Government Ministries (e.g. Defence, Finance, Interior, Justice, Veteran Affairs)
In April 2009 the Dutch and the Burundian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding(MoU) concerning the professionalization of the police and army following SSR principles (later called: the Security Sector Development program: SSD). Although the situation in Burundi since 2015 has deteriorated significantly, this does not mean that all programs and projects executed in Burundi in the previous years have failed. This is certainly not the case of the SSD-program. There are good examples in the program of how the participating Dutch military tried to balance the reinforcement of capacity and the reinforcement of accountability and integrity.
The SSD-program is divided into four phases of two years. From the beginning on it was decided that the first phase would be “SSR-light”. This phase was used to gain a certain status as partner country so that the program could introduce gradually the more sensitive issues and become more focused on strategic planning instead of solving the day to day, often post-conflict, challenges.
The program has three pillars: Governance, Police, and Army. The Army pillar consisted of Burundian military project-managers and was reinforced by a Dutch army officer, who acted as team leader during the 1st phase and became coach of the team in the 2nd phase.
Although the first phase was more train and equip oriented than the second phase, the first phase implicitly tried to combine capacity and accountability. Accountability is part of military daily life. It is so common that we do not see it. For example one of the projects was the delivery of cooking kettles for the kitchens, which had been constructed by UNDP but there was no budget for equipping them. The project delivered the necessary cooking kettles and introduced a system of maintaining them and how to control regularly the maintenance of the kettles and the presence of the linked kitchen equipment.
The SSD-program delivered also medium-sized trucks. The truck project foresaw the delivery of spare-parts. Spare-parts have a certain financial values, certainly the more exchangeable ones like tires, mirrors, batteries and filters. The program introduced a system of how to manage spare-parts and how to control the use of spare-parts. Through this project, the larger SSD program was able to propose a more profound project concerning the organization and management of the maintenance and repair unit of the Burundian army. This project was monitored and assisted by two additional Dutch military and reinforced the oversight and control of the maintenance and repair organization. Unfortunately the turn in political circumstances in Spring 2015 prevented the continuation of the project but the plan was that this project should become the pilot project of the entire logistical organization of the Burundian army.
Before the MoU was signed one of the PBF-projects was the project “Moralisation”. Despite the awkward name, its contents was extremely important: it concerned the revival of the lost norms and values of the Burundian army. The SSD-program continued this project and recalled it: “Military Ethics”. The project started by training 12 Burundian officers for two months. The training was executed by two additional Dutch army officers (one legal and one psychologist). They trained Burundian officers so that they could become the trainers of the Burundian army. There was an exam at the end, which only one officer failed and he was not to become a Military Ethics trainer.
After the training, the program facilitated Military Ethics training throughout the whole Burundian army resulting in some 2500 officers trained. In the meantime the trainers wrote the Manual on Military Ethics including some 25 cases which could be used in training. The manual was accepted and became a formal manual of the Burundian army. The program was asked to deliver a two-day training to all Burundian military going on mission to Somalia and Central African Republic. For years the Burundian army received positive remarks from the Somalian civil society on their behavior. The project continued in the 2nd phase leading to the first “Open doors of the Army” in Burundian history. For people in Europe this is something which happens on a yearly base but people who know Burundi or who are used to work in fragile states understand the value of this enormous breakthrough.
The situation in Burundi as of Summer 2015 is very tense and there is an increasing number of casualties. In the media, the police is often blamed for using disproportional force or lethal force without sufficient reason. In the same media, the army has been mentioned as being more professional and moderate in their behavior. This illustrates a continued positive outcome of the efforts done within the “Military Ethics” project.
The progress made does not mean that every member of the Burundian army always performed well. There was a criminal case in Somalia in which Burundian military are said to be involved in Cibitoke-province in 2014. However, things would have been worse if the DSS-program had not conducted the “Military Ethics” project.
Comparisons judging the performance of an army of a post-conflict state only against internationally accepted norms and values are often made too soon. Consideration should be given to where this army comes from and what the context is. This is not the same as accepting the abuse of force. On the contrary, evidence of improvement in the functioning of command and control, including internal investigations and disciplinary action, are evidence of progress in governance and denouncing impunity.
The military can significantly contribute to the reinforcement of accountability and integrity, which will lead to more professional behavior of armed forces in other countries. Reinforcing accountability sounds more complex than it is: it starts at the operational level and is not always that difficult to introduce as it concerns the daily life of every member of the armed forces.
Produit avec l’appui technique et financier du Programme d’appui à la bonne gouvernance « Gutwara Neza » de l’Union Européenne et la Coopération technique Belge, le présent module rappelle les tâches confiées aux agents de l’ordre judiciaire. Il reprend les généralités, les fonctions d’un agent de l’ordre judiciaire en matière civile et pénale ainsi qu’en matière d’exécution des jugements. En outre, ledit module constitue un point d’introduction à la formation des agents de l’ordre judiciaire sur plusieurs autres modules relatifs à la Gestion administrative et judiciaire, à la déontologie et les relations publiques.
Le présent module de ‘’Notions fondamentales’’ de droit répond au besoin des agents de l’ordre judiciaire de mieux connaître les notions juridiques de base qui leur permettront de communiquer aisément avec les usagers des services de la justice. Ainsi, les AOJ devraient avoir une formation de base sur les notions fondamentales de droit et de la procédure pour accomplir valablement leur rôle.
