Planning and Logistics

From Internal AAR:

La période des vacances n’a pas du tout été propice à la bonne planification du mandat. Ceci depuis la demande initial des mandataires à ISSAT jusqu’au déploiement de l’équipe sur le terrain. Les personnes de contact du côté des mandataires (DFID et UE) étant en vacances durant la phase de planification. L’équipe a donc observé un manque de communication, de soutien logistique et administratif. Il y a eu également un manque de référence aux documents clés à analyser avant la mission de terrain. De plus, les membres de l’équipe d’ISSAT, issus du roster, n’ont pas reçu toute l’information nécessaire sur les tenants et aboutissants de la négociation du mandat afin de bien se préparer pour leur mission de terrain. ISSAT ayant soutenu de manière continue DFID RDC depuis 2012, il aurait été intéressant de briefer l’équipe d’experts sur les résultats des précédents mandats.

Les TdR ont probablement été copié-collé d’un modèle de l’UE, assez peu détaillés et pas finalisés ni approuvés officiellement avant le déploiement de l’équipe sur le terrain. Les objectifs officiels, détaillés dans les TdR, étaient fort différents des objectifs officieux qui n’ont été communiqués à l’équipe qu’une fois sur le terrain.

Les partenaires locaux n’ont que très peu été impliqué lors de la phase de planification. De manière générale, les partenaires locaux ne reçoivent pas les documents de DFID qui ne sont pas traduits en français. Ceci est le cas par exemple pour les rapports d’évaluation du SSAPR rédigés en 2012 et 2013 conjointement par ISSAT et la SU. Ceci dit en passant, ces rapports étant très (voir trop) long selon certains, il est difficile et fort coûteux de les traduire. Il serait intéressant d’essayer de réduire la longueur des rapports auxquels ISSAT contribue.

Leçons identifiées:

-          Besoin de TdR clairs, détaillés, identifiant les responsabilités de chacun, ainsi qu’une personne de contact pour la logistique du côté du mandataire. Les TdR devraient être approuvés avant le déploiement de l’équipe sur le terrain.

-          Mener une mission préalable(scoping mission) de quelques jours est une des leçons apprises par ISSAT afin de mener à bien la phase de planification, voir de finaliser les TdR et obtenir une approbation officielle. Ceci n’a pas été possible pour ce mandat à cause de raisons diverses et variés (temps, disponibilités des experts, volonté des mandataires).

-         Traduire les documents clés pour les partenaires locaux. Intégrer le coût de la traduction dans le budget du mandat afin de mener à bien ce travail (car ceci n’est jamais fait par DFID). ISSAT et le mandataire doivent convenir ensemble de qui s’occupera de la traduction et partager les contacts de bons traducteurs (qui ne sont pas facile à trouver).

-         Communiquer avec les membres de l’équipe d’ISSAT, issus du roster, sur les tenants et aboutissants des négociations du mandat avant leur déploiement sur le terrain. Dans le cas où le mandat est la suite d’un mandat précédent mené par ISSAT, s’assurer de bien communiquer les résultats de ce dernier à la nouvelle équipe d’expert. Si cela est opportun, faire venir le Team Leader chez ISSAT à Genève pour 1-2 jours afin de discuter avec les membres d’ISSAT ayant suivi les précédents mandats.

Capacity building activities were mainly carried out individually, through the participation to the field mission of one staff from Norad. It was clear from the start that someone on the mandator side had to participate to the mandate and it proved to be very useful. The evaluation methodology was not new to the mandator but applying it made the terms and concepts more understandable. The mandate took a structured and systematic approach in collecting and sharing the information, with day-to-day team briefings, planning the interview questions ahead of time, etc. This was considered to be very good. The involvement of Norad staff was limited to the field mission. It could have been better if he would have been involved also during the planning and reporting phases.

The role of ISSAT in terms of capacity building was not clear. It should have been clarified since the beginning in the ToR. NORLAM staff could have benefitted from capacity building activities on the methodology and the use of terms such as output, outcome, impact, etc. Moreover, they do not have the in-house expertise to implement some of the recommendations on strategic planning, project design, etc.

NORLAM staff considered that the ISSAT field mission was very time consuming in terms of planning interviews and logistics. They did not expect that at all and were very busy with their day-to-day work. The mission added a lot of work on top of everything else. Even though the ToR clarifies that “Overall responsibility for co-ordination of the team’s activities on the ground will be provided by NORLAM. i.e. making appointments, providing transport, etc.”, this investment should have been better communicated and someone should have been dedicated to that. There seems to be some confusion on the role of the local expert, part of the review team, in terms of planning and logistics.

It is recognised that time was a big constraint for this mandate. The field mission was very intense with a lot of interviews and only 10 days in Moldova. But this mandate was very well organised and very well led by the team leader. Team members were impressed by that. An additional 2 days on the ground could have been foreseen in order to collect additional information or meet again with some interlocutors to clarify certain issues.

Lessons identified on capacity building:

• Include a staff member from the mandator side since the beginning of the mandate, from the planning to the reporting phase. Clarify her/his role in the ToR as well as capacity building activities to be undertaken during the mandate.
• Propose a workshop on the evaluation methodology to the mandator staff in the field. This could be done in half a day at the beginning of the field mission.
• Clarify and communicate as much as possible on who should plan interviews and take care of the logistics. Recognise that it takes time and plan that well in advance (3 weeks before the deployment of the team in the field).
• If possible, leave two free days at the end of the field mission in order to be flexible to investigate further certain issues and plan additional interviews.

Success for mission logistics came from good support from ISSAT headquarters before and during the mission. Having one member of the team with designated duties to handle on the ground logistics also helped free the focus of senior advisors, as well as having access to local fixers in both Nairobi and in Juba. Having a member of senior staff who also had built up connections and institutional memory of previous missions was also crucial to guiding the relationship with SPLA counterparts and building their confidence in the team.

For team dynamics, it helped to have the prep meetings in Geneva, as well as time in Nairobi and a few days in Juba to coordinate messages and finalise the mechanics of the workshop. Having more than one ISSAT staff also helped to enforce and bring back to focus ISSAT’s mission and guidelines for conduct which might not always be known by all expert roster or Member counterparts.

Security briefings on arrival by the Swiss House team were also useful.

For mission logistics, the Paradise Hotel in Juba is not recommended although it is two blocks away from the Swiss House, and relatively ‘cheaper’ for safe accommodation. It is believed that two team members got ill from this accommodation.

As a safety issue, although it was good to have an extra cushion of money for unknown needs (this was useful for unanticipated Sudan registration costs), the cushion might be brought down some in future, as too much cash on hand in the Juba airport can apparently be a security risk.

For team dynamics, expert roster members who are new to a mission and even new to operating with ISSAT need to be made aware of all aspects of a mission’s history (i.e. previous ISSAT engagements in same country and with the same Member), as well as the mission and principles of ISSAT. Further members of a team, even fellow members of ISSAT, will come to a mission with different concepts and vocabulary. These should be harmonised as best as possible and as early on in the mission as possible to avoid contradictory messages on the ground.

Governing Board team members also need to be engaged in activities on the ground as much as possible to a) to learn from the experience ISSAT is bringing in and so that ISSAT is aware of the counterpart’s knowledge, b) to build up their relations with national counterparts.

As part of building relationships, although the Swiss had a new conference facility within Swiss House, to hold the workshop there instead of SPLA Headquarters was actually inconvenient for SPLA members as they had transportation difficulties. The conference facility, although spacious, was quite bad for acoustics, which was not helped by the fact that many SPLA members talk quite softly.

Finally, this may be context specific to southern Sudan, to the SPLA, and to the DGMMA Technical Working Group, but future teams may want to minimize the possibility of groups working with Power Point as it loses a lot of time and workshop participants often became more focused on making PPT presentations than discussing content. Facilitators who have access to computers, electricity, and vehicles should also be careful in distributing extra work during a workshop to national counterparts who might not have access to these resources. Although extra hours of work that are outside the workshop schedule are typically necessary by all participants, they also need to be reasonable based on resources available.

Format for power point presentations:The team was not aware of the Microsoft version available for the training participants. This meant that the power point presentations were not compatible with the software and the team had to spend valuable time in resolving this technical issue.

