Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso

Case Studies

Burkina Faso - Current Critical Security Issues


Burkina Faso has been increasingly exposed to the threats and attacks of violent armed groups, targeting symbols, institutions and representatives of the state, including the defence and security forces, local leaders and political figures.

With a history of several coup d’états, the country has entered a cycle of more frequent terrorist attacks since 2014. The northern parts of the country, bordering Mali and Niger, are particularly at risk as a result of conflict spill-over. In December 2018, a state of emergency was declared in several regions, granting extraordinary powers to the security forces and restricting freedom of movement and assembly in the country. The State of Emergency was renewed twice in January 2020 and June 2021.

This short knowledge product aims to address emerging concerns for human security in a country of high interest to ISSAT Members. It builds on DCAF’s operational programming, open-source documents, as well as the learning ISSAT captures from its Governing board Members engagement in the country. and maps out the top challenges and actors impacting the hybrid security landscape in the country. This note also aims to be a conversation starter and ISSAT welcomes comments and contributions from its members and Community of Practice.

Food Insecurity

Burkina Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries with more than half of its population living on 1.90 USD per day. It is a traditionally rural country and agriculture is its main source of income. Farming and forestry employ 80% of the population. Despite recent economic growth, poverty levels remain largely stagnant. This is partly driven by population growth rates, combined with recent climate shocks, affecting crops and food security . Urban areas are particularly affected, with an unemployment rate of 50%. Poverty, combined with an overstretched state apparatus, leads to significant gaps in access to state security and justice services and creates a breeding ground for social tensions and violence. This gives credibility and space for non-state armed group to operate, in particular in areas where the community expresses perceptions of exclusion, especially amongst the youth, namely in relation to corruption and unequal distribution of resources and wealth. This could be compounded by unharmonized access to public services between the capital and regions.

Community Level Tensions

The broader security landscape in the Sahel region needs to be taken into consideration when examining the worsened security situation in Burkina Faso. Following the conflict in northern Mali, the armed groups have contributed to the rise of intercommunal violence in central Mali, but also in Niger and Burkina Faso.

While their areas of operation were at first concentrated in the administrative provinces of Soum and Oudalan, in the northern Sahel Region bordering Mali and Niger, the attacks have now spread into other administrative regions notably the Est, Boucle du Mouhoun and Northern Regions and are also threatening the capital, Ouagadougou, and the border areas with Benin and Ivory Coast.

These armed groups have been mostly targeting civilians and state security forces and committing serious human rights violations, leading to massive population displacement and intercommunal tensions. The heightened security risks across the region could lead towards further militarisation within Burkina Faso. As armed groups recruit and arm (male) civilians, the State is trying to compensate for its shortcomings by also widening the access to weapons for reasons of national civil defence. As a result, regional human security is undermining prospects for peace and development in Burkina Faso and the Sahel region.

Population Displacement

Indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Burkina Faso have led to the displacement of more than a million people as of December 2019. Compared to 50,000 in January 2019, this is a number, experts expect to continue increase.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) face several critical human security challenges such as food insecurity and limited access to the land resources and markets. Access to basic services such as health, education, water, sanitation and justice is also a major concern. Their presence weighs on the resources of  host communities and puts an extra burden on an already stretched out national resources and public services infrastructure, leading to increasing tensions among the communities and risk of intercommunal violence. These tensions were exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has globally affected the most vulnerable hardest.

Population displacements also impact the security of the territory, and the ability of the security forces to track members of the armed groups, while there are growing concerns that IDPs and those living in refugee camps are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Over-Stretched State Security Institutions

Burkina Faso’s security forces are considered inadequately equipped and lack sufficient operational capacity to perform their duties in line with the country and population’s needs. They have sometimes been accused of disproportionate use of violence, extrajudicial killings and human rights violations, including towards civilians. Concerns were also raised regarding the composition of the army and auxiliary forces under its control and the risk of the current events affecting the coherence and resiliency of this institution. Furthermore, corruption, lack of accountability and weak legitimacy undermines the legitimacy of the security forces. National security personnel may also be members of non-state forces such as the Koglweogo, which is one of the largest non-state security actors in Burkina Faso. Koglweogo groups gradually became important players in Burkina Faso’s security and political landscape, questioning State authority and legitimacy.

Despite the recent creation of a new special forces body, the path is still long and challenging before their role and impact become clear. The previous elite unit, the Presidential Guard, was dissolved in 2015, leaving an institutional and human resources gap as it had represented around 10% of the total military body and a large margin of the defence budget, training and equipment.

The international community, including the EU, UN, US, and the Joint G5 force for Sahel are supporting armed forces’ capacity development, including skills and equipment provision. However, lack of sufficient attention to management and accountability aspects in a country where those are perceived to be corrupt, politicised and abusive of their powers, makes this a risky endeavour.

Lack of Access to State Security Services

A 2018 donor-led assessment conducted through ISSAT’s support in Burkina Faso showed that security forces were absent in 36% of the regions. The ratio of security personnel of 1/758 is well below the international standard of 1/400. With a total strength of 5,219 gendarmes, the gendarmerie ratio is 1/2,685. The country has 350 administrative regions in total, 156 of which do not have any internal security force unit established.  24% of the administrative regions have at least one police station and one gendarmerie unit and  31% have one gendarmerie unit or a police station.

The inconsistent coverage of all the territory has led to unequal distribution of State services across the entire population, in particular in rural areas. At the core of this institutional challenge are multiple drivers, including inefficient use of human resources, unclear institutional mandates, blurred lines of management and weak national coordination. Burkina Faso still lacks clear plans to organise and restructure the territorial distribution of its security forces.

The National Police is placed under the authority of the Ministry of Security and organized around the General Directorate of the National Police. It is responsible for public security and consists of civil servants. The National Gendarmerie is technically under the authority of the Ministry of Defence but reports to the Ministry of Security, with weapons and equipment still managed by the Ministry of Defence. It is a military force with similar ranking system to the army. The police and gendarmerie perform their activities across the country. While the law provides that a decree shall specify the respective areas of territorial jurisdiction, both police and the gendarmerie often end up working in the same locations at the expense of certain regions. The traditional role of the police to operate in urban areas and the gendarmerie in the countryside, has been blurred during the last years, leading to a shift of the National Police outside urban areas and the ‘urbanization’ of Gendarmerie units.