Produit avec l’appui technique et financier du Programme d’appui à la bonne gouvernance « Gutwara Neza » de l’Union Européenne et la Coopération technique Belge, le module traite des principales fonctions d’un agent de l’ordre judiciaire, de son rôle dans les phases pré juridictionnelle et juridictionnelle, et de ses fonctions en matière d’exécution de jugements.
Comments from Mark Downes, Head of ISSAT, to open the Panel Discussion on SSR in West Africa and to introduce the panel members.
ISSAT Senior SSR Advisor sheds light in this video on the main characteristics and competencies that SSR Advisors need to have inorder to carry out their activities efficiently. Besides the technical skills that are needed in any SSR Advisor, Bgen(ret) Belondrade, shares his real-life experience on what competencies he had to develop to undertake advisory activities to high level authorities on SSR.
In this video interview Bgen(ret), Bernard Belondrade, talks about the political dynamics of SSR processes between decision-making and implementation bodies. Senior ISSAT SSR Advisor lays out the complexities of interactions between security forces and political authorities when it comes to Security Sector Reform.
Brigadier General (ret'd) Kellie Conteh from Sierra Leone, Head of the Office of National Security Sierra Leone since 2002, talks about SSR in Sierra Leone, which is often seen as a success story for SSR. Specifically:
- Sierra Leone's historical setting - how it came to realise that it need SSR after 11 years of conflict
- what Sierra Leone was looking for to reform the security sector
- strategies developped by Sierra Leone to tackle reform.
The audio-only version of this video is available here.
This presentation gives a background on the theory behind the concept Security Sector Reform, as well as an overview of the international efforts within SSR today.
What are the "politics of SSR" and how could these dynamics be managed? Bgen(ret) Bernard Belondrade shares with ISSAT Community members the experience of a training workshop where this aspect was predominant in how the trainees reacted to the knowledge shared with them.
The former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Hussein Arab Isse, talks about the challenges of reforming the security sector in Somalia, including the need for greater inclusion of women in the process. Interview conducted 3 October 2012.
Moderator: Dr. Michal Mlynár, Ambassador of Slovakia with residence in Nairobi and Chair of the ISSAT Governing Board
Ambassador Sahle-Work Zewde, Director General of the UN Office at Nairobi (UNON) (TBC)
Ambassador Nancy Kirui, CBS, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of State for Defence, Kenya
Moderator: Mr. Gabriel Negatu, Regional Director for the East Africa Resource Centre, African Development Bank (AfDB)
Dr. Julius T. Rotich, Deputy Secretary General (Political Federation), East African Community (EAC)
Mr. David W. Njoka,Director of Political Affairs, Ministry for the East African Community (EAC)-Kenya
Commander Abebe Muluneh Beyene, Head, IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP)
Dr. Medhane Tadesse Gebresilassie, African Security Sector Network’s Senior SSR Adviser to the African Union
This podcast is the audio version of a presentation by Brig (retd) Kellie Conteh on the transformation of the security sector in Sierra Leone. It outlines the participatory approach to reach an assessment of needs, and highlights the need to encompass the remit of intelligence. Head of ISSAT, Mark Downes, provides a summary at the end of the presentation.
The video version of this podcast is available here.
Policy and Research Papers
The improper management of conventional ammunition and explosives poses significant safety and security risks. Frequent ammunition depot explosions and diversions from ammunition stocks of state actors testify to the relevance of the issue to Africa. Overcoming challenges to effective national ammunition management can be a formidable task in itself. This paper considers the challenges to and scope for action on ammunition management in Africa. It is argued that concerted efforts by African states and their international partners will be essential to effectively limiting risks of undesirable explosive events and ammunition diversions on the continent.
One of the key weaknesses in controls on the international arms trade is the absence or penury of national regulations on arms brokering activities. At present, only about sixteen countries in the world are known to control the activities of those negotiating, arranging or otherwise facilitating arms transfers between buyers and sellers. Moreover, unscrupulous brokers have demonstrated their ability to circumvent existing controls by exploiting differences in national approaches, or by simply conducting their activities from another country with lax or no controls at all. This weak link in arms control allows unscrupulous brokers to engage with impunity in undesirable or illicit activities such as arranging arms transfers to embargoed governments or non-state actors.
An important regional initiative to counter this phenomenon is the EU Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering. Under this instrument, EU member states have committed themselves to establishing a clear legal framework for brokering activities taking place within their territory. By creating common standards, the EU Common Position thus represents a significant step forward. However, there remain concerns that these standards still fall short of what is required to effectively combat undesirable or illicit brokering activities.
The first part of this report identifies key issues in this respect and suggests concrete measures governments should consider when deciding on what controls they deem appropriate. The second part of this report presents an overview of already existing or planned brokering controls in certain EU member states. The report concludes that despite the progress presented by the EU Common Position, there are still shortcomings regarding the controls that would seem necessary for effectively combating unscrupulous brokers and their activities. Where appropriate, governments of EU member states should therefore individually be encouraged to ensure that their national approach fully addresses arms brokering. This would also facilitate possible future efforts on the level of the EU to further strengthen common commitments. In turn, such further efforts to counter undesirable brokering will be required to strengthen member states’ abilities to combat and prevent illicit arms transfers.
