosovo; reviews Kosovo’s capacity to implement European standards, that is, to gradually
approximate its legislation and policies with those of the acquis, in line with the European Partnership priorities. The period covered by this report is from early October 2008 to mid-September 2009.
This document analyses the role of the main international actors involved in the implementation of police reform in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably that of the UN and the EU. Despite considerable efforts and resources deployed over 17 years, the implementation of police reform remains an ‘unfinished business’ that demonstrates the slow pace of implementing rule of law reforms in Bosnia’s post-conflict setting, yet, in the long-term, remains vital for Bosnia’s stability and post-conflict reconstruction process. Starting with a presentation of the status of the police before and after the conflict, UN reforms (1995–2002) are first discussed in order to set the stage for an analysis of the role of the EU in the implementation of police reform. Here, particular emphasis is placed on the institution-building actions of the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina deployed on the ground for almost a decade (2003-June 2012). The article concludes with an overall assessment of UN and EU efforts in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the remaining challenges encountered by the EU on the ground, as the current leader to police reform implementation efforts. More generally, the article highlights that for police reform to succeed in the long-term, from 2012-onwards, the EU should pay particular attention to the political level, where most of the stumbling blocks for the implementation of police reform lie.