ISSAT’s video-conferencing system: This is an excellent system, connecting the team members in both Geneva and Zűrich and ameliorating the inevitable difficulties of planning in three different locations.

ISSAT’s database for project management: Basecamp enabled us to upload and download presentations, programmes and commentaries with both ease and confidence. Both these technologically derived solutions greatly facilitated the planning and delivery of the course.

Responsibilities for the individual sessions:Responsibilities were quickly allocated, this allowed team members to prepare their individual contributions. It was helpful on several levels that the team arrived 24 hours before the course started.  Not only did it allow time for harmonisation of the course material, it also provided time to adjust presentations to be compatible with technical requirements of the participants’ computers

Format for Power Point Presentations: It would have been helpful to have known what version of Microsoft Office was available so the presentations could be adapted from the start.  Alternatively, it might be that 2003 compatibility mode would be more appropriate for most or all training deployments.  

• The mandate was very demanding in terms of visits to LAC missions. It required coordination from Brussels, regional HQ as well as country offices. There was often confusion (in the EU) about who was responsible for managing logistics and setting agendas – though these were routinely fixed. There were also challenges in coordinating timing of visits owing to multiple obligations of EU counterparts.

• Assigning responsibility to a central agent in Brussels (EU) as well as a key interlocutor in country was critical. This can strengthen accountability and the pace of organization. That said, it can also result in logjams if said individual is away. Likewise, there are often internal turf battles within large organizations (like the EU) which are out of the contractors control and can stall progress.

• Ensure explicit assignation of responsibilities in the ToR with future clients. Anticipate the possibility of delays (but be sure to very clearly prescribe delegation of authority. 

• Due to SIDA’s tight timelines, team suffered from challenging time constraints in the planning phase and while conducting the mission. This impacted local ownership of the process.
• National partners didn't have a clear idea of the mission objectives. Some believed that the team was there to support developing a community policing policy. This impacted negatively the process given the short time the team had in the field.
• The security situation in Kenya as a result of the Westgate incident complicated the planning process: timelines were pushed forward and the local partners were probably still too preoccupied with the repercussions of that incident.
• Workshop in Mombasa was too far from where the target group was located (Nairobi). This impacted level of participation. The objective of having it outside of the capital was to allow participants to focus on the workshop away from their daily work and also to facilitate the creation of a team as a result of the process. This could have been also achieved had the workshop been closer to the capital thus costing less in time and money.  

• The team decided to send two members to the field in advance of the team’s deployment to start working on creating a “programme design team”. This worked very well. It was intended to be a structure representing local partners who would drive the process forward.
• It was a significant contribution to creating sustainability and supporting local ownership despite the very short timelines for the team in the field.
• Use of Dropbox as a tool to stock documents and share among team members was extremely useful.

• A bigger effort should have been invested in clarifying the mission’s objectives to local partners. Several actions could have helped in that direction:
  • Having the “right capacity” on the ground to support HQ-based teams in passing through key messages to national stakeholders, creating clarity on mission’s objectives and contributing to supporting local ownership of the process.
  • Team meetings were all conducted through tele-conference technologies. While this helped the planning process at a low cost, the challenge was when key messages had to be passed through: such as mission objectives, expectations from national partners, etc. Face-to-face meetings would have allowed inter-personal interactions to better consolidate a common understanding of key messages as opposed to tele-conferencing which works better when the team members have already worked together, are familiar with each others’ models and methods of work, etc. In this case the Swedish Police Adviser was new which should have been considered as a reason to have a face-to-face meeting, ensuring that everybody is on the same page.
  • During team meetings, HQ-based team should have been clearer in their messages to field-based staff in terms the objectives to be communicated to national partners.
• More time spent on planning and more time in the field would have been useful to nurture a better nationally owned process through -for example- being able to do key visits after the workshop presenting the results and recommendations from the workshop.

• The workshop was temporarily cancelled less than one week before the scheduled date, resulting in the loss of one presenter.
• Dealing with UN administration is a nightmare. I am still to be paid for work I did in June, prior to this mission, and certainly not for this mission.
• UN pay is bad leading to discrepancies with consultants being paid by ISSAT.
• Team responsibilities unclear. What is the role of a UN-paid consultant vis-à-vis ISSAT-provided team members?

• Shared payment means shared responsibilities.
• Being paid by the UN means being part of the UN.

• Clarify roles and responsibilities.
• ISSAT to overcome pay discrepancies

• There was a gap in terms of planning once in the field. The team needed one extra person dedicated to taking appointments and arranging schedules.
• One more week in the field would have been useful to test some of the preliminary findings and ideas.
• UNDP-UNMIL communication was not great. Many gaps lead to misunderstandings.
• It is a very political environment so every decision had to be run by all concerned which considerably slowed down the process.

• A Letter of Agreement was signed between ISSAT and UNDP to facilitate funding of this mission. This framework was not required by UNDP but ISSAT searched for acceptable frameworks of agreement that UNDP is familiar with and works with inorder to ensure payment by UNDP.
• As a result of this LoA, ISSAT got its funding as a lump sum; however, the team had to submit a financial report to UNDP.
• The LoA held specific clauses on Security issues for ISSAT which. Approved by UNDSS??
• Team received badges and phones and full time driver by UNDP.

One member of the team was from ISSAT’s roster. This was his first time working with ISSAT: very little bureaucracy, planning and logistics of highest order!

• It is unclear here whether this should be the way forward for ISSAT’s work with UNDP, in particular because ISSAT has been paid by UNDP in the framework of two previous 2013 mandates (Somaliland and Guinea) without having to sign any LoA. This matter has to be examined further.

• What do you believe are the reasons behind choosing ISSAT to support?
  • MoFA wanted to ensure an independent aspect for this evaluation that is behind them seeking ISSAT’s support. Selection processes within MoFA was easy and fast once they discovered that using ISSAT would be of very low cost.
• What do you believe was ISSAT’s main added value in this mandate/mission?
  • ISSAT added an independent aspect to the review as an external actor.
• Did this mission replace or reinforce?
  • Reinforce
• Did this mission have ToRs? 
  • Yes 
• Was the ISSAT template used? 
  • Unknown)
• What was ISSAT’s contribution in designing the ToR? 
  • High 
• What was the mandator’s contribution to ToRs design? 
  • High 
• Did this mission have a Mandate Request Form (MRF)? 
  • Unknown
• Was the MRF filled in online?
  • Unknown
• Was that Easy? Somewhat difficult?  Difficult?  Very complicated? Unknown?
  • Unknown
• What was ISSAT’s contribution in designing the MRF? 
  • Unknown
• What was the mandator’s contribution in designing the MRF? 
  • Unknown
• Did you use the ISSAT mission checklist? 
  • Unknown

• What do you believe are the reasons behind choosing ISSAT to support?
  • The SU tried to locate experts in their own Security and Justice roster but couldn’t find adequate skills in the timelines required so they called upon ISSAT to support.
• What do you believe was ISSAT’s main added value in this mandate/mission?
  • Flexibility in mission planning, speed in deployment, knowledge of context  and local contacts or networks (Teohna)
• Did this mission replace or reinforce? (Please elaborate under methodology.)
• Did this mission have ToRs? 
  • Yes
• Was the ISSAT template used? 
  • Unknown
• What was ISSAT’s contribution in designing the ToR? 
  • Low
• What was the mandator’s contribution to ToRs design? 
  • High 
• Did this mission have a Mandate Request Form (MRF)?
  • Yes
• Was the MRF filled in online? 
  • Yes
• Was that easy? Somewhat difficult?  Difficult?  Very complicated?
  • Easy
• What was ISSAT’s contribution in designing the MRF? 
  • Low 
• What was the mandator’s contribution in designing the MRF? Too High  Just right Low Unknown
• Did you use the ISSAT mission checklist? 
  • Unknown

• The MRF was drafted at the last minute
• Visa before departure was needed to go into South Sudan for first time (unfamiliar situation)
• ISSAT mission checklist was not yet produced at the time of the mission implementation
• Timing of this review was problematic since this was one of several reviews back to back. There was a clear sense of review fatigue. The final review could have been easily blended in with the annual review.