This book aims to show busy senior officials and senior officers in Defence Ministries and Armed Forces how progress can be made in defence without tackling the
problem right across government. It presents ten particular measures that are based on recent experiences of countries.
This book is about understanding, managing and, as necessary, reforming the defence sector. It does not, however, treat the defence sector in isolation, but as part of government and the security sector, as a grouping of assets that can be employed in support of overall national policy. Nor does it equate the defence sector with the military alone.
The handbook has been produced by a collaborative effort among researchers and practitioners across Africa. It provides guidance on undertaking a process of security-sector transformation consistent with democratic governance principles and a human security agenda. It is primarily intended for security-sector practitioners both in the security organisations and among the civil authorities charged with managing and monitoring the activities of the security organisations. It is secondarily intended to assist policy makers, civil society, and those agencies that provide financial and technical support to efforts to strengthen security-sector governance in understanding the issues involved in a transformation process.
This report is presented as a nascent effort to catalogue the socioeconomic impact of excessive pretrial detention around the world. As discussed in Section II, precise data on pretrial detention are rare. Rarer still are rigorous cost (or cost-benefit) analyses of pretrial detention. Although there are extant studies from Mexico (summarized in Appendix 1), Chile, Argentina, and Ukraine, the literature is thin. This report, then, may be seen as both an initial foray and an appeal for additional research.
DCAF conducted a mapping study on Gender and Security Sector Reform Actors and Activities in Liberia from November 2010 to March 2011. The mapping study was undertaken by an independent consultant, Mr Cecil Griffiths from the Liberian National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA). This research was made possible thanks to the cooperation of most gender and SSR actors in Liberia including the Ministry of Gender and Development (MoGD), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Civil Society Organization Working Group on Security Sector Reform.
This project aimed to complement existing information on gender and SSR issues in Liberia and to reinforce information-sharing and coordination between actors.
On 31 March 2011, LINLEA and DCAF organised a workshop in Monrovia to complete and validate the findings of the study. In addition to validating the findings of the study, the participants made key recommendations related to gender and training, policy development, programmes and activities. The report was launched in Monrovia on 23 September 2011.
The Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Security Sector Reform Working Group held a workshop entitled “Gender & Security Sector Reform” from 17 to 19 February 2010. The workshop, hosted by DCAF, was an opportunity for thirty-six practitioners, researchers and policy advisors from sixteen NATO and PfP countries to discuss and exchange on ongoing efforts and challenges to integrating a gender perspective into SSR. The workshop focused on best practices and examples from the ground in both national and international security sector institutions, including NATO peace support operations, ministries of defence, and armed forces.
In 2011 NATO initiated the Inteqal process, i.e. the “transition” of security responsibilities from ISAF to the Afghan state and its security forces. The main pillars of this process are the build up of the Afghan Army and Police and the improvement of Afghanistan’s governance system at both national and local level. Progress has been made in this respect, although challenges remain. NATO aims to complete the transition by 2014, while reducing its military presence in the country, but a substantial Allied footprint is likely to remain in Afghanistan beyond that date. The death of Bin Laden has brought about little changes to the situation on the ground, while it may have a significant impact on the US’s attitude towards peace talks with the Taliban and thus influence the transition timeline and nature.
The Deaf, the Blind and the Politician: The Troubles of Justice and Security Interventions in Fragile States
This article argues for an integrated, political and pragmatic approach to justice and security development as one of the key objectives of effective international support to peace building and state building in conflict-affected and fragile states. Developments since the 1990s suggest that different actors and communities have started to work on the same issues from different angles and with – perceived– different mandates. As a result, important parts of the debate on how to deal with security system reform (SSR), justice reform and the rule of law seem somewhat stuck in conceptual arguments. This article suggests moving away from such debates and instead to focus on what such justice and security engagements are meant to achieve, for whom, and which general approaches are likely to provide most added value. It argues that results require political focus, long-term processes and need to be in tune with local elite interests – whilst pursuing the aim of gradually helping to improve delivery of justice and security as basic services for all, to appropriate local standards. External and domestic objectives require careful balancing, creative compromises and strong incentives. The article also outlines a number of recurrent challenges to effective programming and suggests some ideas for improvement to achieve better results and more value for money.
Institutional assessment is often considered to be a first step in the reform or development of institutions. It involves an analysis of various components and stakeholders in an institutional setting and provides a means of identifying the current situation, priority areas for intervention and the various constraints/barriers that could undermine reform efforts. Assessments of this nature usually examine both the overall institutional framework (the rules of the game) and the organisations operating within this institutional context (the players).
This report collates information, guidelines and case study material. Not all of the documents included below directly use the term ‘institutional assessment’, but the processes described, variously referred to as reviews, studies and assessments, broadly pertain to the definition of institutional assessment.
The report includes coverage of a number of donor designed frameworks for assessing the policing and justice sector. According to much of the general academic and policy literature on SSAJ programmes, substantial reform of the police force is only possible when reform of the justice system is administered at the same time. However, whilst the underlying principles for the institutional assessment of policing and justice may be similar, the specific frameworks espoused by donors appear to tackle the institutional assessment of policing and justice separately.
Willing and Able? Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States – Insights from the Central African Republic
Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral part of the international community’s efforts to build peace and enhance security in weak post-war states. It has, however, proven difficult to undertake SSR in such contexts. A number of factors constitute a challenge to create security forces that are able to provide security to the population.
