Lack of security in the Americas is a long-standing phenomenon, linked in particular to conquest, rapid settlement, control and exploitation of natural resources, the immensity of the new territories, poor economic prospects for large swathes of the population and the insufficiency of state action (notably in terms of good governance, rule of law and social fabric), all of which are combined with a high level of inequality.
Moreover, during the last few years many Latin America and Caribbean countries (the "LAC region") have been confronted with increasingly high levels of violence (which finds sometimes its roots in political armed conflicts such as in Colombia, Peru and Central America), notably when linked to international organised crime which has become an ever increasing threat in the region.
The proliferation of both conventional and organised crime is also a heavy burden on citizens, impeding their daily existence, the delivery of public services, their livelihoods, their growth and development processes. Efforts by households and firms to protect themselves against recurrent violence impose heavy economic burdens. In Central America, the security situation is particularly critical, and the number of private security companies has increased significantly in recent years. This results in a perverse situation in which there are more private security officers (an average of 245,000 people in Central America and 300,000 in Mexico) than police personnel. This situation is made worse by the large number of firearms circulating in the affected countries, with security agents being more part of the problem than its solution. Furthermore, crime and violence have a directly negative impact on the investment climate, which carries its own specific long term costs. 35% of firms in Latin America and the Caribbean identify crime as the major problem for their business activities, according to the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that Latin American GDP per capita would be 25 percent higher if the region’s crime rates were equal to the world average. In a number of countries (such as Venezuela with an estimated 20,000 homicides in 2011) loss of life, particularly of people in the best productive age, is important, further affecting economic performance.
Another element is represented by the existence of armed gangs linked to violent crime and petty drug trafficking, as in Northern Central America or the Caribbean, where deportation of violent criminals from the US has contributed to the problem, in particular through the proliferation of the so called “Maras” (violent youth gangs) as well as to the availability of small arms and light weapons in Central America or Venezuela. In the case of organised crime, the illegal activities proliferate along the routes used to ship cocaine between producer countries and consumers (particularly in the US, Canada and the EU), but also increasingly in Latin America (Argentina,Chile and Brazil are becoming important consumers, the last one in particular) and the Caribbean. Most Bolivian cocaine is shipped to Brazil, both for Brazilian consumption and for shipping to Europe.
Unsurprisingly, security is nowadays viewed both by the governments and the citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean as one of the main challenges in the region. The states in the LAC region and in particular along the trafficking routes have launched strategies and plans to counter the cross-border security threats. Recognising that organised crime is a phenomenon which cannot be contained within the borders of specific countries, they have sought to confront it at a regional level with the help of their international allies. However, the cross-border and regional cooperation mechanisms in the field of law enforcement and judicial cooperation are generally still very weak in the region, notably due to the lack of regional integration, of funding, of relevant national capacities and of mutual trust.
Today, drug and notably cocaine trafficking (which originates in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia where all coca and cocaine for the world market is produced), but also human and arms trafficking as well as money laundering represent very lucrative activities for criminal organisations. At the same time, a regional weak social fabric, with high levels of inequality and widespread acceptance of violence in society (including gender-based violence), contributes to high levels of conventional crime, which is negatively affecting both the investment climate (and economic growth) in the region, as well the human rights and well-being of citizens, especially the poor and most vulnerable populations.
As a consequence, democratic governance, the rule of law and stability are severely menaced by all the phenomena related to crime in the LAC region, where it has pushed some already unstable states to the brink of failure. The State institutions are often not sufficiently prepared to cope with the various security challenges and seem sometimes to be rather part of the problem than of the solution, notably when infiltrated by criminal organisations, or in cases where they may be perceived as having only limited democratic legitimacy because they represent rather the interests of the elites than of the whole population. Weak governance characterises the national justice and security systems of many Latin America and Caribbean countries at various levels, including: understaffed and underpaid security and judicial personnel leading to inefficiency and widespread corruption; badly trained and equipped (and sometimes over-militarised) security personnel; lack of planning capacity on strategy and budget; blurred separation of competencies between the military as well as law enforcement and judicial authorities; inadequate legal frameworks; lack of respect of rule of law and human rights; lack of access to justice, in particular for the poor people; etc. These weaknesses contribute to explain also the high levels of impunity in many LAC countries, which further exacerbates the insecurity and lack of justice. Furthermore, violence is a hindrance to the exercise of fundamental freedoms: freedom of press, expression and association, the freedom to move and the free election of public office.
Given the security challenges faced by the LAC countries and their request for continuous support in this area, EU external aid in this region is expected to go on and may even further increase.
The present assignment is to support DEVCO G and other relevant EU services in the preparation of the future EU support to the security and justice sector in the LAC region under the next financial framework 2014-2020.
The purpose of the support is to:
1. carry out an independent study on the main characteristics (general features, strengths and weaknesses,…) and needs of the security and justice sectors in the LAC region, as well as of the support provided so far in this area by the EU during the 2007-2013 programming phase and other relevant donors over the same period;
2. provide a set of concrete recommendations on objectives and types of activities which could be envisaged by the EU in terms of future support in this area in the LAC region under the financial framework 2014-2020, which would address in particular the regional/sub-regional level under the DCI and also cover an analysis on possible implementation options.
Mandating organisation / agency / department / ministry
Target organisation type(s)
Mandate outputs / products
- an assessment of the main characteristics, problems and needs of the security and justice sectors in the LAC countries, in particular with regard to their response capacity to both organised and conventional crime; analyse and provide an overview on the important commonalities, but also on the main differences between the security and justice systems as well as the security (reform) policies/strategies of the various LAC countries and sub-regions.