Weak Oversight and Accountability over a Hybrid Security Landscape

Initially locally formed to respond to rising insecurity in the northern regions, non-state armed groups such as the Koglweogo, Dozos and Rugas have evolved to key players in the security and political landscape in Burkina Faso. These groups have established semi-formal relations with the security forces with whom they collaborate. In 2018, the government launched several initiatives to strengthen the dialogue with the Koglweogo and adopted a decree formally allowing them to participate in the fight against insecurity alongside the State forces. The option to transform these groups into a community police mechanism was also scoped.

Adding to the hybridity of Burkina Faso’s security landscape, in 2020, the government adopted a decree creating the status of ‘Defence Volunteers’, according to which, these contribute, by force of arms, if necessary, to the defence and protection of persons and property in their area of residence. The volunteers undergo a swift military training, are armed and placed under local leadership structures. These have been loosely placed between state security institutions and non-state armed groups. They have as a result been victims of attaches by non-state armed groups and unable to seek shelter in military camps.

The Koglweogo and other non-state armed groups have been able to implement their own rules and pass sentences. They have already been accused of committing human rights violations and their activities are often inconsistent with the respect of basic rule of law principles such as the presumption of innocence. Despite their perceived effectiveness in dealing with insecurity at the local level, the legalisation of such groups questions the ability and credibility of the State to oversee  armed groups’ practices. The community’s frustration with armed groups’ human rights  abuses could further expose the State’s incapacity to oversee them and hold them accountable in the framework of Rule of Law.

Weapons Proliferation

The trafficking and diversion of weapons and ammunition are fuelling the conflict in the Sahel and continue to threaten community safety across the region, in particular in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Burkina Faso is located along some of the most important weapons trafficking routes in West Africa. To prevent the deterioration of the situation, the Burkinabe government suspended the sale of firearms to the civilian population at the end of February 2019. However, after only a few months, the measure was lifted in June. In early 2020, the government took a reverse approach by creating the Defence Volunteer status, therefore giving civilians access to weapons and legalising their use of force to supplement the security forces.

However, arming civilians could negatively contribute to a complex security landscape and fuel conflict.  Burkina Faso’s intercommunal tensions soared due to the multiplication of armed groups as the perceived association of Fulani communities with Islamists groups generated resentment and mistrust among the rest of the population. Therefore, arming civilians in a tensed security context where government control is limited could likely foster the proliferation of weapons and heighten probability of intercommunal conflict.

Elections Volatility

Burkina Faso has a long history of coup d’états. In the current security situation, the international community could be concerned that non-state armed groups could seriously impair the election process. Due to increased violence and terrorist attacks, entire villages have been displaced from regions in the north and east. As a result,  electoral constituencies have undergone significant change in inhabitants, reflecting an emerging imbalance between number of candidates and sizes of constituencies. The electoral law and the possibility for displaced voters to vote outside their constituencies is also under scrutiny.

Armed groups have also been playing a key role in the political space in Burkina Faso. As a prominent actor with an increasingly important role, armed groups have been using their influence in shaping the future of Burkinabé elections and politics.

SSR Process Facing Significant Challenges

The worsened security situation in the country, increased violence, high number of IDPs and lack of access to State services across the whole country are some of the main challenges facing the security sector reform process in Burkina Faso.

In October 2017, a National Security Forum held in Ouagadougou with over 600 participants from ministries, agencies and civil society kicked-off the Security Sector Reform process led by the National Defence and Security Council (CSDN). The country set itself on a reformative agenda to elaborate on a new national security policy and strategy, develop an anti-corruption strategy, increase governance of the security sector and develop a strategy to combat violent extremism, among other commitments. DCAF has been supporting this process through contributing to the drafting of a national security policy and a national security strategy.

One of the key priorities currently in Burkina Faso is preventing violent extremism and a national strategy to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism was adopted in May 2021. Whilst the pressing need in Burkina Faso is the stabilisation of the country and building the resilience of its community in view of the millions of IDPs and overwhelmed public sector, longer-term reforms need to remain important for the donor community in this country. The synchronisation between crises response and investment in SSR for sustainable conflict prevention and peacebuilding is the biggest challenge facing reform across the Sahel region.

case study

Burkina Faso : où en est la réforme de l’armée deux ans après l’insurrection populaire ?

La présente réflexion analyse les enjeux de la réforme de l’armée au Burkina Faso, deux ans après la fin du régime de Blaise Compaoré. Cette réforme s’inscrit dans le processus de changement impulsé par l’insurrection d’octobre 2014. La stabilité du nouveau pouvoir dirigé par le président Roch Kaboré et la résilience du pays à la menace terroriste constituent les principaux enjeux. De par sa portée, et malgré les changements qu’elle a suscités, la réforme n’induit pas encore un changement de paradigme sur la politique de défense.

Pour accéder à l'étude Burkina Faso : où en est la réforme de l’armée deux ans après l’insurrection populaire ?, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.

case study


Tool 1 : Political Leadership and National Ownership of Security Sector Reform Processes

Tool 1 of the Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa by DCAF addresses political will and national ownership, fundamental requirements of SSR processes.

Without the strong political commitment of national authorities, SSR will fail, regardless of the material resources and technical expertise invested into it. SSR must be home-grown, designed to meet country-specific needs, and led by national stakeholders who take full responsibility for it. For SSR to produce sustainable results, it is also essential to ensure the active involvement of a critical mass of citizens - men and women - from all strata of society in the definition and implementation of a reform agenda that reflects a shared vision of security. Unless it relies on an inclusively defined and widely shared vision of security, SSR cannot succeed.

Acknowledging the challenges that may arise in the process of operationalising these principles, Tool 1 offers practical guidance on how to reinforce national ownership and leadership while defining an inclusive, national vision of security as a basis for a security sector reform. It provides an overview of potential entry points for SSR in the broader framework of national governance in a West African setting. It also suggests how to institutionalise the national leadership and coordination of an SSR process, including through strategic communication.

The Tool is primarily intended for policy and other strategic decision makers, government officials involved in security sector governance, national SSR advisers and practitioners. It will also provide members of parliament, other oversight institutions, civil society organisations and development partners with an overview of the responsibilities of the executive in SSR and how to uphold national ownership throughout the process.

For more information on the tool Political Leadership and National Ownership of Security Sector Reform Processes, kindly follow the link to the DCAF website.

Follow the links to access the other documents in the Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa: 

Tool 2: Security Sector Reform Programming

Tool 4: Effective Management of External Support to Security Sector Reform

Tool 6: Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance

The publication is also available in français and português.