Based on previous research, this report highlights some of the challenges to SSR in weak post-war states. Through an analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic, this study shows that informal power structures, a volatile security situation and failure to understand how SSR is influenced by other political processes, negatively impact on the prospect for successful implementation of reforms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that weak capacity and lack of political will on behalf of the national government, is a challenge to local ownership and sustainable reforms. Despite a holistic approach to reforms aiming to improve both the capacity of the security forces and to increase democratic control of the security institutions, insufficient international engagement, scarce resources, lack of strategic direction and inadequate donor coordination have limited the prospect for implementation of reforms.
Afghanistan is emerging from decades of strife, and the new Government faces several challenges. Arguably the most daunting of these is to make Afghanistan secure, and establish the rule of law. Approximately $9 billion of foreign assistance has been spent on the security sector from 2003 to 2007, underscoring the important role the security sector plays in the wider reconstruction agenda. From 2007–10 a major scale-up to over $14 billion is planned, to be funded largely from external assistance. This resource expansion should be accompanied by heightened scrutiny of how foreign assistance is spent and whether it is delivering the desired outcomes of peace and a stronger, more accountable Afghan state. One important question to ask is whether the current financing model employed is the correct one, and how it affects the incentives around the reform process.
This paper takes an aid effectiveness approach to judge whether the financing model is appropriate for Afghanistan and it finds that the current financing model falls short of good aid effectiveness practice.
Informal Conclusions of the Chair: High Level Panel on the Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in East Africa
The overall purpose of the High Level Panel (October 2nd-3rd 2012) was to take stock of the challenges when implementing security and justice reforms at a national level; to identify lessons that could be applied to other SSR processes in the Eastern African region; and to look at what role regional and international actors could optimally have in SSR initiatives. The High Level Panel brought together over 200 SSR policy makers and practitioners to unpack the key issues faced by both those implementing and leading SSR. Those attending the event were experts responsible for leading and implementing processes in Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan, as well as key donors, regional and multilateral organisations and representatives from the African Security Sector Network and other civil society organisations.
This report reflects the informal conclusions drawn from the selected country-case studies as well as thematic debates at the High-Level Panel.
Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation
Rule of law–based criminal justice responses to terrorism are most effectively ensured when they are practiced within a criminal justice system capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the rights of the accused and when all are equally accountable under the law. Building the capacity of weak criminal justice systems to safeguard mutual rights and responsibilities of governments and their citizens is essential for the alleviation of a number of conditions conducive to violent extremism and the spread of terrorism. A new wave of multilateral counterterrorism initiatives has the opportunity to recalibrate how criminal justice and rule of law–oriented counterterrorism capacity-building assistance is delivered to developing states with weak institutions.
This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the Paris Principles and the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity-building assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically.
Honduras’ security and justice sector suffers from severe deficiencies. It remains largely inefficient and unable to safeguard security and the rule of law for its citizens. Criminal investigative units are plagued with serious problems of incompetence, corruption and progressive penetration by organised crime. The judiciary lacks independence and is subject to systematic political interference. Inter-institutional coordination is poor and flawed by a climate of mutual mistrust and rivalry over competencies.
This report describes and analyses the EU’s contribution to strengthening security and the rule of law in Honduras through a major security sector reform (SSR) programme earmarked with a budget of €44 million. The report underlines the crucial need for increased local ownership as a sine qua non condition if the EU’s endeavours are to trigger sustainable institutional change and thus further human security in Honduras. The report also examines prospects for the creation of an international commission against impunity, following the example of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).
This chapter examines the security sector reform in Iraq after the end of major combat operations in April 2003. The author discusses the Polish contribution to stabilization and reconstruction as member of the US-led 'coalition of the willing.' He draws the conclusion that an augmentation of NATO capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly security sector reform, would enable it to better face the challenges of the strategic environment in Iraq.
This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.
This MENA report joins the overall Index report, available at www.defenceindex.org, as an analytical summary of the detailed
This is a brand new tool and is the result of a major two-year study. This Index provides governments and citizens with information on how their defence ministries and armed forces compare to others in tackling defence corruption. It measures the degree of corruption risk and vulnerability in government defence establishments – the defence ministry, the armed forces, and other government institutions in that country (such as auditing institutions) that may influence levels of corruption risk in the sector. It forms a basis for reform for concerned governments, and serves as a tool to identify where to concentrate efforts.
As a part of this Index, 82 countries across the globe were subject to expert, independent assessment. These countries accounted for 94 per cent of global military expenditure in 2011 (USD 1.6 trillion).
They were selected according to the size of their arms trade, the absolute and per capita size of their militaries, and a proxy of the size of their security sector. Each country was assessed using a comprehensive questionnaire of 77 questions, clustered into five risk areas: political risk, finance risk, personnel risk, operations risk, and procurement risk. Each of these five areas in turn has specific risk areas, as shown in the diagram below.
The analysis was subjected to multiple levels of peer review to minimise the risk of bias and inaccuracies in the responses. Governments were given opportunities to comment on the draft and to provide additional commentary if they desired. Each government has received a comprehensive report outlining our findings for each question, with references to all the sources we used. These assessments are made public on our website.
A second index has also been developed that addresses defence companies, analysing the anti-corruption systems of 129 major global companies. This index, the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (www.companies.defenceindex.org), was published by Transparency International UK’s Defence and Security Programme, on 4th October, 2012.