• The positive ISSAT-DfID relationship facilitated an effective collaboration for the MRF to be completed at the last minute
• ISSAT advisor assigned to mandate was fortunately a UK citizen so the SU knew what to do to obtain visa.
• SU provided significant support on the visa front and helped ISSAT Advisor get their visa. Which is another demonstration of positive working relations with mandatory and the impact of that on mission planning.
• Stephanie Blair filled in the MRF online and that was a very easy process.
• Team had to pay a lot of attention to how the questions were asked and by who as a result of the sensitivities related to the timing and the review fatigue.
• Familiarity between team members and the interviewees was extremely useful to smooth out the negativity. However to maintain a necessary balance for the interviews, the team chose to ensure that ne team member would know the interview and the other wouldn’t.

• Encourage positive relationship building between ISSAT and DfID. Moving forward, ISSAT is to expect more and more short-notice mandates from DfID so good relations would be the key to ensure flexibility and effectiveness in collaboration between two parties.
• DfID to share its monthly Sit Rep with ISSAT as means to ensure awareness of SU’s medium term engagements.

• HLP event was help on the sidelines of this training and AfDB participants were attending both trainings this created misunderstandings in relation to logistics.
• Logistics for this mission were very complicated. AfDB didn’t have the appropriate contacts on the field to help organize the training even though they had an office in Nairobi which ISSAT thought at first would be a huge support.
• Even though AfDB staff members were asked to be on-site one week prior to the training, they were still unable to figure out what needs to be done and ISSAT training coordinator had to give them a list of things to do every day.
• Synchronisation between the HLP sessions and the training was a huge issue. It created a lot of confusion and cultural faux-pas.
• ISSAT had to deal with taking the blame for logistics mishaps on the ground. AfDB staff disappeared and ISSAT had to shoulder the responsibility when they were not supposed to deal with logistics in the first place.
• Hotel was not a good choice and working with them was challenging. Participants had to be downgraded in terms of room quality which was not appreciated by AfDB senior staff.

• Planning for this event started 4 months in advance of the event
• AfDB staff members were asked to be on site to verify all details one week in advance of the event.

• Next training should have a logistics person dedicated by AfDB to the event.

• Relying on assumptions: prior good practice with the one of the mandators was enough for ISSAT to lower the defence mechanisms on behalf of ISSAT, assuming that inspite of the early negative signs, the mission will probably go well.
• Overlapping of this mission with high-level visit: Team was aware that the Norwegian Minister for Development was intending to visit during their presence in country; however this was not expected to block the mission’s work. Nevertheless, in reality, the team leader who was a Norwegian national was deeply involved in this visit which led to her distraction from the priority and importance of the assessment mission. This impacted negatively the team’s work especially that the leader did not delegate some of her roles to guarantee a smooth flow of work during the visit. 
• Division of labour between the two mandators: one of the mandators relied entirely on the other for all planning issues and was completely absent from preparations.

• ISSAT AFS discussions session on mission planning:There needs to be a more rigorous approach within ISSAT when mandates show various signs of low or insufficient engagement capabilities on the side of the mandator. A fine balance needs to be struck between the technical, political and diplomatic dimensions of a mandate. This balance needs to be monitored throughout the planning phase and not only upon approval of mandate. This fact is rendered more complex ISSAT Advisors’ status when they deploy under mandators’ hats. The nature of their roles (reinforce and not replace) locks them in situations where they are: responsible for the mission’s performance, building the capacity of the team, the “guardian’s of SSR doctrine” and trying not to appear as the leaders of the mission. In this mission, the Advisors were in the difficult position of needing to perform while the leader was alternating between open and flexible attitudes and -then without priori warning and with no apparent reason- imposing her own methods of work which were not sufficient or adequate to achieve the needed results while micro-managing the team. One of the two mandators’ lack of engagement is also reflected during the report-writing phase, where the Advisors find themselves  to be working in tandem with one mandator which in theory should be done by the owner of the mission (mandator) with the support and the monitoring of ISSAT. Hence, in the absence of engagement/technical capabilities of the mandator/team leader, ISSAT Advisors are pushed towards eventually expanding their role beyond “supporting” and towards “replacing” the mandator in producing the outputs even during missions where there was no leeway for them to sufficiently influence field work, ensuring sound collection of data and information as a necessary basis for the analysis work. As a result, this mission team is required to sign off on products, whose quality or views, they do not necessarily approve of. Risks of low engagement should be realistically assessed prior to deployment and mitigation strategies should be thought through as much as possible.This After Action Review recommends a full discussion session for the AFS team under the leadership of Mark Downes. The session’s objective would be to discuss the various challenges that that the AFS are facing in implementing their missions and that could be tackled at the planning phase, suggesting possible mitigation strategies. In that respect, the After Action Reviews Focal Point will prepare a note to be shared with Mark Downes and the AFS and based on which the discussions session could be organised. The AAR FP will organise date for such an event.

• Planning process:
  • Plans for this mission began a year before the actual dates of engagement and ISSAT had financially committed in its budget to undertake this mission. Inspite of this, no methodology, had been devised when things came together and the first field mission was planned.
  • Despite of the above conditions, ISSAT’s financial commitments (Canadian funding imperatives) and the strategic advantages of undertaking such a mission with PBSO, were two substantive stakes pushing ISSAT to remain engaged and try to push for as much sound planning as it could.
  • On mandator’s HQ’s (PBSO) side, there was a strong insistence on the mission dates without the ability to absorb the additional load on logistics as a result of the increasingly tight deadlines.
  • PBSO was incapable to see to the essential administrative and logistics aspects to ensure timely departure and a smooth mission on the ground. For example, travel authorization was not issued until the end of the ISSAT Advisor’s time in Liberia.  The ISSAT Advisor is yet to receive a copy of this administrative document, which enables payment of mission related costs.
  • This situation resulted in ISSAT Advisors having to spend a good part of the 5 days allocated to substantive preparation working out logistics.
  • It also resulted in much higher expenses to obtain the necessary visa to enter Liberia (expedited handling of administrative processes for visa acquisition)
  • On the mandator field-office’s side (PBO Liberia), it was tasked with organizing the ISSAT Advisor’s mission at the very last minute, despite of its generally acknowledged organisational weakness and inability to easily take-on unforeseen additional responsibilities.

• Mission timing conflict  between HQ and field:
  • All direct stakeholders in Liberia (The PBSO PBC Liberia Focal Point, the OROLSI-SSRU Chief and the UNMIL SSR Advisor) had stressed to the Policy, Planning and Application Branch of PBSO that it was not an opportune time to conduct such review in Liberia because of their schedules, but also because the implementation of PBF-funded SSR activities in Liberia were still at an early stage. 

• Communication for mission-planning:
  • Relevant New York-based stakeholders (PBSO PBC Focal Point) were informed of this ISSAT mission only a couple of days in advance. Also ISSAT Advisor was informed of the former’s role and arrival to Liberia late into the process.
  • Locally, direct partners for the mission (UNMIL SSR and Peacebuilding Advisors) were not notified of the ISSAT Advisor’s mission until one week prior to arrival to country and were thus not available to support. Relevant (UNMIL) staff were completely absorbed by preparations for another upcoming high-level mission (Technical Assessment Mission 18-28 Feb). 
  • In terms of donors, the representative of one of the donors most engaged in SSR in the country noted that they had been advised on 10 Feb for a 13 Feb meeting - at a time when they were busy with several other missions of high importance. The same representative expressed certain frustration over the fact that this was the fourth “consultant” sent by PBSO in the space of three months.
  • Thematic Review lead was on an unrelated mission in Indonesia and had clearly indicated to PBSO some time constraints on her part, which PBSO did not properly factor in with respect to the Liberia component of the Review.
  • The ISSAT Advisor did not dispose of correct information as to who will be her main interlocutors until a few days prior to the mission. This impacted her networking and communication efforts crucial to understanding of context and needs and thus ISSAT’s ability to undertake sound mission planning. (ISSAT Advisor was informed at first that UNMIL will be her main interlocutor, to discover later that in reality PBO Liberia was going to play that role).
  • On communication to local stakeholders, see below points under the sections: Local Ownership and collaboration with team.