Tool 2 : Security Sector Reform Programming

The conduct of an SSR process requires translating a political, national vision of security into an operational programme and defining the different concrete actions needed to generate the desired societal change and improve security for all. SSR programming provides tools both to determine the nature of the change sought in the functioning of the security sector and to plan implementation in a structured manner that is measurable over time.

Tool 2 of the Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa addresses the successive programming steps that enable the development and rolling out of a context-relevant SSR programme. These steps range from an initial needs assessment to the setting up of coordination mechanisms aimed at ensuring overall coherence of national SSR efforts. The Tool offers practical advice for prioritising and sequencing reform actions, budgeting the programme and mobilising the resources necessary for its implementation, establishing viable and efficient management mechanisms, coordinating national and international actors involved in the implementation of the programme and developing a communication strategy to support transparency and sustain national ownership.

For more information on Tool 2 : Security Sector Reform Programming, kindly follow the link to the DCAF website.

Follow the links to access the other documents in the Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa: 

Tool 1: Political Leadership and National Ownership of Security Sector Reform Processes

Tool 4: Effective Management of External Support to Security Sector Reform

Tool 6: Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance

This publication is also available in français and português.


Ferramenta 1 : Liderança Política e Apropriação Nacional dos Processos da Reforma do Sector de Segurança

Esta ferramenta 1 « Liderança Política e Apropriação Nacional dos Processos da Reforma do Sector de Segurança », parte da « Caixa de Ferramentas para a Reforma e Governação do Sector de Segurança na África Ocidental », fornece orientações práticas para as autoridades nacionais da África Ocidental sobre como abordar a RSS de uma forma que demonstre liderança e garanta uma apropriação nacional inclusiva. Ressalva a importância da vontade política na formulação de políticas relacionadas com o sector de segurança, a necessidade de envolver actores não-estatais não só na fase inicial, mas também durante todo o processo de reforma, e a necessidade de articular a RSS com outras políticas e reformas à escala nacional. A ferramenta também se debruça sobre o papel desempenhado pela CEDEAO, que apoia os estados-membros na construção de processos de reforma endógenos. Aborda igualmente os desafios práticos que as autoridades nacionais poderão vir a enfrentar na concepção e implementação de processos de RSS, propondo também soluções para enfrentá-los.

A ferramenta pretende ser um recurso para os responsáveis pela tomada de decisões estratégicas, funcionários governamentais, consultores nacionais e outros profissionais de RSS. Também disponibilizará aos membros do parlamento, a outras instituições de supervisão, às organizações da sociedade civil (OSC) e aos parceiros de desenvolvimento uma visão geral das responsabilidades que o poder executivo tem na RSS e sobre como garantir a apropriação nacional ao longo do processo.

Para maiores informações sobre a Ferramenta 1 : Liderança Política e Apropriação Nacional dos Processos da Reforma do Sector de Segurança, siga o link para o website do DCAF.

Por favor, siga o link para ter acesso às outros documentos da Caixa de Ferramentas para a Reforma e Governação do Sector de Segurança na África Ocidental: 

Ferramenta 2 : Programação da Reforma do Sector de Segurança

Ferramenta 4 : Gestão Eficaz do Apoio Externo à Reforma do Sector de Segurança

Ferramenta 6 : Envolvimento da Sociedade Civil na Governação e Reforma do Sector de Segurança

Esta é a versão em Português da publicação. It is also available in English et disponible en français.



Relever les défis de la sécurité au Sahel

Le Sahel est une région diverse qui devient de plus en plus importante pour la sécurité régionale et mondiale. Par ailleurs, des dynamiques telles que la mauvaise gouvernance, un secteur agricole fragile, l'absence d'une transition démographique, et le manque d'emplois, en ont fait "une nouvelle frontière" pour les groupe djihadistes. En effet, ceux-ci essaient d'y manipuler et exploiter les tensions sous-jacentes de la région.

Serge Michaïlof résume les défis sécuritaires auxquels le Sahel fait face en particulier démographiques, d'extrémisme, de gouvernance et autres et explique ce qui devrait être fait pour y répondre de manière efficace.


Les milices incontrôlables du Burkina Faso

Les villageois burkinabé en avaient assez des coupeurs de route et des voleurs de bétail. Alors ils ont décidé de créer leurs propres milices, qu'ils ont appelé les Koglweogos. Mais ces groupes d'auto défense sont maintenant tellement puissant qu'ils inquiètent les autorités.

Alors peut on contrôler encore les Koglweogos ? 


G5 Sahel pour une prospérité partagée

Afin de présenter son mandat et son action au grand public, l’organisation G5 Sahel a produit ce reportage afin de mettre en avant ses initiatives dans le domaine de la sécurité et du développement.



Governance and Security in the Sahel

This conference brought together experts of West Africa and the Sahel specifically to shed light on the implications of elections, radicalization, and rising threats from jihadi militants and other armed conflict actors.This tripartite political phenomenon has significant consequences for governance and security in the region and beyond.

The conference addressed the practice and significance of multiparty elections in contexts of competitive authoritarian regimes, post-intervention transitions, and governance reforms – particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. It also assessed logics of radicalization, consequences for security strategies, and logics of military engagement both for state actors and international forces. Finally, it assessed the distinct threats arising from Jihadi groups in the region, state militarization, and migrant trajectories.

To listen to the podcast, Governance and Security in the Sahel, please follow the link.


Comment repenser la présence française au Sahel ?

Six ans après le début de l'intervention militaire française au Mali, l’opération Barkhane qui a succédé à l’opération Serval en 2014 montre ses limites et la présence de l'armée française est de plus en plus mal vue par les populations locales. La France est-elle enlisée au Sahel ?

Pour écouter le podcast (minutes 22 à 58) Comment repenser la présence française au Sahel ?, veuillez suivre le lien. 


Policy and Research Papers

Auto-évaluation des capacités parlementaires et des besoins législatifs au Burkina Faso

This report (in French) is a self-evaluation workshop report on parliamentary oversight of the security sector with the National Assembly of Burkina Faso. In June 2013, DCAF and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) organised a three-day workshop where parliamentarians and staffers from the Burkinabe National Assembly assessed their capacities and the legislative need in view of strengthening parliamentary oversight of the security sector. The parliamentarians who participated in the workshop were members of the committee specifically responsible for matters relating to security.


The workshop report highlights self-identified opportunities and challenges in the fulfillment of the committee’s mandate on oversight of the security sector by the Assembly. Challenges include the reluctance of the institution to assume such a role, the taboo surrounding security questions and the lack of technical knowledge of the parliamentarians. The report also summarises concrete recommendations made by the participants to overcome these challenges and reinforce the oversight role of the National Assembly.