There have been considerable developments in security-policy thinking since the end of the Cold War, and a complex set of transnational threatsand challenges necessitates new security policies and strategies. Not only the attacks of 11 September 2001, but also the dark side of globalisation such as climate change, the global spread of dangerous technologies and international organised crime have changed the security perspective and policy procedures in recent years. Consequently, new
national-security strategies, white papers and security-policy documents have been drafted in order to take into account the changing security landscape.
On 6 April 2009, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) welcomed a group of leading security experts for a seminar entitled “Security Strategies Today : Trends and Perspectives”. The goal of the seminar was to provide a forum for experts from different European states, major international powers and regional and international organisations to take stock of current security polices in the European region and beyond. The participants had an opportunity to assess the direction of security-policy thinking by analysing a number of key security-policy documents such as national-security strategies, defence concepts and white papers, among others. Assumptions regarding future threats were considered, as were a variety of drafting processes and methodologies.
More than 30 participants attended the seminar, including representatives of the Defence Ministries of Finland, Germany and Sweden, as well as representatives of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to faculty members from the GCSP, regional and international experts from a range of academic and policy institutions participated, including speakers from PricewaterhouseCoopers, the International Affairs Institute (Rome), the Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing), the Royal Institute of International Relations (Brussels) and the Foundation for Strategic Studies (Paris).
In preparation for the October 2000 Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) in Manaus Brazil and at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) studied the global trend toward the creation of Defense White Papers. The study aimed to understand the nature of these documents in order to prepare the U.S. delegation to discuss the tendency in Latin America and the Caribbean during the DMA. The INSS study team found no agreement about what constitutes a 'white paper' other than each is a consensus statement on a topic. The team examined 15 defense documents worldwide and interviewed participants in the development process and independent analysts. The results suggest that the formative, often difficult, process through which governments must move to solidify their approach to national security defense policy, and the structure to implement it and build consensus for it is the essential part of a 'white paper,' providing a constructive experience that benefits the country. Governments tended not to want a template for this process, although at the working level there is some interest in the experience of other states. Defense White Papers become highly stylized nationalistic documents that reflect a state's unique domestic circumstances and international geopolitical situation. The attached chart provides an overview comparison of the Defense White Paper processes of Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa. Past efforts by U.S. agencies to design templates have failed.
The ongoing transition process in Afghanistan will deliver three shocks in the coming few years: foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, aid volumes and international spending in the country will decrease and, lastly, the political dispensation will be upended by presidential elections in which President Hamid Karzai is not supposed to run again. These challenges are mounting at a time when, due to inconsistent international approaches and a lack of appreciation for the Afghan context, Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption, and ethnic factionalization within the society and the domestic security forces. Based upon a review of the security sector, governance, social and economic conditions, regional relations and negotiation efforts with the insurgents, this article finds that fundamental questions about the efficacy of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan continue to lack clear answers. Regardless, significant room for improvement – both in policy and execution – appears to exist. It remains to be seen whether, as many Afghans fear, a civil war will engulf Afghanistan once again in the post-transition period or whether the international community will take those steps – re-energizing governance reform efforts, maintaining financial support and continuing to strengthen the Afghan army and police – which could help to bolster stability.
This publication is the result of a Seminar with participants from varied sectors of the Liberian government. Its main findings show that despite good beginnings in the security sector, several challenges in terms of prioritization, resources, training and strategizing remain. A section on the country's DDR efforts highlight the accomplishments and challenges of the program at the time (2007)Furthermore, this publication formulates a series of open questions with regards to the issues of gender sensitivity in DDR, verification of actual disarmament, reintegration of adult ex-combatants as well as the geographical imbalance of reforms.
Post-conflict peacebuilding demands concerted efforts from all stakeholders to ensure its success; particularly, civil society must complement the capacity of the conflict-weary state. A successful peacebuilding, however, requires a harmonious relationship between the state and civil society. This paper analyses state-civil society relations at different phases of Liberia’s protracted post-conflict peacebuilding process. The paper argues that civil society groups have played and continue to play important role in the peacebuilding process in Liberia and therefore need the support of the Liberian state and the international community to continue their watchdog role. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the Liberian experience for other post-conflict states.
Under the aegis of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) DCAF undertook three case studies in Burkina Faso, Burundi and Senegal each of which was prepared by country experts. Each study seeks to identify and facilitate the exchange of good practices and experiences between the states concerned, as well as among similar institutions around the world. Each study examines relevant national institutions, as well as their legal status, shedding light on their strengths and weaknesses and contributing to an evaluation of their capacity building needs. Each study also includes details of their complaints handling procedures and of standards that may be relevant to other similar institutions, contributing as a result to a deepened understanding of their mandates, remit, and functioning. Furthermore, these case studies provide a snapshot of the state of security sector governance in each of the three countries, as well as the progress of ongoing reforms.
Long term defence planning is a complex, multi-stage, iterative process. The main stages defined in this report are:
- Political Guidance Analysis
- Environmental Assessment
- Mission Analysis
- Planning Situations Development
- Capability Requirements Determination
- Capability Assessment
- Options Development
- Solution Selection
Long term defence planning is never just a technical procedure. That is also a highly political process that needs to be discussed in political terms.