• Planning process:
  • ISSAT had to compensate for PBSO’s lack of preparedness and focus on the substantive level through dialogue over the mandate request (seeking to ensure that mission’s objectives were as clear as possible); and through its contribution to the methodology (although there was never any process to finalise the methodology). 
  • ISSAT stepped in to ensure that the ISSAT Advisor could travel as planned, buying the plane ticket and providing the documentation necessary to obtain a visa.
  • It was very useful for the mission team that the liaison officers had remained engaged in the process throughout. Although she was not part of the mission team that deployed to the field,  she continued to play a strategic guidance role which was very positive for the mission’s effectiveness.

• Cost-Sharing:
  • Cost-sharing was established with PBSO since the start.
  • Communication for mission-planning:
  • Serious efforts on behalf of PBO Liberia (PBO’s Executive Director arrived back in-country on the same plane as the ISSAT Advisor and picked up on PBO Senior Advisor’s efforts to set up the ISSAT Advisor’s programme) helped secure meetings with parliamentarians and some government officials. Still, this was not enough, mostly in terms of notice for both PBO and ministers, to organize a meeting with key informants such as the Minister of Justice for instance
  • The fact that the ISSAT Advisor had contacts in the field (UNMIL staff) facilitated the mission: on the administrative level (hotel reservation and access to the UN building), and substantively (in-depth briefings from HR and political most helpful in complement to the meetings with the SSR, Peacebuilding and RoL Advisors).
  • Given that the national stakeholders were unaware of the mission dates or objectives, mitigation measures had to be undertaken to reach out to key national players and obtain their feedback on some of the issues. For example, to make up for a meeting cancelled a few minutes before it was supposed to start, ISSAT Advisor sent the Minister of Justice’s Special Assistant a number of questions via email for the consideration of the Minister.  However -to date- no response has been received yet from the Minister’s Special Assistant or the mission partners on the field (PBO/PBSO/UNMIL staff), directly contacted to support.
  • The representative of one of the donors most engaged in SSR in the country provided names and contact details of other donors involved and encouraged them to make time to meet with ISSAT Advisor.
  • ISSAT Advisor conducted two interviews with key respondents via skype after leaving Liberia.  

• Planning process:
  • This mission was not about reacting to a political or security emergency. Time for proper planning should have been allocated to allow for sound methodology development and mission planning. In the future, ISSAT should be able to be much more demanding of PBSO in terms of their mission planning processes when they ask for ISSAT’s support.
  • Using the standard ISSAT template of ToRs (currently being developed) for this mission as a checklist would have been useful to underline the gaps in the one developed by PBSO.
  • A checklist for formal handover between the liaison officer and the mission lead would be very useful when the team lead is not the liaison officer and not included in the SMT meetings (this was not a gap specific to this mission, communication between mission team and liaison officer was very positive in this case).
  • A list of planning milestones could be developed to be used with mandators, whereby if certain milestones have not been achieved at a certain time, the mission would not be able to go forward. The milestones can be drawn from the assessment OGN and used as a tool for planning of ISSAT missions.

• Communication for mission-planning:
  • A similar list for communication milestones could be developed, listing all of the international and national partners that need to be informed and by when. This could also be used as a tool for pressuring mandators to communicate properly their missions.

• Cost-sharing:
  • ISSAT attempted to arrange for a cost-sharing approach with UNPOS for funding this mission. This did not work out.
• Mission planning communication:
  • Mission has not been properly communicated to those concerned. Programme staff and national stakeholders were not always available during ISSAT Advisor’s mission.

• Cost-sharing:
  • In spite of a missing arrangement to split costs, the SSDO gave good support with logistical arrangements.

• Cost-sharing:
  • ISSAT to work towards a standard cost-sharing model with UNPOS following the UNDP or EU examples.
• Mission planning communication:
  • Although ISSAT depends on its mandators to communicate missions’ dates and objectives to the relevant stakeholders, this is not being done appropriately, in particular during UN-mandated missions. ISSAT needs to identify strategies to mitigate that highly probable risk which is affecting largely the effectiveness of its delivery on objectives.

• Timing and availability of stakeholders: Request for support was done “last minute”. Timing of 1^st 2 missions – Dec & Jan, just before & after Christmas meant many key people were away. Adding to that, the fact that a high level diplomatic mission from UK government was organised during the same period. The team was aware that this would be a challenge but due to several factors, they could not change timing to avoid Christmas holidays and other commitments.
• Logistics support from field: Due to relatively recent establishment of UK Embassy in South Sudan and its limited capacity, 90% of necessary logistics support in country came from DfID’s implementing agent (Adam Smith International-ASI) and the mission team itself  (finding own hotel rooms, setting up meetings etc.) which took too much of its time and energy. This situation was aggravated by unavailability of hotels due to the holidays and high level diplomatic event. 
• Donor strategic lack of clarity in country.
• Ever-changing political context in South Sudan: The mission was conducted during a very difficult time for South Sudan. It was challenging to meet the right people at the right time as a result of the changing political context. 

• Team members’ networks: As a result of the limited experience and capacity of the UK Embassy in South Sudan, a combination of the knowledge and contacts of the team members, with the support of ASI, was necessary to allow trips outside the capital and to facilitate most of the meetings. The previous working experience the team members had in South Sudan was key to allow them access to key people.
• Excellent and significant all-round assistance from in-place programme implementation team
• Timelines of the mission were expanded to meet increased demands

• Contextual knowledge for Donors’ Headquarters: Stronger knowledge of the context by the programme staff at headquarters would have helped in the preplanning in terms of assessing the capacity of team on the field and anticipating some of the planning and logistics challenges.
• Timing and availability of stakeholders: Timing of assessment missions that require for their success, extensive range of interviews and meetings need to be well thought through, taking in consideration the countries’ holidays and avoiding competing with high level diplomatic visits.
• Logistics support from field: Mandator (through embassy or other parties) should always ensure that enough has been set up prior to mission team’s deployment to country. As UK Embassy gets stronger and more established, it should be able to plan and manage logistics of such trips in future.
• HMG planning for ISSAT support: ISSAT should encourage HMG to improve forward planning with its requests for ISSAT support.

- The study was published only shortly before the seminar so that a number of participants to the seminar where not yet well prepared to discuss the findings of the report.

- The presentation of the report at the seminar was very eloquent.

- Better preparation of the first phase: writing of the study well beforehand.

- Excellent location. Participation by almost all members of the relevant Commitee. Good interaction opposition/majority on the issue. Excellent presentations by the experts.

- To be repeated and expanded!

- ToRs need to be focused and achievable in time allotted: The ToRs were defined quite broadly in the opinion of the team. They found it difficult to do a thorough assessment of the Security and Justice sector with limited time in the country, while simultaneously having to identify projects and provide detailed project proposals. 

- Meeting with mandators to discuss expectations and clarify ToRs is useful: The visit to the Hague (to meet the mandators) prior to the mission to discuss their expectations from the missions was considered useful, it help clarified some ambiguities within the ToRs and highlighted areas where the Govt wanted to focus in particularly.

- Team pre-planning prior to deployment is key: The team met in Geneva for 2 days planning prior the mission, an anthropologist with expertise on Kosovo was also included in this meeting, and provided an in-depth analysis of political-cultural and social dynamics at play in Kosovo. He helped the team to understanding how to deal with politically difficult issues

- Including team leader and team members in finalisation of the ToRs: It is proposed that the team leader, and if possible the other members of the team, be involved in finalising the Terms of Reference for a mission.  

- The political calendar left no time to prepare for the mission, particularly the desk research of valuable documents.  This will turn out to be an issue toward the end of the mission.

- The UN offices on the ground worked to overcome logistical challenges and coordinate the schedule of team members from various horizons

- As much as possible plan ahead, not let crises dynamics determine the early steps of such a mission.

- Excellent location for the course.

The one area that proved problematic in the programme design was procurement. Each mandator and country context will have different regulations and therefore it would be unreasonable for ISSAT to develop knowledge about the separate processes; however, the applicable procurement regulations play a critical role in determining the architecture for programme implementation. 

- The team had an excellent fixer with very extensive networks across the country, and prior experience of working with two of the team. His role, commitment and judgement proved invaluable.

- The speed with which ISSAT turned around payments to external members of the team should be praised. This is key to creating a relationship of trust between ISSAT and external consultants or ISSAT roster members and creates a positive impression of professionalism. However, charges for international bank transfers should be absorbed by DCAF as a default. 