La République démocratique du Congo vit-elle un scénario à la burkinabé?

La situation s'est brutalement tendue en République démocratique du Congo, où les manoeuvres du gouvernement en vue des prochaines élections présidentielles faisaient débat depuis plusieurs mois. Joseph Kabila, au pouvoir en RDC depuis l'assassinat de son père en 2001, a été élu en 2006 et 2011. Tandis que les élections de 2006 avaient mobilisé une très forte attention internationale et avaient notamment reçu un soutien très actif, financier et humain, de la part de l'Union européenne, les élections de 2011 avaient été entachées de davantage d'irrégularités.

Le second mandat du président Kabila arrivant au terme que lui fixe la Constitution l'année prochaine, des élections présidentielles devraient avoir lieu, auxquelles il ne devrait pas pouvoir se présenter. La Constitution établit en effet une limite de deux mandats présidentiels consécutifs. Les spéculations vont donc bon train depuis plusieurs mois autour d'une potentielle réforme de la Constitution par la majorité u
président Kabila afin de permettre le maintien au pouvoir de ce dernier.


Burkina Faso: cap sur octobre

A moins de quatre mois de l’échéance, la transition au Burkina Faso doit concentrer tous ses efforts sur les élections d’octobre. Dans un contexte marqué par des tensions politiques et une forte agitation sociale, l’exclusion des représentants de l’ancien pouvoir des prochains scrutins, inscrite dans le nouveau code électoral, ouvre la porte à d’interminables arguties juridiques et menace le respect du calendrier électoral. Elle rend possible la mise à l’écart d’un pan entier du monde politique. Faute de pouvoir s’exprimer dans les urnes, celui-ci pourrait être tenté de le faire par d’autres moyens ou d’essayer de saboter le processus électoral. Il n’est toutefois pas trop tard pour atténuer les risques. Le gouvernement peut encore préciser le code électoral par décret. Par ailleurs, le dialogue entre les acteurs politiques et sociaux de tous bords doit être maintenu, idéalement par la mise en place d’un cadre de concertation. Le Conseil constitutionnel, qui statuera en dernier recours sur l’éligibilité des candidats, doit rester fidèle à la lettre et à l’esprit inclusifs de la charte de la transition et de la Constitution.

Cette analyse publiée par l'International Crisis Group revient sur la période de transition vécue par le Burkina Faso et propose une série de mesures dans le domaine de la justice et de la sécurité, encourageant le dialogue politique entre représentants de tous pans de la société et le renforcement de la transparence dans la planification de réformes de la sécurité et de la justice.


Le Burkina Faso et son armée mis au pas par le Régiment de sécurité présidentielle?

Depuis la chute de Blaise Compaoré le 31 octobre 2014 à la suite d’une révolte populaire, le Burkina Faso traverse une période politique turbulente, secouée par quatre tentatives du RSP de mettre fin à la transition. Cette fois en effet, le RSP est parvenu à perpétrer un coup d’État, mais il n’est pas sûr qu’il réussisse à mettre fin à ce régime. Si elle semble atypique, cette situation ne l’est pas vraiment si on se replace dans le contexte de l'évolution politique de ce pays depuis son indépendance.

Article complet: Le Burkina Faso et son armée mis au pas par le Régiment de sécurité présidentielle?


Burkina Faso : transition acte II

La victoire de Roch Marc Christian Kaboré à l’élection présidentielle du 29 novembre montre que les Burkinabè aspirent autant au changement qu’à la continuité. Des défis considérables attendent le nouveau gouvernement : fortes demandes socioéconomiques, exigence de justice, lutte contre la corruption et l’impunité, réforme de l’armée et insécurité régionale.

Document disponible ici: Burkina Faso : transition acte II


Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III) : West Africa

This International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the third and final in a series analysing the regional dimension of insecurity in Africa and collective and individual state responses, presents the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)’s current institutional apparatus in the field of peace and security, and analyses its responses and deficiencies through three case studies: Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Bur­kina Faso. It is part of a broader reflection on the changing nature of conflict and growing transnational threats, problems requiring novel solutions which regional bodies are well placed to find. This report considers what institutional reforms need to be undertaken to improve ECOWAS’s collective action in the face of formidable challenges to peace and security in West Africa.

For full access to the ICG report Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa, kindly follow the link.

This report also exists in French.


Les armées africaines et le pouvoir politique au sud du Sahara

Dans un contexte post-indépendances, l’Afrique sub-saharienne a constitué un terrain propice aux coups d’Etat. Ce numéro des Champs de Mars, la revue académique de l'Institut de recherche stratégique de l'Ecole militaire (IRSEM), s'intéresse à la conception du pouvoir militaire dans ces pays, présentant les liens particuliers qu'il entretient avec le pouvoir politique. Les rapports entre légitimité de l'armée et celle du pouvoir politique sont donc mis en exergue. 


  • Introduction au thème : de l’institutionnalisation de l’armée dans l’appareil d’État (Axel Augé et Amandine Gnanguênon)
  • Le coup d’État de décembre 2008 et la transition controversée en Guinée (Dominique Bangoura)
  • La démilitarisation paradoxale du pouvoir politique au Burkina Faso (Léon Sampana)
  • D'une armée prédatrice à une force au service de l’ONU : l’exemple de la Sierra Leone (Aline Leboeuf)
  • Les institutions militaires sud-africaines et zairo-congolaises face aux processus démocratiques : éléments d’analyse politique et stratégique (Mathias Eric Owona Nguini)
  • Varia : Le rôle politique de l’armée dans les pays d’Afrique lusophone (Neia Fernandes Monteiro)
  • Post-face : du lien entre État, armée et société (Mathurin Houngnikpo)

Pour accéder au Champ de Mars sur les armées africaines et le pouvoir politique au sud du Sahara, veuillez suivre le lien.


Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes dans cinq États ouest-africains


La présente note publiée par le Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) est consacrée à l’évolution des dépenses militaires et aux achats d’armes de la dernière décennie de cinq pays francophones d’Afrique de l’Ouest : le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Aucun de ces pays ne peut être considéré comme une grande puissance, mais la plupart d’entre eux ont récemment choisi la voie d’un net renforcement de leur potentiel militaire, apparemment en riposte aux menaces terroristes et sécessionnistes qui secouent la sous-région. Sans trancher sur le bien-fondé d’une réponse militaire à ce type de menaces, la note tente de fournir un éclairage sur la quantité de ressources affectées à la défense et la sécurité, en les comparant dans la durée et au regard des dépenses affectées aux besoins sociaux des populations de ces pays.