The fourth edition of "US National Security" reflects the strategic landscape as it has evolved in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The ongoing US military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus on homeland security, the significant organizational changes in the intelligence bureaucracy, and the impact of the Bush Doctrine are among the current issues that inform the authors' presentation and appraisal of US security interests, politics, and processes.
Belize 2021 National Security Framework: Strengthening the Links between Policy, Resource Allocation, and Execution
This publication briefly describes the formulation process of Belize's national security framework.
The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation - Building a Progressive Kenya - Our Common Vision: Vision of Stakeholders
This document reflects the discussions of the “Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Building a Progressive Kenya” conference, which took place in Nairobi on 5 – 6 December, 2011. Held in the aftermath of a process of nationwide dialogue and at the invitation of the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities, various stakeholder groups representing a wide cross-section of views and perspectives of Kenyan society participated at this conference so as to coalesce these views around the implementation of the objectives and goals of the KNDR process
The National Dialogue, co-hosted by the Liberian Transitional Government and UNMIL, brings together all statutory security agencies of Liberia to help address the critical problem of Security Reform, which is attributed to the main causes of the Liberian conflict. This report summarizes the discussions that took place among these stakeholders
This annual report by Dr. Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith and AMB Elizabeth McKune describes the national security decision-making process of the US government.
The countries of the Americas have identified the development and sharing of national Defense White Papers as a useful confidence- and security-building measure for the promotion of security in the Hemisphere. This paper is intended to provide a brief outline of essential characteristics of Defense White Papers and to explain the rationale and the process for their development. A listing of elements commonly contained in White Papers is also provided.
It is important to note that there is no agreed standard format for White Papers in the Americas. This is perhaps a logical reflection of the differing historical, geographical, cultural, political and fiscal contexts in which the countries of the Americas define their security threats and defense objectives, capabilities and constraints. However, there are elements which are common to many White Papers. This paper focuses on basic principles and raises issues that Governments could usefully consider in the formulation of their own White Papers, based on the experience of OAS Member States which have already undertaken that process.
The report, co-drafted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (formerly known as the Centre for Civil-Military Relations) and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence with the support of DCAF, presents the findings of the needs assessment on gender and SSR in Serbia.
• Generates a detailed baseline for the current state of gender mainstreaming in security sector institutions at the central, provincial and municipal level;
• Identifies local needs, gaps and shortcomings of current SSR processes, and prioritizes needs which should be addressed by national authorities and civil society, with the support of the international donor community, including DCAF’s gender and SSR project.
The needs assessment is built on desk research, interviews, and a series of local stakeholder consultations conducted in Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Novi Pazar, Bujanovac and Belgrade in the course of March and April 2010. It forms the building block of DCAFs dedicated and long term gender and SSR project in Serbia.
These Principles were developed in order to provide guidance to those engaged in drafting, revising, or implementing laws or provisions relating to the state’s authority to withhold information on national security grounds or to punish the disclosure of such information.
They are based on international (including regional) and national law, standards, good practices, and the writings of experts.
They address national security—rather than all grounds for withholding information. All other public grounds for restricting access should at least meet these standards.
These Principles were drafted by 22 organizations and academic centres (listed in the Annex) in consultation with more than 500 experts from more than 70 countries at 14 meetings held around the world, facilitated by the Open Society Justice Initiative, and in consultation with the four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and/or media freedom and the special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights:
the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights,
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media.
On 2-3 October 2012, DCAF-ISSAT organised a High Level Panel (HLP) on Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in East Africa , in partnership with the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON), the Governments of Burundi, Kenya, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Somalia and South Sudan, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). It was attended by over two hundred SSR policy makers and practitioners.
This report seeks to take those discussions further, including more of the points raised by participants during the HLP, and adding in lessons from experience gathered from individual missions and related trainings. Three case studies featured in the HLP (Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan) and as such provide many of the examples, although the report also draws from examples beyond East Africa. An introductory section on SSR in each of these countries is provided in section one and full case studies are included in the annex.
This report, which keeps to the same thematic areas as those covered in the HLP, offers information on contemporary thinking in security and justice reform, and provides some recommendations and examples of good practice to those interested in or engaged in SSR.
Some videos interviews of the participants at the event are listed in the Related Resources column on the right of this webpage. A full list of available videos from this event are available under the documents tab on the HLP's Events page. Podcasts of all the sessions are available there also.
Putting governance at the heart of Security Sector Reform - Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme
Democratically governed security and justice sectors are a core objective of the Security Sector Development (SSD) agenda. But few such programmes put governance front and centre.
The Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme has broken new ground in the promotion of democratic security sector development. It has begun to break down barriers to security-sector secrecy, increase dialogue on governance aspects, enhance security-sector accountability to civil authorities and its adherence to (inter)national law, although many hurdles still remain.
It has achieved these results by proactively addressing the politics of change at all levels and on a daily basis, establishing results progressively, prioritizing the gradual development of national ownership and matching timeframe with ambition and environment, recognizing that small steps can be important milestones in countries setting out along the road to democratic governance.
In this report, senior visiting fellow Nicole Ball of Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit analyzes the Dutch SSD program in Burundi, its governance achievements and its challenges going forward.