- Laws and regulations on procurement (national or donor) have a strong influence on programme design. Include discussions on this up front in order to identify the relevant parameters. Guidance would be useful on how to approach this.

- Consider the impact to the schedule and existing commitments of national team members: they may not be given ‘time off’ to work on the project.

- Nationally owned processes take longer, especially if they involve producing options for national partners to select from. In addition, be realistic in the turnaround time for decisions from Ministries etc. whilst maintaining momentum in the process.

- Lay out roles and expectations with regard to managing the political process early on in the process.

- The politics of local NGOs are as important to consider as State agencies, especially when widening participation in the process outside of traditional partners. 

- The use of mobile phones is prevalent in Albania and local SIM cards are a must. Phone calls from new telephone numbers should be preceded by an SMS to alert the official who is trying to contact them, as otherwise they will tend to ignore the call. Personal email addresses were often more reliable than official ones.

- Build up trust with the fixer as an integral member of the team through regular communication from the start.

- Be aware that the fixer does not represent all of society and access to people can be skewed.

- Timely payment of team members for services delivered is vital for developing trust and a professional atmosphere.

• Time allocated for this mandate was too short. No specific reason mentioned during the discussion on why such little time was allocated.
• The need to write two reports (narrative and as per DFID Annual Review template). This was a requirement in the ToR. The review team decided to first write the narrative report then complete the template, which was considered to be the most efficient use of time and resources.
• Only two out of four team members were in the field for the entire field mission. One other team member was in the field for the first few days only, due to other commitments. Another team member was not at all in the field (as foreseen in the ToR).
• Limited access to senior level staff from the government of SL due to the fact that the implementation partner did not have themselves such access, and to the need to send formal letters to obtain meetings with these senior staff.

Lessons identified for tackling these main challenges:

• Provide enough time for such mandate,especially in the field.
• Provide enough time for organising the field mission and especially for sending formal letters for meetings with senior level staff from beneficiary country.
• Make sure, to the extent possible, that all team members are in the field during the entire duration of the field mission.

• Great team work,  good division of labour between members of the team due to:
  • Very good expertise in terms of thematic (justice and security) and context (SL and DFID working methods);
  • Team members knowing each other well;and
  • Good ToR, discussed beforehand and circulated to all team members.
• Great support from DFID SL and the implementing partner.

Lessons identified for improving the chances of success:

• Have a mixed team with:
  • strong and relevant thematic expertise;
  • knowledge of the country and programme context;
  • knowledge of mandator’s methods and procedures;and
  • who knows each other.
• Circulate and provide comments on the ToR before hand.
   
• Ensure strong support from mandator’s field office/Embassy and programme implementers.

• Local programme staff limited resources and time to undertake the additional workload of international mission preparation: The schedule of meetings and interviews was not prepared and shared with ISSAT experts before their field deployment despite the explicit requests from the –Geneva team.  This is due in part to the knowledge of local programme staff of the flexibility of local stakeholders and the possibility of confirming interviews at the last minute. It was also due to the fact that the programme staff’s limited resources and time to dedicate to such an evaluation. They had to juggle their own working schedules with the additional responsibility of organizing such a mission.
• Balance between planning imperatives and the context imperatives: This gap in planning meant that the team had to spend some of its time on logistics. However, this did not have a big effect on the mission’s effectiveness since local stakeholders were easily accessible and scheduling appointments for interviews was relatively rapid. The international team’s continued requests for a schedule of interviews as an important milestone for their planning led to certain moments of tension with the local counterparts. The latter interpreted the international team’s concern as lack of confidence in their capacities and knowledge. The international team however, was uncomfortable arriving to the country without a list of planned interviews in hand. 
• First engagements for experts from ISSAT roster: One of the experts on this mission was from the ISSAT Expert Roster embarking on a first mission with ISSAT. Substantive planning with this expert had already started when they discovered that the ISSAT operating procedures were not suitable for them. This was challenging for the team since the mission-planning process had already started and losing one team member at this stage would have problematic.
• Security Briefings for ISSAT staff: Security briefings for ISSAT staff are standard imperatives for all missions. However, in the case of this country, the Dutch Embassy has not provided security briefings for its own staff members, who work and live in country with their families. Requesting security briefing for ISSAT inspite of this fact might cause exasperation as a result of unrealistic expectations on ISSAT’s side.

• Flexibility of local stakeholders: The stakeholders implicated in the interviews, were very flexible in terms of their availability and the evaluation team could organise meetings with a fair degree of facility and relatively short notice.
• Project Assistant supporting missions: The evaluation team received the support of a Project Assistant whose contribution to the mission was to perform the necessary desk review, collate reports and papers, review their relevance with the available advisor and then ensure that the team is able to access them through Basecamp. This worked very well as it ensured that everyone had a harmonized database of documents and all team members had access to the same documents saving them time and effort that they could then invest in the planning and methodology design. This good practice was a lesson learnt from previous missions where ISSAT Advisors used to undertake the above role at the expense of time that should be invested in the mission methodology design and other preparative activities.

• Balance between planning imperatives and the context imperatives: e mission team tried to push for more rigorous planning regarding the interviews with stakeholders. However, when the situation in the field became clearer in terms of the programme staff’s resources and time, in addition to reassurances from them on the expected flexibility of stakeholders, the international team pushed less on their criteria and accepted the context’s imperatives. A balance needs to be struck between structured planning imperatives, the reality of the field, time limitations and the local programme staff’s capacity, resources and availability. This could be done in being realistic about the crucial issues to be ready before field deployment and the issues that permit more flexibility. This balance is usually facilitated by the team leader as in most cases team members have different visions of what should be urgent and what is not. 
• First engagements for experts from ISSAT roster: Having a consolidated power point presentation explaining ISSAT’s structure and functions should be made available to all Expert Roster Members on the CoP. Sharing ISSAT contracting procedures and conditions with first-time Expert Roster members before they embark on the mission planning is of capital importance.
• Security Briefings for ISSAT staff: In cases where the mandator does not provide security briefings to its own staff members, higher flexibility from ISSAT might be required. It might need to look for alternatives whether online or through contacting relevant embassies.
• Joint collaboration and consultations between ISSAT mission teams and In-house resource people: Consultations and/or joint working sessions between mission team members and other ISSAT members on specific aspects (governance, gender, strategic planning, etc.) before, during and after field mission can be of high value on the team’s work. Proper channels need to be put in place for such exchanges. Some suggestions can be:
  • Before missions: Working sessions and/or discussions with advisors as appropriate
  • During mission: Email interactions between mission team and Geneva team on targeted issues
  • After mission: Post-mission informal briefings by the mission team to ISSAT team (upon interest). This will help the process of thought of the team before  the report typing phase.

• Advisors could have appreciated a security briefing before deploying to the field in order to be aware of the challenges to expect in a context such as that of the Palestinian territories.
• Division of tasks in terms of logistics was not clear. ISSAT’s modus operandi (reinforce and not replace) implies a multiplicity of actors for each mission which adds complexity to planning and logistics. In this case, the advisors were not entirely sure who was the lead on the various aspects of logistics (visa, travel tickets, security briefing, etc.).
• None of the two experts were familiar with ISSAT’s way of operating and approach (reinforce and not replace).

• Given the relatively short time span between notice and mission start, logistics worked very well due to the proactive role ISSAT played in facilitating logistics and acting as an interface between the Advisors and the donor.
• Since both Advisors were not aware of the security challenges upon their arrival to the Palestinian territories, they opted for a full transparency approach in explaining the motive of their visit to the security authorities. This worked very well and facilitated their entry into the country.

• When possible, increased notice and preparation time would enable better mission planning. This is even more important for contexts that are significantly challenging (complicated security situation vast geographic areas, specific political conditions, etc.).
• Both Advisors would have benefitted very much from having access to a Power Point Presentation on ISSAT, explaining its mandate and functioning before to first time collaborators.