Pour accéder à la note Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes dans cinq États ouest-africains, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.


Ombuds Institutions for the armed forces in francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa

Ombudsmen Sub Saharan Africa DCAF

This mapping study on ombuds institutions for the armed forces in francophone sub-Saharan African states is a project initiated under the aegis of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), in the framework of the OIF programme “Providing Support to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding”.

The mapping study is the continuation of extensive research conducted within the context of a first project entitled “Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces in Francophone Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi and Senegal.” The objectives of the mapping study are to develop a comprehensive analysis of the activities and role of the ombuds institutions; to identify factors that may facilitate or hinder the establishment and functioning of such institutions; to encourage ombuds institutions to deal with the armed forces and to improve the functioning and effectiveness of existing institutions; and to involve the ombuds institutions of the states concerned in the global process of exchanging good practice and experience between existing ombuds institutions.

The research explores sub-Saharan states, some with ombuds institutions whose mandates include military matters (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger, Senegal, and Togo), some who have established general ombuds institutions, but without such jurisdiction over the armed forces (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Republic of Guinea, Madagascar and Mali), and some who lack these institutions (Comoros and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The paper delineates some common characteristics of general ombuds institutions, before pointing the challenges they confront, from the level of resources to a lack of visibility.

To access the Ombuds Institutions for the armed forces in francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa, kindly follow the link.


Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l'Ouest (Octobre à décembre 2016)

Ce monitoring trimestriel, publié par le GRIP depuis 2011, est réalisé dans le cadre d’un projet intitulé « Contribution à l’amélioration de la sécurité humaine, à la prévention des conflits et au renforcement de l’état de droit en Afrique sub-saharienne », financé par le ministère des Affaires étrangères du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg. Il a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l’Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, la Guinée, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Il se penche sur les questions de sécurité interne au sens large, les tensions régionales, la criminalité et les trafics transfrontaliers.

Pour accéder à l'étude Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l'Ouest , veuillez cliquer sur le lien.


Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l’Ouest – Avril à juin 2017

Ce monitoring trimestriel, publié par le GRIP depuis 2011, a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l’Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, la Guinée, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Il se penche sur les questions de sécurité interne au sens large, les tensions régionales, la criminalité et les trafics transfrontaliers. 

Pour accéder à l'étude Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l’Ouest – Avril à juin 2017, veuillez suivre le lien. 


Vers une approche plus globale pour stabiliser le Sahel ?

Aux prises avec le changement climatique, la croissance démographique, l'insécurité alimentaire, la corruption, et la criminalité, le Sahel est l'une des régions les plus pauvres du monde. Une nouvelle publication du Conseil européen pour les relations internationales (ECFR) soutient que l’Europe doit embrasser une approche plus globale pour stabiliser la région, en mettant l’accent sur le besoin d’une plus grande intégration régionale entre l’Afrique du Nord et le Sahel ainsi que sur la création de canaux d’immigration légale et d’emplois. Cette approche pourrait réduire les flux migratoires clandestins vers l’Europe en créant un marché du travail plus grand et plus dynamique en Afrique.

Pour accéder à l'étude Vers une approche plus globale pour stabiliser le Sahel ?, veuillez suivre le lien. 


Nord du Burkina Faso : ce que cache le jihad

Les violences jihadistes au Sahel de l’Afrique de l’Ouest se sont propagées dans le nord du Burkina Faso. La réponse de Ouagadougou et ses partenaires doit tenir compte des racines sociales et locales de la crise et non uniquement de ses dimensions religieuses et sécuritaires.

Pour accéder à l'article "Nord du Burkina Faso : ce que cache le jihad", veuillez suivre le lien. 


The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso’s North

Jihadist violence in the West African Sahel has now spread to the north of Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou and its foreign partners recognise that their response requires more than military offensives and that a definitive resolution of the crisis hinges in part on the situation in Mali. However, their approach needs to better take account of the local and social roots of the crisis, which are more profound than its religious and security dimensions.

For full access to The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina Faso’s North, kindly follow the link. 


Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence

Attacks on the Burkina Faso army headquarters and the French Embassy on 2 March 2018 were better organised, involved heavier weapons and were more sustained than anything seen so far in Burkina Faso. This paper explores the challenges this attack revealed for the Burkinabé. 

For full access to Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence, please follow the link. 


Inquiétante escalade de la violence jihadiste au Burkina Faso

Les attentats du 2 mars 2018 contre l’état-major des armées du Burkina Faso et l’ambassade de France sont sans précédent dans le pays : mieux organisés, ils ont impliqué des armes plus lourdes et duré plus longtemps que les attaques passées. Selon notre directeur du projet Afrique de l’Ouest, Rinaldo Depagne, ces attaques jihadistes démontrent une nouvelle fois la faiblesse des forces de sécurité burkinabè.

Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Inquiétante escalade de la violence jihadiste au Burkina Faso, veuillez suivre le lien.


Le rôle de l'Autorité de développejment intégré de la region du Liptako-Gourma (ALG) dans la lutte contre l'insécurité entre le Niger, le Mali et le Burkina Faso

Le rôle de l'Autorité de développement intégré de la region du Liptako-Gourma (ALG) dans la lutte contre l'insécurité entre le Niger, le Mali et le Burkina Faso: l'ALG est une initiative à vocation transfrontalière, qui couvre toute la zone de convergence des trois frontières des pays membres. L'organisation a été mise en place pour mutualiser les projets de développement et l'exploitation des ressources de la région.

Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Le rôle de l'ALG dans la lutte contre l'insécurité entre le Niger, le Mali et le Burkina Faso, veuillez suivre le lien.


La force conjointe du G5 Sahel prend de l’envergure

Le G5 Sahel a été créé en 2014 comme un partenariat intergouvernemental entre le Burkina Faso, le Tchad, le Mali, la Mauritanie et le Niger pour promouvoir la coopération économique et la sécurité dans la région du Sahel. La virulence croissante des groupes de militants islamistes, tirant parti de la faible densité de population des zones frontalières, a cependant posé un sérieux défi à la vision du G5.

En réponse, en 2017, le G5 Sahel a augmenté ses efforts de sécurité en lançant une force de sécurité commune pour lutter contre le terrorisme, le trafic de drogue et la traite des êtres humains. La force a été approuvée par la suite par le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine et par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et a l’appui de divers partenaires internationaux. La force conjointe du G5 Sahel doit maintenant jouer un rôle de premier plan dans les futurs efforts de sécurité transnationale dans le Sahel. 

Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, La force conjointe du G5 Sahel prend de l’envergure, veuillez suivre le lien.


Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l'Ouest

Ce monitoring trimestriel, publié par le GRIP depuis 2011, a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l’Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, la Guinée, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Il se penche sur les questions de sécurité interne au sens large, les tensions régionales, la criminalité et les trafics transfrontaliers.

Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l'Ouest, veuillez suivre le lien.


Afrique de l'Ouest: Faire de la prévention des conflits la règle et non l'exception

Résultat d’une recherche documentaire et de dizaine d’entretiens menés à Cotonou, Lomé et à Abuja en mars et juin 2018, ce rapport s’interroge sur la manière dont le mécanisme d’alerte précoce et de réponse de la CEDEAO contribue à la prévention des conflits en Afrique de l’Ouest.

Partant des obstacles politiques et techniques auxquels la CEDEAO a été confrontée, il présente tout d’abord ses évolutions en matière de collecte de données ainsi que la récente réforme de décentralisation au plan national. En outre, il passe en revue les réponses que la CEDEAO, les États et la société civile sont susceptibles d’apporter pour combler le décalage persistant entre l’alerte et la réponse.

Enfin, il conclut sur l’idée qu’au-delà des difficultés techniques et financières, le déficit d’alerte précoce et les délais de réponse, souvent trop longs, résultent aussi d’une culture de la prévention encore très théorique. Des pistes de réflexion sont proposées pour en permettre une meilleure opérationnalisation.

Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Afrique de l'Ouest: Faire de la prévention des conflits la règle et non l'exception, veuillez suivre le lien.


Koglweogo, Miroir d’une faillite d’Etat

Face à l’insécurité rampante, ils se sont étendus dans une grande partie du pays pour pallier le manque d'effectifs policiers. Ces milliers d’associations citoyennes entendent ainsi s’attaquer à l’injustice et à la corruption des forces de l’ordre, des élites politiques et judiciaires. Leur efficacité est reconnue de tous, mais en mettant la main sur la chaîne répressive dans son ensemble, les Koglweogo s'arrogent les rôles de policiers, justiciers et bourreaux. 

Pour accéder au dossier, Koglweogo, Miroir d’une faillite d’Etat, veuillez suivre le lien.


“By Day We Fear the Army, By Night the Jihadists” - Abuses by Armed Islamists and Security Forces in Burkina Faso

Since 2016, armed Islamist groups have dramatically increased their presence in Burkina Faso, creating an environment of fear throughout the country. They have attacked government buildings and schools, intimidated teachers, conducted brutal assaults on cafés and other gathering places, and executed those suspected of collaborating with authorities. In response, Burkinabè security forces have conducted counterterrorism operations in 2017 and 2018 that resulted in numerous allegations of extrajudicial killings, abuse of suspects in custody, and arbitrary arrests.

Victims of violence by both the armed Islamists and security forces complained about the slow pace, or complete lack, of investigations into human rights cases since 2016. Community leaders from the north complained about what they perceived to be a partial response to abuses by the authorities. They said killings and abuses by armed Islamists almost always triggered an investigation and, often arrests, while alleged abuses by security force personnel were rarely, if ever, investigated by the security forces or the judiciary.

To access the report, “By Day We Fear the Army, By Night the Jihadists” - Abuses by Armed Islamists and Security Forces in Burkina Faso, please follow the link.


Self-Defence Movements in Burkina Faso: Diffusion and Structuration of Koglweogo Groups

In the midst of a political transition since the popular revolution of 2014, Burkina Faso has known a collapse of security in the context of the threatening Islamist movement in the country’s North. Considering this socio-political upheaval, self-defence groups known as Koglweogo, “bush guardians”, have appeared in 2015. The movement has spread in large parts of the country and is infamous for the violent punishments it inflicts on presumed thieves and outlaws. This article delves on the genesis of this galaxy of armed groups which have entitled themselves to security agendas in the name of lawfulness.

To access the article, Self-Defence Movements in Burkina Faso: Diffusion and Structuration of Koglweogo Groups, please follow the link.


Le problème du contrôle des groupes de vigilance en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone : Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Sénégal

En Afrique, les groupes de vigilance varient énormément dans l’espace et le temps. Généralement, on explique l’émergence des groupes de vigilance par une aggravation assez intolérable et persistante de l’insécurité. Ils suppléent ainsi les carences de l’État dans les zones peu ou mal desservies par la police publique.

Ainsi à travers eux, ce sont les populations directement touchées par des crimes spécifiques qui s’approprient leurs problèmes et génèrent une entité chargée de les résoudre. Ces groupes permettent en outre de rendre disponible le bien collectif qu’est la sécurité à des populations qui en sont dépourvues. C’est une sécurité privée pour les couches défavorisées de la société.

Pour accéder à l'intégralité de la publication, Le problème du contrôle des groupes de vigilance en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone : Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Sénégal, veuillez bien vouloir suivre le lien.


Can Peace Become Affordable? Lessons from Security Sector Expenditure Reviews in West Africa

West Africa and the Sahel continue to be plagued by fragility, conflict and violence. Faced with challenges ranging from the spread of Boko Haram to persisting food insecurity, forced displacement, and youth unemployment, the region needs help. In response, the international community has marshalled significant resources to support governments in fostering the essential preconditions for peace – inclusive security and sustainable development. Such tasks can devour the funds of even the most ambitious aid programmes, while the reality of budgetary constraints calls for a constant search for efficiency.

The European Union’s engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a case in point. Transforming security and justice systems in fragile states is one of the top priorities of the EU’s external action. According to its 2016 SSR framework, the EU will help partner countries put the military under civilian oversight and provide effective, legitimate and accountable security and justice services to their citizens. EU programmes will apply a comprehensive approach aimed at: (i) formulating integrated security and justice policies and setting up national coordination mechanisms; (ii) providing training and non-lethal equipment to defence and security forces; and (iii) building internal accountability mechanisms and systems for human resources planning, budgeting, and financial management.

In 2017, €2.5 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) managed by the European Commission was allocated to governance and civil society, including SSR. There are ongoing or planned rule-of-law, security and justice programmes in more than 40 countries worldwide. In West Africa, EU institutions have channeled over €100 million to finance the nascent 5,000-strong G5 Sahel Joint Force, while assistance for stabilisation in the region has reached €400 million.