Tintin is no longer in the Congo – A Transformative Analysis of Belgian Defence Policies in Central Africa
This study examines Belgium’s involvement in Central Africa over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the role of the Belgian Defence. The objective is twofold: on the one hand to analyse Belgium’s changing policies towards its former colonies during the last twenty years, and on the other hand to take an in-depth look at the military collaborations on the ground and establish an empirical and practical take on what role they fill, how they function and what aims they achieve through interviews and field observations. The analysis is made through the adoption of a transformative approach which includes evolutionary explanation factors, such as national political-administrative history, culture, and style of governance and static factors like national polity features, visible in constitutional and structural factors.
The author argues that the divided nature of Belgian internal politics, which is noted both in its polity features and its political-administrative history, influences its foreign policy towards Central Africa in an inconsistent manner. This is exemplified in the absence of a long-term strategy for the region. Yet, Belgium shows a strong desire to remain involved in the region, which, in the absence of a comprehensive and coherent strategy, results for the most part in a variety of one-dimensional short-term projects. It is recommended that Belgium, as one of the most trusted partners in the region, exploit its expertise in a more efficient manner and develop long-term three-dimensional projects, involving the three D’s (Defence, Diplomacy and Development), which would both benefit the reform processes under way in the partner countries, and Belgium’s visibility in the latter.
What can we learn from how community policing has evolved in Sierra Leone? This report answers the question by presenting an in-depth analysis of Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs), the main institutional response to community needs by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP).
A general understanding of how LPPBs operate is available, but there is a dearth of concrete and systematic analysis of how LPPBs in Sierra Leone’s 33 police divisions operate. The report is based on data collected in 17 of Sierra Leone’s police divisions and makes the following broad observations:
- One of the key strengths of the LPPBs is that they are built around already existing actors of authority at the local level such as traditional leaders, quasi-vigilante groups and secret societies. This is also one of the reasons why it is difficult to ascertain if these actors would have played a central role in local order-making, regardless of whether LPPBs had been established or not. It is clear, however, that LPPBs have supported the (re)formalization of relations between the police (state) and local communities (population).
- There is an important difference between the interplay of local authorities and community in rural and urban areas. Involvement of the community in rural areas tends to mean involvement of paramount and lesser chiefs. There is often a complete overlap between the chiefly hierarchy and LPPB members, and as such the latter act both as representatives of local authorities and as police proxies. In urban or densely populated areas the establishment of LPPBs has expanded the range of actors involved in defining and responding to local security, incorporating teachers, youth and women’s leaders, among others. As such, Sierra Leone’s LPPBs have in fact supported the democratization of security.
- Because LPPBs are still evolving as a concept and as a set of practices, it should be considered carefully how and under what conditions they are formalized in legislation. It is essential that it is not done prematurely so that the LPPBs have the space to develop and respond flexibly to context.
- The voluntary nature of LPPB membership is one of the cornerstones of the LPPBs. This status is central to maintaining the status of these boards as connected to, but not as formal components of the police.
- Whatever activities the police and LPPB leadership pursue in the future to strengthen LPPBs, their ‘in-between’ status should not be altered. LPPBs help an overstretched police force resolve cases at the local level, and as such, they act as a non-threatening, mediation-oriented police force multiplier. LPPBs should continue to be seen as part of the community in the broad sense of the term, while they remain in a position to liaise with the police when necessary. This is fundamental to the original vision of LPPBs and to the concept and practice of community policing in Sierra Leone.
Since 2003, the international community has invested considerable resources in keeping the peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Many interventions were focused on supporting security sector reform (SSR) and on the stabilisation of the volatile ‘militia belt’ in the eastern DRC, but these only achieved limited impact and the security context remains volatile. To explain why international efforts did not bring about the expected changes, the authors examine issues such as the peculiar relationship between the armed forces and local communities, and the neopatrimonial incentives of the Congolese elite. A largely technical approach that ignored the bigger political picture underscores the failure to fundamentally change the DRC’s security context. The defeat of the M23 rebellion in 2013 was a rare success, but it now threatens to take away the necessary pressure for meaningful reform.
Cette mission d’audit a été demandée par l’inspection générale de la sécurité publique (IGSP) du ministère de la Sécurité publique (MSP) du Burundi en liaison avec le programme de Développement du Secteur de la Sécurité (DSS) des Pays-Bas. Elle s’inscrit dans le contexte du nouveau plan stratégique du MSP 2013-2016, du plan d’action 2014 de l’IGSP et la préparation de la phase III du DSS.
L’objectif principal de cette mission était d’analyser l’organisation, la structure et le fonctionnement de l’IGSP afin de définir des recommandations pour l’amélioration de son service et du contrôle interne de la police en tenant compte du contexte politique, économique et social actuel du Burundi et des principes fondamentaux de démocratie, d’intégrité et de contrôle interne de la Police du Burundi.
This paper outlines the process of producing Sierra Leone’s 2002 defence white paper. Unique to this process was the document’s explicit aim of explaining to the general public both the progress and the shortcomings of security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone’s defence system. The white paper was produced on the assumption that without making this information publicly available, opportunities to engage ordinary people in future reform initiatives would be limited.
The paper also describes some of the challenges faced in the white paper’s production, including those from military counterparts in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and from international military and civilian advisers.
After a complex process of consultation and debate, the defence white paper is a strong statement of where Sierra Leone’s defence sector stands today and the direction it should take in the future. It is obvious that all this chapter’s recommendations will not necessarily be implemented in practice. It is also clear that while Sierra Leone has come a long way in building up a strong and democratically accountable defence system, there are still many challenges ahead.