• Internet connection at the training facilities would have been useful to allow for facilitators to properly present the e-learning by taking the participants through the programme. Also, during week 2, having internet access would have allowed the participants who were engaged in designing the courses themselves as part of the ToT week;
• The Rwanda Peace Academy is an institution that is currently being built up in terms of infrastructure and human resources. They still partly use the facilities of the Rwanda Military Academy. During the planning and design phase of this training, the Academy had very limited capacity to dedicate this lead to the following gaps:

•  
  • The trainees were not identified before the training started, hence a detailed Training Needs Analysis (TNA) was not properly conducted and the training team did not have sufficient clarity on expectations, languages proficiency and knowledge on SSR ;
  • The majority of the trainees were of military background and no trainers were among the participants even though the training team had indicated the importance of a varied audience, including trainers;
  • One participant was a French speaker with very limited proficiency in English;
  • The training team had little clarity on what the session led by the RPA would contain and who will be facilitating;
  • The training team had little clarity about logistics (timing for training sessions and closing day);
  • The programme for week two had to be changed to adapt to new closing times by RPA;

• The nomination of participants was a lengthy process that included clearing the selected names with the Ministry of Defence and ministry of Foreign Affairs;
• The Director of the RPA was changed in mid process which led to a loss in the communication and set the process a couple of milestones back;
• Discussions regarding budget were at times challenging – partly because the main RPA Point Of Contact for the budget was changed during the preparation process;
• Time management during sessions was challenging including managing discussions, exercises and adapting & selecting the right sessions for the two-week training;
• Basecamp was used as the platform to share documents amongst the team.  It was very useful since most of the team did not have access to the ISSAT shared drive. The challenge was that however, team members had to download the entire presentations several times even if the changes were minor. In countries were internet connections are limited, this could be time-consuming;

• To mitigate the effects of a lack of detailed TNA (see challenges column) , the training team prepared and distributed a training needs assessment questionnaires which was distributed on the morning of the first day and retrieved by end of that day. This permitted the adaptation of the material for the rest of the days as much as possible;
• To mitigate challenges of language barriers, the training team paid extra attention to the French speakers providing one-on one support when needed. For the training of trainers week, the trainers ensured the French-speaker had a French speaking group with possibility to present in English, this resulted in integrating this person as opposed to isolating him in an English speaking group;
• The Rwanda Peace Academy assigned a person for logistical assistance (e.g. copying, printing etc.);
• The team’s skills in responding to unexpected changes and adapting the sessions and approaches as the training went along proved to be very positive as it allowed coverage of most of the important issues, while allowing time for RPA and participants to interact;

• Although the training team was in contact with RPA regularly, in some cases high levels of flexibility and proactive  approaches are needed to respond to the challenges of a limited capacity institution;
• Due to lack in capacity and the specific cultural settings of the training, expectations in terms of structured mission planning and design had to be altered and replaced with proactive response to the needs of the interlocutors;
• A physical visit of the Academy and meeting of stakeholders would have been of important value in terms of establishing operational contact before the detailed design of the training started. This visit could have been implemented after the initial scoping visit to Rwanda by Gordon Hughes and before the operational planning had started. The result of such a visit would have added important value in terms of shaping the expectations and assumptions of the training team and thus planning accordingly; in addition to, establishing first personal contact and facilitating logistics;
• In cases such as this training (geographically far, weak institutional capacities and cultural specificities) team should start planning as early as possible to allow for the design of mitigation strategies to respond to as much unexpected issues as possible;

• Scheduling meetings: In SS, it is very difficult to schedule meetings well in advance. Teams should be prepared for last minute or unexpected changes.

• Planning time: In order to allow for the presence of the ambassador in the field, planning time for the mission was shrunk down and was thus insufficient. As a result, necessary research on the background and actors could not be done before deployment. This impacted on the team’s ability to appreciate the broader context and weakened its efficiency during the mapping exercise. This was aggravated by the fact that half the team did not know the context and had never been to the country.

• Team building: No team building activities were organized before deployment. If it were done, it could have positively contributed to team dynamics and facilitated work during the mission.

• Assumptions about team background knowledge and preparedness for the mission: Contingency planning to allow for team to familiarize itself with background and context was not built in. The mission was planned on the assumption that everyone was on the same page in their background reading, which wasn’t exactly the case.

• Support from ISSAT team in Geneva: Mission team had a comprehensive briefing with relevant Policy Advisor, before departure, on history of ISSAT and Norway’s implication in South Sudan. This briefing session was key in preparing the Policy Advisor on what to expect. Also the mission team was supported by the team in Geneva through daily exchanges. This method impacted strongly the efficiency of the mission.

• Support from ISSAT administrative team: Mission team received support in organising logistics details which made it easier for them to concentrate on the substantive part of the mission.

• Presence of Norwegian Ambassador: the presence of the ambassador in SS at the moment of the mission was intentional and very useful. He provided the access to high level and political people and information that would have been difficult to obtain had he not been there.

• Collaboration with political attaché: The role and contribution of the ambassador was complemented by the mission team’s strong links with the political attaché within the embassy. He supplied the invaluable political view of the context and the necessary background information to read between the lines allowing a stronger understanding of the relevant actors’ “underlying drivers” that are invaluable to any assessment or situation analysis.

• Team building: Teams that have not worked together previously should meet in one place at least once before deployment to the field. This could be done in the country itself if team arrives one day in advance.

• Informal gathering for team before mission start: mission team found the face-to-face informal gatherings prior to mission-start as very useful for bonding and sharing information facilitating professional exchanges.

• ISSAT to be involved in mission planning as early as possible –ideally before drafting of ToRs: This mission has shown that the sooner ISSAT gets into the information loop with the relevant Governing Board member the better. This includes direct exchanges with the key people about their vision and expectations and helping to shape the latter. It also includes getting involved in the design of the ToRs and team composition for the mission (when possible).ISSAT’s involvement could be done indirectly through phone or email exchanges or through a capital visit.

• ISSAT to include the lead adviser for the mission since the outset: This recommendation is linked to the previous one. It relates to the internal handover of mission planning information by ISSAT management to the mission team. The South Sudan mission has shown that the sooner the mission planning includes a lead adviser in the loop, the better.The adviser would be the appropriate resource person to dig deeper with the mandator on the substantive part of task preventing any loss in the communication loop once the mission is passed from ISSAT management to SMT and then to team leader.This is very valuable to a mission team that would benefit from in-depth knowledge of the context.  The inclusion of both ISSAT management and lead adviser in communication with GB member from the start would guarantee the appropriate capture and processing of mission information on, both, the strategic and substantive levels.

• Assumptions about team background knowledge and preparedness for the mission: It is always safer to start a mission based on the assumptions that the team has not had the time to familiarize itself completely with the context-related or mission-related information. Contingency planning by team leader in this case could be very useful; for example, allow one day in advance in the field for an extensive team review of necessary knowledge products and make sure everyone has read the needed documents and are on the same page before starting meetings or other activities.

• Information gaps: Change in team composition & team leadership, due to unforeseen developments within ISSAT, led to loss of information and gaps in communication between ISSAT management and the team and amongst the team members themselves. Other gaps in information were due to the fact that initial mission communication takes place between client , Head of ISSAT and Training Team  leader before team is on board. These gaps in information create confusion and might result in loss of valuable time on the field thus decreasing team’s efficiency.
• Cultural Sensitivity: Date and time for group photo could have been communicated to participants earlier to accommodate possibility of arriving in traditional dress.
• Seating and facility requirements: Specifications on training facilities and seating set-up was not communicated by ISSAT to organizing partner; as a result, facilities turned out to be inconvenient. 
• Training Needs Assessments: Although the strategic objectives of the Bank were clearly expressed to ISSAT prior to the training, a gap remained on the individual participants’ level. A TNA was not implemented for this activity and expectations forms were not received from participants. As a result, information on participants and training needs were not factored-in until very late in the process. This was due -in part- to AfDB internal processes resulting in last-minute choice of participants.

• ISSAT’s independence in planning: ISSAT took its own logistics and preparations in hand and did not rely on the Bank. Direct communications with the hotel permitted needed flexibility with respect to cancellation fees.
• Task allocation:  Clear distribution of tasks in terms of mission planning with the Bank kept the team organised and the issues dealt with efficiently.
• Mandator’s designated contact person for the mission: The focal point within the bank drove the initiative. This was critical to the existence and facilitation of this training.
• Platform for information-sharing: Having a platform for sharing information and documents amongst team-members was very useful. Basecamp in particular was a very helpful tool since not all team members were in office and had access to ISSAT’s internal shared drive.
• Preparedness of facilities: Part of the team arrived to training facilities in advance to confirm preparations which managed to reduce the amount of last minute challenges.
• Informal exchanges with resource people: Informal meeting with Bank's focal point to get information and insights in regards to participants' knowledge, expectations and learning abilities helped bridge the lack a of a TNA.
• Team meetings prior to deployment: Pre-deployment meeting through video conference with the entire team was essential to consolidating bonds and clarify roles.