The EU has also launched three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. In Mali and Niger, capacity-building missions (EUCAP) provide technical assistance, training and equipment for internal security forces to fight against terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration. The EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) has been helping the government to restructure eight army battalions.6 France has deployed 4,000 soldiers for Operation Barkhane in Mali, Niger, and Chad, an endeavour that costs about €600 million per year. Meanwhile, development funding to improve security outcomes by tackling the root causes of conflict has also risen. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa allocated almost €1 billion to Lake Chad and the Sahel, with projects in Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal supporting youth employment, private sector development, social protection, health and education.

Given the scale of the investment, the following questions arise: what is the value for money of each additional euro spent on strengthening West Africa’s armies and police? How can SSR assistance lead to effective and sustainable reforms, and ultimately contribute to reduce fragility, conflict and violence?

This Brief seeks to answer these questions by analysing the introduction and implementation of the security sector public expenditure review (PER), a public sector governance instrument that assesses the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of governments’ security and defence allocations, including SSR programmes. Developed by the World Bank in partnership with the United Nations, this data-driven assessment tool can facilitate a policy dialogue between civilian administrators, soldiers, and diplomats on the affordability of armies and police, and can therefore maximise the impact of security assistance programmes. Following an overview of security expenditures in West Africa, the Brief outlines the genesis of security sector PERs and highlights lessons learned from implementation in Liberia, Mali and Niger. The conclusion then offers recommendations on how PERs can be applied by the EU to ensure affordability and national ownership of defence and security assistance programmes.

For full access to the policy brief, Can Peace Become Affordable? Lessons from Security Sector Expenditure Reviews in West Africa, kindly follow the link. 


Burkina Faso at Crossroads

Long spared by the Sahel’s jihadi groups, Burkina Faso is now confronted with increasingly frequent and lethal attacks in its northern and eastern provinces. Whereas the armed forces have launched some operations to contain the jihadi incursion, there has also been a spontaneous proliferation of vigilantes to counter bandits in the hinterlands. This policy brief aims to examine the latent informalization of the state security apparatus and its impact on the political trajectory of the country. By resorting to the ‘rule standardization1’ thesis, I argue that while the pluralization of security institutions may apparently provide the biggest opportunity for Burkina Faso to contain the jihadi incursion, any failure from the government to keep this patchwork of (new) security providers under tight control is likely to contribute to the country’s political fragmentation. This will constitute a blow to the resilience that the ‘land of honest men’ has shown until now and add Burkina Faso to the list of Africa’s fragile states.

To read the full paper Burkina Faso at Crossroads, please follow the link provided.


The Deteriorating Security Situation in Burkina Faso

Already three months into 2019, disturbing reports of intercommunal violence in central Mali and in north central Burkina Faso underscore the tragic reality that the Sahel remains locked in crisis.

• The increased activities of violent actors have rightly raised alarm among regional government officials who believe that the situation may worsen or even begin to destabilize the coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea.

To read the article, The Deteriorating Security Situation in Burkina Faso, kindly follow the link.


Monitoring of regional Stability in the Sahel region and in West Africa – April to June 2019

This monitoring aims to monitor the security situation in West Africa with a focus on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. It examines in particular broad internal security issues, regional tensions, and cross-border and transnational crimes.

For full access to the report, Monitoring of regional Stability in the Sahel region and in West Africa – April to June 2019 kindly follow the link. 


Si Les Victimes Deviennent Bourreaux : Facteurs contribuant à la vulnérabilité et à la résilience à l’extrémisme violent au Sahel central

Les groupes armés s’inspirant du djihadisme qui se sont installés dans les régions du Sahel central ont représenté un choc perturbateur des équilibres fragiles des communautés locales. Face à ce phénomène, ces dernières ont réagi de différentes façons, allant du rejet à l’attraction. Axée sur la jeunesse peule dans les régions de Mopti (Mali), du Sahel (Burkina Faso) et de Tillabéri (Niger), cette étude analyse les facteurs qui permettent d’expliquer la vulnérabilité ou alors la résilience des populations face à la montée de l’extrémisme violent.

L’adoption d’une approche comparative permet de vérifier la pertinence et la généralité des résultats de recherche sur toute l’étendue des régions étudiées, afin de fournir une compréhension plus ample du phénomène complexe de l’extrémisme violent au Sahel central. En ce sens, la présente étude capitalise les résultats des recherches antérieures sur le sujet, dont elle offre une revue critique à l’aune d’un riche apparat de nouvelles données qualitatives récoltées auprès des communautés peules vivant au front, et qui sont dès lors victimes tant de l’extrémisme violent que des réponses des acteurs nationaux et internationaux au terrorisme et à l’extrémisme violent.

Pour accéder à Si Les Victimes Deviennent Bourreaux : Facteurs contribuant à la vulnérabilité et à la résilience à l’extrémisme violent au Sahel central , veuillez suivre le lien. 


Ansaroul Islam: The Rise and Decline of a Militant Islamist Group in the Sahel

Ansaroul Islam has played an outsized role in the destabilization of northern Burkina Faso. From 2016 to 2018, just over half of militant Islamist violent events in Burkina Faso were attributed to Ansaroul Islam. The violence perpetrated by Ansaroul Islam has forced more than 100,000 to flee their homes and 352 schools to close in Soum alone. Yet by mid-2019, Ansaroul Islam was associated with only 16 violent events and 7 fatalities. This dramatic decline in the group’s activities warrants closer attention. It is particularly important to understand how this militant Islamist group first emerged and what factors have contributed to its diminished role in the first half of 2019.

To access the full note Ansaroul Islam: The Rise and Decline of a Militant Islamist Group in the Sahel, kindly follow the link. 


Sahel : soubassements d’un désastre

Économies atones peu créatrices d’emplois, croissances démographiques vigoureuses, aides internationales souvent considérées comme des rentes, appareils de sécurité incapables de sécuriser les espaces nationaux, et surtout de protéger les populations : les États du Sahel sont-ils en train de perdre la main sur leurs propres espaces intérieurs ? La déroute des systèmes militaires, judiciaires et éducatifs n’autorise que peu d’optimisme sur l’avenir de ces pays, et de l’insécurité qui y grandit.

Pour accéder à l'intégralité du document Sahel : soubassements d’un désastre, veuillez suivre le lien.


Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l’Ouest – juillet à septembre 2019

Ce monitoring trimestriel, publié par le GRIP depuis 2011, a pour but de suivre la situation sécuritaire en Afrique de l’Ouest avec un accent plus particulier sur le Burkina Faso, la Côte d’Ivoire, la Guinée, le Mali, le Niger et le Sénégal. Il se penche sur les questions de sécurité interne au sens large, les tensions régionales, la criminalité et les trafics transfrontaliers. Ce monitoring trimestriel couvre la période juillet à septembre 2019. 

Afin d'accéder à l'analyse, Monitoring de la stabilité régionale dans le bassin sahélien et en Afrique de l'Ouest - julliet à septembre 2019, veuillez suivre le lien.


Politics at the Heart of the Crisis in the Sahel

The governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are ill-equipped to confront the worsening security crisis in the region. Their approach to these challenges has been insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst.   In contrast to its counterparts in Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s political class is doing the bare minimum to respond to the conflict. Though the government faces some domestic pressure to address insecurity, it may believe there is an unacceptable political cost to doing more.  The international community should work to reshape Mali’s domestic political calculus to promote a more robust response. It should continue its security partnerships, especially with Burkina Faso and Niger, to address capacity shortfalls and reduce incidents of human rights violations.

For full access to the paper Politics at the Heart  of the Crisis in the Sahel, kindly follow the link. 


Summary Report: Integrating Human Security into National Security Policies in North-West Africa

The first ever regional conference on “Integrating Human Security into National Security Policies in North-West Africa” was hosted in Rabat 23-24 November 2010 by the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy Studies (CEDHD) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), with the support of Switzerland. The conference brought together a large number of high-ranking representatives from North-West Africa and the Sahel region (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal) as well as a number of international experts. This was the first event of its kind to consider the development and implementation of national security policy from the regional perspective of North-West Africa.


Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces in Francophone Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi and Senegal

Under the aegis of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) DCAF undertook three case studies in Burkina Faso, Burundi and Senegal each of which was prepared by country experts. Each study seeks to identify and facilitate the exchange of good practices and experiences between the states concerned, as well as among similar institutions around the world. Each study examines relevant national institutions, as well as their legal status, shedding light on their strengths and weaknesses and contributing to an evaluation of their capacity building needs. Each study also includes details of their complaints handling procedures and of standards that may be relevant to other similar institutions, contributing as a result to a deepened understanding of their mandates, remit, and functioning. Furthermore, these case studies provide a snapshot of the state of security sector governance in each of the three countries, as well as the progress of ongoing reforms.



Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa

Experience shows that successful democratic transitions need to be underpinned by a security sector that is effective, well managed, and accountable to the state and its citizens. This is why it is so important to carefully examine security sector governance dynamics in contexts where security has often remained a 'reserved domain.' Understanding the issues and perspectives that divide political elites, the security sector, and citizens is the only way to develop security sector reform programs that are legitimate and sustainable at the national level. Through drawing on the close contextual knowledge of practitioners, researchers, and diverse local actors, this book supports this goal by analyzing security sector governance dynamics in each of the nine Francophone countries within West Africa. From this basis, strengths and weaknesses are analyzed, local capacities evaluated, and entry points identified to promote democratic security sector governance in the West African region. (Seri


Other Documents

Tribune: Trois réponses immédiates aux désastres récurrents au Mali et au Burkina Faso

Tribune de Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, économiste et analyste politique, selon qui, face à l'ampleur et la récurrence des massacres de civils dans le centre du Mali et dans le nord du Burkina Faso, les urgences sont multiples : apporter une réponse sécuritaire et judiciaire à la fois ferme et ciblée, repenser le dispositif sécuritaire et contrer l’entreprise de démolition du vivre ensemble menée par les jihadistes et autres entrepreneurs du chaos.

Pour acceder  à l'intégralité de la tribune, Trois réponses immédiates aux désastres récurrents au Mali et au Burkina Faso, veuillez cliquer sur le lien.

Other Document

World Bank Country Partnership Framework for Burkina Faso 2018-2023

This document present the World Bank Groups' Partnership Framework for Burkina Faso 2018-2023.

To access the full Country Partnership Framework for Burkina Faso, kindly follow the link. 

Other Document

UNDP Country programme document for Burkina Faso (2018-2020)

This document present UNDP's country programme in Burkina Faso 2018-2020. To access the Burkina Faso country programme,  please follow the link. 

Other Document

National Security Strategy Development - Burkina Faso Case Study

This paper presents and discuss the national security strategy in Burkina Faso. To access the full paper of National Security Strategy Development, kindly follow the link. 

Other Document

Les principaux secteurs d'intervention de l'Union européenne au Burkina Faso

Le programme indicatif national 2014-2020 détaille les secteurs prioritaires de la coopération de l'UE avec le Burkina Faso dans le cadre du 11e Fonds européen de développement. La coopération de l’UE avec le Burkina Faso est mise en oeuvre principalement dans le cadre d’un Programme Indicatif National (PIN) pluriannuel (2014-2020), financé par le Fonds Européen de Développement (FED). L’enveloppe du PIN est complétée par d’autres outils financiers à travers le Fonds Fiduciaire d’Urgence pour l’Afrique (FFU), les lignes thématiques, le Programme Indicatif Régional (PIR) et de l’aide d’urgence à travers le Bureau de l’Aide humanitaire de la Commission européenne (ECHO). Ces actions sont mises en oeuvre conjointement avec les autorités du pays, à travers un dialogue politique et technique constant.

Pour accéder à l'intégralité du document, veuillez suivre le lien.


Other Document

Burkina Faso: Stopping the Spiral of Violence

What’s new? In Burkina Faso, violence is intensifying as a result of a multifaceted rural crisis. Armed groups are proliferating, including bandits, jihadists and self-defence movements. In 2019, Burkina Faso suffered more jihadist attacks than any other Sahelian country.

Why does it matter? The country is locked in a perilous downward spiral. Jihadists are gaining ground by exploiting rural communities’ frustrations. In turn, the government’s largely military response often entails abuses by security forces and self-defence groups that fuel local, community-based violence that provides a fertile recruiting ground for diverse armed groups.

What should be done? The government should limit both its use of force and the role of self-defence groups in its counter-insurgency efforts, and develop a more integrated approach to security. In the longer term, resolving land disputes that often drive local conflicts is a priority in tackling the crisis in the Burkina countryside.

Read the full document here.

Other Document

Burkina Faso: BTI 2018 Country Report

This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. It covers the period from February 1, 2015 to January 31, 2017. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries.

To read the full 2018 report on Burkina Faso, please follow the link. 

Publisher: BertelsmannStiftung 2018

Other Document