This preliminary scoping study was commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), with the aim of considering the security and justice sector reform efforts of 19 of the main Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Council (OECD-DAC) donors. It focuses on the efforts of each nation’s foreign affairs, development, defence, and justice agencies, and provides an initial assessment of how policy and programming are linked, what evidence of good practice has been collected, and what knowledge and programming gaps exist currently.
With the departure of United Nations peacekeepers, Australia becomes the largest international presence in Timor-Leste. It does so at not necessarily an easy time: despite the stark development challenges that remain, the government in Dili is tired of outside advice. Australia’s past actions over oil and gas in the Timor Sea still cast a shadow over the present. Although Australian aid in Timor-Leste is wide and varied, drawing broad conclusions about its effectiveness and impact is difficult owing to the relative absence of independent evaluations of these programs. Decisions made by each country’s leaders can impact detectably upon the bilateral relationship and complicate the work of Australian government personnel in Dili.
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agena for Action agreed upon in 2005 and 2008 respectively by over a hundred Ministers and senior official of both developed and developing states. The Paris Declaration initially focused on: ownership; alignment; harmonisation; results; and mutual accountability. The Accra Agenda for Action built on this by focusing on: predictability; counrty systems; conditionality; and untying.
This policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia andin what context these possible activities should be viewed. The main focus will be on direct engagement on security topics such as the EU Border Management project BOMCA.
However, indirect activities such as education programmes that might be beneficial to security and stability in Central Asia will not be ignored. After an exposé on EU security interests in Central Asia, in the second paragraph attention is devoted to national and regional threats to the security of Central Asian republics and engagement of the EU. The paper concludes with a few recommendations for EU institutions and member states that could help to strengthen EU–Central Asia security cooperation including aspects of Security Sector Reform.
This paper examines the charge laid out in the US Marine Corps General Jim Jones report, explains why institution building and reform at the MOI have proved so difficult, and notes flaws in the international capacity building effort that need to be addressed. The central argument is that Iraq’s political dynamics, combined with the unprecedented burdens being placed upon the MOI, will continue to make institutional development and reform terribly difficult. However, assessments such as the Jones report ignore the fact that the ministry is more functional than it may at first appear. Furthermore, there are signs of incipient, MOI-led reforms; these provide hopeful pointers. In order to take advantage of these incipient reforms, the international assistance effort needs to significantly raise its game. If this can be achieved, then, gradually and painfully, the ministry could become a more positive force in Iraqi society. However, even if technical institutional reforms are successful, it will be important to understand that the ministry will reflect Iraq’s political make-up; it cannot stand above national politics.
The aim of this issue paper is to provide some ideas regarding how best to create suitable conditions for security sector reform (SSR) in DRC. Throughout the last decade, SSR has become a key component of the international agenda in states affected by conflict. There is a growing consensus amongst donors regarding the necessity of implementing SSR for effective stabilization and reconstruction. Since 2003, this has resulted in DRC in several donor-supported initiatives to strengthen the police, military, and justice sectors. Although some of these efforts may have initially shown must promise, progress on SSR in DRC remains very limited.
The Security Sector Governance (SSG) Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducted baseline studies of the security sector in six Southern African countries, namely Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as the Southern African Development Community’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC Organ). The results of this research are reflected in this monograph.
Serious political crises in Niger, Honduras, Turkey, Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, and Mauritania in recent years illustrate the continuing influence of security forces on the political trajectories of countries around the world. Examples of such instability are particularly recurrent in Africa. When Africa’s political crises turn into coups, armed insurrections, or tragic confrontations, the defense and security forces (DSF) are invariably key players. For many years, such military actions were justified as an established right of state sovereignty over domestic issues. Often, they were even recognized as such on the international level.
This reflection seeks to address Mozambique’s public sector reform in the post-conflict period and in particular activities in the specific component "Legality, Justice and Public Order". It starts with the political context of the peace process in Mozambique, presenting a brief diagnosis of the post-conflict public sector and the government’s programme immediately after the conflict. It covers generically the global strategy for public sector reform and then describes aspects of the "Legality, Justice and Public Order" component of the reform.
On 1 October 2012 the roundtable on Security Sector Expenditure Reviews, hosted by the World Bank Global Centre on Conflict, Security and Development in Nairobi, Kenya and organised in partnership with DCAF’s International Security Sector Advisory Team, brought together economists and Security Sector Reform (SSR) practitioners and experts to discuss the challenges and opportunities for supporting the conduct of expenditure reviews and enhancing financial management in the security sector.
The roundtable considered past and ongoing security sector expenditure reviews, in particular in Afghanistan and Liberia. It sought to examine the challenges, trends and prospects of including similar reviews in other post-conflict countries. It also provided a platform for economists and SSR practitioners to discuss how they can better collaborate to promote and enhance security sector expenditure review processes. In addition, the roundtable included discussions on how such expenditure reviews can enhance ongoing SSR efforts and how to ensure that financial management becomes more integrated in SSR processes.
The aim of the activities within the scope of this strategy is to contribute to strengthening the resilience of the Syrian population and of vulnerable groups in Syria's neighboring countries that are being severely affected by the conflict. The strategy will also contribute to strengthening democracy and gender equality and to greater respect for human rights in Syria and for refugees from Syria in neighboring countries. The strategy will apply to the period 2016–2020 and will comprise a total of SEK 1.7 billion.