• Allocation of responsibilities in ToRs: Clear break down of responsibilities and tasks, including mission planning and logistics needs to be explicit in the ToRs.
• Independent logistics:  ISSAT needs to continue to take responsibility of its own logistics when a project partner has not explicitly stated their role in logistics.
• Confirmation of adequacy in response to expectations: Ensure that at the end of trainings a follow up step is taken to ensure that expectations were answered. This could be through a plenary session allowing random feedback from participants or individual follow-up with each participant or inviting 2 participants to contribute to end of day wash-ups usually done by training team. However, team should bear in mind that this may be very difficult if they are staying off-venue and common transport is provided. Equilibrium needs to be struck between mandator feedback and participants’ feedback.
• Paper trail for smooth communication: Ensure there is a paper trail of key discussion and decisions throughout the mission so any change in project team members will have minimal information gaps.
• Time management for mandator’s interventions:  different audiences tend to have different approaches to contributing/interventions. Team needs to be aware that more or less discussion time may have to be built in and therefore incorporate flexibility into the planning. For optimal time management, integrate mandators’ presentation in master power point presentation and arrange for clear time management of intervention and consequent debate.

Preparedness of facilities: 

• Better coordination with the venue provider in regards to training venue (use of checklist available on G-drive)
• Confirm need to always arrive in advance to training venue to ensure logistics and other details have been taken care of. Early arrival on premises also allows for design of mitigation strategies in case of unanticipated issues. Since ISSAT reinforces ongoing activities led by its mandators, this might lead to situations where the set-up cannot be improved due to the lack of alternative rooms. 
• It would be useful to compile a set of possible training room layouts to show to organizers, giving a visual idea of what would be needed.   

• Time planning: Planning to arrive in advance and staying after the  training gave the trainer the possibility to receive valuable feedback from participants that would not have been possible otherwise.
• Project and Partner Familiarity: The external advisor had a well-established relationship with Fundasaun Mahein and had conducted similar capacity development exercises with the group, allowing a relatively easy setup of this project.
• Local Technology for Communications: The advisor used text messaging to check in with workshop participants as opposed to e-mail since all could be contacted through that method.

Security: Although this situation was resolved in the end, there is still some need to clarify that ISSAT personnel must be covered by a mandator’s security plan.

Capacity to Implement: When pushing for a political priority to undertake in programming, be sure to thoroughly conduct a self assessment on what operational capacity is available to implement a new programme. This will help in evaluating programme design options and determine additional capacity required or if the new programme is even feasible. The sooner this is done, the better planning will be. In the EU context in particular, this initial feasibility assessment could be more formalised by liaising with both the political and operational wings of EU delegations.

Team Roles and Responsibilities: There was a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each team member. This derived from a leadership role that led each member of the team know clearly what their value added to the team was.

Communications: Excellent communication between all team members, ISSAT and EU delegation. This was largely achieved through regular meetings.

Reliable Logistics: EU delegation provided adequate logistic support including, space, IT and transport.

Interview Arrangements: EU team members led in making all arrangements for interviews based on their strong on the ground connections. This was a huge benefit.

Security: Make sure to not compromise personal security when trying to move ahead with a mission.

Feasibility Study: Assessment and programme design phases of a project should include an internal feasibility study of a donor’s capacity to carry out a programme. Without doing this expectations can be raised from political ambitions that potentially cannot be delivered as planned.

Clear Communication: Clear communication on roles, value added of each team member, and continuous dialogue can help facilitate a good working environment. Clear communication can also facilitate a feasibility study.

• ToRs: Terms of reference for the mission were not clearly defined nor exposed in writing to us or our management before departure to mission
• Roles: Roles of each of the actors and their implication in our mission was not clarified ahead of the mission

• Preparatory meetings: ISSAT mission team planned a preparatory phase of  meetings with the mandator for better understanding of the picture before deployment
• Preparatory meetings with mandator were followed by a scoping phase on the field during two full days of meetings. At the end of the 4 first days, ISSAT personnel drafted their own ToRs consolidating them with UN SSR focal points and circulating them for validation by stakeholders.
• Political Coverage: ISSAT has a good and reliable system established where management in Geneva can handle political issues of a mission while the team in the field can focus on technical issues.

• Formal or informal ToRs: ToRs before mission deployment save time while on the field and is crucial for short term missions, where time does not allow for permission scoping.
• In case of absence of formal ToRs, there should be always some form of informal/formal communication of objectives validated by all concerned.
• Written ToRs should have a degree of flexibility however as context will change a number of aspects once on mission.
• ToR Development as advantageous: Having some questions around the ToR can be advantageous if used correctly, by allowing the completion of the ToRs to be an opportunity for the mandatory to reflect critically on a programme. Use processes such a stakeholder analysis, SWOT, or appreciative inquiry to help fill in blanks.

Informal assessment: Ahead of the workshops, the training team met with Dutch staff to discuss expected attitudes towards the SSR concepts among the Burundian team. The informal nature of this discussion was quite useful to get a quick assessment of training needs and absorbsion capacity, and enabled the training team to tailor the training material to the audience.  Meeting informally, in this instance, as opposed to formal interviews also allowed the military and police officials to feel more relaxed and speak more openly about their thoughts.

Get to know the audience: As useful as the informal discussions with the Dutch team were, it would have been even more beneficial to have met informally with the Burundian counterparts. This would have given an even better idea of how to adapt the training, as well as established an initial rapport. 

• Preparation Time: Aside from having more time to confer with team members prior to mission commencement, with respect to overall approach, planning and logistics were very good.

• Planning and logistics to support the assessment team were fine. Support to team members in the DRC and logistics for in country travel were also very good.

• Mission planning and logistics worked well and there are no specific suggestions for improvement in that regard.

Team Structure: With as large as the team on the ground was, having one additional person coordinate on the ground logistics would have been beneficial. Further, when bringing on external members to ISSAT in senior roles, extra time needs to be committed to briefing those people on ISSAT processes and procedures. If this is not done, roles might get shifted and time on the ground for gathering data is lost.

Recce Mission: The recce mission was very useful for the logistics preparation of the deployment of the team within the different localities to be visited.

Team Structure: When pulling together a team of largely external consultants, roles must be clarified, and the standards of the coordinating organisation must be understood well in advance. Without this, field work and end products can suffer. Having too big a team can have the possibility of complicating this task further.

ISSAT SoPs: SoPs should be strengthened to outline roles for each team member depending on its role and its position as ISSAT staff or expert roster.

• The start up of  UNOCI was challenging for two reasons:

a. It took over a regional structure which is ECOWAS
b. It replaced a political UN Mission, which is MINUCI

• Difficulty to recruit police experts

• Integrated logistics through the Joint Logistics Operation Center (JLOC)
• Integrated Mission Taining Center for induction puposes, permitted UN personnel to know each other's roles and responsibilities from start

• UN experts: UN should develop a larger roster of experts; UN's missions are more and more complex with SSR bringing in new and additional challenge
• Selection of UNPOL Officers: UN should better balance and be more proacitive in the selection of future UNPOL officers, watching out for quantity v/s quality

The start up of  MICAH was challenging for the following reasons:

• No transition between the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti/DPKO mission and MICAH
• MICAH started from scratch 
• Logistics was deficient
• Heavy administrative and recruitment procedures
• Limited mission funding

• Integrated missions: The technical assistance mission with three integrated pillars (Justice, corrections, human rights and police) worked well and was efficient

• Sustainability: Plan a transition period by using the phasing-out of a mission to bring in the leaders of the future mission
• Funding: Funding should be available as soon as a mission starts

None

• The review commission's terms of reference were well formulated: the goals and methods of the review, the commission's functions and the expected outputs were expressed clearly. The terms of reference were finalised in consultation with the commission after it had been established.
• The commission's secretariat comprised members of the intelligence ministry, seconded by the intelligence minister. This helped to ensure adequate logistics, communication and administration, as well as access to the relevant documentation.