- an analysis (taking a more holistic approach) on how to strengthen institutional capacities to investigate and prosecute criminal activities, and - from the perspective of human/citizen security - how to improve security and access to justice for all citizens with a particular emphasis on crime prevention aspects and approaches, as well as on the strengthening of human rights (including children rights), the rule of law and gender equality.
- a general assessment and systematised presentation/description of the EU support provided during the 2007-2013 programming phase in this area at bilateral, sub-regional, regional and trans-regional level, with a view to identifying important commonalities or differences, possible successes and failures, lessons learned, possible gaps and weaknesses, etc. with regard to the EU support.
- a broad presentation and analysis of the policies, strategies and concrete support activities provided between 2007-2013 in JSSR by other important actors and donors.
- a detailed set of conclusions and concrete recommendations on how the EU could provide support to the security and justice sector in the LAC countries, in particular with regard to objectives, concrete areas of intervention, types of activities and implementation options (modalities and potential implementation partners). These would cover both the sub-regional (notably at the level of Central America and/or the Caribbean) and/or regional level (the whole LAC region), with a thorough analysis of the expected respective advantages and disadvantages regarding each level (not limited to already existing types of activities/implementation modalities).
- information regarding potential implementation partners, concerning the mandate, legal status and implementation capacities of these partners.
Outcome objectives of mandate
Improved future EU support to the security and justice sector in the LAC region under the next financial framework 2014-2020
Specific Lessons Identified
- The mandate was very demanding in terms of visits to LAC missions. It required coordination from Brussels, regional HQ as well as country offices. There was often confusion (in the EU) about who was responsible for managing logistics and setting agendas – though these were routinely fixed. There were also challenges in coordinating timing of visits owing to multiple obligations of EU counterparts.
- Assigning responsibility to a central agent in Brussels (EU) as well as a key interlocutor in country was critical. This can strengthen accountability and the pace of organization. That said, it can also result in logjams if said individual is away. Likewise, there are often internal turf battles within large organizations (like the EU) which are out of the contractors control and can stall progress.
- Ensure explicit assignation of responsibilities in the ToR with future clients. Anticipate the possibility of delays (but be sure to very clearly prescribe delegation of authority.
- The mandate was complex owing to the sheer scale/volume of countries to be visited and the insistence of the EU on “regional” priorities over “national” priorities. It was exceedingly difficult in many cases to identify regional priorities in EU country offices since most of them are understandably preoccupied with “national” concerns. Moreover, EU investments in regional programs are often among the weakest and least impressive in terms of performance. The EU’s relatively limited investment in security and justice also meant that the level of awareness/understanding was comparatively low.
- The missions often involved reviewing both regional and national programs. There was a risk of inflating expectations of EU counterparts, but this could not be avoided. Likewise, the mission reports were shared with EU counterparts for their review and comment – seen as essential in building up good will between Brussels and country offices. As such the mission was concerned with both the tangible output (a report) as well as process outcomes (improved relations and sensitization of JSSR priorities in the LAC country offices).
- Greater negotiation with counterparts to ensure that there is an adequate balance of HQ and country office concerns in the ToR. The risk is that external consultants can have their methodology undermined if the mission agenda is not at all aligned with country office priorities and preoccupations. Also, a short “fact sheet” on JSSR could be usefully circulated to country offices in advance so they are prepared for visiting consultants. This would obviate the need for extensive explanations of what was/was not JSSR.
- The team made liberal use of ISSAT reports in setting out “principles” of JSSR for the report. But owing to the fact that LAC is not well represented in DCAF/ISSAT work streams, there was more limited use of “content” based material.
- The team drew on a wide range of JSSR materials in shaping the report, some of them ISSAT/DCAF related. Where gaps were identified, they were supplemented. There are alternate definitions of JSSR in Latin America and the Caribbean, including citizen security, and so the team identified a wide range of literature for its own purposes.
- None needed at this stage.
- A key (if not always explicit) objective of the mandate was to enhance EU engagement at HQ and country level in JSSR priorities more generally. This is not a comparatively well understood area, and investments are scattered and poorly monitored. Yet the needs in LAC are exceedingly acute. As such, a considerable amount of energy was put into supporting HQ and country teams in understanding JSSR, assessing their portfolio, identifying needs and the like.
- The missions involved the production of country reports (8-15 pages) that summarized key findings and recommendations. These were shared with EU teams (HQ and at country level) for their inputs. Likewise, the mission team produced 30+ country reports (together with InSight Crime) which also provided a good baseline for all countries (the 12 visited, but also the others which were not). These will be shared later via various organizational websites. There was considerable contact with EU teams.
- Make it explicit in the contract that there are at least two expected outputs – the report (and annexes/mission reports) and greater ownership in the JSSR agenda on behalf of the client. Likewise, more clear and explicit instructions should be made about the public nature of the mission reports. In 50% of the cases, governments and civil society groups consulted also wanted to see the final report. They were NOT provided them unless authorized by the EU. But this can alienate government counterparts and should be discussed at the outset (not mid-way through as was the case in this assessment).
- There was excellent collaboration within the ISSAT team (and its various partners) as well as with the EU, UN, IADB, regional organizations, government counterparts and civil society. Indeed, many countries took the mandate VERY seriously setting-up extensive agendas with literally hundreds of meetings and site visits. The mandate successfully circulated the ISSAT brand.
- When the EU HQ relationship with countries was strong and positive, the reception in country was (predictably) positive. Where EU country offices were less engaged in JSSR activities, or had tense relations with Brussels, the experience was less positive. This is, in some ways, unavoidable.
- The ISSAT team devoted considerable time (4 months!) to defining countries to visit in consultation with the EU. This was a long and pain-staking process and was entirely dependent on the client’s priorities and interests. The only suggestion is that the ToR reflect these challenges (obliquely, since they are political in nature) and expectations be managed accordingly.
- The teams were gender balanced.