None

• Insufficient preparation: The mandator provided a large amount of documentation but it was unclear which were the key documents, different versions of documents existed. The reporting methods and reporting templates were still unclear during the ISSAT team visit.
• Lack of coordination: There was no coordinated plan to put the reports of the separate expert reports together.
• Reporting method: Only the team leader presented the team findings to the mandator without their being a final overall report on findings and recommendations to DFID.
• Field time: The ISSAT team was split up for visits to 2 of the 3 provinces selected for the project implementation.  Due to the short time provided in the provinces not as many interviews as hoped could be conducted thus affecting the quality of data.
• Use of capital time: In Kinshasa, time could have been allocated better for planning meetings/interviews.
• Use time in the field appropriately: As time in the field is limited, it is best to use this time on what cannot be done elsewhere (i.e. collecting information).  Although analysing information with a team together is good, report writing should potentially be left to a more appropriate time.

• Making use of time: The local teams in the provinces were able to organize a full schedule for the one day visits there.
• Team cohesion: The informal contacts between the experts cleared up many issues.

• Team preparation time: Better preparation before the next ISSAT team visit, provided for end 2011 (2-3 full days of preparation for the whole team in Geneva, one month for the next team visit)
• Sufficient organising: Dates set for the team visit at least two months for the team next visit to RDC (availability of the team experts).
• Organise Documentation: Selection of key documents and reports should be done in a timely fashion so as not to impact efficiency.
• Agreed on Templates: Again, to maximise efficiency, clear decisions on final versions of documents and on templates should be made in advance of deployment.

• Movement in-country was challenging. We were coordinating directly with a security company ourselves, who were unreasonably rigid in carrying out their protection responsibilities. Without an intermediary (in-country or from HQ), this became a source of tension every time we needed to move.
• Security policies: The organization had a policy that no nationals were allowed on our compound. Because I did not want to visit national colleagues at their homes with armed protection and in a armored vehicle, I had planned to host them at the compound; they made such visits, which were crucial to the mission, virtually impossible. Finally we managed on one occasion to find a third-party venue, but I missed all other opportunities to meet with people on issues directly related to the mission.

• Planning: The planning for this mission was smooth and professional. The program officer in HQ provided all the administrative paperwork early in the process, accompanied with instructions. Briefing material arrived shortly thereafter, including an extensive reading list. I had a security briefing by phone, laying out all the issues I might anticipate. Having lived in this country prior, they were responsive to detailed questions. Due to security concerns (raised primarily by me), the original dates of the mission were postponed, but the team adjusted planning and everything rescheduled.
• Pre-mission team meetings: The team met in Dubai the morning of our flight to Kabul. We spent a couple of hours familiarizing ourselves with the mission, reviewing the schedule and generally setting the context for the mission. This was a helpful thing to do before arriving in-country,
• Security context: Given the security environment and how difficult it made moving around town, we only scheduled about 4 meetings/day. We also scheduled team "working meals" to reflect on the mission and make changes as needed. Some missions are non-stop affairs, exhausting team members and overloading them with information; having more of a balance, I believe, allowed us to be more productive.

• Local focal point on security issues: In conflict environments, where security protection is used, an in-country focal point should be chosen to liaise with the team on mission. Movement will likely be a contentious issue anyway, but having someone who can make decisions outside of prescribed policy would be helpful.
• Finding alternatives: If nationals are not allowed in expat compounds, alternative venues must be provided - it's absurd to limit contact with nationals of a country while in that country.

• The team comprised a senior staff member of the organization and myself. A third team member was in the US, and participated via teleconference. Needless to say, this was not an effective approach, and while his insights were useful, his physical absence slowed down the processes, was the source of miscommunication, and made the development of that proposal all the more difficult.

• Preparation for this mission went smoothly. I dealt with field staff on the substance of the mission (TOR), and HQ staff on admin/logistics of the assignment. Field staff were therefore removed from contract/compensation negotiations, which was welcome by all. We had a number of Skype calls in the lead-up to the mission to clarify the terms and ensure that the team was all on the same page. This organization has country offices in both of the two countries where the work was done. As such, they had staff assist with logistics and planning as needed throughout the mission.

• Because there was no flexibility in the timing of the mission (we had specific dates by which to develop the proposals), all efforts should have been made to ensure that the entire team was available to travel. Additional experts could have been brought on for a more limited engagement toward the end of the process, and could have done so remotely.

• Individual logistics: While we were very clear about the logistics for participants, there were numerous problems and challenges for each training. Questions regarding compensation, per diem, travel expenses, and so forth surfaced constantly. We wasted a great deal of time dealing with individual issues that were tangential to the training program itself.

• First run on limited group of participants: We piloted this program initially with seven councils. Based on an extensive lessons learned exercise, we expanded the program to 18 councils, and then again to 24. Given the difficulty of organizing logistics in post-conflict settings, having run through the program with a limited number of participants allowed us to run a smoother program once it expanded.

• Written logitic procedures: We finally developed written policies on every aspect of the logistics of the training. While questions/challenge still arose, they were far fewer and we had an official organizational document outlining permitted expenses and procedures.

• Consensus: The most challenging aspect of the mission was to forge a consensus on defence policy among a diverse set of stakeholders with different interests and, more significantly, different values and ideologies. The main stakeholders were government ministers and defence officials from the ruling party, the African National Congress; the parliamentary defence committee, comprising a number of political parties; conservative senior officers from the apartheid era who remained in leadership posts in the new defence force; and civil society groups with an interest in defence policy.

• Building consensus: During the planning phase the challenge of building a consensus on new defence policy was addressed by 1) establishing a drafting team comprising senior ANC defence officials and senior apartheid-era officers; 2) appointing a progressive lead drafter who reported to and took political direction from the Deputy Minister of Defence; 3) making funds available for an extensive consultation process; and 4) having a commitment from the President, the Defence Minister and the chairperson of the parliamentary defence committee to forge a national consensus on defence rather than simply impose the policies of the ruling party.

None

Decision-making taking into consideration the level of conditionality of donors in terms of release of funding could be very difficult. Although there are criteria to help take decisions of such nature, it is common that opinions and personal perceptions of the political situation of a country lay the most decisive role. this is where the difficulty is, SSR and DDR experts are usually technical people who often lack political understanding of the situation and context of intervention.

The Trust fund Manager at the World Bank had left to the field earlier than the rest of the mission and prepared all necessary networking, communication and planning for meetings. The World bank had also arranged for and facilitated a donor coordination meeting on the field. This was very very helpful to the missions since they optimized the time on the field and didn't miss out any of the critical stakeholders.

When doing SSR trainings and capacity building activities, organizations need to be more careful that there approach be less of a horizontal one and more of a geographical one.

SSR theories need to be applied to specific geographic contexts, building up geographical knowledge capacities.
Organizations like ISSAT FBA etc. need to make sure that informations is transmitted in geographical manner which will be very useful later in the field.

• Time estimate: Such a political process with many actors involved need plenty of time. This was not sufficiently envisaged by the team, but adjustments were made to allow the process to mature in a proper pace.

• Composition of team:  The composition of the team, regional experts on justice and security, facilitated the methodological approach as they were very experienced in working, from their home countries, on crime scenes and pursuing homicide investigation.
• Engagement of national team: This greatly facilitated the work.

• Time estimate: It is important to  plan for spare time as to allow for unforeseen needs, primarily political, to make planning adjustments and add activities.

• Local partner logistics: transportation, work equipment and facilities, after hours, for national actors (DGMMA Technical Working Group) were a constraint while the external team and Swiss project leader had good access.
• Cushion money as security risk: although helpful to the mission, represents perhaps an unnecessary security risk at the airport. Nothing happened to the team, but travelers with ‘large’ amounts of US dollars were being stopped.

• Mission planning time: absolutely critical for external team.
• Pre-planning: brought the views and ideas of a diverse team together as best as possible. The team met in Geneva for 3 days, and then used layover time in Kenya, and a few days before the workshop, to plan with the Swiss team leader.

• Consider local partner logistics: The logistical constraints on the national actors need to be taken into account when planning workshops. For example, the workshop could have been conducted at SPLA headquarters.
• Sufficient pre-planning: Ensure sufficient time for team to work on mission planning prior to the actual mission.